

The Enemy at His Back

by

ELIZABETH CHURCHILL BROWN

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By Elizabeth Churchill Brown
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To
my mother, Kathryn Churchill
who has always been an inspiration to me.

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The Enemy at His Back

With the best wishes of the author
Liz Brown

Washington, D.C.
April 1965

CONTENTS

Chapter I	Early battles of the Pacific—First peace feelers	I
Chapter II	How Communist propaganda affects our foreign policy	13
Chapter III	Yalta and the advisers	43
Chapter IV	Okinawa—Suzuki—Eugene Dooman testifies	83
Chapter V	The “resignation” of Mr. Grew	122
Chapter VI	Potsdam and the advisers	137
Chapter VII	The atomic bomb and surrender	162
Chapter VIII	The MacArthur hearings	199
Appendix		223

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

"Liz" Brown landed her first job in the newspaper business as a society editor on the "New York Evening Journal," under the watchful eye of the original Cholly Knickerbocker, Maury Paul.

In 1942, she invaded Washington as a representative for "Town and Country," and later wrote a society column for the "Washington Post" before joining a news bureau representing several Texas newspapers.

She married Washington Evening Star syndicated columnist Constantine Brown in 1949 and settled down to be a housewife—but not for long. She was too troubled by the things she heard, and read, and saw.

"Connie" complains that since she "discovered" the voluminous congressional hearings, and all the wartime memoirs, she's been sitting up all night, every night, with her nose in some book about communism.

And from the amount of research evident in this book—it must be true.

She has proved herself a perceptive reader and writer.

THE PUBLISHERS

FOREWORD

ON the National Archives Building in the Nation's Capital, is etched the inscription, "What is past is prologue."

In the Atomic Age in which we now live, it is important that Americans understand the past so that we may better plan for the future.

At the time of Yalta, eleven years ago, there were two hundred million people behind the Communist Iron Curtain. Now there are approximately nine hundred million who have lost their freedom to the most godless tyranny the world has ever known.

Elizabeth Brown has done a great deal of research and with insight has developed additional facts in helping to explain the strange course of our foreign policy during the past eleven years.

Not until all of the documents are published on Teheran and Potsdam, will we have sufficient information on which to base final judgments on that crucial period.

In the meantime, however, **THE ENEMY AT HIS BACK** will be of value to all individuals anxious for a free world of free men. We must recognize that in dealing with the Kremlin, the road to appeasement is not the road to peace. It is only surrender on the installment plan.

WILLIAM F. KNOWLAND
United States Senator

THIS IS WHAT YOU CALL

Acknowledgments

I MUST say "thanks a million" to a number of people. First, Edna Fluegel who not only challenged every word I wrote and checked and triple checked, but also taught me a few professional tricks. I have come to think of her as "good old Edna" even though she isn't old at all but a pretty professor of political science at Trinity College in Washington. Formally speaking, she is "Dr. Edna Fluegel," but I share the sentiments of Admiral Turner Joy who once said to her, "female Doctors overawe me." So does her vast knowledge of political history.

Edna is dedicated to the cause of truth and no amount of time or trouble can deter her from digging it out. Her faithfulness in working with me in the last hectic days of getting out this book, while at the same time we were selling our apartment, buying a house and moving, is a story in itself.

Then, of course, I have to say "thanks a million" to my sweet husband who put up with all this. For months he had to step over books on the floor, eat on a dining room table full of papers and documents, and miss a lot of nice Sunday afternoon bridge games so we could get through with the reference books before they were packed for storage. And it wasn't until this stage of the game that I discovered that both my husband and Edna thought I'd get tired of writing and never finish the book. It was two years before I could persuade either of them to read it! Then came the red-letter-day. It was while my husband was running a pencil through one of my "didactic" statements and exclaiming that virgin was spelled with an "i" and not with an "e," that he suddenly said, "This is getting to be a good

book!" That was at 2:30 in the afternoon. He repeated the statement at 4:32, and it was then that I felt that maybe my two and a half years of work had borne some fruit.

I mustn't forget to say "thanks a million" to Maude Wood. Maude is our maid whose lineage is of the most distinguished African ancestry. I'm sure they were distinguished because my Maude is an aristocrat and a bit of Victorian as well. She fussed and fumed at what Edna and I did to her dining room and parlor. (We made the "snore room" out-of-bounds so my husband could have some place to escape.) But Maude took pity on us hard working girls and provided delectable trays of goodies in our hours of drudgery. If company was expected, Maude was outraged at my unhousewifely demeanor and cleaned up in a most ingenious way. Afterwards, Edna and I would have to play Easter-egg-hunt to find our books again. Once, after 24 hours of hunting for Owen Lattimore, Edna exclaimed, "why, he's behind the electric fan!"

These were the three who put up with me and my book day in and day out.

I now come to the large group of people who helped in other ways. There were a number of distinguished men and women who read my manuscript and were kind enough to make very helpful suggestions, and to provide important items of information. Some have asked that I not use their names, and so I will sorrowfully omit them all. But to these people I am more and ever grateful.

And whatever would I have done without the aid I received from the staffs of the senators who supplied me with all kinds of help. Without their know-how of research, I'd still be looking! To their kindnesses I respectfully bow my head in thanks.

I must not forget the many workers in the Library of Congress who dug out a lot of documentation. They deserve a great deal of thanks because I didn't always know exactly what I was looking for which made extra work for them. It is their work and dedication to re-

search that makes the Library of Congress the most wonderful library in the world.

And last, but most important, are the publishers and authors of the books from which I have gleaned so much information. The political memoir writers are by far the greatest contributors to history. Let us have more and more of them.

For permission to quote, a "million" thanks to the publishers and authors listed in the bibliography.

INTRODUCTION

THIS book is the result of a woman's curiosity. It is not the work of a student of history nor even the work of a student. Neither is it written for students but rather for ordinary people like myself who would like to know "who killed Cock Robin?"

All of those closely acquainted with my story who have so generously given their time to read my manuscript have said: "But you left this out" or "you left that out." I have had to resist almost all of them, and to discipline myself as well. The temptation to prove my story over and over again, as well as to include startling facts on related matters, was hard to overcome. Anyone who wishes to make a thorough study may pick up the threads, and go on from there, but this is a story which ought to be told without too many detailed detours.

I came to live in Washington in 1942. I had come from New York City where indignant Republicans were voicing wild and irresponsible charges against the New Deal. I considered their accusations so wild that I deserted the Republican ranks and campaigned for the Democrats. Had not President Roosevelt spoken about the "lunatic fringe"? But the day was to come when I would realize that many of these "wild charges" made by the "lunatic fringe" were indeed understatements.

All during the War I tried to figure out what was going on in our government. I read the Washington Times-Herald published by that late, lamented female dynamite, Cissy Patterson. She wrote her editorials with a battle axe for a pen, and, like Simon Legree, whipped her reporters into a white heat of righteous indignation. What I read in the Times-Herald I thought was exaggerated. Nothing could be as bad as that!

And then I read the Washington Post with its calm and persuasive editorials. The paper assumed a "conservative" tone, and its reporting seemed, on the surface at least, factual. Still I felt there was something wrong there too.

I was equally confused by the various radio commentators. For instance, should I believe Fulton Lewis, Jr. who sounded mad all the time, or should I follow the honeyed words of Raymond Gram Swing?

But one thing I never could reconcile. Why did the United States have to be SO friendly to Soviet Russia? "Why do we have to kiss them on the mouth?", I used to ask. It seemed to me that, since circumstances had forced us to accept such an ally, we naturally would treat that murderous nation with cold reality.

I recall that it was the "sound" editorials of the Washington Post which convinced me that the Chinese Communists were not like Russian Communists. They were an entirely different breed of cat, I thought, of a mild stripe and entirely harmless. In that case, why bother to help the "corrupt" Chiang? I so expressed myself whenever the issue came up in social gatherings.

In those days I was not aware that many facts were available to anyone who would take the trouble to discover them. I did not know how valuable the Congressional Record was (how dull it looked!), nor that the printed hearings of the Dies Committee could easily be obtained. It never occurred to me to go to the public hearings and listen for myself.

But always there was that uneasy feeling that something was wrong. And as the years went by my curiosity became stronger and eventually prodded me into doing a little digging. The more I learned the more frightened I became. How many other people in America were still as confused as I had been? In 1956 there are too few who have been awakened to the formidable danger confronting our nation.

In 1949 I married Constantine Brown who writes a syndicated column about national and foreign affairs—subjects most women in the past, especially be-

fore so many had lost their men in the fury of modern wars, had found of little concern.

One day he told me an interesting story about the mysterious "They." The first time he heard about "They" was in 1939 on the eve of World War II, when a Frenchman recently arrived in this country paid him a visit. The Frenchman explained that he had decided to become an American citizen, and had brought with him his family and his fortune. They had bid adieu to France for all time. The reason, he said, was that he had discovered that a great war was to be launched in Europe, and that "They" would maneuver France into losing it. His conversation was so well seasoned with references to "They" that my husband asked him who "They" were. The Frenchman replied that he did not know—he only felt sure of their existence. Constantine Brown was convinced the "bonhomme" was slightly off his rocker and dropped the incident into his mental wastebasket. But only a few years later, the inexorable logic of events bearing out the Frenchman's prediction caused him to recall the strange interview with ever increasing wonder.

As great national emergencies succeeded each other with bewildering regularity, the Frenchman's mysterious "They" seemed to appear more and more frequently in the vocabulary of the bewildered public. In 1954, Senator William E. Jenner, Indiana Republican and chairman of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, held a series of hearings concerning the Korean War. The real enemy, the Senator felt, was not the Red soldiers confronting our boys, but men hidden many thousands of miles behind the combat lines—in Washington, Moscow, London, Paris, and New Delhi.

"... victory in Korea was denied" us "by an unidentified 'they,'" Senator Jenner said. In his remarks to General James A. Van Fleet, appearing as a witness, he continued, "... some of our questions today will cover these border-line areas of policy in the hope that your answers may serve to pinpoint areas of decision

Interlocking
Subversion
in Govt.
Depts.

Part 24
2019-20

where the mystery of 'why' may lead to further identification of the mysterious 'they' . . ."

General Mark Clark, also a witness before the Sub-committee, wrote a book called "From the Danube to the Yalu" in which he expressed a fearful suspicion, setting a precedent for American generals:

Pt. 21
1654

"The nagging fear was that perhaps Communists had wormed their way so deeply into our Government on both the working and planning levels that they were able to exercise an inordinate degree of power in shaping the course of America in the dangerous post-war era.

"I could not help wondering and worrying whether we were faced with open enemies across the conference table and hidden enemies who sat with us in our most secret councils."

The initial inspiration to write this book, however, came from a different quarter and at an earlier date. I had decided to look up some of my husband's columns of the past ten years, and went to the Library of Congress to search through his writings of 1945. Within an hour I found two startling examples of reporting. On January 30, 1945, a week before the Yalta Conference, he revealed part of the most carefully guarded secret of the entire war. He published in his column the most important points of the Yalta agreement concerning China and Japan which were known at the time to only a few and kept apart from the full agreement. This contract, signed at Yalta by Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill, was deposited in Admiral Leahy's private safe in the White House and was not made public until a year later, February 11, 1946. It was published a year to the day upon which it was signed.

Wash. Even-
ing Star A
8

Here is what my husband wrote:

". . . the Soviet leader will require a certain price for intervention against the Japanese. Russia is likely to require the restoration of her power in the East to the position it held before the Russo-Japanese War of 1904 and possibly a little more . . . it is believed that Premier Stalin will require that Manchuria . . . be taken from Japanese tutelage

and made into an independent republic with a government friendly to the U.S.S.R.

"The same request is expected to be made in regard to Korea, with Port Arthur . . . restored to Russian control."

Although Korea was not a part of the Yalta agreement, its northern half did become a "government friendly to the U.S.S.R." But the manner in which this came about provides proof of the existence of "They"—men without faces or names.

Shortly after VJ-day a round-robin telephone conversation took place between the War Department and the White House. One of the participants in this unusual "conference" told me that those in the Pentagon did not know to whom they were talking in the White House—and, that it was the White House parties who ordered the partition of Korea at the now infamous 38th parallel.

After a study of the map of China it is easy to realize that, without Russian control of the areas demanded and obtained in the Yalta agreement, China would not have been lost to the Reds. And without Red control of China and the partition of Korea, the Korean War would never have happened.

The second column I came across appeared Feb. 11, 1945, and disclosed that the Japanese had been offering unconditional surrender since "about 3 months ago." That is, since November 1944. It also contained what was to be the history of the Pacific as it happened from that day onward. This is what he wrote:

Wash. Eve.
Star C 1

"The Tokyo government may be forced into surrender sooner than most optimistic observers believed possible . . . This unexpected turn is not due so much to the exhaustion of Japan's ability to continue to fight as to the desire of a large and heretofore unheard group of Japanese who want to save something out of the wreck. This group believes the . . . overthrow of the clique which has developed the idea of Greater East Asia under the domination of Japan, might be accepted as unconditional surrender in the United States.

"... the Japanese believe the American people would not be opposed to the maintenance of the dynasty. The Emperor of Japan would form a government, choosing as his advisers those remaining liberals who have not been purged but have gone underground since the outbreak of the war. Such a government would agree to a withdrawal from the ill gained possessions in China and the South Pacific, agree to whatever military terms might be exacted by the United States and throw Japan at the mercy of this country.

"Little has been revealed about the devious approaches of some of the Japanese 'liberals' who have suggested that America's own future defense in the Far East will have to depend on a friendly Japan in the same way Russia's security and power in Europe depends on 'friendly' border governments in Poland, the Balkans and, in all likelihood, Germany. In plain English, some of the Japanese 'liberals' who did their utmost to avoid war with America suggest that Japan become a 'puppet' of the United States. And they argue that in self-defense America should accept this suggestion, particularly if it is clothed in humility.

"The form of this humility would be the acceptance of all the unconditional surrender demands with the tacit understanding that they will be no harsher than those imposed on Italy . . . The possibility that Russia soon may enter the Far Eastern arena with a strong force from Siberia has hastened the efforts of the 'negotiators' . . . The reported approaches started about three months ago when the Japanese gained the definite impression that as soon as the Germans were defeated the Russians would turn their forces to the Far East . . . The Japanese became fearful of Russia's intervention when their agents in Siberia began to report a significant concentration of Russian troops, planes and war materials at strategic points north of Manchukuo. They were equally suspicious of Russia's intentions when a little publicized Free Korean government was organized in Siberia.

"In a nutshell, the individuals who say they are speaking with the consent of Emperor Hirohito assert that Russia's intervention in the Far Eastern war will result in the establishment of a Free Korea and Manchuria and the setting up of a 'friendly' government dominated by the Communists in Northwestern China. They point out that

the Free Korean and Manchurian governments will be equally dominated by individuals who have been coached recently in Moscow and will direct their activities toward a full political co-operation with the U.S.S.R. They admit that under such circumstances Japan will perish . . . This will be still easier, if Russia, after the collapse of Japan, is successful in forming 'friendly' governments in Korea, Manchuria and northwestern Chinese provinces.

"Does America want to see totalitarian governments in Asia as well as Europe? . . . They admit that Japan can be crushed forever. But, they ask, how will the American people who must think in long range political terms benefit by the total destruction of the Japanese Empire . . . The Chinese will certainly accept the outstretched hand of the United States. But will America have a free hand to help China in the manner she desires if Chiang Kai-shek is compelled to knuckle down to his Communist opponents and they have a free reign throughout that vast country? . . .

"But these intermediaries, whose names and nationality are only known to a very few, are willing to interpret our own position in the world today and draw the conclusion that it would be to the advantage of the United States to accept a 'negotiated unconditional surrender' from Japan, possibly before Russia became a co-belligerent . . . We are being told that Japan is quite prepared to hand over all these war criminals regardless of rank or position. . . . Japan, we are also told, is willing to accept the strictest American control over her armaments and industries. She proceeds on the theory that world politics is elastic and that the time may come in the distant future when the United States might be glad to have a potentially strong Japan in the Far East.

"Russia they say unquestionably will be the dominating power in Europe. In the Middle East the British prestige and power are on the wane. The Moslem world, from Afghanistan to Arabia and Egypt and possibly even as far as Morocco on the shores of the Atlantic Ocean, now believe that the long pan-Islamic dream may come true, thanks to the support they expect to obtain from Russia.

"In the Far East, the influence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek hangs on a thin thread. The representatives of some 60,000,000 Chinese Communists schooled in Moscow are now attempting to impose themselves on the Chungking

government, and the American officials themselves are urging Chiang to reach a compromise. The Generalissimo knows as well as any one else that a compromise with the Communists, even if they have no direct ties with Russia, will mean his eventual disappearance from China's political life. Any compromise with the Moscow-trained Communists must end in their dominating the political scene. Hence the United States which is now gently pressing the Generalissimo to cooperate with the Chinese Communists, must know that sooner or later it is this group which will take over the government of China."

I found a war calendar and looked at the war's events in the Pacific from November 1944 on, the time when the Japanese desired to surrender. It reads like this:

Nov. 24, 1944	First B-29 raids on Tokyo
Jan. 9, 1945	Americans land on Luzon
Feb. 19, 1945	Marines land on Iwo Jima
April 1, 1945	Americans land on Okinawa
June 21, 1945	Okinawa taken
Aug. 6, 1945	Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima
Aug. 8, 1945	Russia declares war on Japan
Aug. 9, 1945	Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki
Aug. 10, 1945	Japan sues for peace

From our library shelves I began to search through the books whose pages I had never turned before. The more I read the more curious I became. In all of them I found a sentence here and a paragraph there, which, placed in sequence, told a remarkable story. In the many memoirs written about World War II there were recounted a surprising number of tragic blunders caused by what the authors usually explained as "errors in judgment" or "bad intelligence." Perhaps because I am not a military or political strategist I ask questions no such specialist would ask. I wanted to know why there were so many "errors in judgment," and who made them. And the inevitable next question was, "Who had benefited from our blunders? The incontrovertible and shocking answer was *Soviet Russia*.

I determined to discover what influences in high places had perhaps "inspired" the decisions made by our leaders, and also to check our policies with those of the Communists as set forth in their publications. The similarity of these policies and the Communist aims was startling.

I had already become acquainted, to a degree, with the Communist conspiracy in America by closely following the hearings of the Congressional investigations and avidly reading the published transcripts—far more frightening than the "who-dunnits" that had "lulled" me to sleep in the past. So it was that I learned how Soviet Russia had placed her agents in high places in our government—agents who not only stole top secrets, but, most important of all, influenced the policy makers of this nation. Agents in key government posts, I learned, also worked hand in hand with agents whose job it was to influence and condition the public mind in order that public opinion would accept the policies as they were made.

With this knowledge at hand, I quickly began to see why the war with Japan was unprecedented in all history. Here was an enemy who had been trying to surrender for almost a year before the conflict ended. And in June of 1945, when the experts on Japan in the State Department proposed a way in which the war could be brought to an end, it was considered by General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, as "premature!"

In the course of my research and talks with men who were no longer "under wraps," I found that all final and absolute decisions of the war were taken by the President and "the Army." Who "the Army" was, I discovered by a process of elimination and a close study of the war. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consisted of Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations; General H. H. Arnold, Chief of the Army Air Force; General George C. Marshall, Army Chief of Staff; and Admiral William D. Leahy, President Roosevelt's and later President Truman's Chief of Staff who presided

Arnold 501

over the meetings. Although the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs were always unanimous, more often than not the two admirals disagreed with General Marshall in private. And General Arnold, according to his memoirs, also quite often did not go along with General Marshall's views. Secretary of War Henry Stimson was so seldom consulted that he, too, must be eliminated. Finally I discovered a passage in General Arnold's book, "Global Mission" which summed up the picture. He wrote—"Usually, he (Marshall) was spokesman at our conferences." Arnold referred to Admiral Leahy as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, but to Marshall as the spokesman. I therefore came to the inescapable conclusion that, when I read that "the Army" or "the Joint Chiefs" had decided upon such-and-such strategy, the decision was invariably that of General Marshall.

The next question was, "Who were the advisers of President Roosevelt, President Truman and General Marshall?" We shall come to that answer as we go along in our story.

Chapter I

EARLY BATTLES OF THE PACIFIC; FIRST PEACE FEELERS

U.S. Navy wins initiative from Japan 6 months after Pearl Harbor.

U.S. Air Force wins superiority over Japanese in 1943.

Loss of Saipan is loss of war for Japanese.

"Peace Party" comes to life and maneuvers the fall of Tojo cabinet.

Peace feelers are sent to China.

Battle of Leyte Gulf, October 1944, dooms Japan.

Chiang shows peace offers to General Wedemeyer.

THE Pacific war, from Pearl Harbor to VJ-day, was dramatic in its swiftness of action. The recovery of our forces from the disaster of Pearl Harbor, and the speed with which the defensive was transferred into the offensive, has no precedent.

But even more remarkable was the fact that this quick succession of victories was won with an acute shortage of men and supplies. The Pacific war was Washington's step-child. No sooner had it begun than high officials established the policy that the defeat of Hitler, who had not attacked the United States, had first priority. The commanders in the Pacific would have to get along on what was left over from men and materials to be sent to Russia and England. Four-star general, George C. Kenney, commander of the Allied air forces in the Southwest Pacific, labeled it "the shoestring war." General MacArthur, one of the first on record to use the word "They," was quoted in a report as saying, "'they' were guilty of 'treason and sabotage' in not adequately supporting the Pacific . . ."

Forrestal 18

Admiral Leahy, employing his usual restrained language, wrote in his book, "I Was There":

Leahy 108

"The Navy generally and the Army in the Far East under Douglas MacArthur would have preferred to employ sufficient forces in the Pacific to move more aggressively against Japan, but they loyally adhered to the general strategy prescribed by President Roosevelt."

By the Admiral's precise statement, "the Army in the Far East under Douglas MacArthur," I assumed that the Army Chief of Staff in Washington, George C. Marshall, must have concurred with President Roosevelt against the advice of the naval officers. Admiral Leahy confirmed this to me.

Lea and
Henschel 148

It was also known that Harry Hopkins "sometimes had the last word in military matters," which leads us to believe that Marshall and Hopkins were the two men on whom the President relied most for military advice.

Lea and
Henschel 160

It was not until MacArthur arrived in Australia after his dramatic escape from Bataan in early March 1942, that he was informed he was "low man on the totem pole" as far as priorities were concerned. Lea and Henschel in their book, "Douglas MacArthur" quote the General as saying "It was the greatest shock and surprise of the whole damn war." MacArthur had been promised help from Washington and expected to find vast American forces assembled for the relief of the Philippines, but instead found that Australia itself was about to become "another Bataan."

Deane 89

MacArthur's shock came from the fact that he had received numerous messages on Bataan that help of all kinds was being sent to him. A fact he did not know was reported by General John R. Deane in "Strange Alliance." General Deane wrote that President Roosevelt sent a letter to all United States war agencies, dated March 7, 1942, stating that he wished all material promised to the Soviet Union to be shipped "at the earliest possible date regardless of the effect of these shipments on any other part of the war program." Strange to say, the American officials in Moscow at that early period were having a hard time forcing our

help down the Soviet comrades' throats. The Russians were insulting, evasive, and hard-to-give-to. General Deane in the same book candidly expressed his feeling about this outrageous situation. "When it was 'Kick-Americans-in-the-pants' week," he wrote, "even the (Russian) charwomen would be sour."

Deane 97

By Washington's decision to give aid to Russia first, General MacArthur was given only 20 percent of the men and supplies which were sent to Europe. This, together with the fact that our Naval commanders in the Pacific had to wage war with a seriously damaged fleet makes it almost a miracle that victories came so quickly in the early stages.

Yet on May 8, 1942, exactly five months and one day after the debacle of Pearl Harbor, the United States Navy won its first victory at the Battle of Coral Sea. This was made possible by the heroic delaying action of our soldiers on Bataan. Admiral King writes in his book, "Fleet Admiral King" that this battle "marked the first reverse and serious loss which the Japanese had had in carrying out their plan for war in the Pacific."

King 379

Six months after Pearl Harbor, June 7, 1942, the Battle of Midway was the second score for the U.S. Navy. The importance of this battle to both the United States and the Japanese was expressed by Admiral King when he wrote that it "was the first decisive defeat suffered by the Japanese Navy in 350 years" and that it "restored the balance of naval power in the Pacific."

King

Incredibly, the Japanese war plans left no margin for error. Their initial strike was to be sudden, and victory was to be won in March 1943, one year and four months from Pearl Harbor. They had arranged their schedule down to the last man, the last mile and the last minute. Since there was to be no setback or error, no provision was made for such an event. Flushed with early victories, their greed was unbounded and they gobbled up miles of the Pacific like a hungry monster—far beyond their intended goals.

USSBS-
Pacific Naval
Analysis Div.
The Cam-
paigns of
the Pacific
4

Once they met in serious battle with the American fleet, the Japanese fell apart like a house of cards. Here is a translated excerpt from a captured Japanese report written by the Commander-in-Chief of the First Air Fleet, Admiral Nagumo. It is contained in "The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway," published by the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence. You will see that the Japanese Navy was having real trouble as early as May and June 1942.

The Japanese
Story of the
Battle of
Midway.
U.S. office of
Naval Intel-
ligence
OPNAV P32-
1002, 5

"Although the flight training program (in preparation for the battle) was conducted without any major incident . . . practically no one got beyond the point of basic training. Inexperienced fliers barely got to the point where they could make daytime landings on carriers. It was found that even some of the more seasoned fliers had lost some of their skill. No opportunity was available to carry out joint training, which, of course made impossible any coordinated action between contact units, illumination units, and attack units. The likelihood of obtaining any satisfactory results from night attacks, therefore, was practically nil . . . The records during these tests (mock torpedo attacks) were so disappointing that some were moved to comment that it was almost a mystery how men with such poor ability could have obtained such brilliant results as they had in the Coral Sea."

From this time on, the Japanese took a pounding from the Americans far beyond their worst fears. In August 1942, only eight months after Pearl Harbor, American Marines and the Navy began their first big amphibious operations on Guadalcanal. Three months later, on the 14th of November, the Battle of Guadalcanal was won. But even this important victory had a difficult time in getting its start, hitting a snag in the Pentagon. The preceding February, Admiral King wrote to General Marshall informing him of his plan for taking "stepping stone" islands preliminary to the proposed landing on Guadalcanal, and asking for his approval of the use of Army troops in the operation. In reply, General Marshall wrote:

"In general, it would seem to appear that our effort in the Southwest Pacific must for several reasons be limited to the strategic defensive for air and ground troops."

Guadalcanal
4

Here we see that Marshall was strictly adhering to the policy of "defensive" warfare in the Pacific. But Admiral King, a tough "salt," immediately challenged Marshall's letter and wrote back that defense was not enough—that we should set up strong points in preparation for an offensive.

The Admiral won his first crucial skirmish in Washington. He got his troops. And by February 1943 the Americans were securely established in Guadalcanal and the Buna area. "... it gained for the United States a strategic initiative which was never relinquished."

Guadalcanal
Marines 165

Postwar accounts reveal that the prospects for a comparatively quick defeat of Japan became obvious to informed officials both in the United States and in Japan at a surprisingly early date. Admiral King in 1942 noted that President Roosevelt himself was aware of the possibility of early victory.

Mentioned in a footnote of his book is the following:

"The President's observation—'defeat of Germany means the defeat of Japan, probably without firing a shot or losing a life'—indicated in a simplified form his understanding that by the application of sea power, Japan could be forced to surrender *without an invasion* of her home islands." (Emphasis is their's.)

King 400

It is interesting that the author of the footnote emphasized the phrase "without an invasion of" her home islands. This was to be another of the issues on which "the Army" and the Naval officers were to disagree.

One of the most revealing books written from the Japanese view is that of Toshikazu Kase, a former member of the Japanese Foreign Office, at one time a member of their embassy staff in Washington, and later Ambassador awaiting admission of Japan to the

United Nations. In "Journey to the Missouri," Mr. Kase penned an astonishing paragraph. He and the British Ambassador to Tokyo were good friends and, after the war had started, the Japanese diplomat secretly visited the interned Sir Robert Craigi on several occasions. Mr. Kase wrote that in July 1942—

Kase 183

"... On my last visit to the British embassy, however, I was entrusted by Foreign Minister Togo with a highly confidential message. I was instructed to give Sir Robert a discreet hint regarding the eventual restoration of peace. After a friendly chat I introduced the subject with all the tact at my command and said, 'Should it happen that the British Government became desirous of discussing or negotiating peace they would find the Japanese Government ready to be helpful . . .'

"I desire to state the fact that even as early as the summer of 1942 we few in the Foreign Office were endeavoring to lay foundations for future negotiations with England."

The outlook for Japan indeed was extremely serious, although at that time Japan expected it would be possible to negotiate for less stringent terms than were later accepted. The year 1943 brought a star-studded row of victories for the United States:

March 1-3, 1943	Battle of Bismarck Sea
June 30, 1943	Americans land on Rendova (Solomon Islands)
Aug. 15, 1943	Allies land at Kiska and find Japanese departed
Sep. 16, 1943	Americans take Lae in New Guinea
Nov. 1, 1943	Marines land at Bougainville
Nov. 21, 1943	Americans land on Tarawa and Makin in the Gilbert Islands

Although the Japanese people were being told of "great victories," Japanese brass was thoroughly alarmed. The Japanese strategists saw by 1943 that the odds were growing hopelessly long. The United States Strategic Bombing Survey stated in its post-war Report that:

"Beginning in the early part of 1944 the Allies possessed an ever increasing numerical superiority in all types of weapons . . .

USSBS Cam-
paigns of the
Pacific War
186

. . . While the Allied air sorties were numbered in the thousands those of the Japanese were numbered in tens, and while the Allies roamed the sea areas off the coast of New Guinea with large forces of carriers, cruisers, destroyers and merchant ships the Japanese had none."

The year 1944 brought more of the same.

Jan. 31, 1944	Americans land in the Marshall Islands
April 22, 1944	Americans land at Hollandia in Dutch New Guinea
May 17, 1944	Myitkyina airstrip captured
June 15, 1944	Americans land on Saipan in the Mariana Islands

The loss of Saipan in early July was the first completely decisive blow the Japanese received. As Ambassador Kase said: "Yet no matter what the cost to us we could not afford to lose this highly strategic island. Once in the enemy's hands it would disrupt our overseas communications to the occupied regions in the south."

Kase 73

Moreover, the island was only 1,350 miles from Tokyo, making an excellent base from which American bombers could batter the Japanese home islands.

There were a number of Japanese statesmen who had made every effort to prevent war between Japan and the United States. In this they had the aid of Emperor Hirohito. For their efforts most of them were sent into retirement. But as the war news grew blacker with each passing day, these outcasts, who became known as the "peace party," began to consult secretly on ways and means of ousting Tojo. This was the first necessary step toward bringing the war to an end. They had sympathetic confederates in the Navy and in the Emperor himself. The Army, with Tojo at its head, was considered "the war party," and as disaster fol-

State Dept.
"War and
Peace" 1931-
1941

lowed disaster, the relationship between the two services became increasingly hostile.

Kase 73

While the battle of Saipan was still in progress, even some of the Japanese cabinet realized that their nation had lost and were eager to join the "peace party." Mr. Kase writes that on June 26th, 1944, Baron Kido, a close adviser to the Emperor and Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal, "sent for Foreign Minister Shigemitsu and asked him if he would work out some plan looking toward an eventual diplomatic settlement of the war."

Kase 77

These two statesmen, Shigemitsu and Kido, pledged themselves at this meeting to work toward the restoration of peace. On June 29, 1944, another secret and important meeting took place. Present were Mr. Kase, Prince Takamatsu, the younger brother of the Emperor, and Shigemitsu. Mr. Kase reports that the Prince stated emphatically that when Saipan fell, as he was sure it would, "the war was as good as lost." "Consequently," he told Shigemitsu that he "felt it highly advisable to seek the termination of hostilities without delay, provided in the process the imperial house was left intact."

Here we find the first mention of what was to become the main issue of the war with Japan. The Prince made only one stipulation for surrender, and that was the retention of "the imperial house." Without assurance from the United States that the Emperor would be allowed to remain on the throne, the Japanese would fight to the end. This assurance we never gave.

Mr. Kase goes on with the story:

Kase 78

"Politically the fall of Saipan opened an avenue for peace, however dim and distant, for it facilitated the ousting of Tojo from the premiership; as the author of the war he would never have consented to abandon the struggle."

The Tojo cabinet fell on July 8th and Koiso became premier in his stead, a direct result of the loss of Saipan. Shortly thereafter President Roosevelt, accompanied by his dog Fala, took his historic trip to the

Pacific (in July 1944) where he met with General MacArthur and Admiral Nimitz. Nimitz and MacArthur briefed the President on the untenable situation the Japanese found themselves in, and convinced him that Japan could be forced to surrender without an invasion of her home islands. Lea and Henschel wrote that MacArthur "pointed out proudly that in two years of fighting in his area, fewer Americans had been killed than in the single battle of Anzio. He insisted the Philippines were the key to the stolen conquered Japanese empire . . . Once defeated (there) they would soon be forced to surrender without the necessity of an invasion by land forces; air and naval power alone would bring her to her knees." Admiral Leahy, always at the President's side at such briefings, told this writer that at this Pacific meeting there was never any consideration given to an invasion of the Tokyo plain during the conversations. Yet an invasion was insisted upon by General Marshall at the Quebec Conference two months later.

Lea and
Henschel
170-1

In the fall of 1944, the Emperor took a desperate step that underscored Japan's increasing certainty of disaster. He attempted to make peace with Japan's oldest enemy of the war, China.

Postwar disclosures reveal that he sent Tadamaro Miyakawa, brother of Prince Konoye, to Shanghai in the fall of 1944 to inform Ho Shih-chen, chief of the Chungking government's intelligence service in Shanghai, that the Emperor desired the speedy termination of hostilities and would dismiss the Tojo cabinet with a view to naming a new cabinet charged with obtaining a negotiated peace.

The Chungking government did not at first take the peace offers seriously. But when the Tojo cabinet suddenly fell, the Chinese officials sprang into action. They immediately convened a meeting of the Military Council which came to the unanimous decision that there must first be an understanding with Great Britain and the United States.

Prince Miyakawa made several trips between Tokyo

and Chungking and, and his last trip in March of 1945, his arguments to the Chinese were that the United States was offering Soviet Russia a part of Manchuria in return for Russian entry into the war against Japan; that in order to prevent such an occurrence, the Emperor wished to offer an unconditional surrender to China, the United States and Great Britain. It is strange that the Japanese themselves got wind of the terms of the Yalta agreement, when it was a carefully kept secret from even American officials. But what Prince Miyakawa told the Chinese in March 1945 was part of the Yalta agreement which had not been communicated by us to the Chinese Government, allegedly for fear of a leak to Japan!

The transmission of these highly secret messages came to the notice of an underground Chinese Communist in the Chungking intelligence service. This Communist immediately leaked the information to the chief of the Japanese forces in China who attempted to arrest Prince Miyakawa and his group. Fortunately they escaped and returned to Japan. This story is stashed away in the dusty files of the Pentagon. It was reported by American officers at the time.

However, no fast footwork on the part of the hidden Chinese Communists could prevent the peace offers from reaching Chiang Kai-shek who in turn relayed them to General Albert C. Wedemeyer, stationed in China at that time. General Wedemeyer related his experience when he appeared before the so-called MacArthur hearings in 1951. He told the committee that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek showed him two notes, one in "the winter of 1944-45 . . . and then about June or May, maybe a few months later, I saw a note." The General also said that "the terms of the surrender were very favorable to the Chinese Nationalist Government; and the Generalissimo stated to me that he was going to fight alongside his traditional friends, the Americans, to the end."

I inquired of General Wedemeyer about this testimony and asked him if he had sent reports to this

effect to Washington, and to whom. He replied that all of his reports were sent to the OPD (Operations Plans Division, sometimes called War Plans Division) in the Pentagon. He said if his reports concerned policy, and these did, they were given to Gen. John Edwin Hull and Gen. Thomas T. Handy who passed them on to the chief of staff, General Marshall.

The loss of Saipan in July 1944 gave the "peace party" their first strong foothold. With the fall of the Tojo cabinet, the "war party" steadily lost power. There was no possible cover-up of the fact that Japan's losses had been so severe that she was no longer able to bring raw materials to the home islands for manufacture.

Kase 98

There was more and even greater disaster to come. The Battle of Leyte Gulf which followed a few months after Saipan, was Japan's Waterloo, and should have ended the war. In this largest naval battle in history, from October 22 to 27, the Japanese lost almost their entire fleet. The amazing tally of 21 ship losses for the United States as against 68 for the Japanese is as follows:

<i>Japanese Losses</i>	<i>United States Losses</i>
3 large carriers	none
3 light carriers	1 light carrier
1 escort carrier	3 escort carriers
4 battleships	none
14 cruisers	none
32 destroyers	6 destroyers
11 submarines	7 submarines
none	3 destroyer escorts
none	1 high speed transport

Most of the surviving Japanese fleet units were damaged beyond effective operations, and those not damaged, along with the few remaining planes, were without fuel. It must be added that, while the American Navy as well as private yards were working around the clock on new naval construction, increasing the

fleet every day, the Japanese lacked the necessary raw materials to even build replacements for their losses.

Leahy 274

Five days after MacArthur landed four divisions on the island of Leyte, Admiral Halsey cabled Washington: "It can be announced with assurance that the Japanese Navy has been beaten, routed, and broken by the United States Fleets."

Kenney 177

The last desperate Japanese effort to stave off the inevitable through the use of suicide Kamikases, was dramatic, costly and futile.

Washington
Evening
Star C1

It was immediately following the Battle of Leyte Gulf that Hirohito and the Japanese peace party made contact with a group of Siamese who relayed another unconditional surrender (with the exception of retaining their Emperor) to Washington, again warning against Russian expansion into Asia. This was the message "leaked" to Constantine Brown three months later.

Japan's navy might be compared to her spinal cord. Without it she was paralyzed—she could not transport her army nor could she supply her isolated garrisons with food and ammunition and she could not fly her planes without fuel. Most of her merchant fleet was at the bottom of the Pacific, and her home islands were now suffering sharply from lack of food and clothing as well as raw materials essential to her war industry. Japan was starving to death.

But "the Army" in Washington under General Marshall would not concede her defeat. The war was to go on for almost another year. Why?

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Chapter II

HOW COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA AFFECTS OUR FOREIGN POLICY

How Communist propaganda works.

Sumner Welles is maneuvered into carrying out Dimitrov's edict.

Communist policy for China and Japan.

Unconditional Surrender is the key.

The part played by Roth, Lattimore and Bisson.

Mr. Grew gets into trouble.

Why? Who allowed this?

RUSSIA was determined that the war in the Pacific would not end until she had gathered all her chickens in the coop. A premature surrender would lose her both Japanese "loot" and the Red Chinese rooster. Before the Japanese were allowed to throw in the sponge, certain territories of China and Japan had to be delivered into Soviet hands. In order to get these territories three things had to happen: First she must obtain her "rights" from China at the conference table; second, she had to be a participant in the war; and third, her troops had to be ready to march into China as liberators before the surrender. Sufficient forces had not yet been mobilized on the Chinese border, nor had they yet received all the supplies from the United States.

Russia had a weapon more powerful than military. With Japan at the breaking point, she mobilized clever propaganda to boost the fighting morale of the Nipponese. Let us see how this was managed.

First we must learn how Russia's propaganda machine works. Making use of the news and information media in America—press, radio, magazines, lectures, and books—as conveyer belts of propaganda has been one of the most skillfully attained projects of the Communist Party. Plainly, of course, the great majority of American newspapermen, radio commentators, authors

Sherwood
643

and lecturers, are not Communists. Few are even pro-Communists. But all too often they do the Kremlin's work by following the policy that "we must be so helpful and friendly" to Russia that she will "willingly join with us in establishing a sound peace."

Daily Worker
July 19, 1955
8 C

This was the policy which was followed in our "RE-recognition" of the Soviets at the Geneva "summit" conference in July 1955. And it was on the basis of such thinking that President Eisenhower opened the Geneva Conference with the statement: "It is time that all curtains, whether of guns, or laws or regulations, should begin to come down." And to prove that the United States would follow "words" with "deeds" we concurred with the Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. (the Russian "congress") of Feb. 9, 1955 which suggested—

Moscow
News Sup-
plement Feb.
16, 1955
20

"... the establishment of direct contact between parliaments, exchange of parliamentary delegations . . ."

and some of our senators and congressmen fell over themselves in their rush for passports and visas to visit Russia.

(As a footnote, it is interesting that in this same Declaration of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., it was also advocated that "... addresses (be) delivered in Parliament by delegations from the parliaments of other countries . . ." Are we now to see the spectacle of Khrushchev, Bulganin and company addressing a joint session of Congress!)

We continued to get into "the spirit of Geneva" when our State Department relaxed the "Acheson regulations" to refuse passports to Communists and known fellow travelers; our scientists were bid to offer their latest discoveries to the world "including Russia"; and farmers and students were urged to trail after the Pied Piper members of Congress and "tour" the U.S.S.R.

The Communists select their propaganda program with care and cloak it in acceptable bromides with the

implication that "this is good for America." Then, through their agents in strategic places, they "sell" their bromides to the men who put out the information, more often than not, unwitting tools.

For example: It is pretty well understood in the light of recent history that, when well-intentioned and patriotic commentators and columnists urged that Chiang Kai-shek cooperate with the Communist Chinese, they were helping to lay the ground for the Red conquest of China. Likewise, if these same newscasters had not helped to build up an unprecedented fear of Russia, our forces in Korea would have won a quick and decisive victory rather than a "substitute."

Louis F. Budenz' book, "The Techniques of Communism," just about covers the water front for the student of Communism. The former managing editor of the Daily Worker reveals in simple language the impact Communist propaganda has made and is making today on our lives as well as on world history. Budenz says in a few lines what this chapter is about:

"... the concealed Communist . . . is following the line set down in the Red official press, in accordance with his own readings and the directives he gets from the functionary in charge of his work . . . Through this one person, placed in a strategic position on a newspaper, the Communist line can be insinuated into the thinking of thousands of non-Communists.

Budenz 137-8
Techniques
of Communism

"So, also, with the concealed Communists or their allies, who have means of working upon the petty political bias or personal weaknesses of men in high public office."

Mr. Budenz offers a word of advice for those who want to know how to combat Communism when he says:

"They can oppose the 'line' in their communities, in local organizations, through letters to the newspapers and their representatives in Congress."

Budenz 139

But of course, the "line" must first be recognized and identified. Let us see how the apparatus works.

The Communists have an entirely different meaning for certain words and phrases than the average American does. It is an instinctive trait of our people to "help the poor." There is no country in the world where the citizenry, from the multi-millionaire to the family earning a mere living, contributes so whole-heartedly for charitable purposes. Nowhere in the world, for instance, is there the equivalent of our Community Chest. But in Communist language, to "help the poor" is another way of saying "divide the wealth." To attain this they advocate lavish expenditures of the taxpayers' money on state ownership, a huge bureaucracy, and "from cradle to grave" plans. Throughout American history there has been a continual and successful effort to raise our standard of living. But in exaggerated form—the aim of the Communists—it would ruin everybody, rich and poor alike. Anyone who protests these plans however, is labeled a flint-hearted reactionary bent on the exploitation of human misery. What better way to confuse the public?

In the Communists' vocabulary "peace" is a companion to "help the poor." When the Communists speak of peace they mean "friendship," that is to say, kowtowing to the Kremlin. Friendship with Russia makes it a "must" to leave our doors wide open to the Red spies and propaganda agents entering our country whose dedicated work is to slip drug-like slogans into our cup of consciousness. They want us to be doped and helpless when the time comes to overthrow our government.

The recent slogan of "peaceful co-existence" (which produced the Geneva Conference) came to prominence in the Daily Worker, in utterances of some gullible statesmen, and in a large section of the press. Those who warn against belief in Russia's proffered friendship and peace, are also tabbed "reactionaries" and sometimes "super patriots." The accusations do not always come directly from Communists but from those who have taken the bait and swallowed the hook. Without

the bait-takers, the Communists could make no headway in the United States of America.

There is one other way of influencing public opinion not mentioned by Louis Budenz. A single Communist in one of our government agencies can work wonders with men who do not think for themselves. In the early thirties a method was set up, whereby the public was "conditioned" to accept a policy which was about to be launched. A longtime career diplomat in our State Department, John Hickerson, explains this method very clearly.

Yalta Papers
94

On Jan. 8, 1945, Mr. Hickerson wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of State with recommendations for the coming Yalta Conference. He specified that, although he did "not like it," he would recommend that the United States not argue with the Russians over their demands for the Baltic States, East Prussia, Bessarabia and the Curzon line in Poland because we needed the Soviet's help so desperately against Japan.

The last paragraph of his memorandum explains how the propaganda apparatus of our government works:

"If the proposals set forth in the foregoing paragraphs should be adopted as the policy of the United States Government, a program should be undertaken immediately to prepare public opinion for them. This would involve off-the-record discussions with Congress, with outstanding newspaper editors and writers, columnists and radio commentators."

Yalta Papers
95

Naturally, this idea did not originate with John Hickerson. It was the standard practice then as it continues to be today. What he implied was that, since the American people took seriously the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms, they might raise a ruckus unless they were told in narcotic words that the sell-out of these small countries was really "peace insurance."

The Communist "line" of any given moment is decided at the highest level. Once decided upon, it

becomes law. The official line is published in Moscow. Currently their main vehicle on foreign affairs is the periodical *New Times*, and it is published in many languages and mailed to non-Red countries. From this the local Communist publications pick up the line on foreign affairs. Not only active comrades but anyone so desiring may subscribe to it. Sometimes local, or urgent decisions are sent out in a form letter via the "drop box," or may first appear in official Communist publications—in the United States, for example, the *Daily Worker*, *Masses* and *Mainstream*, *Political Affairs*, etc. Underground Communists pick up the line, pass it along in normal conversation with sympathizers or receptive dupes, knowing they in turn will pass it on to others. With this system even one hidden Communist in a periodical or radio station is often sufficient to influence the policy of the whole organization. The Party line becomes a slogan in no time and non-Communists are pushing it!

A perfect example of this is shown in a group of items which I tore from the *Daily Worker* at random over a period of a few months. They plainly show how the comrades exploited the fact that non-Communists were plugging their slogan of "peaceful co-existence." And these non-Communists were, of course, unconsciously parroting a statement made by Stalin back on April 2, 1952 when he told a group of American editors "Peaceful co-existence of capitalism and communism is quite possible if there is a mutual desire for cooperation . . ."

STALIN

Headlines from the Daily Worker, November 1954 to March 1955

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|---------------|---|
| Nov. 3, 1954 | Rabbi Silver Urges Courageous Policy of World Coexistence |
| Nov. 8, 1954 | Salisbury Says Coexistence is Possible |
| Nov. 11, 1954 | Coexistence Urged by <u>AFL Meat Cutters' Leaders</u> |
| Nov. 12, 1954 | Laborite Cites Malenkov Faith in Long Co-existence |

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 19

Nov. 12, 1954	UNESCO Executive Board OKs Peaceful Coexistence	
Nov. 12, 1954	Coexistence Will Be Keynote at Soviet Amity Rally Tuesday	
Nov. 13, 1954	Coast Missionary, Back from China, Urges Co-existence	
Nov. 24, 1954	"Co-Existence or No-Existence," Mr. <u>Meany</u>	George Meany
Dec. 23, 1954	<u>Stevenson</u> Urges Co-Existence	←
March 1, 1955	<u>Justice Douglas</u> Asks Co-Existence in Asia	←

This is the "normal" transmission belt. There are exceptions. When a matter of great importance and urgency arises, a special agent is employed. For example, Mr. Budenz describes in his book how, in 1932, a man by the name of Sergei Ivanovitch Gussev, who had served as Comintern agent and Stalin's personal representative in the United States, "commanded the Communists in the United States to take up four tasks." Two of them were the "defense of the Soviet Union," and the "furtherance of Red conquest of China." In 1933 the now notorious Gerhart Eisler, "was secretly sent into the United States by Moscow" to make sure these orders were carried out.

Budenz 162

The two mentioned tasks have been executed. In 1933, the United States recognized Soviet Russia, and China fell to the Communists in 1949.

Budenz 163

Just as Hitler made known his aims in "Mein Kampf," Russia likewise has never kept secret her plans and methods for the domination of the world. Anyone wishing to become a student of Communism has no trouble in making himself acquainted with Moscow's manifestoes. The Russian plans for the conquest of China were again set forth in 1936 and, for the purpose of this story, they are of utmost importance because they played a key role in our war against Japan.

In that year, Georgi Dimitrov, a Bulgarian Communist who was General Secretary of the Comintern (the international organization of the Communist Party), spoke at the 15th Anniversary of the Com-

China: The March Toward Unity, address "The 15th Anniversary of the Communist Party of China" by Georgi Dimitroff 83-87

munist Party of China, laying down the "line" to the followers. Three small excerpts tell a big story:

"... as a real Bolshevik Party, the Communist Party of China realizes that however great the successes it has achieved, they are only the first serious steps on the road to the liberation of the Chinese people . . .

"The Party . . . is faced with the task of carrying on a systematic struggle to establish a *united* national front with the Kuomintang." (This is the government of Chiang Kai-shek.) (Emphasis mine.)

And—

"It is necessary that energetic measures be taken to exert pressure on public opinion and the governments, first and foremost in England, France and the U.S.A. . . . Let the celebration of the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Communist Party of China become a real impulse for mobilizing the forces of the whole of the international proletariat to render help to the Chinese people." (Emphasis mine.)

There is, of course, a "translation" to these excerpts from Dimitrov's speech. He first pronounced the aim of "liberating" ALL China—and it is not necessary to be a student of Communism to understand what a Red means by "liberate." The tragic drama of Russian "liberation" of Poland, Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and others, is a living example of the Red interpretation. The more recent threats to "liberate" Formosa, Quemoy and the Matsus, is understood by all.

The second statement has more meaning than at first meets the eye. Only the year before, at the Seventh World Congress of the Communist International, Dimitrov had specifically defined the "united front" as "a 'Trojan horse' tactic." In advocating a "united national front" with Chiang Kai-shek's government, Dimitrov was giving a direct order to infiltrate and eventually take over control.

The third plainly says in effect, "It is necessary to influence the government and thinking of the peoples

of France, England and the United States so that we Reds will have their cooperation in all our plans."

In 1950, Earl Browder, former head of the Communist Party of the United States, testified before the so-called Tydings committee and explained just how Dimitrov's demands were carried out. The language he used was extraordinarily frank.

"... the term 'transmission belts' ... simply means the utilization of every agency reaching the minds of the masses ..."

Tydings 1-672

"I used information which I received from Mao Tze-tung, the head of the Communist Party in China—of China—to inform the President of the United States about the military situation inside of China ..."

1-681

"It was our purpose to stir up all sorts of political expressions of opinion in support of the Communists in China and support of unity in China: to influence the Government in every possible way. (Emphasis mine.)"

682

"We based our efforts to influence the Government, in terms of changing the attitude of the policymakers."

1-683

Seven years after Dimitrov's speech, in 1942 when we had been a part of the great war for nearly a year, Earl Browder was able to bring about the first and most important step toward the Russian goal in China. It is a remarkable story. Both Earl Browder and Louis Budenz in separate testimony, told of the extraordinary manner in which the United States came to change its long and historical policy in the Far East.

In October of 1942, Browder delivered a message to the Young Communist League, which Budenz published in the Daily Worker. The message was prepared by arrangement with Lauchlin Currie, personal adviser to President Roosevelt on Far Eastern affairs, and was designed, among other things, "for the purpose of smoking out the anti-Soviet elements in the State Department." This speech and its publication was the first step in this plan concocted by Browder and Budenz. Immediately after, Browder received an in-

IPR 2-594

itation from Undersecretary of State Sumner Welles and Lauchlin Currie to come to Washington for a conference.

Browder's interview with Welles was also published in the Daily Worker and reported in the daily press. The Under Secretary was quoted as saying, "The United States favors 'complete *unity*' among the Chinese people and all groups or organizations thereof." (Emphasis mine.)

Tydings 1-
675

Browder told the Tydings committee, "This change in policy was given to me as a matter of information by the Under Secretary of State . . . I simultaneously transmitted that statement of United States Government policy on China to Madam Sun Yat Sen, in Chungking, by cable." (Note: Madam Sun Yatsen became a member of the Chinese Communist Party and lives in Peiping.)

IPR 2-600

Budenz finished his testimony on this subject by saying that the Welles statement was "used throughout the country as an indication that American policy was seeing eye to eye with Soviet policy in the Far East," and that "Browder said it was as important as an agreement between nations . . . representing what he considered to be a great gain for the Communist cause."

To follow the current and localized Communist line is not always easy, not even for the comrades themselves. So subtle and intricate is the strategy that on occasion there is one line for the average Party worker, another for the high echelon, and still another for the sympathizer or dupe. Also, the "line" may be reversed overnight.

For example, one Party line during the war was that the Allies must "abolish" the Japanese Emperor, either by exile, or through his conviction as a war criminal. The Red aim, obscure to most people at the time but clear in view of postwar events, was to keep the Japanese fighting FOR their Emperor even when defeat was inevitable. Actually, the Kremlin

Communist
2 prongs of
propaganda

did not want to do away with the Emperor until some time after the war. The Communists expected then to be able to change public sentiment so that the Japanese "liberals" (mainly Communists) would get rid of him themselves. It was something like the plan used in Italy when the King was successfully ousted. Stalin, in late May 1945, felt that the Japanese Emperor would guarantee an orderly surrender after which the victors could "give them the works," or so Harry Hopkins interpreted Stalin's views. While the Leftist press in the West kept up a steady barrage against the Emperor, which reacted on the Japanese people, the hidden Communists and their allies in high government circles in Washington kept the issue indecisive.

Sherwood
904

IPR 4-1016

The American and British public got the "line" in the following manner. American State Department officers in China swapped information with newspaper people and unofficial observers stationed there. All of them had a grand time obtaining interviews with Communist leaders, both Chinese and refugee Japanese. Needless to say the Communists were most charming and most accessible. And, they were news! The result was a flood of colorful, favorable propaganda, with the reports sent to the State Department often containing the same information as appeared in the current American and British press. It seemed true because everybody was saying it.

Roth 270

The American State Department officials were John S. Service, John K. Emmerson, Raymond Ludden and John Paton Davies, Jr. Some of the press and unofficial observers were such important writers as Owen Lattimore, re-instated professor at Johns Hopkins University; Theodore White, then representing Time magazine and more recently with the Reporter and Colliers magazines; Edgar Snow, for a long time on the staff of the Saturday Evening Post; Guenther Stein, correspondent for the Christian Science Monitor who was involved in the Sorge spy ring; Israel Epstein a correspondent for the New York Times; and Har-

IPR 2-680

IPR 2-635

IPR 2-435
635

rison Forman, correspondent for the New York Herald Tribune.

There were many others who, whether consciously or not, picked up the line and sent it home in their written dispatches.

That the press reports and books written by this group were pleasing to the Communists can be ascertained by the following item in the Daily Worker of June 18, 1947:

IPR 2-460

"We have had many excellent books about China in the past few years, books by topflight reporters like Harrison Forman, Guenther Stein, Agnes Smedley, Theodore White, and Annalee Jacoby. At the top of this list belongs a book published today, Israel Epstein's Unfinished Revolution in China."

American correspondents and American officials received one Communist line in regard to the Emperor and whooped it up for the liquidation of Hirohito right on through 1944 to August 1945. This was the line the Soviets used to prevent premature surrender.

Meanwhile, another Communist line was being prepared for Soviet use (and they were sure the Allies would adopt it) when it would serve the Red purpose to have the war end quickly. This was done by Susumo Okano, the Japanese Communist leader who had fled from Japan in 1931 and who became a member of the Comintern in 1935.

This important Japanese Communist began to work hard on "re-educating" Japanese prisoners captured by the Red Chinese in 1938, and by 1941 he had established a "school" in Yen-an. This provided him the ideal way to learn what the Japanese people were thinking back home. He began to see that, while some of the Japanese prisoners were swallowing the Communist philosophy all right, they balked at any ridicule aimed at their Emperor. Okano realized how important this "emperor worship" was. So in the summer of 1944, he "tried for size" the new Communist line on

a group of reporters. For instance he told Guenther Stein that "... a President elected by the people" ought to replace the Emperor. But to Harrison Forman he said that "The Emperor is still too much of a godlike figure" and suggested that he not be attacked at the moment but should subsequently be tried as a war criminal.

Roth 270

Right after that, in October (during the battle of Leyte Gulf) Wataru Kaji, a "leftist writer," who was to be reported by the New York Times in 1952 as being involved in a Communist spy ring in Tokyo, gave the follow-up to Okano's tentative line. He gave a lecture in the Nationalist capital of Chungking, of all places, under the auspices of a "front" organization called the Sino-American Institute of Cultural Relations. In this lecture he demoted the Emperor from a "war criminal" to a "puppet of the military which must, therefore, be overthrown." This was the change-over phase of the Emperor question which took the emotion out of the issue. As we have noted, Stalin himself told Hopkins and others that what happened to the Emperor was a matter of expediency and it might serve the allied purposes to keep the Emperor until after the surrender.

N.Y. Times
Dec. 18, 1952

FBIS Chung-
king Oct.
1944

Sherwood
904

This, of course, was not known at the time except in the inner circle. From this distance you can see how the strange two-headed Communist propaganda apparatus worked. While the angry anti-Emperor communist propaganda was going full force in the United States, Stalin himself was preparing the great reversal. It required careful timing.

The line which was to be given officially to the small pumpkin comrades was prepared some months later—May of 1945. Again it was Susumo Okano who gave the word. He made a speech before the National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party at Yen-an, the Red capital, and all the Communist leaders of the Asiatic countries flocked to hear his words. It was called "Building Up Democratic Japan." This important address was reprinted in full in the Communist

Emancipation Daily at Yen-an on May 29th, but its distribution in America was withheld until the "right time." The "right time" would be when Russia was in the war against Japan and Japan had surrendered. The Soviets declared war on August 8, 1945, Japan threw in the sponge on August 10, 1945, and the editors of the Daily Worker put their prepared report on the Okano speech "in the works" the same day. It appeared in that Red paper August 11, 1945. This was the careful timing. And, it had a strange dateline—"Yen-an, China, June 10, (delayed)." (Emphasis mine.)

The pertinent parts of Okano's dicta are the following:

. . . "The emperor as head of a despotic political system or emperor's prerogatives, must be immediately abolished . . . *But we must take a considerate attitude . . .*" (Emphasis mine.)

And here Okano explains why such violent action as trying the Emperor as a war criminal was a bad idea—

"Faith in the emperor, implanted in the mind of the general public for the past 70 years, is considerable and profound."

So here follows the new line—

"Therefore we propose to decide by a people's referendum after the war the problems of dethroning or retaining the emperor."

Thanks to General MacArthur this referendum never came off.

To make sure the comrades understood, and to help the "progressive Americans" (the third echelon) save face, Joseph Starobin, who was then foreign editor of the Daily Worker, wrote an article which appeared

on the same page as the report of Okano's speech. In part he said:

"It is understandable, of course, that progressive Americans are alarmed at any possible special position for the Emperor . . .

"Once Japan is occupied and once the major industrial centers of Manchuria are in United Nations hands, it will be the actual evolution of Japanese politics, under Allied control, that will count."

The second and equally important program the Kremlin proposed for Asia was also relayed to the State Department by our officials. We learn by way of these reports that in the Fall of 1944, Ch'in Po Ku (Ch'in Pang-hsien), who was in charge of Chinese Communist propaganda, put out the following manifesto: "Colonies and all conquered territory must be taken away from Japan. Formosa and all Manchuria must come back to China."

FBIS 1944

You will see later on, how similar this was to the Cairo Declaration of December 1943. But the Communists know so well how to use double talk. They knew that any paper in the United States or Great Britain publishing the statement that Manchuria and Formosa should be returned to China, would mean to American and British readers, Nationalist China; while to Russia and Communists, it meant eventually Red China because they had long planned it that way. These orders have been partially carried out. Half of the Sakhalin island and all the Kuriles islands were given to Russia. Manchuria fell to the Communist Chinese by the arrangements of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, and in 1954, 1955 and 1956 the drive for the fall of Formosa into Red hands has been repeatedly announced from the Red capital of Peiping.

It is almost uncanny with what precision the comrades carry out their orders. But taking into consideration the political thinking of some of our foreign service officers at that time, the picture becomes more clear. When you realize that "John K. Emmerson

Budenz 177-8
They Cry
Peace

Cong. Record
June 5,
1951 page
6298

recommended in a report to the State Department that the civilian government of Japan be made up only of Communists, since the Red group was the only 'democratic' force there"; when you have Raymond Ludden reporting that "the so-called Communists (in China) are agrarian reformers of a mild democratic stripe," you realize what strong American confederates the Communists had.

But let us see how the seemingly contradictory line concerning the Emperor applied to the war in the Pacific.

When Churchill and Roosevelt met at Casablanca in January 1943, they made a joint announcement to the effect that the Allies would accept nothing less than "unconditional surrender." To those understanding something of psychological warfare, this was an electrifying and incendiary statement to both sides of the firing line. To the enemy it was an inspiration to fight even harder, and to the homefront it had great patriotic appeal.

Sherwood
696

There are several stories on how the policy came to be adopted. The most widely circulated is that Roosevelt, without having informed anyone, announced it during the press conference at the conclusion of the Casablanca meeting. Robert Sherwood in his book, "Roosevelt and Hopkins," quotes a later notation made by President Roosevelt saying that he remembered "that they had called Grant 'Old Unconditional Surrender' and the next thing I knew, I had said it." Churchill's story was that he was taken by surprise and had to quickly improvise a like statement. (He later said he made an error in this.) However, Sherwood contradicted FDR when he went on to say that Roosevelt had a prepared statement in his lap.

Sherwood's hint that the "unconditional surrender" statement was planned beforehand is confirmed by General Albert C. Wedemeyer who was present at the Casablanca conference. The General relates that he and General Marshall shared the same villa, and their bedrooms were adjoining. Before they went to

bed, they chatted about each day's happenings. On the eve of the press conference, General Marshall dined with Roosevelt and Churchill. When he returned to the villa, he went to General Wedemeyer's room and sat down to tell him of the evening's events. He told Wedemeyer that the President and the Prime Minister had agreed to announce the following day that unconditional surrender would be the only terms acceptable to the United Nations for the surrender of their common enemies.

Why then, did both Churchill and Roosevelt publicly state that it was NOT discussed before the press conference?

It is known that the phrase was discussed long before the Casablanca conference took place. In late April or early May of 1942, Norman Davis, chairman of the Security Subcommittee of the President's Advisory Committee, proposed that unconditional surrender be considered as a basis for post-war policy. His proposal was immediately opposed by all other members including the representatives of the military establishment. The proposal was never mentioned again. Is it any wonder that those who participated in this discussion were startled, to say the least, to read the announcement in the press that unconditional surrender had become a United Nations policy!

Who persuaded Roosevelt to change this decision? Unconditional surrender meant the complete destruction of Italy, Germany and Japan, and the only nation benefiting from such a destruction would be Russia.

From then on, this phrase became the key to both wars—in Europe and in the Pacific. During the following years there were numerous requests that the term be clarified. Many people realized that if it was not explained to the enemy, they would never give up the fight until the last man had been struck down, an entirely unnecessary tragedy for both our boys and theirs. But until the day before VJ-day no explanation was forthcoming. And the extraordinary punishment we imposed on the defeated Germans in May of 1945,

gave the Japanese a frightening bird's-eye view of what they could expect from the American conquerors.

The implications of "unconditional surrender" had a different effect in Germany and Japan. The German people, whatever their loyalty to Hitler, nourished a great love for their fatherland. They would fight to the last rather than see their "Heimat" completely destroyed. The Japanese people, on the other hand, centered their love of country on the person of their Emperor. If unconditional surrender meant a humiliating destruction of their national symbol, there was no doubt that every patriotic Japanese would be willing to die fighting.

Leahy 145

Admiral Leahy who was not at Casablanca regretfully commented in his book that "Before the war was over, there were occasions when it might have been advantageous to accept conditional surrender in some areas, but we were not permitted to do it."

It is odd, however, that conditional surrender *was* permitted the Italians. Why was it a rigid policy for Germany and Japan?

No one expected the war in the Pacific to progress so swiftly and so victoriously for the Americans. By late 1943 a victorious end of the war was plainly in sight, and this had an effect among "certain elements."

To bring another event into focus, in December 1943, the State Department published a book entitled, "Peace and War, 1931-1941." This was a selected record of our foreign policy towards Japan and Germany in those years and became known as the "White Paper" (This is not to be confused with the later White Paper of 1949 put together by the "China Boys.") In its pages was found the statement to the effect that Hirohito had forbidden the Japanese Army and Navy to attack the United States and Great Britain. This caused a chain reaction in the press beginning with such headlines as "Hirohito War Ban Revealed by Hull," "Hirohito Plea for '41 Peace May Save Him," "Allies May Let Him Remain on Throne." But im-

N.Y. Times,
Dec. 5, 1943
A, 30:2

mediately the leftist press protested in a violent manner, and from that time on the future of the Japanese Emperor became a highly controversial subject.

Deeply embroiled in the drama was Joseph C. Grew, our ambassador to Japan at the time of Pearl Harbor. He returned on an exchange ship in August 1942, and was assigned by the State Department to make a speaking tour of the country to explain the war in the Pacific to the American people. Mr. Grew had lived in Japan for ten years and knew his subject well. He toured the country for 18 months during which time he emphasized in every speech the same theme. This is important because it was this theme which was to make him temporarily acceptable to the Communists. He told his audiences that the American people should be warned against any peace offers from Japan and the "dangers of a false, treacherous peace." He said to the Foreign Affairs Council of Cleveland on Feb. 5, 1943 that the clue would come when some former liberal Japanese statesmen were brought back into public office to replace some of the military. "This step," he said, "would be heralded as representing the overthrow of military dictatorship in favor of liberalism. The scene would then be set for a peace move."

Grew 1397

Grew 1397

Later on you will see how accurate Mr. Grew was in all his predictions, and in particular, this one. He went on to emphasize that " 'Unconditional surrender' is the complete summary of the terms which we of the United Nations shall and must offer the aggressor powers."

1398

Who was helping Mr. Grew write his speeches?

In time, he was to completely reverse himself. But he did not deviate from this first theme until December 29, 1943, shortly after the State Department published the White Paper on Japan and Germany. On that date he touched a high-voltage nerve in the Communist apparatus which had the effect of a weasel making an unexpected call on a hen house.

What Grew said was anathema to the Reds because

Roth 62

he pointed out that Hirohito was a "peace-loving" ruler, and once he got out from under control of the military, he would be "an asset and not a liability" after the war. This statement set off a concentrated attack on Mr. Grew by the press which was even echoed in far off China. Dr. Sun Fo (son of the late Dr. Sun Yat-sen), well-known as a "liberal" favoring Chinese friendship with Russia, wrote an article protesting Mr. Grew's statement.

Roth 64

In the United States the attack was so forceful that in February 1944, Mr. Grew was compelled to give an interview to the New York Times, which had severely criticized him, in which he tried to extricate himself. He told the newspaper categorically that he had never "either publicly or privately" expressed an opinion either way about the Emperor's retention on the throne after the war.

Notwithstanding this statement to the New York Times in February, the following April Mr. Grew did take a stand in a memorandum to Secretary Hull, the full text of which appears in volume II of his book, "Turbulent Era." In this memorandum Mr. Grew advised the Secretary that, in considering the question of dethroning the Emperor, the State Department should not be led by current public opinion since the public did not know all the facts. He pointed out—

Grew 1411-
13

"The prejudice in our country today against the Emperor of Japan is intense . . . I can see only chaos emerging from such a decision . . . I therefore say, without qualification, that the Emperor can be used equally well—indeed far more easily—to justify and to consecrate, if you will, a new order of peaceful international co-operation."

It is no wonder that when President Roosevelt, the following November, appointed Mr. Grew to be Undersecretary of State, there was an explosive eruption from the leftists. At this period the battle of Leyte Gulf was over (Oct. 27, 1944) and the Japanese were

obviously staggering. By the time Mr. Grew was to appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the issue had become so heated that the now famous Caucus Room in the Senate Office Building was filled to capacity.

Just prior to the hearing, the now defunct New York PM seemed to appoint itself the leader of the attack on Mr. Grew and the Emperor. On the succeeding days of Dec. 3, 4, and 5, one of their best writers, Ramon Laval, devoted three lead articles to the subject. And on Dec. 13th, James Wechsler, the PM's national editor and now editor of the New York Post, wrote an entire page in PM attacking Grew. Two days later, an article by I. F. Stone, also on PM's staff, entitled "An Appeal to the U.S. Senate" blasted Grew as an appeaser.

The reaction of high level Communists to the PM diatribes was quite unexpected. It becomes clear only with an understanding of Communist techniques and of the different lines for different circles which I have just described. In this instance the brakes were applied by Frederick Vanderbilt Field, an offspring of the wealthy Vanderbilt family who, in time, became a prominent fixture in the Communist front window. Although named a number of times under oath as a Communist, he had repeatedly taken the Fifth Amendment in answer to the "\$64 million question." But also, according to testimony given under oath, what Field wrote and spoke was Communist gospel.

Tydings 711

IPR 2-539

On December 9, 1944, four days after the Laval attacks, Fred Field was a "guest columnist" for the Daily Worker. You can be sure the article was read with care and followed to the letter by the Party "boys" inside and outside of government. It was not an editorial in the sense we know it, since everything of this sort published in the Daily Worker is direct instructions to the comrades. The piece is so full of "meat" that I shall quote it entirely. While reading it, bear in mind the speeches Mr. Grew had made across

the country at an earlier date warning the American people against a "compromise peace." Here is the Field column:

"The telephone has just rung and I have had the following conversation with a good friend of mine whom I shall designate as X. Before getting to the conversation itself, let me assure you that X is a person for whom I have great respect and admiration, a person who has done more for the people of China than I ever hope to do in my life.

After the preliminary greetings our talk was something like this:

X: "What do you think of the nomination of Grew as Undersecretary of State?"

F: "I can think of several people who would have been better. What do you think?"

X: "I think it stinks. And I want to know what you're going to do about it."

F: "Well, my plans are to support Grew's nomination as well as that of Clayton, Rockefeller and MacLeish."

X: "But my God, Fred, don't you know that he is working for a strong Japan after the war headed by Hirohito? Don't you know that Chinese progressives hate him?"

F: "Just a minute, X, let's get some perspective on this thing. Certainly Grew is a conservative, but I wouldn't call him a reactionary, because I associate the word reactionary with semi-fascists and anti-war people and I know that Grew isn't that."

X: "Isn't it true, Fred, that Grew has spoken in favor of retaining the Emperor and that he's for a strong Japan after the war?"

F: "O.K., maybe he did make some speeches exonerating the Emperor when he first came back from Japan, but I'm more impressed with what he's been saying lately about the dangers of our falling for some of the moderates now being brought back into public life in Tokyo. Grew has been warning us not to fall into their trap for a negotiated peace. That makes sense to me."

X: "Well, what about China? Just as Chungking is putting some recent men like T. V. Soong into big positions we elevate a man whom progressive Chinese don't trust because of his long record of appeasement in Japan."

F: "I think you're strictly wrong there, X, President Roose-

12/9/44 - Daily Worker
Frederick V. Field
tells - C.P. members
Nelson Rockefeller
is O.K.

velt's policy on China is very progressive, it may even be the decisive force that will rebuild China. I doubt whether Grew or anybody else in the State Department is going to reverse that policy. It's been developed over the bodies of mighty tough babies in the Department, some of whom aren't there any more. The President and public opinion are going to see that there is no change toward China.

"The point where you go haywire, X, is in believing that we're fighting for some kind of socialism, and that therefore only progressive liberals can run the government. This is a capitalist country, and that's the kind of country that's fighting this war. It's not only natural, but it's vital to have conservatives and business men in the government. Without them how can we possibly have national unity?

"Now if it had been Berle or Long (note: Adolf Berle who took Chambers' information on Hiss to Roosevelt; and Breckenridge Long) or one of the other fancy boys with a long pro-Franco, anti-Soviet record behind them who had been nominated, Undersecretary, I'd be all for protesting. But in the case of Grew we're dealing with a genuinely anti-fascist conservative and I, for one, am perfectly willing to work with him. *If he makes mistakes on policy we'll raise hell.* But let's not protest simply because he's a conservative." (Emphasis mine.)

X: "I disagree and as a matter of fact, I was thinking of sending a letter of protest to the White House this afternoon."

F: "Well, I'm not, and what's more, I'm afraid you'd find yourself associated with a bunch of semi-fascist reactionaries and crackpot Social Democrats, and by joining with them all what you'd accomplish will be to strengthen their disruptive campaign."

X: "If that's the score, I guess I'd better think again before I mail that letter."

Who was "X"? Was he a real person—one of the many who had direct access to the President? Or was "X" a device? Perhaps "he" was really the vast army of letter writers, reporters and commentators who needed to be alerted that the destruction of Mr. Grew was to be postponed.

Grew's nomination quickly won Senate approval. But the issue of the Emperor was not to be dropped

by the left. The next attack came "unofficially" from another quarter, and in the following manner.

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, headed by the late Sen. Pat McCarran, Democrat from Nevada, devoted more than a year, 1951-1952, to the investigation of the fascinating organization called the Institute of Pacific Relations.

The Institute was organized initially for the benefit of students, professional and otherwise, who wanted to increase their knowledge of the Pacific area. Its aims were to publish the writings of experts on these countries, and many worthy authorities on the Far East joined as contributors. But shortly after the Institute got a start in 1925, the Communists began to infiltrate it.

As the years went by, the members began to note a change in policy apparent in the writings of the contributors and the staff. Although many IPR members did not realize this was Communist propaganda, they were unable to go along with this "blindness" and resigned. With the advent of World War II the importance of the Institute increased. The State Department was obliged to refer to the IPR publications to get information on the Far East because, as Owen Lattimore said, they were the only publications that "not only specialized on the Far East but were confined to the Far East." And by the time the war started the IPR had come under the guidance of Frederick Vanderbilt Field, Owen Lattimore and others less well known.

IPR 9-2917

The McCarran subcommittee's hearings brought out that often, when the organization hit the bottom of the barrel financially, it was Fred Field who came to the rescue, contributing in all, \$60,000. However, more than half the support for a period of more than 20 years was supplied by Carnegie and Rockefeller Foundations and Corporations. Of the other half, part came from individuals, and part from oil companies, banks, etc.

The money from the foundations was contributed to the authors who made extensive trips to the Far East and into Communist controlled territory. From these experiences and contacts they were able to write their books.

One of the two publications of the Institutes was Pacific Affairs, a "front" periodical for the unsuspecting. On occasion, a rightwing author was invited to contribute as window-dressing. But in the following issue a criticism of that article was sure to appear. Pacific Affairs for December 1944, published an article by T. A. Bisson. Bisson has been named under oath as a Communist, and has denied it. After serving in the government during World War II he became a professor at the University of California.

IPR 14-
5506

IPR 2-535

This article, "Japan as a Political Organism," sets forth what the author recommended as the United States postwar policy for Japan. It was lengthy, and in great detail; Bisson's article reads in part: "Before the occupation force leaves Japan, it should have enforced the following measures." Let us look at points No. 6 and No. 14:

- No. 6 Punishment of war criminals, including the Emperor.
- No. 14 Abolition of the Emperor system by the constitutional convention, with accompanying warning that this will be a key factor in determining the future attitude of the United Nations toward Japan.
(See appendix for full text.)

The IPR had other vehicles of influence besides its magazines. The books published under its sponsorship played an important part in conditioning the thinking of the American public. A check of published works at that time leaves little doubt that leftwingers, pro-Communists and Communists, produced and reviewed most of the books on the Far East published during the critical years when the United States policy in the Pacific was being formed. These books found their way into the libraries of universities and were given

careful study by professors of contemporary history, and by newspaper and magazine writers who specialize in foreign and military affairs. They were also placed opportunely in the hands of members of Congress, and high ranking officials in the War and State Departments and the war-time agencies where so many of the IPR members were employed.

These combined literary trickles began like apparently innocent snow, falling on remote mountain tops, melting into mountain streams, and tumbling swiftly to the valley where they meet hundreds of other streams, becoming mighty rivers and reservoirs affecting the lives of thousands of people.

Two books published during 1945 merit special attention. The first was "Solution in Asia" by Owen Lattimore, an Atlantic Monthly Press Book published by Little, Brown and Company, which concentrated on China with few but important references to Japan. The other which appeared in the late summer of that year was "Dilemma in Japan," and was also published by Little, Brown and Company. The author was Lieutenant Andrew Roth of the United States Naval Intelligence Reserve who was to become involved in the notorious "Amerasia Case."

With the help of Lattimore, a small crew of leftist Asian specialists had cornered the book market, a fact confirmed by Lattimore himself when he stated in the New York Times on June 22, 1947, "It is noteworthy that the recent and current trend of good books about China, well documented and well-written, has been well to the left of center."

In "Solution in Asia," the Johns Hopkins professor peppered his pages with anti-Hirohito jibes and even went so far as to suggest that the Japanese people give the Emperor the same dose as the English gave Charles I of England who got his head chopped off.

In more serious language he advised that the "Japanese people are likely to overturn the throne unless we prevent them," and by "we" he meant certain people in our State Department. He then said that the

Lattimore 29

IPR 3-725

Communist Propaganda Affects Foreign Policy 39

Emperor and "all males eligible to the throne . . . be interned, preferably in China." Could Mr. Lattimore have had Red China in mind?

His book was of great interest to the Communists in the United States and was advertised in Communist newspapers alongside a book by the head of the Communist Party USA, William Z. Foster. Both were sold at the Communist International Book Store, and what the International Book Store sells is "must" reading to the comrades.

IPR 9-3073

Lattimore's explanation of this was that he had never heard of the International Book Store and didn't know anything about the Communists' interest in his book.

IPR 9-3071

On this, Mr. Budenz's testimony is interesting. The following question was asked by Robert Morris, Counsel for the McCarran subcommittee investigating the IPR.

Mr. Morris. . . . Did the Communist Party make use of Owen Lattimore or Owen Lattimore's writings with respect to Japan?

IPR 2-624-5

Mr. Budenz. Oh, yes, we see that with respect to Japan policy and others . . . His book, *Solution in Asia*, was it not?—was used by the Communists and other writings of his.

Roth's "Dilemma in Japan" came into fleeting prominence during the Tydings hearings in 1950 when Lattimore testified that Roth had brought the galley proofs to his house for him to read. Two comments concerning this book deserve attention here. The *Daily Worker*, which did not begin its campaign against the Emperor until early spring, 1945, reported on June 26, 1945: "Dilemma in Japan . . . exposes Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew's predilection for Japanese Emperor Hirohito."

IPR 2-609

And Louis Budenz, appearing before the McCarran IPR hearings, had this to say in answer to the questions by Counsel Morris:

IPR 2-625

Mr. Budenz. . . . Dilemma in Japan was not only advanced by the Communists but *it was submitted to the Politburo before publication.* (Emphasis mine.)

Mr. Morris. Was Andrew Roth a Communist?

Mr. Budenz. Yes, sir, from many official reports he was a Communist . . .

Mr. Morris. Mr. Budenz, is it your testimony that Andrew Roth's book was used to supplement this Communist campaign?

Mr. Budenz. Most decidedly.

Roth selected several subjects which were important to the "Party line." On each he elaborated until he had squeezed the lemon dry, trying to impress the reader with his vast knowledge of Japan and her men of destiny. He used venom and vitriol with extravagant abandon in the chapters concerning the Zaibatsu (the big industrialists of Japan), Joseph C. Grew, and Emperor Hirohito. The tone of the book is, to borrow an expression from Walter Lippmann, "sophisticated violence."

IPR 12-4184

An interesting item is found on page 234 where Roth recommends the use of Okano and Kaji by our government in the making of a "democratic" Japan. He apparently agreed with the State Department's John K. Emmerson that the Japanese Communists were the only ones on whom we could rely to accomplish this objective. (T. A. Bisson had also recommended the above mentioned Communists as potential aids to our postwar occupation in another article published in *Pacific Affairs* in September 1944.)

Roth 35

Roth left no reasonable doubt that Joseph Grew was an important enemy to Russia's plans for Japan. Although Mr. Grew had for 41 years faithfully and loyally represented United States policy as an official of the State Department, he was totally unconscious of the new influences forming reverse policies in Washington. Roth bluntly stated that "The general pattern of the attack was that Mr. Grew was a gullible aristocrat . . ."

Roth mentioned "three complementary thrusts" and

you will notice how unusually similar they are to Okano's trial balloon in the summer of 1944 as well as his authoritative statement of policy in May 1945. The first "thrust," he says, should be to weaken the sources of the Emperor's strength; the second should discredit the Emperor system, and the third should support the "democratic forces" in Japan which eventually would do away with the Emperor.

Roth 118

Then he warned against the wrong strategy in getting rid of the Emperor. He wrote that there is real danger in a "premature, frontal attack" on Hirohito. "THE DANGER," he emphasized, "ARISES NOT FROM THE OBJECTIVE BUT FROM THE INCORRECT STRATEGY FOR ACHIEVING THE CORRECT OBJECTIVE."

Roth 115-6

He explained this new line by saying that Okano, the leading Japanese Communist, came to this conclusion after having discussed it with the Communist underground in Japan. In other words, Okano warned that the average Japanese would never stand for an attack on their Emperor. They had to be persuaded first that the Emperor system was not a good one.

Roth ended his lecture on the new line by putting into words the clever method the Communists use in all their programs to defeat America—whether it's an attack on the Secretary of State, stirring up racial hatreds or tearing down our traditions.

"In politics, as in war, when a frontal attack is too costly, it is frequently advisable and no less effective to utilize a flank attack. This is undoubtedly the strategy which should be used in this case . . ."

Roth 118

An unusual chronology of dates occurs here. You will notice that the Daily Worker quoted from Roth's book in June 1945—before it was even finished! It was not published until September 1945 and contains references to events taking place in July at Potsdam. One can only guess that it was felt that the new "line" on the Emperor should be given by a person supposed

not to belong to the Communist conspiracy. And it was passed out to the second echelon comrades and "progressive Americans" through a lieutenant in the United States Naval Intelligence. But it was passed out in slow stages. Until Russia entered the war, articles like Field's "Appeasement of Japan" (*New Masses*, July 31, 1945) and editorials like "A Versailles for Japan," (*Daily Worker*, July 19, 1945) continued the old "liquidate the Emperor" line.

That the Communist aim of insinuating their propaganda against the Emperor in our press was highly successful and had a telling effect on Japan, is told by Mr. Kase in his "Journey to the Missouri." He wrote that some newspapers in the United States implied that the Emperor was the source of the Japanese aim at world conquest, and that—

Kase 250

"Men like Owen Lattimore were known to be advocating the internment in China of the Emperor and of all males eligible for the throne. Such statements in Allied countries unfortunately strengthened the hands of those in Japan who mistrusted the intentions of the Allied powers."

In plain language, Mr. Kase was saying that the attacks on the Emperor prolonged the war.

Chapter III

YALTA AND THE ADVISERS

The Yalta Conference.

Harry Hopkins and the advisers.

Roosevelt's view of Stalin and Churchill.

U.S. Policy toward Russia set forth by Gen. Burns and Hopkins.

The controversy over Russian entry into the Pacific war.

The press continues its attack on Hirohito.

Bohlen explains the Yalta agreements.

THIRTEEN million young Americans were taken from peaceful pursuits and hauled into the tortuous cauldron of World War II. In three and one half fateful years they had fought one of the most brutal wars in history and laid before the feet of a grateful nation an amazing record of victories. Yet the United States was to go far in losing the fruits of victory at a quiet conference table six months before the war ended. This was Yalta where, among other tragic errors, Chinese territory was traded for Russia's entry into the war against Japan.

Gathered at this conference in February of 1945 were the most powerful leaders in the world; Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin. The most powerful of them all was President Roosevelt, but it was to be his team which lost the battle of political wits. The question is, "why"? The only way to find out is to look as closely as possible at the experts and advisers accompanying him; to carefully scrutinize their political thinking.

What went on in Roosevelt's mind during the course of the wartime alliance with Russia has puzzled even the closest and best informed observers. As an outsider who has had the privilege of listening to many informed discussions, I have been unable to reach any conclusions myself. One reasonable and plausible

explanation of the late President's attitude comes from one who had access to many official documents including Roosevelt's personal correspondence with Churchill and Stalin. His careful analysis strongly supports the conclusion that, until 1943, Roosevelt regarded Russia with a patronizing attitude, and that he assumed it would be the United States and Great Britain who would settle the postwar problems. But beginning with mid-1943, American policy seemed to change to "fear" of postwar Russia. And the correspondence indicated that FDR's attitude changed to one of wishful thinking—that Roosevelt the aristocrat could charm Stalin the peasant. The President put great faith in his theory that if the United States proved its honest intentions with honest action, Stalin would react likewise. But such a policy was no more successful then than it was in 1955.

Perhaps Mr. Roosevelt's early views are explained by a statement of Martin Dies when he quoted the President as saying to him: "Several of the best friends I've got are Communists. You're all wrong about this thing . . . I'm not defending the Communists as such, but I'm telling you it represents a tremendous advance over what existed in Russia."

Martin Dies' statement also sheds some light on Roosevelt's reaction as described by Whittaker Chambers in his book "Witness." Mr. Chambers relates that when, in 1939, Adolf Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, had brought Chambers' exposure of Alger Hiss and others to FDR—

"The President had laughed. When Berle was insistent, he had been told in words which it is necessary to paraphrase, to 'go jump in a lake.'"

Roosevelt was considered by his admirers and critics alike as a brilliant statesman, which makes it even more difficult to understand his disbelief in the devious working and evil intentions of the Communist conspiracy. Some explain his naivete by pointing out

U.S. News
and World
Report Aug.
20, 1954

Chambers
470

that he was also an intellectual dilettante, a collector of novel ideas, and eccentric friends whom he firmly believed he could control.

Many have attributed the actions and attitudes of President Roosevelt to his advisers. There is no doubt that the political thinking of the official family of any President is reflected in his official statements and deeds. Although their names are not always familiar to the public, they are a real power in the White House. It is these people who read all incoming reports—and often summarize them for Presidential reading. What they omit or insert can mislead a President in many matters.

As I glance over the list of men who accompanied Mr. Roosevelt to Yalta, they seem to me to fall into two groups of opposite opinions. Those who received advice, reports and opinions from these advisers were President Roosevelt, Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., and the Director of War Mobilization and "assistant President," James F. Byrnes.

The opposing teams of advisers are as follows:

*Those who believed
Russia our friend.*

Harry Hopkins
General Marshall
W. Averell Harriman
Alger Hiss
H. Freeman Matthews
Charles E. Bohlen

*Those who believed
Russia a questionable
ally.*

Admiral Leahy
Admiral King

(Harriman frequently warned of Russia's dubious intentions in various memos, but loyally carried out Hopkins' orders without protest. His guiding motto seems to have been, "Harry knows best.")

The two able naval officers were naturally more military in their thinking than political which meant a constant alertness to even the least suspicion of danger to the nation. Admiral Leahy had served as our ambassador to Vichy, France, during the occupation of Paris by the Nazis, and had proven to be both

a nimble and a blunt diplomat. Both King and Leahy had the simple opinion that having Russia as an ally was tantamount to fighting side by side with an octopus, and that we'd better keep one eye on our enemy and the other on our doubtful ally. But they were an isolated pair in the circle of Presidential advisers. Moreover, being military men, they obeyed orders.

The larger of the two groups included some of the most influential men in the United States. Harry Hopkins, the President's most trusted adviser, was for a long time a White House "boarder" and was in the President's confidence even more than was his family. A quick perusal of the press reports of those days will vividly recall the political heat this strange, untidy and sickly man generated. From the beginning of his career until his death he surrounded himself with men whose loyalty to the United States was questionable, and some of whom were more than on the Communist border-line. Hopkins' strange friendships did not bother the President, Neither did they shake his confidence in his adviser. When Hopkins made his first visit to Moscow in July 1941, the President provided him with a most unusual introduction to Stalin. It said; "I ask you to treat him with the identical confidence you would feel if you were talking directly to me."

Sherwood 4

A retired Army officer once said to me in an explosion of retrospective heat that "Hopkins ran the whole damn war." I took his statement lightly until I had studied Robert Sherwood's book, "Roosevelt and Hopkins" and understood what he meant. There was no phase of the war in which Harry Hopkins did not have the last word. Although he was universally known as having been "Roosevelt's personal adviser," he had many other official as well as unofficial assignments. He was chief of Lend-Lease, Chairman of the Munitions Assignment Board, member of the War Production Board, Chairman of the President's Soviet Protocol Committee, and member of the Pacific War

Sherwood
917

Council. Those agencies of which he was only a member were headed by his chief aides.

There are many references concerning Hopkins' influence with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in planning battle strategy in both theaters of war. And in diplomacy, "Hopkins was now more than ever 'Roosevelt's own, personal Foreign Office,'" by-passing Secretary of State Hull, and his successor, Stettinius. Added to this: it was on his initiative and under his sponsorship that the project for the development of the atomic bomb got its start. He was "associated with this development since the very inception of the National Defense Research Council."

Sherwood
640

Sherwood
927

Admiral Leahy confirms:

"The range of his activities covered all manner of civilian affairs, politics, war production, diplomatic matters, and, on many occasions, military affairs."

Leahy 138

It was true that "Hopkins ran the whole damn war."

Holding the life-line between defeat and victory for each of our allies, Hopkins placed Russia's needs above all others, even our own. In June of 1942 when he spoke before the Russian Aid Rally at Madison Square Garden in New York City, on the anniversary of the German attack on Russia, he pledged to the Soviets: "We are determined that nothing shall stop us from sharing with you all that we have . . ."

General John R. Deane who worked with Ambassador Harriman in Moscow on Lend-Lease, provides still another view on Hopkins' "Russia first" policy. He commented in his book, "Strange Alliance," that the "mission was carried out with a zeal which approached fanaticism," and that "Faymonville had had instructions from the President that no strings were to be attached to our aid to Russia and that the program was not to be used as a lever to obtain information about and from the Russians."

Deane 90-2

In General Phillip R. Faymonville, Hopkins had a lieutenant completely devoted to the "cause." There

Tydings 627
IPR 1-151

can be found in the volumes of the hearings on the Institute of Pacific Relations, many references to the General in the correspondence of Edward C. Carter, who was named under oath as a Communist. The late Mr. Carter, according to his letters, saw to it that Faymonville made contact with many Russians and Russian sympathizers because, as he testified, "He was eager to meet all sorts of Russians who could bring him up to date."

Others on Hopkins' team were all firm believers in the theory that if we played more than fair with Russia and overlooked bad faith on their part, a "permanent peace" would be the ultimate result.

In reading the memoirs of the men present at Yalta—Stettinius, Leahy, Byrnes, King and Hopkins—I find that, although Hiss was of equal importance to the other State Department advisers, he is mentioned not at all in Admiral King's book, nor Sherwood's biography of "Roosevelt and Hopkins," nor by Byrnes. Admiral Leahy mentions him once in passing, but Stettinius generously gives him credit for his advice and help throughout his some 300 pages, even producing a full page picture of himself with Hiss. For this, future historians should be grateful. Stettinius apparently felt duty bound to help a man in trouble, although the book was being written after the historic hearings before the Un-American Activities Committee, and published during 1949 when the two Hiss trials occurred. The Secretary of State wrote early in his book, which he entitled, "Roosevelt and the Russians":

Stettinius 31

"Hiss performed brilliantly throughout the Dumbarton Oaks conversations, the Yalta Conference, the San Francisco Conference, and the first meeting of the United Nations Assembly in London. I always had reason to believe that Hiss acted honorably and patriotically in the performance of his duties at these conferences. The following pages of this book reveal his contribution at the Yalta Conference."

On a later page, the Secretary relates his prescribed routine at Yalta saying that he conferred with ". . . Matthews, Bohlen and Hiss just after I got up in the morning." After the usual diplomatic dinners each night, Stettinius again consulted "with Matthews, Bohlen, and Hiss . . . often as late as two in the morning."

Stettinius 83

To amplify how closely the team worked with the President, Admiral Leahy writes in "I Was There" concerning the first meeting of the Chiefs of Staff with Roosevelt, Stettinius, and Harriman:

"The Secretary of State outlined the political questions . . . Then two of his assistants, H. F. Matthews and Charles E. Bohlen, elaborated on several of the more acute of these problems."

Leahy 298

Charles Bohlen held an even more unique position than his colleagues. He spoke Russian fluently and acted as interpreter for the President. When Stalin and Molotov called on Roosevelt, Admiral Leahy tells us, "the only other American present" was "Bohlen, who acted as interpreter." Which makes President Eisenhower's ambassador to Russia the only living man today who is personally familiar with certain top level conversations. And he added to his laurels when he was Eisenhower's adviser and interpreter at Geneva in July 1955.

Leahy 299

Admiral Leahy was a conservative writer (he had no ghost writer and wrote the entire book longhand) who occasionally permitted himself a salty remark. But he omitted several of the more "juicy" tidbits. Privately he has told the story that at Yalta one of the security officers approached him with the warning that it would not be a good idea to mention high level secrets in the presense of Alger Hiss. Astonished, the Admiral snorted the obvious question: "What'd they bring him here for?" The security officer shrugged and replied that the selection of the Presidential advisers was not in his province; he could only inform the Executive of their security status.

At this writing in the fourth year of the Eisenhower Administration, Hiss has ended his prison term; "Chip" Bohlen is our ambassador to Russia after having hurdled a fierce fight in the Senate with the conservative wing of the Republicans, and Matthews is our ambassador to Holland. Averell Harriman is governor of New York and has unofficially thrown his hat in the ring for presidential nomination, and General Marshall, retired in Virginia, remains the senior statesman and soldier whose advice is sought by both President Eisenhower and his advisers.

Another plausible argument heard for the "errors in judgment" is that at Yalta, in 1945, Roosevelt was already a dying man and that the reins had slipped from his fingers. In poring over the Yalta documents you will find that this is true to a certain extent. Roosevelt was able to "handle" Churchill, but he was too weary to buck Stalin. However, Robert Sherwood points out that Roosevelt "had been prepared even before the Teheran Conference in 1943 to agree to the legitimacy of most if not all of the Soviet claims in the Far East . . ."

Sherwood
866

At Teheran, Roosevelt was not a dying man and his son Elliott, who was his father's aide at that meeting, endeavors to give the President's thoughts at the time. In his flip manner Elliott gives an important bird's-eye view of his father's personal feelings towards the two men he had to deal with throughout all the Big Three conferences—Stalin and Churchill.

Elliott asks his father what he thought of Stalin:

Roosevelt
176

"Oh . . . he's got a kind of massive rumble, talks deliberately, seems very confident, very sure of himself, moves slowly—altogether quite impressive, I'd say."

"You like him?"

He nodded an emphatic affirmative."

Then we come to Roosevelt's comparison of Stalin with the Prime Minister of England, Winston Churchill:

"I'm sure we'll hit it off, Stalin and I," Father said. "A great deal of the misunderstandings and the mistrusts of the past are going to get cleared up during the next few days—I hope once and for all. As for Uncle Joe and Winston, well . . ."

"Not so good, eh?"

"I'll have my work cut out for me, in between those two. They're SO different . . ."

Father told me of the dinner . . . (that) the diametrically opposed views of Stalin and Churchill (were) a great barrier."

At another Teheran meeting between Roosevelt, Stalin and Molotov, at which Elliott was present, the author recounts some of the most important conversations. It leads directly back to the testimony of Browder and Budenz, in the preceding chapter, and the manifesto of Dimitrov:

"Father went on to the other aspects of his conversation with Chiang, the promise that the Chinese Communists would be taken into the Government BEFORE any national Chinese elections . . . Stalin punctuated his remarks, as they were translated, with nods: he seemed in complete agreement." (Emphasis his.)

Remembering the Russian demands for the "unity" of the Red Chinese with Chiang's government, is it any wonder that Stalin was nodding his head in agreement!

But Roosevelt's statement could not have come as a surprise to Stalin. He had his agents well planted in our American government and they did their work well. The President had obviously been well-briefed by one of Russia's helpful friends in the State Department. Although the Teheran papers have not yet been published, we find in the Yalta Papers a briefing paper which surely must have been a duplication of a Teheran briefing in 1943. This unsigned paper recommended a "united, progressive China" as against a "divided, and reactionary China," pointing out that

Roosevelt
176-7

180

Yalta Papers
353

"Communist China is growing in material and popular strength." The recommendation was "that we assume the leadership in assisting China to develop a strong, stable and *unified* government . . ." (Emphasis mine.)

Many have said our State Department was and is riddled with Communists. The facts do not bear this out. A few, powerful conspirators in key positions are all that is needed to steer our policy into Russian channels. The rest of the personnel consists of leftwingers easily led by their Communist colleagues, and a large group of good Americans who keep their mouths shut for expediency's sake. Too many have lost their jobs when they objected to certain policies, or attempted to inform Congressional committees and the FBI about these policies and those who carry them out. A perfect example of this was shown in a press story appearing in the Washington Evening Star on Oct. 20, 1955, which began:

"Prof. Donald M. Dozer, fired as assistant chief of the State Department's Historical Policy Research Division, has asked the Civil Service Commission to find he was improperly discharged because he objected to a 'partial and distorted compilation' of the Yalta Conference documents."

Who were Roosevelt's expert advisers on China prior to Yalta? There were two powerful men. In the White House the President's closest adviser on the Far East was Lauchlin Currie, of whom the McCarran Committee Report on the Institute of Pacific Relations comments:

IPR R-152

Currie, Lauchlin . . . Collaborated with agents of the Soviet intelligence apparatus as shown by sworn testimony. Out of the country or otherwise unavailable for subpoena.

IPR-R-181

The sworn testimony also shows that Currie was in constant communication with Owen Lattimore. And for a short time, Lattimore shared Currie's office.

In the State Department we find that John Carter Vincent was Chief of the Office of Chinese Affairs from 1944 to 1945. The same IPR Report states:

Vincent, John Carter . . . Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.

IPR R-159

We then come to what the Communists call the "fascist group." And it goes without saying, the advice of these people was constantly ignored. Their presence was never required at the big conferences. At that time Joseph Grew was Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs and then Undersecretary of State. Working closely as Grew's assistant was Eugene H. Dooman. Neither of these men trusted the Russians.

We should also bear in mind that "in the field" in China were the aforementioned John S. Service, John P. Davies, John K. Emmerson and Raymond Ludden. The importance of their reports to Washington cannot be emphasized too much, and their favoritism toward the Chinese Communists was accepted by many uninformed and naive men in the State Department. As of this writing, Emmerson and Ludden still remain in our foreign service.

Added to these State Department men, information was coming in from other government agencies such as Treasury where Harry Dexter White was all powerful, the Foreign Economic Administration, the Office of Strategic Services, and the Office of War Information.

The trend of Roosevelt's talks with Stalin are understandable in the light of the character of his Far Eastern experts. It was with authority that Earl Browder testified in 1950 that our China policy from 1942 to 1945, the year he was ousted as head of the Party, undeviatingly followed the Communist line.

Although Winston Churchill warned that it would be catastrophic if Russia were to be left the dominant power in Europe after the war, he got nowhere with

Tydings 1-681

Roosevelt. Strangely enough he had never seen the danger of Communist domination in Asia. One of my helpful friends who read this manuscript for me, made a note in the margin which I will incorporate right here. He scribbled, "Churchill was an unmitigated fool when it came to Far East policy—and continues to be!"

But a United States policy was set at Teheran which has been carefully watched by all our allies both in Asia and Europe ever since. That is, we "view with grave concern" the progress of Russia in the act of absorbing territories, and then call it "peace" after the act is done!

But whatever the P.M.'s shortsightedness in Asia, his one undenied virtue remains "Britain first." Our own statesmen have not adopted an "America first" motto in many, many years. Roosevelt seemed to feel (according to Elliott) that the Prime Minister was a selfish man whose only concern was England, and that he was a stubborn man in his distrust of the Russians. Elliott quotes his father as saying, "Trouble is, the P.M. is thinking too much of the POST-war, and where England will be. He's scared of letting the Russians get too strong."

Roosevelt
185

In discussing the Yalta Conference Elliott relates that "Harry Hopkins is my witness . . . (that) He (Roosevelt) dominated Winston Churchill more completely than before . . ."

241

Hopkins knew whereof he spoke. A classic example of this "domination" can be found in the minutes of a meeting of the President and the Prime Minister with the Combined Chiefs, Feb. 9, 1945, at Livadia Palace. It was here that "The Prime Minister expressed the opinion that it would be of great value if Russia could be persuaded to join with the United States, the British Empire, and China in the issue of a four-power ultimatum calling upon Japan to surrender unconditionally . . . there was no doubt that some mitigation would be worth while if it led to the saving of a year or a year and a half of a war in which so much

Yalta Papers
826

blood and treasure would be poured out. Great Britain would not press for any mitigation but would be content to abide by the judgment of the United States."

President Roosevelt replied that he thought the matter might be taken up with Stalin, but "He doubted whether the ultimatum would have much effect on the Japanese . . ." And there the subject was dropped. There is no record that it ever was "mentioned to Marshal Stalin."

Yalta 826

The minutes of the Yalta conferences (and there were two or three every day) make it obvious that President Roosevelt was tired. This comes out in his inability to retain the many vital details which were discussed. For instance: At a meeting on February 4th we find this interesting sentence in the minutes: "In reply to the President's question as to whether the British troops released from Burma would go into China, General Marshall said that the British had not raised this point." Roosevelt had forgotten that only two days earlier Churchill had proposed just that. Perhaps General Marshall had too, but we find in the minutes of a meeting on February 2nd that "The Prime Minister repeated that if the Americans made any request for British troops to go into China he would certainly be prepared to consider it."

Yalta 565

Yalta 545

A fateful stroke of the pen at Yalta, Feb. 11, 1945, signed the death warrant of many of the soldiers to die until August 10, 1945, and all who died in Korea; it condemned to slavery the Iron Curtain countries, East Germany, half of Korea, and all of China. No one was permitted to know the content of this important document, not even the countries involved. So secret was the "Agreement Regarding Japan" that Stettinius wrote it "did not appear in the protocol of the Yalta Conference . . . Few of the President's closest advisers knew of its existence." And Admiral Leahy remarked that "The actual agreement signed by the President and Stalin was entrusted to my care and kept in my secret files at the White House."

Stettinius 94

Leahy 318

But even after the partial release of the Yalta

agreements, the average citizen still did not comprehend their appalling intent. Although Senators, Congressmen and a handful of newspapermen explained the meaning of the agreements, it was only several years later, when the results became tragically clear that the public began to understand them. I remember hearing many people protest in anger and outrage of the "Yalta betrayal" without realizing what they meant. I had no idea where Yalta was, nor what took place there other than a "Big Three" meeting.

My husband tells the story that in late 1944 he was talking with Admiral Leahy when the Admiral happened to remark that no one had come up with any likely suggestions as to where the coming meeting of the Big Three should take place. My husband, who had travelled in Russia when he was a correspondent in World War I, suggested a place called Yalta.

"Never heard of it," rumbled the Admiral. "Where is it?"

My husband explained that it was formerly the summer resort of the Tsars on the Black Sea. The Russian royal family and noblemen had had their magnificent summer palaces there. It was as warm a spot as could be found in all Russia in February (Stalin refused to leave Russia), although Churchill grumbled from beginning to end at the chilly climate and inconveniences. The approach from the airport was 80 miles of snowy, mountainous roads, and Churchill's palace was 12 miles from Livadia Palace where Roosevelt was staying and where most of the conferences were held.

Forgetting about his chat with the President's Chief of Staff, my husband was genuinely surprised when the meeting of the Conference was set for the southern Russian resort.

It was only when I started this book that I had enough curiosity to take the World Almanac from our book shelf and read the agreements on Asia for myself. I was surprised at the simple language in which it

is written, and even more shocked than I expected to be.

I checked with the State Department Yalta Publication and found it to be a true copy. Let us read the "price" the United States paid Russia for her collaboration in the Pacific War, a war that was already won.

AGREEMENT REGARDING JAPAN

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain—have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has terminated the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

Yalta Papers
826-7, also
Decade of
American
Foreign Pol-
icy, State
Dept. p. 33-4

(1) The *status quo* in Outer-Mongolia (The Mongolian People's Republic) shall be preserved;

(2) The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz:

(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union,

(b) the commercial port of Dairen shall be internationalized, the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union in this port being safeguarded and the lease of Port Arthur as a naval base of the U.S.S.R. restored,

(c) the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian Railroad which provides an outlet to Dairen shall be jointly operated by the establishment of a joint Soviet-Chinese Company it being understood that the preeminent interests of the Soviet Union shall be safeguarded and that China shall retain full sovereignty in Manchuria;

(3) The Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.

It is understood, that the agreement concerning Outer-Mongolia and the ports and railroads referred to above will require concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

The heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union shall be unquestionably fulfilled after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its readiness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the U.S.S.R. and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

Joseph V. Stalin
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Winston S. Churchill

If you belong to that vast number of citizens who are not in the habit of reading international treaties, then take a little extra time to weigh the above words and follow them with the accompanying map.

The third paragraph from the bottom is particularly significant:

The President will take measures in order to obtain this concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin.

This diplomatic gobbledegook, translated into plain English means:

President Roosevelt will force Chiang to accept this agreement when Marshal Stalin tells him he is ready.

All negotiations for this agreement were handled by Harriman and Molotov. The published Yalta Papers permit us to have a small peek at what went on behind scenes. They published Stalin's original draft for the "political conditions," which Molotov handed to Harriman; the suggested changes by Harriman, and the final document.

You will notice that, in the first place, the Russian draft had loopholes which were corrected in the final draft. And secondly, that Harriman attempted to remind the "Two Great Powers" that Chiang Kai-shek should be considered somehow.

The Russians drew up the final draft, ignored Harriman's changes, and plugged up the loopholes with the words "Take measures," and "unquestionably fulfilled."

The meetings at which this agreement was discussed reveal very clearly the strategy of "deflection of thought." There were very many important matters on the mind of the ailing and weary President, and it was easy enough to "rush things along." At a meeting held at Yalta on February 4th at which Roosevelt, the Joint Chiefs and Harriman were present, the topic of China came up. "The President said he wished to have the views of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek before discussing the STATUS QUO in Mongolia . . ." and the subject was postponed.

Yalta Papers
501-2

There was obviously no time for the President to discuss anything with Chiang who was thousands of miles away.

Six days later at a meeting between Roosevelt, Stalin and Harriman, Stalin discussed his "price" for entering the Pacific war, just as though Roosevelt had never expressed a desire to talk it over first with Chiang. According to Harriman's minutes, he, Harriman, never reminded his Chief of his aforementioned desire. Roosevelt's mind seemed to have been confused and, after he had agreed to Stalin's proposed revisions of a draft agreement, he asked the Marshal "when the subject should be discussed with the Generalissimo . . ."

Yalta papers
894-5

And the Marshal's reply was incorporated in the final agreement—"Marshal Stalin said he would let the President know when he was prepared to have this done."

Yalta 895

Harriman then noted that "At that moment the Prime Minister interrupted the discussion. I had an opportunity later, however, to ask Marshal Stalin whether he would undertake to draft the further revisions, to which he replied in the affirmative." Stalin's revision was signed the next day by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill, the latter never having seen any of the drafts until he was presented with the final one and a pen with which to sign it.

Churchill
Triumph &
Tragedy 388-
9

If you examine the first Soviet draft which follows, and Mr. Harriman's proposed changes, and then turn

to Stalin's final draft on page 57 which became the agreement adopted, you will notice Stalin got even more than he initially asked for.

FIRST DRAFT OF MARSHAL STALIN'S POLITICAL
CONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN
THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

(Translation)

Yalta Papers
896

The leaders of the three Great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United States of America and Great Britain have agreed that in two or three months after Germany has surrendered and the war in Europe has ended the Soviet Union shall enter into the war against Japan on the side of the Allies on condition that:

1. STATUS QUO in the Outer Mongolia (the Mongolian Peoples Republic) should be preserved;
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 should be restored viz:
 - a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to this part of Sakhalin should be returned to the Soviet Union,
 - b) possession of Port-Arthur and Dairen on lease should be restored.
 - c) the rights possessed by Russia before the Russo-Japanese war to the operation of the Chinese-Eastern Railroad and the South-Manchurian railroad providing an outlet to Dairen should be restored on the understanding that China should continue to possess full sovereignty in Manchuria;
3. The Kurile islands should be handed over to the Soviet Union. The Heads of the three Great Powers have agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated.

For its part the Soviet Union expresses its willingness to conclude with the National Government of China a pact of friendship and alliance between the USSR and China in order to render assistance to China with its armed forces for the purpose of liberating China from the Japanese yoke.

MR. HARRIMAN'S SUGGESTED CHANGES IN
MARSHAL STALIN'S DRAFT OF RUSSIA'S POLITICAL
CONDITIONS FOR RUSSIA'S ENTRY IN THE
WAR AGAINST JAPAN

ITEM 2. b):

lease of the port areas of Port Arthur and Dairen should be restored, or these areas should become free ports under international control.

Yalta Papers
761

ITEM 2. c):

Add the following after the word "Manchuria"; at the end of the paragraph *"or these railroads should be placed under the operational control of a Chinese-Soviet Commission."*

ITEM 3.:

Add final paragraph:

"It is understood that the agreement concerning the ports and railways referred to above requires the concurrence of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."

(Note: portions italicized are additions to the original document.)

Now, all of this was kept secret from the head of the Chinese Government, Chiang Kai-shek. The reason given by Dean Acheson when the White Paper was published in 1949 is highly astonishing. The official explanation for not informing Chiang was: "For reasons of military security, and for those only, it was considered too dangerous for the United States to consult with the National Government." This was incredible! Chiang, not Stalin, was our ally in the Pacific. And there was not a single instance during the war when Chiang was not wholeheartedly loyal to the United States. It might be added, he was loyal "over and beyond the call of duty." On the other hand, Russia at that time had given ample proof that she was NOT to be trusted as an ally.

White Paper
IX
1944-49

Acheson goes on to say that "It was felt that there was grave risk that secret information transmitted to the Nationalist capital at this time would become available to the Japanese almost immediately."

Yalta Papers
952-3

Yet, in the Yalta Papers there appears a cablegram from Acting Secretary of State Grew in Washington to Secretary of State Stettinius in Yalta, dated Feb. 5, 1945, which proves that Chiang was already aware of the subjects to be discussed at Yalta. The cablegram concerned a message from Ambassador Patrick Hurley in China. Here is the pertinent part of Grew's cable:

"Chiang Kai-shek and Soong have informed Hurley that the Soviet Government has agreed to receive Soong as a personal representative of the Generalissimo . . . Discussions will cover establishment of closer relations, *Soviet participation in the war against Japan, Soviet-Chinese relation in Korea and Manchuria*, post-war economic matters and the Sino-Soviet border. Hurley invites suggestions regarding this agenda for Chiang who desires full cooperation . . ." (Emphasis mine.)

Perhaps when Mr. Acheson presented his Letter of Transmittal, he was confident that the Yalta Papers would never be published.

Sherwood
866

Why did Stalin want the agreement kept secret? The pretense was this. He told Roosevelt at Yalta that "he intended to start the movement of twenty-five Russian divisions across Siberia to the Far East and this operation must be conducted in utmost secrecy . . ." Perhaps FDR did not know that it was physically impossible for Japan to do anything about such a movement of troops. But there is no doubt that his "advisers" at Yalta were well aware that Japan was on her last legs.

Yalta 952
Yalta 769

The proposed reason for Stalin moving twenty-five divisions to the border of Manchuria was to help China defeat the Japanese. But from a close examination of the Yalta documents, it is obvious that they were to be used to help the Red Chinese troops against Chiang. The Soviets postponed the meeting with Soong to late February or March. And at Yalta, Stalin told Roosevelt that "when it was possible to . . . move twenty-five divisions to the Far East it would be possible to speak to Marshal Chiang Kai-shek about these

matters." "These matters," of course, being the Chinese territory Russia was to get. Stalin suggested the time for the meeting with Soong should be the end of April. The implication of these minutes is that with twenty-five formidable Russian divisions on the Chinese border, Chiang would "wholeheartedly" agree to giving up his territory to the Russians.

Meanwhile, Ambassador Hurley in China cabled that Chiang wanted a meeting between himself, Roosevelt and Churchill at Delhi to discuss the Yalta agreements. There is no record in the published documents that this cable was ever answered. Perhaps it was one of the many which were omitted. But Chiang never got his chance to have a meeting with Churchill and Roosevelt.

Yalta 960

The United States Strategic Bombing Survey gives a clear picture of the military situation in the Pacific on the eve of Yalta:

In June the loss of the Marianas had struck terror into the hearts of responsible Japanese authorities and had convinced many that the war was lost. *By January 1945 Japan was in fact a defeated nation.* The Philippines had been lost, true, but much more important was what had been lost with them. The Southern Resources Area, the prize for which the war had been fought, was gone and American fleets sailed with impunity to the shores of eastern Asia. All hope of future resistance had depended upon oil and now the tankers were sunk and the oil cut off. The surface fleet was gone, and so were 7,000 aircraft, expended in four months defense of the last supply line. Suicide attack, bleeding tactics, were now the last best hope of this shrunken empire and even these economical methods of defense suffered from the blockade: pilot training was cut again to a bare 100 hours and in the Inland Sea the surviving ships of the Imperial Navy could barely muster enough oil for a last planned one-way trip.

USSBS The
Campaigns of
the Pacific
War 1946
pp. 289-90

At home the bad news began to be known and mutterings of negotiated conditional peace arose even in the armed forces. Japan was defeated: it remained only necessary to persuade her of the fact. (Emphasis mine.)

Instead of persuading Japan to accept defeat, however, Roosevelt was persuaded that he must buy Russian help to defeat an already defeated foe. The price was high in blood, treasure, honor and in peace itself.

President Roosevelt died the following April, but President Truman carried out the word of his predecessor. On August 14, 1945, Chiang's Foreign Minister, Wang Shih-chieh, put his signature to a separate treaty with Russia in Moscow, the news of which was lost in the excitement of VJ-day. If China had not signed, it was a foregone conclusion that no further aid would come from America in China's desperate fight against the Chinese Communists.

It must have been a very lonely day for the Generalissimo, who, unknown to the world, had agreed to sign away the freedom of his country and incidentally world peace, which that day was so mistakenly celebrated. And no one knew it better than Chiang.

It is permissible to speculate on what thoughts flowed through the mind of Chiang Kai-shek. Did he recall the Japanese surrender offer? Did he recall that, when the United States did not respond, he remained loyal to his alliance and continued to fight an enemy who had offered great concessions to China in exchange for peace?

On the other hand, a hint of things to come was given the Generalissimo by the Teheran Conference in December 1943. The only time Chiang was invited to a meeting with Roosevelt and Churchill was at Cairo, a few days before the Teheran meeting took place. It was at Cairo that Roosevelt promised the Chinese to carry out a vigorous campaign to recapture Burma, and, according to General Wedemeyer, "Chiang Kai-shek was told there substantially that the sovereignty of China over Manchuria would be recognized and Formosa would be returned to China." But "The agreement at Cairo did not stick for more than ten days . . ." because at Teheran, Nov. 28, 1943, Stalin's statement that Russia would join the war

MacA 3-2416

Sherwood
774

Chiang refused to accept Japan's offer out of loyalty to U.S. A. who then betrayed Chiang & China

in the Pacific caused Roosevelt to abandon any "vigorous" aid to China. Later, the story goes, certain members of the State Department staff came to refer to the meeting at Teheran as "the corrective conference," putting their seal of approval on the change in policy toward China.

Sherwood
800

From early in the war Franklin Roosevelt was determined to help Chiang as much as possible. He looked upon the Generalissimo as one of the United States' staunchest allies. But strangely, he abandoned his friend on the instalment plan, finally ending with his signature to the Yalta Agreement.

As a footnote, Robert Sherwood writes that "aside from the declaration assuring the freedom and independence of Korea, the effect of these meetings (at Cairo) on the progress of the war or on history was negligible."

Sherwood
771

According to recent history it would seem that the declaration concerning Korea was also "negligible."

Perhaps Chiang was also reflecting on the general atmosphere at Cairo and the following "corrective conference" at Teheran as he pondered the treaty signing at Moscow.

One must remember that Harry Truman, who had been President for only a few months prior to Potsdam, had to rely on the briefing of his inherited advisers who were familiar with the Yalta Conference. Throughout his short term as vice-president, Mr. Truman had been treated as another "Throttlebottom" and knew less about what the Chief Executive was doing than the most humble White House attaché. But it is impossible to believe that our American officials were merely naive in forcing Chiang to sign the Russo-Chinese Treaty on VJ-day.

It has been said by a number of apologists for Yalta that Chiang was pleased with the Russo-Chinese Treaty. Charles Bohlen told a Congressional committee in 1953 that "I know that at the time the Chinese-Soviet treaty was generally regarded as a victory for

Senate Foreign
Relations 124-5

Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist Government, and it was so considered by him, if you can judge by his public statements."

This was a strange statement to be made by a man who later became our ambassador to Russia as well as one of the chief advisers of President Eisenhower and Secretary of State Dulles at the 1955 conferences in Geneva. Bohlen knew, as well as anyone, you can't judge by public statements! Chiang still hoped we would keep the Red Wolf from his door—and also, he had to maintain the morale of the Chinese people. How could he tell them there was a good chance the Red hordes would take over?

MacA 3-2417

General Albert C. Wedemeyer, who went with General Patrick Hurley on June 15, 1945 when the latter informed the Generalissimo of the Yalta Agreement, tells a different story. Chiang was stunned. General Wedemeyer told a Congressional committee that after General Hurley had recited the agreement to Chiang: "He did not ask a question. He just was silent for about a minute. And then he asked Ambassador Hurley through the interpreter to please repeat that . . . And then he just said that he was terribly disappointed, or words to that effect."

MacA 3-2432

Premier T. V. Soong was sent to Moscow immediately to negotiate the treaty. The insults and arrogance he received from the Russians, plus the time he was kept cooling his heels, caused him to return to Chungking, leaving the negotiations to be carried on by Foreign Minister Wang Shih-chieh. General Wedemeyer testified that Soong felt so strongly about the treaty that he "told me he would not sign such an agreement . . . ceding territory whose sovereignty had been recognized," and "he didn't." Wang Shih-chieh signed in his stead.

However, Russia did not bother very much with the treaty. It had merely given the Communists the key railways and ports they needed without the necessity of fighting for them. Moreover, Russia had other plans. The treaty was the last necessary step before the Red

Chinese could begin their big push to take over all of China, eventually forcing Chiang and the Nationalist troops to seek refuge on Formosa. Russia waited from 1936 (Dimitrov's speech) to 1949 for this vitally important territorial gain toward world domination. In February 1950 the Soviets signed a "thirty-year friendship and mutual defense pact" with Mao Tse-tung, the Red leader. With the fall of China and this pact the Korean war was all set to go four months later.

The story of Yalta is strange and shocking. Future historians will always wonder why President Roosevelt, speaking before a joint session of the Congress of the United States, March 1, 1945, said, "Quite naturally, this conference concerned itself only with the European war and with the political problems of Europe and not with the Pacific war."

another
of
F. D. R.'s
lies -

But these revelations we learned in later years. At that time only a few men in Congress saw the folly of secret conferences and secret agreements. However, their lonely voices were shouted down with hints of treason, and their personal characters were ridiculed before the public in every possible way.

The late Robert A. Taft was a "blackguard" playing into the hands of the Nazis; Martin Dies was smeared to high heaven for daring to expose the evil intentions of Russia; the late Senator Kenneth Wherry was the darkest of rascals; and Senator Styles Bridges was a contemptible "reactionary" for boldly stating on the Senate floor and in newspaper interviews that "the American people want to know" if our gallant allies have been sold out by secret "commitments."

In order to understand American policy during the war years it is necessary to become familiar with a most extraordinary memorandum. It was prepared for Harry Hopkins by General James H. Burns, Executive Director of Lend-Lease who reported directly to Hopkins. Like all of Hopkins' aides, Burns felt free to ignore all top-ranking officials, and in dealing with the Russians his power was subordinate only to his

Standle

boss. The subject of the memo was the absolute need to have Russia as a friend. It was, in fact, the basis for our wartime foreign policy, and has remained so even today. Indeed, it seems to have replaced the Declaration of Independence.

For an official memo it smacks of fanaticism. Robert Sherwood published it in its entirety because he said, ". . . it was an excellent statement of Hopkins' own views . . ."

Sherwood
641

The following selected items explain many actions by our government heretofore unexplainable.

Sherwood
641-3

6. WITH REFERENCE TO OUR NEED FOR RUSSIA AS A REAL FRIEND AND CUSTOMER IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD.

8. (c) Do everything possible in a generous but not lavish way to help Russia by sending supplies to the limit of shipping possibilities and by sending forces to Russia to join with her in the fight against Germany. (Emphasis mine. See appendix for additional text.)

Item (c) provides the background for a remarkable action taken by President Roosevelt during the sticky and tragic problem of the "Murmansk run." Our ships carrying supplies and munitions to Russia through the narrow Arctic waters met such terrible disasters at the hands of the German fleet that our losses amounted to one out of every three ships. Hopkins was distressed over these figures because it meant our ships were being sunk faster than we could build them.

"At one time," writes Sherwood, "there were fifteen ships in Iceland that had turned back from the Murmansk run; . . . there were twenty-one more Russian-bound ships halfway to Iceland that had to be rerouted to Loch Ewe in Scotland because of the congestion at Reykjavik . . . In order to free some of these idle ships for some useful service their cargoes were unloaded in Scotland, which led to all manner of acrimonious charges from Moscow that the British

Sherwood
544

C.F. Reis
member

were 'stealing' Lend-Lease material assigned to them. There was consequently an increasing effort to get the ships through at whatever cost—and the cost was awful."

For a short time the Murmansk run was abandoned. Although Stalin was well informed of our untenable losses, neither Hopkins nor Roosevelt could get up his nerve to tell him the last convoy had been cancelled. Finally on Oct. 5, 1942, Roosevelt sent a cable to Churchill in which he "indicated he had reconsidered the question of cancelling the convoy PQ 19." He proposed that the ships sail in twos and threes ". . . at intervals of twenty-four to forty-eight hours, supported by two or three escorts." He emphasized to the Prime Minister:

Sherwood
638-9

"I think it is better under any circumstances that we run this risk rather than endanger our whole relations with Russia at this time."

Sherwood
639

The words of Alfred Lord Tennyson—"Theirs not to reason why, Theirs but to do and die," more adequately commemorate the sailors and seamen on the Murmansk run than the heroes of Balaclava. The "Noble six hundred" at least, were dying because "some one had blundered" on the battle field. Our boys, on the other hand, were being extravagantly sacrificed by a carefully considered decision made in Washington.

The next item of the Burns' memorandum reveals more than anything else the difficulty Congressman Martin Dies had as chairman of the Un-American Activities Committee in exposing Communists in government agencies. The problem is still with us, and maybe the memorandum is too.

8. (g) Establish the general policy throughout all U.S. departments and agencies that Russia must be considered as a real friend and be treated accordingly and that *personnel must be assigned to Russian con-*

Sherwood
643

tacts that are loyal to this concept. (Emphasis mine.)

This extraordinary paragraph implies that only pro-Russian Americans in our government service were to be selected to make contacts with Russian officials, the latter, of course, being trained spies.

Yalta Papers
396

A curious follow-up on this is to be found in a memorandum from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the President dated 23 January 1945. It was signed, not by the Chairman of the JCS, Admiral Leahy, but by General George C. Marshall. The subject concerned "the status to date of negotiations with the Russians." The last paragraph enumerated the many delays in the war effort caused by the Russians. Marshall said the JCS suggested that Stalin be asked to clear up these difficulties, "and that he also be asked to state what inefficiencies and delays his own people have experienced in working with the U.S. in order that we may make necessary corrections on our side."

In other words, Marshall wanted the Russians to tattle on Americans whom the Soviets considered responsible for delay in our aid to Russia so he could "make necessary corrections!"

The final item in the Burns' memo was the basis for our policy at Yalta:

Sherwood
643

- 8 (j) Agree to assist, in every proper and friendly way, to formulate a peace that will meet Russia's legitimate aspirations.

With this memorandum as a background it is understandable that diplomats who disagreed with the appeasement of the Russians were shunted off to remote posts where they were too far away to create interference. And it also explains why military officers who put America's interests first at all times were demoted or transferred to non-sensitive outfits and eventually retired.

A classic though little publicized example is the fol-

lowing story. Former Governor George H. Earle of Pennsylvania was a Lieutenant Commander in the Navy serving as assistant naval attaché in Turkey when he sent frantic dispatches to Washington of the alarming situation in that country in regard to Russia. Frustrated when he received no replies, he became convinced that his messages were being pigeonholed by lower echelon officers. He flew to Washington and had a personal interview with President Roosevelt. The President assumed a fatherly and sympathetic attitude, and noted that the strain of work in Turkey was "telling" on the former governor. He suggested a new post where the work was light and the weather pleasant. With amazing speed, Commander Earle became Governor of Samoa, a remote island in the Pacific. There he literally was forgotten until after the war when it took the personal intervention of a Pennsylvania Congressman with President Truman to release Governor Earle from his Samoan exile.

At the Foreign Ministers' meeting in Moscow in October 1943, Stalin promised Secretary of State Cordell Hull that Russia would enter the war against Japan. At Teheran, two months later, the details were spelled out to President Roosevelt. Stalin announced that Russia would enter the Pacific war three months after the defeat of Germany. He explained that he would need three months to transfer his troops from Europe to Siberia on the Manchurian border.

However, the Japanese foreign service officer, Mr. Kase, writes (and our intelligence as well as the Japanese and Chinese knew) that Stalin did not wait for the fall of Germany to start moving his troops. Kase points out that the Japanese military position was rapidly deteriorating and that, in order to reinforce the home defense, Japan transferred the bulk of its highly trained Manchurian army to Japan. This left Manchuria "thinly defended." Mr. Kase then goes on to say that "Beginning about March 1945, trainload after trainload of Russian soldiers and equipment was sent

Kase 165-6

eastward from the European theater where the war against Germany was drawing to a close."

Again we remember that the only stated reason for keeping the Yalta agreement secret from Chiang was that, if the Chinese knew, they might leak the news of these troop movements to the Japanese. How such large troop movements could NOT be detected by the enemy and allied agents and observers is difficult to understand. And the Japanese did know it. Mr. Acheson made no mention of this fact in his Letter of Transmittal in the White Paper.

It was not to be expected that Philip Jessup, in charge of writing the 1949 White Paper for Acheson, would make known the fact that a number of the President's advisers not only did not believe it was necessary to get Russia into the Pacific war, but on the contrary were fearful of the consequences if she did. The one-sided White Paper contained only those views which would give support to the Yalta agreements. But all through the memoirs written of those days we find polite and restrained references to the disagreements when "the Army" in the person of General Marshall differed with the Naval officers and civilian statesmen. The latter protested that the war had already been won. To quote Stettinius:

Stettinius 90 "I knew at Yalta, for instance, of the immense pressure put on the President by our military leaders to bring Russia into the Far Eastern war . . ."

This pressure persisted, according to Stettinius, up to the San Francisco United Nations meeting. He comments in his book about a discussion he had with President Truman shortly before the conference, April 25, 1945, about the Soviet violations of the Yalta agreements:

Stettinius 97 ". . . the United States military representatives pleaded for patience with the Soviet Union because they feared that a crack-down would endanger Russian entry into the Far Eastern war."

In commenting on his own advice en route to Yalta, Admiral Leahy recorded:

"I was of the firm opinion that our war against Japan had progressed to the point where her defeat was only a matter of time and attrition. Therefore, we did not need Stalin's help to defeat our enemy in the Pacific. The Army did not agree with me . . ."

Leahy 293

James F. Byrnes borrows Admiral Leahy's "jaundiced" view in "Speaking Frankly":

"I must frankly admit that in view of what we know of Soviet actions in eastern Germany and the violations of the Yalta agreements in Poland, Rumania and Bulgaria, I would have been satisfied had the Russians determined not to enter the war . . . I feared what would happen when the Red Army entered Manchuria. Before it left Manchuria my fears were realized."

Byrnes 208

Commander Whitehill, ghosting for Admiral King, reflects the Admiral's opinion on the subject:

"To King, Leahy, Nimitz, and naval officers in general, it had always seemed that the defeat of Japan could be accomplished by sea and air power alone without the necessity of actual invasion of the Japanese home islands by ground troops . . . From the time of the Teheran Conference there had been the political consideration of Soviet intervention in the war against Japan, and the Army had been convinced that the use of ground troops would be necessary. Upon Marshall's insistence, which also reflected MacArthur's views, the Joint Chiefs had prepared plans for landing in Kyushu and eventually in the Tokyo plain. King and Leahy did not like the idea, but as *unanimous decisions were necessary in the Joint Chiefs meetings*, they reluctantly acquiesced, feeling that in the end sea power would accomplish the defeat of Japan, as proved to be the case."

King 598

I have purposely italicized the words above because the readers of various memoirs and Congress-

sional hearings can be seriously misled by the often repeated statements that "such-and-such was the unanimous opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff." This leaves the implication that "therefore if everyone agreed, it must have been the best opinion."

General MacArthur, however, did not join his Army colleagues in Washington in the belief that Russian aid in the Pacific was a necessity. John Chamberlain who collaborated with Maj. Gen. Charles A. Willoughby in the book, "MacArthur," quotes the General's comment:

Willoughby
285

"From the viewpoint of my Headquarters, Russian participation was not required. I had urged Russian intervention back in 1941 to draw the Japanese from their southward march and keep them pinned down in Siberia. By 1945 such intervention had become superfluous."

Pentagon
papers 50

General MacArthur's views on the Pacific war were not asked for before or during Yalta. In fact he was only told after the Conference about the military decisions and not about the "price" we paid. Yet who would know better whether it was necessary to obtain Russia's help against Japan?

Pentagon
papers 39

Added to these points of view, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, according to the "Pentagon papers" published in October 1955, recommended as early as November 23, 1944, that "Soviet participation, while desirable to hasten the unconditional surrender of Japan, was not essential. Therefore, support should not be given the Soviets at the expense of the main United States effort in the Pacific."

34-5

The most curious aspect of all this was that Stalin was afraid that we would not need Russia to defeat Japan! Ambassador Harriman sent a report to President Roosevelt on a meeting he had with Stalin Sept. 23, 1944 in which he said that "Stalin inquired whether we wished to bring Japan to her knees without Russian assistance or whether you wished as you suggested in Teheran Russian participation." Roosevelt sent a hasty

assurance to Stalin, and then sent a message to Churchill saying "Stalin is at the present time sensitive about any doubt as to his intention to help us in the Orient."

While the American public did not have access to this inside information, the daily papers had been consistently reporting the series of defeats suffered by the Japanese. Along with this was a sprinkling of propaganda against the Emperor. The following are a few items reported directly after Yalta:

N.Y. TIMES, FEB. 13, 1945

London, Feb. 12.—The Chinese delegation to the World Trade Union conference demanded today the Emperor of Japan be brought to trial as a war criminal.

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, FEB. 14, 1945

Feb. 14—A Tokyo radio commentator told the world in a broadcast heard in London today that it is Japan's policy "not to reject any hand which offers peace."
(Quoting Shigemitsu.)

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, FEB. 15, 1945

Pacific Fleet Headquarters, Guam, Feb. 16, AP . . . The greatest Naval fleet ever assembled hunted for a fight within 300 miles of Japan's shores.

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, FEB. 19, 1945

Feb. 19, AP . . . Admiral Halsey said today . . . they (the Japanese) have got very little left to fight with and what they have is not good enough."

On March 23rd the New York Times reported Brig. Gen. Carlos P. Romulo, Resident Commissioner to the Philippines, as calling "for Congressional action against war criminals, including the Japanese Mikado."

On March 12, a dispatch from Guam told that the Japanese had lost at least 17 warships, including a 45,000 ton super battleship and 8 aircraft carriers. On March 31st, American carrier planes sank 18 Japanese ships, probably sunk 13 others and damaged 15. The amazing total was 56.

Roth in his "Dilemma in Japan" reflects the fears of the Communists that the war was coming to an end

Roth 14

sooner than they had expected. He warned that in the first months of 1945, that is, at the time of Yalta, it was realized that Japan, being on the rocks for all practical reasons, might make offers of peace. This accounts for the almost frantic propaganda the Communists began to manufacture against the Emperor, stepping up the "line" in a faster acceleration.

Baldwin 80-1

To understand fully the attitude of the controlling powers in Washington, it is helpful to read the comments of those authors who favored the policies at Yalta. Robert Sherwood was a close associate of the White House group and had intimate knowledge of those who made our policies. In his book he reveals the fact that MacArthur's reports to Washington did not always reach the President. This was also suspected by Hanson Baldwin, military editor of the New York Times, who contended in his book, "Great Mistakes of the War," that much information and military intelligence concerning the Pacific never reached the top at the Yalta Conference.

Sherwood writes:

Sherwood
878

On March 24 (1945), I went to see the President in his office . . . I said that . . . victory in the Pacific appeared a great deal nearer than I had imagined before I made this trip. I told the President what I had heard MacArthur say on this subject, and Roosevelt observed, rather wistfully, "I wish that he would sometimes tell some of these things to ME." He then asked me to put my observations in the form of a short memorandum, and I did so as follows:

1. General MacArthur's intelligence service on the enemy and enemy-held territory is superb, due largely to the Filipino guerilla organization which was organized and directed under his command.

2. On the other hand I was shocked by the inaccuracy of the information held by General MacArthur and his immediate entourage about the formulation of high policy in Washington. There are unmistakable evidences of an acute persecution complex at work. To hear some of the staff officers talk, one would think that the War Department, the State Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff—and, possibly, even the White House itself—are under the domination of

"Communists and British Imperialists." This strange misapprehension produces an obviously unhealthy state of mind, and also the most unfortunate public relations policy that I have seen in any theater of war . . .

3. . . . Following is a brief summary of General MacArthur's views on the future handling of Japan which he expressed to me at considerable length and with great positiveness and eloquence:

. . . The total destruction of Japanese military power, therefore, can involve (for the Japanese civil population) destruction of the concept of Hirohito's divinity. This will result in a spiritual vacuum and an opportunity for the introduction of new concepts . . .

A note from General Willoughby, General MacArthur's chief of intelligence, states that "*MacArthur was opposed to the removal of the Emperor.*" (Emphasis his.)

Some years later, in March 1953, when Charles Bohlen appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee for confirmation on his appointment by President Eisenhower as United States Ambassador to Russia, he shed further light on the Yalta Agreements. Having served as adviser and interpreter at the Moscow Foreign Ministers meeting in 1943, and subsequently at Teheran, Yalta and Potsdam, he is more familiar with the story of World War II than most living persons. Unfortunately he has not seen fit to write his memoirs.

Former Senator Homer Ferguson, Republican of Michigan, and a member of the committee, interrogated Mr. Bohlen extensively. Discussing the wording of the agreement he asked—

Senator Ferguson. (reading) ". . . the President will take measures in order to obtain the concurrence on advice from Marshal Stalin."

Bohlen hearings 22-23

Now, is it not true that he is going to "take measures," and not just request them?

Mr. Bohlen. I understood that the words "take measures" in that sense means that he will use his influence with Chiang Kai-shek to that effect.

Senator Ferguson. Was it not more than influence; was it not meant that measures would be taken?

Mr. Bohlen. I have understood, sir, that the word "measures" meant that you were not going to do anything except to urge upon the Chinese acceptance of this.

* * *

page 90

Senator Ferguson. We were going to force China to do this.

Mr. Bohlen. This is the question. The question did not arise because it was not necessary to use any force or pressure on them. In fact, quite the contrary.

Senator Ferguson. Chiang Kai-shek had to have help from us. There isn't any doubt about it, to fight Red China.

* * *

page 39

Senator Ferguson. Do you know whose words I read to you this morning: "Take measures to obtain 'the concurrence of Chiang Kai-shek with the provisions.'" Do you know whose words those are?

Mr. Bohlen. No, sir; I don't . . .

Senator Ferguson. You don't know who even suggested that?

Mr. Bohlen. No.

page 47

The text of the agreement, Mr. Bohlen testified, was drawn up by Harriman and Molotov with only a Russian interpreter present. At the two meetings at which the terms were discussed and agreed upon by Roosevelt and Stalin, those others present were Molotov, Harriman, Bohlen and a Soviet interpreter.

Senator Ferguson interrogated the witness concerning the moral meaning of the agreement. He asked Mr. Bohlen:

page 22

Senator Ferguson. . . . what I want to know is whether or not the giving of this land of another power, another nation, was not in violation of the Atlantic Charter . . . ?

Mr. Bohlen. Well, sir, I do not think that the Atlantic Charter was against any *territorial adjustments* between countries. . . .

page 24

Senator Ferguson. . . . Was it not true in the Nine Power Pact that we agreed to respect the sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China?

Mr. Bohlen. Yes, as I understand it; I am not too familiar with the text of it.

Senator Ferguson. Do you believe that what was done at Yalta breached and repudiated that part of the Nine Power Pact that I read to you?

Mr. Bohlen. Senator, that is a matter of opinion. . . .

* * *

Senator Ferguson. Then you come to the conclusion that the only wrong that you can find in these agreements at Yalta, Teheran, or any of the others that we made with Russia, was in the interpretation?

Bohlen 23

Mr. Bohlen. No, sir; I think that the chief thing that was wrong was the violation of them afterward. (By the Russians.) (Emphasis mine.)

Many good Republicans would not have voted to confirm Mr. Bohlen's appointment as ambassador to Russia if he had been appointed by a Democratic administration. But they, as well as the now ex-Senator Ferguson, remained loyal to the new Eisenhower administration and supported the candidate even though they were thoroughly familiar with Bohlen's political philosophy exposed in his testimony before the Foreign Relations Committee.

Averell Harriman is a "photo-finish" second to Bohlen in his knowledge of our wartime dealings with Russia. Bohlen's role as interpreter and adviser between Roosevelt and Stalin when the two met alone is all that puts him first. Otherwise Harriman was present at almost every important meeting, "Big Three" and otherwise.

Governor Harriman could, if he would, throw great light on past U.S.-Soviet relations. But his only contribution to historians has been his statement "Regarding our Wartime Relations with the Soviet Union" which he drew up for the MacArthur hearings in 1951. Bohlen fell back on this statement during his own hearings in 1953.

In this statement Harriman begins by condemning all those who have criticized the Yalta agreements,

MacA 5-3228

saying some of these people "have profited from hindsight." (And "hindsight" is the excuse we have been hearing all along.) "Still others," he said, ". . . have distorted and perverted the facts to a point where their statements have little or no basis in reality."

But if an interested party should ask if there had been any "foresight" information *before* Yalta, I would unhesitatingly direct them to a memorandum found in the Yalta Papers, written by none other than Ambassador to Russia W. Averell Harriman, Jan. 10, 1945, and received by the Secretary of State, Stettinius, exactly one month before the Yalta agreements were signed! If the United States delegation to the Yalta Conference had made this document, written by Harriman, the basis for their policies, the world would have been a different place today.

One of the most interesting passages is the following observation. Mr. Harriman wrote that the Soviet Union was incorporating into their Union all allied countries on their borders by the use of a "wide variety of means." Let us look carefully at the list of "means" he gave.

occupation troops
secret police
local communist parties
labor unions
sympathetic leftist organizations
sponsored cultural societies
economic pressure

Except for "occupation troops," Soviet Russia has been using these same "means" in the United States today. Why hasn't Averell Harriman dedicated himself over the past ten years to warning America that Russia uses these "dupes and allies" in an attempt to overthrow our government?

"It is particularly noteworthy," he wrote in 1945, "that no practical distinction seems to be made in this connection between members of the United Nations

whose territory is liberated (from the Nazis) by Soviet troops and ex-enemy countries which have been occupied . . . The Soviet conception of 'security' does not appear cognizant of the similar needs or rights of other countries . . ."

Yalta Papers
451

I have found in my research a number of other memos from Harriman warning that Russia's actions make her an untrustworthy ally. And because of these memos, Mr. Harriman must have been aware that the "Agreement Regarding Japan," which Stalin dreamed up and Harriman and Molotov negotiated, was bound to throw all of Asia into the Red orbit.

How is it possible for him to say in his 1951 statement that, "The postwar problems have resulted not from the understandings reached at Yalta but from the fact that Stalin failed to carry out those understandings and from aggressive actions by the Kremlin"?

MacA 5-3328

What made him change his mind in postwar years?

Mr. Harriman, as well as everyone else in our government at the time of Yalta had ample proof that Russia was not likely to keep her promises or stand by her treaties. The Yalta Papers contain some warning memoranda—but omit others. The Yalta Papers do *not* include any documents showing Japanese offers to surrender. Could there have been telephone conversations such as Harry Truman had with Winston Churchill when they discussed the German offer to surrender in April 1945? Did either Roosevelt or Truman know that Japan had been offering to surrender?

Until another more enlightening memoir is written, or Congressional committees ask more questions of those responsible, much information on Yalta will die with this generation. When the Papers were finally published—after a nine year delay—the State Department admitted they were incomplete. Some of the omissions were of the Department's own making, and many were not. For instance, the Stettinius estate, Governor James F. Byrnes and Governor W. Averell Harriman refused to contribute their own notes and

documents. And, although the Roosevelt and Hopkins papers kept in the Hyde Park Library were made available on request, a full search of those documents was never requested. What are these heavy secrets still so carefully kept from the American public?

Yalta has become a new word with a new meaning because it was a turning point in world history. It produced death instead of life, war instead of peace, hate instead of friendship, lies instead of truth.

Chapter IV

OKINAWA—SUZUKI—EUGENE DOOMAN TESTIFIES

Okinawa, April 1 to June 21, 1945.

Hirohito sends up a "smoke signal."

Press reports.

Peace feelers.

Eugene Dooan testifies.

ON April Fool's Day 1945, a United States Army, Navy and Marine force under Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, launched another D-day which was to be one of the bloodiest battles in history—Okinawa. It was the beginning of nearly three months of warfare with which only Tarawa and Iwo Jima compared in cruelty. It was here that an ordinary American kid, who should have been worried about college exams and dates, now grasped a flame thrower and watched a man's face drop to the ground like a slab of butter.

Although the Japanese Air Force and battle fleet had been so depleted that they were able to give only token support to their large land force on Okinawa, the Japanese fought stubbornly and without hope. An AP dispatch from Guam on April 3rd 1945 reflected the fighting ability of our own men when it reported that "Almost 10 days ahead of schedule, the 25th Corps infantrymen today were on the eastern shore of Okinawa."

But it was only the beginning of the weary, bloody days which followed one after another with repetitious terror and GI's called the gain of a yard a victory.

Had normal reactions been allowed to carry through and the surrender of Japan been accepted, the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa would never have taken place. And there is good reason to believe that the enormous casualties suffered by our youths in those battles greatly influenced our new President, Harry

Truman, in his desire to obtain aid from Russia in the Pacific war.

That Okinawa was a lost battle, and that its loss meant utter disaster, was known to the Japanese military and recognized by the "moderates" and "liberals" of the peace party. The situation called for drastic and desperate steps to end the war. "On April 4th," Mr. Kase writes, "the Koiso cabinet (which followed the Tojo cabinet) died an ignominious death." Koiso was a "snow man melting away into water under the rays of the sun," Mr. Kase went on, and "The sun was the rising sentiment of the people at large for peace—peace at any price."

Kase 108

It was at this time that the Emperor sent up his "smoke signal," a signal that rose so high the whole world would see it and understand it for what it was—the white flag of truce. The "signal" was the appointment of Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki as the new premier. He had belonged to the "moderates" all his life and had always been an avowed pacifist. Those who have followed the political history of Japan will remember that Suzuki had been one of the targets of the "young militarists" uprising in 1936 and at that time he had been shot and left for dead. His appointment in April 1945 was a signal to the Allies that the Emperor had won a victory over the militarist leaders, and that Japan was willing to talk surrender.

Kase 116 also
USSBS,
Japan's
Struggle to
End the
War 6

The significance of the appointment of Baron Suzuki was recognized by diplomats, statesmen and newspapermen from continent to continent. But to those in Washington who had power to take action, it apparently carried no serious meaning. An enterprising and analytical reporter for the Associated Press wrote a dispatch on April 5th 1945 which should have at least given the public and Congress a hint. "Admiral Baron Kantaro Suzuki," he wrote, "may be the front man for a Japanese peace offensive . . . which the Japanese might hope could gain a hearing for peace tenders to America and her allies."

D.C. Star
April 6, '45

The Communist Party recognized fully the signifi-

cance of Suzuki and we can find testimony to this in Roth's "Dilemma in Japan." He wrote that all that was needed to make the Suzuki Cabinet a complete peace cabinet was for them to get rid of the "militarists or Gumbatsu."

For several days the press in America emphasized the peace signal but, like the seeds that fell on barren ground instead of fertile soil, Suzuki's appointment met with official eyes that were "blind" and ears that were "deaf."

An editorial in the Washington Evening Star on April 6 notes:

This might be the first move toward a bid for a compromise peace with the western powers before Russia entered the picture.

On the same page Major George Fielding Eliot also caught the meaning, although he took the opposite tack:

The point for Americans to keep firmly in mind is that we must not be deceived by the appointment of Suzuki . . . All Americans will welcome Russian collaboration in the task of bringing that surrender to pass.

This, of course, was the policy of our government, and more than likely was given Major Eliot in an interview with the often quoted "high official source."

Another to take notice of this important Japanese step was former President Hoover. He considered it of such great importance that he requested an appointment with President Truman to discuss the matter, and came to Washington for that purpose.

To those well acquainted with the personalities and political character of Japanese statesmen, it was also significant that Suzuki's Foreign Minister, Togo, belonged to the "peace party" as did Admiral Yonai, the Navy Minister, who "was an avowed supporter of the peace movement and was widely acknowledged

as such." These facts were all brought out by Mr. Hoover in talking with President Truman. While the latter listened with apparent interest, his closing remark, asking Mr. Hoover to make a memo on the subject, threw a wet rag on Mr. Hoover's hopes for peace. It is not out of the way to wonder why Mr. Truman's reaction was so negative. Could it be possible that, in preparation for the former Republican President's visit to the White House, Truman's advisers had briefed him in advance and convinced him that the Suzuki appointment was unimportant? With a sense of futility, Mr. Hoover went back to New York and sent the memo.

World wide political effects so often depend on whether a man has a quick mind or a slow one; whether he is strong or weak. As we shall see, Admiral Suzuki pulled one or two boners himself. It was his first venture in political affairs for many years, and, not being aware of all the current factors, he was more optimistically inclined than his colleagues. When Suzuki became premier, he told his people that "There is but one way for our nation to follow, and that is to fight to the very end . . . The unconditional surrender voiced by the enemy means the death of our people. We have no way but to fight." This speech helped the Left clique in America to ignore the "smoke signal."

Kase 151

USSBS
Japan's
Struggle to
End the
War p. 6

Suzuki's problem, of course, was "On the one hand he had instructions from the Emperor to arrange an end to the war" but he had to do it without alerting the remnants of the "war party" who might assassinate him!

Unconditional surrender was as irrevocable as the 16th Amendment on income tax, and the Pentagon papers very plainly point out that, as long as this policy stood, the invasion of the Japanese islands was a necessity. On April 24, 1945, the Joint Chiefs again reviewed the Pacific picture. The report on this meeting is one of the most important documents of the war, yet I have not found any extensive reference to

it in any of the memoirs I have read. The JCS said that "In no case to date in this war have organized Japanese units surrendered. The concept of 'unconditional surrender' is foreign to the Japanese nature" and that "Unless a definition of unconditional surrender can be given which is acceptable to the Japanese, there is no alternative to annihilation and no prospect that the threat of absolute defeat will bring capitulation."

"Annihilation," of course, was the desire of Russia.

The JCS report went on to recommend that the definition of unconditional surrender be made on a "governmental level." ". . . it is possible that a government could be formed in Japan that would sign and could enforce a surrender instrument."

Was this suggestion made in recognition of Admiral Suzuki's new position as premier a couple of weeks earlier? There is no mention in the Pentagon papers that this suggestion was considered. Who ignored it?

As silence across the Pacific greeted the Suzuki "smoke signal," the Emperor and the "peace party" experienced another frustration in a long series of frantic appeals for peace. And so Japan, like so many subsequent nations in the years to come, lost hope in the policies of the United States and sought an understanding with Japan's historic enemy, Russia.

Mr. Kase tells us that "By the middle of May, 1945, the six top men of the Supreme War Council finally agreed upon a course of policy toward the Soviet Union." They decided former ambassador to Moscow, Hirota, would approach the Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo for the purpose of "improving Russo-Japanese relations." Hirota was to conduct the conversations in three stages. If one and two didn't work he was to try the third. This was—"If the worst became unavoidable, request the Soviet government to use its good offices with the United States and Great Britain for the restoration of peace."

Hirota called on the Soviet Ambassador to Tokyo, the since famous, or infamous, Mr. Malik of the

The Entry
of the
Soviet Union
into the War
Against
Japan: Mili-
tary Plans,
1941-45
p. 63

Kase 170 also
USSBS
Japan's
Struggle to
End the War
p. 6

Kase 171

United Nations whose role as Soviet representative on the Security Council during the Korean War needs no recalling. Hirota had two talks with Malik, the Soviet playing "cat" to the Japanese's "mouse," and when Hirota asked for a third meeting, Malik declined "pleading 'indisposition.' "

Back home, the American press gave a clear indication of Japan's ultimate defeat as catastrophe struck day after day while Japan's enemies were demanding the death of the Emperor, striking even more terror in their souls:

NEW YORK TIMES, MAY 7, 1945

Chungking, China, May 6, UP—Death for Emperor Hirohito, termed the No. 1 Japanese war criminal, was asked today by Chinese newspapers.

WASHINGTON EVENING STAR, MAY 22, 1945

May 22, AP (headlines) Agitation for Peace Growing in Japan, High Official Admits

NEW YORK TIMES, MAY 25, 1945

Chungking, China, May 24, AP—A communique of the United States 14th Air Force: Fighters and bombers of the Fourteenth Air Force swept Japanese operated railroads in the Yellow River area on May 23 without air opposition . . . From all these missions all our aircraft returned.

NEW YORK TIMES, MAY 26, 1945

Guam, Sat., May 26, AP—Pacific Fleet communique 373 . . . One enemy bomber attempted a wheels-up landing on the Yontan field, but all occupants of the plane were killed when they attempted to attack our installations with hand grenades.

A discordant note is struck by another AP dispatch appearing in the Washington Evening Star, May 27, 1945, which appears to have been inspired by the familiar "handout" from a government agency:

AP—Japan still is capable of waging a long war despite destructive air attacks and naval defeats which have cut off almost entirely her stolen sources of rubber, oil and tin, the Foreign Economics Administration said last night.

"A large portion of the war industry she had at Pearl Harbor is intact," said a report by the Enemy Branch of the agency. (Chief of the Enemy Branch was Henry N. Fowler.)

During this time Harry Hopkins was in Moscow having a series of highly important meetings with Marshal Stalin, cabling his reports to Washington every day. And while Hopkins was in Moscow, there began, among the policy makers, one of the most strange and heated episodes. Undersecretary Grew presented Mr. Truman with a surrender paper which he had had drawn up for announcement to the Japanese, firmly believing that, if an inducement were presented to Tokyo explaining our terms, there was more than a fair chance it would bring the war to an end. This, of course, was the same idea the JCS had on April 24th. The President accepted the proposition, but asked that Mr. Grew first take it up with the War Department before it was acted upon. The meeting took place in the Pentagon on May 29, 1945, and all those present agreed that the announcement should be made. However, *General Marshall expressed the opinion that the paper was "premature" and the project was pigeonholed.* (You will read details of this incident further in this chapter.) The question is, "why?"

Perhaps a clue may be found in Harry Hopkins' cabled reports of the conferences he had with Marshal Stalin on the day before the "premature" Pentagon meeting was held. His Kremlin conference took place at 6 P.M. (10 A.M. our time) on May 28th. The report sent by Hopkins to President Truman and the State Department is as follows: (The Pentagon papers give the date of the Conference and the cable as May 29th. However, I am inclined to trust Robert Sherwood's date of May 28th.)

1. By August 8 the Soviet Army will be properly deployed on the Manchurian positions.
2. The Marshal (Stalin) repeated his statement made at Yalta that the Russian people must have a good reason for going to war and that depended on China's willingness to agree to the proposals made at Yalta.
3. For the first time he stated that he was willing to take these proposals up directly with Soong when he comes to Moscow. He wants to see Soong not later than July 1 and expects us to take the matter up at the same time with Chiang Kai-shek. This procedure seems from our point of view most desirable in light of Stalin's statements about the Far East which follow.
4. Stalin left no doubt in our mind that he intends to attack during August. It is therefore important that Soong come here not later than July 1. Stalin is ready to see him any time now.
5. He made categorical statement that he would do everything he could to promote unification of China under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek. He further stated that this leadership should continue after the war because no one else was strong enough. He specifically stated that no Communist leader was strong enough to unify China. In spite of the reservations he expressed about him, he proposes to back the Generalissimo.
6. Stalin repeated all of his statements made at Yalta that he wanted a united and stable China and wanted China to control all of Manchuria as part of a United China. He *stated categorically that he had no territorial claims against China* and mentioned specifically Manchuria and Sinkiang and that in all areas his troops entered to fight the Japanese he would respect Chinese sovereignty. (Emphasis mine.)
7. The Marshal stated that he would welcome representatives of the Generalissimo to be with his troops entering Manchuria in order to facilitate the organization in Manchuria of Chinese administration.
8. He agreed with America's "Open Door" policy and went out of his way to indicate that the United States was the only power with the resources to aid China economically after the war. He observed that for many years to come Russia would have all it could do to provide for the internal economy of the Soviet Union.
9. He agreed that there should be a trusteeship for Korea

under the United States, China, Great Britain and the Soviet Union.

10. We were very encouraged by the conference on the Far East.

It is more than likely that this report was in the President's hands by May 29th, the day of the Pentagon meeting. Had General Marshall seen it? The report states that the Red Army would not be ready to march into Manchuria before August 8. And it says also that the Yalta agreements must be accepted by Chiang Kai-shek as Russia's price. Again we ask, was this cabled report kept from the other members of the Pentagon conference? In James Forrestal's diaries he says that McCloy had told him about its contents some time later.

It is not likely that our generation will ever know the answers to these questions. Perhaps no generation will.

Hopkins sent a second cable on the same meeting with Stalin which indicates that Hopkins was familiar with Japan's desire for peace. It also indicates that Stalin's fear that the United States might accept surrender was uppermost in Hopkins' mind:

1. Japan is doomed and the Japanese know it.
2. Peace feelers are being put out by certain elements in Japan and we should therefore consider together our joint attitude and act in concert about the surrender of Japan. Stalin expressed the fear that the Japanese will try to split the allies. The following are his statements about the surrender:

A. The Soviet Union prefers to go through with unconditional surrender and destroy once and for all the military might and forces of Japan. Stalin thinks this is particularly to our interest because the Japanese have a deep seated antipathy to the United States and if the war lords, the industrial leaders and the politicians are permitted to withdraw to Japan with their armies undefeated, their navy not totally destroyed and their industrial machine partially intact, they will start at once to plan a war of revenge.

Sherwood
903

Stalin made it quite clear that the Soviet Union wants to go through with unconditional surrender and all that is implied in it.

B. However, he feels that if we stick to unconditional surrender the Japs will not give up and we will have to destroy them as we did Germany.

C. The Japanese may offer to surrender and seek softer terms. While consideration of this has certain dangers as compared with (A) it nevertheless cannot be ruled out. Should the Allies depart from the announced policy of unconditional surrender and be prepared to accept a modified surrender, Stalin visualizes imposing our will through our occupying forces and thereby gaining substantially the same results as under (A). In other words, it seemed to us that he proposes under this heading to agree to milder peace terms but once we get into Japan to give them the works.

3. The Marshal expects that Russia will share in the actual occupation of Japan and wants an agreement with the British and us as to occupation zones.

4. He also wants an understanding between the Allies as to areas of operation in China and Manchuria.

Nowhere could one find better expressed one of the important aims of Soviet Russia and the reason for unconditional surrender. Germany had already been devastated and her army pulverized into non-existence, thus removing one of Russia's greatest barriers to world domination. And since that time, Russian propaganda and Russian infiltration into "free world" governments, have seen to it that the German army remains non-existent or too small to be a "danger." In May of 1945 Stalin expressed his determination to Harry Hopkins that Japan's army would receive the same fate. What he didn't say was that he hoped such total destruction of Japan would also invite Japanese hatred of the United States.

The full detailed story of "premature," one of the biggest mysteries of the war, was given in testimony by the former State Department officer, Eugene Dooman on September 14, 1951. Instead of attempting to tell you about it, I shall let you read portions of the text for yourself. It will also help to make you ac-

quainted with those people working in the State Department, and the constant battle between the "reactionaries" and the "Leftists." This testimony of Mr. Dooman's was perhaps the most sensational to have come from the so-called McCarran Committee's investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations in 1951-52. And, although there were some thirty or forty reporters present, very little appeared in most papers.

Friday, September 14, 1951

IPR 3
pages 703-
754

The subcommittee met at 10 a.m.

Present: Senators McCarran, Eastland, and Smith of North Carolina.

Also present: J. G. Sourwine, committee counsel; Robert Morris, subcommittee counsel; Benjamin Mandel, director of research.

Mr. Dooman began by giving his name and address, and previous occupations in the State Department which he entered in 1912. His last position, before he resigned Aug. 31, 1945, was Chairman of the Far East Subcommittee of the State, War, and Navy Coordinating Committee, the top interdepartmental political and military policy committee. The title of this committee was such a jawbreaker that it was nicknamed SWINK which you will find used in the testimony.

He told the Senate Subcommittee that the purpose of the SWINK subcommittee was to formulate policies, both military and political, primarily for Japan.

The testimony begins with the attempt to bring Owen Lattimore into the State Department as a consultant:

Mr. Morris. Well, Mr. Dooman, can you recall that Owen Lattimore was proposed at one time as a consultant to the chief of the China desk of the Department of State? 704-5

Mr. Dooman. I can; yes.

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us your recollection with respect to that particular incident, Mr. Dooman.

Mr. Dooman. At that time, which must have been early in 1945, I was, as I have just said, acting as Chairman of this Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK . . . but one of the men in the office told me that papers were going through the State Department calling for the appointment of Dr. Lattimore as adviser to the China Division, the papers having been initiated by the Chief of the China Division.

Mr. Morris. Who was that?

Mr. Dooman. That was Mr. John Carter Vincent.

I discussed the matter with Mr. Ballantine, who was then Director of the Far Eastern Division, and pointed out that Lattimore at that time, and for several months previously, had been using every opportunity to discredit the then Acting Secretary of State, Mr. Grew.

And I pointed out that it would be incongruous for a man who had expressed himself so freely on Mr. Grew to be occupying a position under Mr. Grew.

With that I reported the matter to Mr. Grew, and he then called up the administrative people who had charge of appointments and ordered that the papers be quashed.

Senator Eastland. What did Mr. Lattimore have to say against Mr. Grew? What was the complaint against him?

* * *

705

Mr. Dooman. The principal cause of complaint was that Mr. Grew had advocated an attitude on the part of the United States of noninterference with the Japanese themselves in the form of government which they wanted to institute.

In other words, if they wanted to keep the Emperor, by all means let them keep it. If they wanted to disestablish the monarchy, by all means let them disestablish it.

* * *

Senator Eastland. His (Lattimore's) opposition to Grew was that Mr. Grew was favoring a policy after the war was won that would prevent the Communists from getting Japan. That is it in a nutshell, is it not? . . .

Mr. Dooman. That is my judgment.

Sen. Eastland. And Mr. John Carter Vincent was urging the appointment of Mr. Lattimore? . . .

Mr. Dooman. Yes.

706

At this point Counsel Robert Morris placed in the record excerpts from a resolution of the national

board of the Communist Political Association as approved on June 20, 1945. The excerpts concern Japan, and it was this resolution that also launched the slogan to remove the "reactionaries" and "fascists" from the State Department. One important and significant point is that this slogan was adopted directly after the "premature" meeting in the Pentagon on May 29th at which time the "reactionary" Mr. Grew's surrender paper to Japan had been discussed. These orders to the comrades appeared in the July 1945 issue of *Political Affairs*, an official Communist magazine:

This growing reactionary opposition to a truly democratic and anti-Fascist Europe in which the people will have the right to freely choose their own forms of government and social system has been reflected in many of the recent actions of the State Department. This explains why . . . they bolster up the reactionary, incompetent Chiang Kai-shek regime and why they harbor the idea of coming to terms with the Mikado in the hope of maintaining Japan as a reactionary bulwark in the Far East.

In the vital struggle to crush feudal-Fascist-militarist Japan, it is necessary that American labor collaborate in the prosecution of the anti-Japanese war with all democratic forces who favor and support victory over Japanese imperialism. . . . some in the State Department, who are seeking a compromise peace which will preserve the power of the Mikado after the war, at the expense of China and the other Far East peoples, and directed against the Soviet Union . . .

In the opinion of the Communist Policy Association, such a program should be based on the following slogans of action:

* * *

Remove from the State Department all pro-Fascist and reactionary officials.

After this was read into the record, Mr. Dooman returned to his initial testimony.

Mr. Dooman. I just recall now that about 2 weeks after this episode Dr. Isaiah Bowman, president of the Johns Hopkins

University, came to see the President. . . . He came to see the President and asked the President to intervene on behalf of Dr. Lattimore with the State Department. And the matter was brought to the attention then of the State Department and no further action was taken.

May I correct it again? This must have been about April of 1945.

Mr. Morris. What position did John Carter Vincent hold at that time, Mr. Dooman, at the time these papers for employing Mr. Lattimore as consultant were submitted?

Mr. Dooman. He was Chief of the China Division.

Mr. Morris. Did he hold any other position in the State Department?

Mr. Dooman. Not at that time.

Mr. Morris. Was he associated with one of the area committees?

Mr. Dooman. Well, yes. The far-eastern area was an intra-departmental committee at which there was an attempt made to get a consensus of opinion about various policies concerning the Far East . . .

Mr. Morris. Could you say this was a policy-making committee, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. Dooman. It was a policy-developing committee.

Mr. Morris. Was John Carter Vincent a member of that committee?

Mr. Dooman. Yes; he could come in whenever he wanted to. As a matter of fact, he chose not to come very often. He was usually represented by a man from his office called Julian Friedman . . .

The Chairman. . . . Who was Julian Friedman?

(Author's note: In the Subcommittee Report of the IPR on page 164, Julian Friedman is reported as: "Identified as a member of the Communist Party by one or more duly sworn witnesses. Denied.")

Mr. Dooman. Julian Friedman was a member of the China Division of the State Department.

* * *

In the following testimony Mr. Dooman tells us a little of the manner in which Leftist propaganda is funneled from certain individuals in government service to the Leftist press.

Mr. Dooman. . . . I said I had not made any charges

(against Julian Friedman) because that implied that I had complained to some higher authority.

The fact was that a very short time after statements had been made in secret meetings of this Far East Area Committee, the proceedings and the statements made by various individuals immediately were quoted in various left-wing periodicals and newspapers. There were literally dozens of such occasions.

Senator Eastland. Such as PM?

Mr. Dooman. That would include PM.

It so happens that among all these instances that actually occurred, I happened to keep one, and that was in *The Nation* of February 3, 1945, where there appears an article by one Pacificus, entitled "Dangerous Experts."

Among other things here is the following paragraph which I would like to read, if I may. I might say that *Dangerous Experts* refers among others to myself.

"Mr. Dooman not only believes in retaining the emperor system minus some of the more militaristic forms of emperor worship, but also thinks that the only elements we can rely on in Japan are the business leaders, court circle aristocrats, and bureaucrats."

. . . Now, I did make that statement. This is a garbled version of what I said. But the important thing is that it appeared a few days later in *The Nation*.

Well, by a process of elimination in a number of instances of this kind, I found that outside of those who were more or less standing members of the committee who appeared every time and who were completely reliable, that Friedman was the constant element.

I therefore went to Friedman and I taxed him with being the source of information for these articles that appeared in *Amerasia*, in *PM*, *The Nation*, *New Republic*, and so on. He denied that he had given any of this information to unauthorized persons.

He said that he reported only to his chief, who was then Mr. Vincent.

* * *

The interrogation of Mr. Dooman then returns to Owen Lattimore:

715-16

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, would you tell us to the best of your ability the position that Owen Lattimore took at that time with respect to Japan? This is in 1945.

Mr. Dooman. Well, there is a whole library that could be made up of statements made by Mr. Lattimore during that period. I suppose the best known, the one most frequently quoted . . . is a book called *Solution in Asia*, which was published, I think, in about February 1945, and was very widely circulated during the spring and early summer, in fact until the surrender of Japan.

In general, he took the position that the Japanese people, when they were defeated, would rise in rebellion against the system and overthrow the monarchy; that there were elements in the State Department, the so-called reactionary Fascist elements, who knew nothing whatever about Japan . . . and that these elements were intended to use the prestige and the force of the influence of the United States to keep the Emperor in power against the will of the Japanese people.

Another point which he made was that the chief militarists were not the war lords, General Tojo and others, but the big industrial leaders. That these, the army and the navy, were merely puppets and instruments of the big industrialists.

Therefore, his position was that we should allow the Japanese people to have their revolt and disestablish the monarchy and that we should then try these industrialists as war criminals and put them out of the way so that they would never be in a position of influence.

And, third, that the Japanese system, economic system, should be completely broken up and a highly developed competitive economic system should be instituted.

Now, as I say, these statements can be found in a great many places.

Mr. Morris. Will you give us whatever documentation you can?

Mr. Dooman. I have here, for example, a radio discussion, a round-table discussion that was carried out, I believe, under the auspices of the University of Chicago. It was along about July 8, 1945.

Now, I notice that the press recently quoted Dr. Lattimore as having said that his position had been consistently one of urging that we do not interfere in the event that the

Japanese wanted to disestablish the monarchy. That is not the whole story.

In Solution in Asia, he makes this statement, which I cannot quote textually, but it runs somewhat along these lines. He says:

I will venture the political prophecy that the Japanese people will themselves revolt and disestablish the monarchy.

Now, the suggestion at the same time, at that time—that is, before the surrender—that people like Mr. Grew and myself were intending to keep the Emperor in power implied, then, that we proposed to use the influence and the position of the United States to prevent the exercise by the Japanese people of their own will.

Well, let me say at this point that this whole discussion about the Emperor carried on by the leftist press at that time was a piece of sheer lunacy. If the Japanese people wanted to get rid of the Emperor there was obviously nothing we could do to keep him in; if, on the other hand, the Japanese people wanted to keep the Emperor it would have been a piece of folly on our part to have disestablished a monarchy.

* * *

It shifts from Lattimore to Vincent again:

Senator Eastland. When Mr. Grew resigned, what place in the Department did Mr. Vincent get?

Mr. Dooman. Mr. Grew retired, or at least presented his resignation on or about the 14th of August. (Note: It was August 16th) I may be off a matter of a few days or so. But the day he retired, or presented his resignation, it was announced in the papers that Mr. Dean Acheson has been appointed as Under Secretary of State . . . And the day after he returned there he announced that I would be replaced as chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK by Mr. Vincent.

Senator Eastland. I would like also to know . . . The difference in what was advocated by John Carter Vincent for Japan and the policies that the Communists put over in Eastern Europe . . .

Mr. Dooman. My judgment is it is the same.

Mr. Dooman begins here to tell an unusual story. The SWINK subcommittee had been working for about 7 or 8 months on a paper called "The United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." It spelled out exactly what the United States proposed to do with our defeated enemy. On August 16, 1945, Mr. Grew retired and was replaced by Dean Acheson as Undersecretary of State. Mr. Dooman then asked Assistant Secretary of State, James C. Dunn, chairman of the full SWINK committee, to call a meeting of the SWINK subcommittee on August 29, 1945 for the purpose of passing on this paper. This they did, and on that same day it was cabled to General MacArthur as "a firm United States policy for Japan."

Two days later, August 31st, Mr. Dooman retired and Acheson immediately promoted John Carter Vincent to Mr. Dooman's former position as chairman of the SWINK subcommittee.

A few weeks later, September 22, 1945, the White House made public the official directive on postwar policy for Japan. Out of curiosity, the retired Mr. Dooman read the released paper to see if it was different from the one which had already been sent to General MacArthur.

Mr. Dooman. . . . These were among the changes that had been made in the paper after it had been adopted on the 29th of August (reading):

"Policies shall be favored which permit the wide distribution of income and of the ownership of the means of production and trade. To this end it shall be the policy of the Supreme Commander—

(a) to prohibit the retention in or selection for places of importance in the economic field of individuals who do not direct future Japanese economic effort solely toward peaceful ends."

Please do not ask me to explain what that means.

"(b) To favor a program for the dissolution of the large industrial and banking combinations which have exer-

cised control of a large part of Japan's trade and industry."

It is on the basis of these two clauses that work was undertaken to destroy, first of all, to eliminate the capitalist class in Japan.

Senator Eastland. Who attempted to eliminate it?

Mr. Dooman. These were the instructions sent from Washington.

Senator Eastland. That was the American State Department?

Mr. Dooman. With the concurrence of the Navy Department and the War Department.

These were the instructions sent to General MacArthur through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator Eastland. That was the work of John Carter Vincent, was it not?

Mr. Dooman. He was chairman at that time of this Far East subcommittee . . .

Senator Eastland. That was the Acheson-Vincent program there? 718-19

Mr. Dooman. Yes, sir.

Senator Eastland. What did they attempt to put over under that program?

Mr. Dooman. The first thing that was done, and this was in 1946, was to levy a capital tax of from 60 to 90 percent on all property in excess of \$1,000 . . . You can imagine what that meant. That is, a capital tax of from 60 to 90 percent of all property above \$1,000. That almost at one stroke wiped out the capitalist class . . .

The next thing was to expropriate all land in excess of 5 acres held by any one owner.

Senator Eastland. That was a Communist system, was it not?

Mr. Dooman. Well, Senator, in Poland I think they put the limit at 200 acres at that time . . .

There was an ostensible effort to pay them compensation for this land (in Japan), but by this time they were paying for land in yen which had depreciated to one one-hundred-and-eightieth of the nominal value of the land . . . In other words, if a man had \$1,000 in land, he was paid one one-hundred-and-eightieth.

There was virtually confiscation of all land above 5 acres.

Senator Eastland. Go ahead and describe what else there was.

Mr. Dooman. Then all holdings by any one individual in any large corporation in excess of 3 percent were confiscated. There were more polite terms used. That is, they were transferred to a government pool.

And then the Japanese Government was ordered to sell those shares in a certain order of priority to farmers' co-operatives, labor unions, and shopkeepers, at whatever price might be offered.

And, furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered to disregard any relationship between the price offered and the real value; and furthermore, the Japanese Government was ordered to finance any bids for the shares by farmers' co-operatives and labor unions . . .

The net result was then to replace people who had traditionally had property with these black marketeers and thugs and blackguards of various kinds.

Although all during the war General MacArthur had clashed with Washington officials on military strategy, particularly with their "Europe first" policy, it was not until he became Supreme Commander of the occupation of Japan that he clashed head-on with the State Department and, in particular, with the new Undersecretary, Dean Acheson. Acheson at that time was Acting Secretary for Byrnes who had to leave the capital for important conferences. Mr. Dooman recalled a bit of this story when he reminded the subcommittee of the General's first set-to with Mr. Acheson. Briefly, the facts were the following: A few days after his arrival in Tokyo, General MacArthur announced to the Japanese people that he looked forward to the time when the American occupation forces in Japan could be reduced to some figure below 200,000 soldiers. The *Daily Worker* was already leading a vicious attack on the General, charging "fascism" and "soft policy" toward Japan, when Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, placed MacArthur in the position of losing face with his oriental wards. Acheson publicly announced that General

MacArthur was not in Japan to make policy, but to carry out orders; policy for Japan would be made by the President and the State Department, he said. This "repudiation" coming in the first month of the occupation boomeranged because it led to the publication of the SWINK directive. MacArthur could not, thereafter, be blamed for executing orders!

In continuing his testimony on the relationship between MacArthur and the State Department, Mr. Dooman sharply pinpoints the United States policy toward Russia and Communism. It would be interesting to learn one day what the Japanese were thinking when their American Supreme Commander was so often repudiated by Washington officials, and often in favor of Russia. That he remained their idol under these circumstances is testimony to the character of General MacArthur.

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, are there any other documents that you care to introduce into the record at this time. . . ? 744

Mr. Dooman. Well, I refer to a statement made by General MacArthur, I think it was on the 1st of September, in which—

Mr. Morris. What year?

Mr. Dooman. 1946, excuse me. This was the first anniversary of the setting up of the occupation in Japan. At that time, he issued a statement to the Japanese people warning them of the dangers from the left as well as from the right.

In other words, he was warning them of the dangers of communism. As a matter of fact, a short time after that, in February 1947, the Communists tried to take over the country by means of a general strike which was prevented only by General MacArthur preventing it. However, the Herald Tribune, as of September 3, 1946, published a dispatch from Mr. John C. Metcalfe, its correspondent in Washington, stating that there was in effect, that there was considerable unfavorable reaction in the State Department to General MacArthur's pronouncement to the Japanese people.

It quoted at that time, this article quoted, as follows; if I may read:

State Department sources said no directives had been sent to General MacArthur indicating any desire on the part of the administration here to raise the cry of "communism" in Japan. The source said they were taken completely by surprise by comments in the MacArthur statement, such as that the Japanese islands might become either "a powerful bulwark for peace or a dangerous spring-board for war."

The incident was considered here as particularly irritating since it came in the midst of delicate American-Soviet relations elsewhere in the world.

The aim of American foreign policy in the Far East is establishment of a just and durable peace, the State Department sources said. It is aimed at "building a bridge of friendship to Soviet Russia" and is not intended to set up "a bulwark against communism" or to inspire anti-Soviet feeling, the sources added.

If we may interrupt Mr. Dooman a moment—the statement of General MacArthur warning against Communism apparently upset the Communist apple-cart.

Senator Eastland continues his interrogation of Mr. Dooman:

Senator Eastland. What other policies were there?

Mr. Dooman. Well, in the draft of this initial policy paper, which had been prepared under my chairmanship, with regard to people who were suspected of being war criminals or being militarists, it was provided that they should be purged; that is, removed from any position of authority, in the light of their own personal record, as brought out by some form of judicial investigation.

In other words, a man would stand or fall on his own personal record.

As you will see from that statement that I just read out, the people were removed from office on the basis of their occupation. Practically the whole executive branch of Japanese business, from chairmen of boards down to section chiefs, practically the whole white-collar element in Japanese big business was removed at one stroke. Not because there was any record against them, but because they occupied certain positions. They destroyed it.

Senator Eastland. Was it not an attempt to destroy Japanese capitalism?

Mr. Dooman. It was an attempt to destroy and eliminate the brains of Japanese business.

* * *

Senator Eastland. All right.

What else did they attempt to put over?

Mr. Dooman. Just following that question, following that point, I want to quote from this round-table discussion of the University of Chicago on July 8, this statement attributed to Mr. Lattimore (reading):

That includes a lot of economic and political action as well because we cannot forget that the civilian war-makers, that is the big industrialists and financiers of Japan, are really primarily even more responsible for Japan's going to war than the military and the navy, since the army and navy are only the striking instruments and the tools.

Now, after the occupation about 12 of the leading Japanese industrialists were put in prison, and they were held in prison for 18 months while every effort was made to dig up evidence which would warrant their being put to trial, just as the military and political people were put on trial and later condemned.

They were held, as I say, for 18 months, and released because there was no evidence.

Now, if we are then to follow Mr. Lattimore, we obviously did a great injustice to General Tojo in hanging him, because according to Mr. Lattimore, we released his lords and masters and hung the tool and the instrument.

Senator Eastland. What other things were in the policy for Japan?

Mr. Dooman. I have with me a copy of a paper known as Far East Commission 230. This is a paper of considerable length, Senator, in which all of the principles are laid out for the atomizing of Japanese industry.

Senator Eastland. The what? I did not understand?

Mr. Dooman. The atomizing, the fragmentation of Japanese industry. It is a very long paper.

The general purport was to see to it that the Japanese economy, not only in industry but in banking and in every

other field, should be reduced to the smallest possible element.

The Chairman. How is that tied in here? Who is the article by?

Mr. Dooman. Well, it was a paper. It was introduced as follows: To the Far Eastern Commission by the Secretary General, Mr. Nelson T. Jonathan (sic!), under a paper which reads as follows (reading):

The enclosure, a statement of proposed policy with respect to excessive concentrations of economic power in Japan, submitted by the United States, is circulated herewith for the consideration of the Far East Commission and is referred to Committee No. 2, economic and financial affairs.

Who prepared this paper, I have no means of knowing . . .

Mr. Morris. Where did you obtain that, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. Dooman. This was obtained, and given to me by a friend of mine, Mr. James Lee Kaufman, an American lawyer in New York, who went out to Japan and discovered the existence of this paper, and he had it privately printed and distributed among his friends, and he also had a copy of it reproduced, or summarized in an issue for Newsweek 2 years ago.

Senator Eastland. Where did he get the paper in Japan?

Mr. Dooman. He was told of the existence of this paper, and was told if he went to a certain office he could find it. So he went to this—I don't know where—some repository of documents and asked a young lady—

Senator Eastland. It was there to guide the occupation forces, was it not? It was a policy to guide our occupation, was it not?

Mr. Dooman. I was getting around to that in just a second, Senator, if I may. I am answering the question.

The Chairman. The question has been propounded to you. Was it or was it not there to guide our occupation forces?

Mr. Dooman. This paper was submitted through the Far Eastern Commission for consideration, and it was never adopted by the Far Eastern Commission.

However, in draft form, it was sent out to Tokyo to the occupation authorities in the economic section and they acted on it.

Senator Eastland. It was sent by our State Department?

Mr. Dooman. Sent by whom, I do not know. But it was sent to the occupation authorities and they acted on it.

And when the disclosure was made by my friend, Kaufman, that this paper had been acted on, it was then disavowed as merely being a draft and merely presented to the Far Eastern Commission for consideration.

But the point I want to emphasize was that it was, for all practical purposes, an official document, because it was on the basis of this that the various instructions were sent to the Japanese government.

Senator Eastland. As a matter of fact, to put it very mildly, there is a striking similarity between the American policy toward Japan and the policies laid down by Russia to the satellite states in Eastern Europe, is there not?

Mr. Dooman. I think that would be a fair statement to state . . . when it came to the question of Japan, there were those elements who, knowing what the Russians wanted in Germany, assumed that they would be satisfied with parallel policies in Japan.

Senator Eastland. Of course, what Russia wanted was to set up a chaos and a system by which they could move in; was that not it?

Mr. Dooman. I think so . . .

Senator Smith. Are there now in positions of power and trust in the American Government any of the men who were responsible for the enunciation of this policy you have described to us?

Mr. Dooman. Oh, yes.

Senator Smith. Who are they?

Mr. Dooman. Some, I say are responsible, from the chain of command.

Senator Eastland. Name them, please.

Mr. Dooman. In 1945 when this initial post surrender policy was promulgated, the responsible people were, from the top, Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State.

Senator Smith. Mr. Byrnes?

Mr. Dooman. Mr. Byrnes, Secretary of State; Mr. Acheson, Under Secretary of State; John Carter Vincent, as chairman of the Far Eastern Subcommittee of SWINK, and also Director of the Far Eastern Division; Mr. Edward Barton (Edward Martin?), who is still an economist, I believe: he is the economist in charge of economic affairs for the occupation of this area; James Pennfield, and then—

Senator Smith. What position is he in now?

Mr. Dooman. I believe he is in Yugoslavia as counselor of the Embassy, I believe.

Mr. Morris. What was his position at that time?

Mr. Dooman. He had just returned from the Far East and was assigned as deputy to Mr. Vincent in the Far East Subcommittee of SWINK.

Now, subsequently—and this is hearsay—the people who have been busy on Japanese affairs, Japanese policies, in addition to those I have named would include Mr. John Allison, and—what is his name now—an economist, Barnett. I don't know what his first name is. (Robert?) Barnett.

I think those are the principal ones.

Senator Smith. Well, now, is there any indication of any activity by the top two men you mentioned in the furtherance of this policy, Mr. Byrnes or Mr. Acheson? Is there any evidence at all, indication of activity on their part toward favoring the carrying out of that policy?

Mr. Dooman. Well, in my personal knowledge, and this requires—well, my personal knowledge, I can recite one case.

In the spring of 1945 there was a meeting of the full committee of SWINK, the chairman at that time for that day being Mr. McCloy, John McCloy, who was then Assistant Secretary of War. And the committee as a whole had been discussing some European matter with which I was not concerned, and, therefore, I came into the room when they had completed their discussion of this European problem.

And I noticed among the people present was Mr. Dean Acheson. Now, he had been called in, apparently, for consultation on the European problem, and he had nothing whatever to do with the problem that I was to discuss, which was the question of the Japanese political system.

However, he stayed on. He was then Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations. He had nothing to do with this officially.

And I made my report to the committee, and at the end of that report Mr. McCloy said, turning to Mr. Acheson:

Dean, you are a great authority on far eastern matters. What do you think of what we have just heard?

And the reply was:

I have discovered that far eastern experts are a penny

a dozen. And you can find some experts which will support any point of view that you care to have. And I, myself, do not go along with what we have just heard. I prefer to be guided by experts who think more along my point of view . . .

This brings a thought to mind. Since Mr. Acheson, according to this testimony, preferred to be guided by experts who thought as he did, it is not surprising that during the Korean War he rejected the advice of military experts who said that the strategic city of Rashin could be bombed without hitting Red territory! And it was not bombed until General MacArthur won the argument a year or two later.

Mr. Dooman. From then on he (Acheson) quoted almost textually from "Solution in Asia" written by Owen Lattimore.

Senator Smith. Do you mean he quoted from this paper that you mentioned?

Mr. Dooman. Where Dr. Lattimore had said that the Japanese people, he predicted that the Japanese people would rebel and disestablish the monarchy, and that if the monarchy existed it would be only because there are certain Fascist groups in the State Department who used the prestige of the United States.

Senator Smith. Did he approve of this policy that was enunciated about practically confiscation of property?

Mr. Dooman. Oh, yes; he was Under Secretary of State . . .

Senator Smith. Is there any indication that Mr. Byrnes, the Secretary of State, knew about this at all? 724

Mr. Dooman. No; there is no indication . . .

Mr. Morris. Were you thoroughly conversant with Owen Lattimore's Solution in Asia at that time?

Mr. Dooman. Thoroughly.

Mr. Morris. When you heard Mr. Acheson enunciate his views on Japan, is it your testimony that they coincided with the views expressed by Owen Lattimore in Solution in Asia?

Mr. Dooman. Exactly.

Mr. Morris. Did his view on experts being a dime a dozen coincide with the views of Owen Lattimore at that time?

Mr. Dooman. Yes . . .

Mr. Morris. . . . I also offer you just by way of assistance in connection with that extract from Mr. Lattimore's Solution in Asia that may aid you in answering the question I have just put to you.

Mr. Dooman. Here is a very reminiscent phrase . . . (reading):

Washington is full of experts who will tell you that the Japanese are mysterious, fanatical, and not to be understood by any ordinary use of the intellect. The same experts are also addicted to citing bits of lore which, they tell you condescendingly, explain why the Japanese always do this or never do that.

Here is an example of the attempts on the part of Dr. Lattimore to put into ridicule people who did not agree with his point of view.

* * *

725

Mr. Morris. . . . Will you proceed with your documentation of views of Owen Lattimore which you have testified to here today . . . ?

Mr. Dooman. Yes; on page 189, I quote as follows (reading):

If the Japanese themselves decide to do without an Emperor, well and good. If not, we should show that militarism has been so catastrophically defeated that we, the victors, do not need to use the Emperor. He and all males eligible for the throne by Japanese rules of succession and adoption should be interned, preferably in China, but under the supervision of United Nations Commission to emphasize united responsibility. His estates, and estates belonging to members of Zaibatsu families and important militarists, should be made over to an agrarian reform program, conspicuously without his sanction and by order of the United Nations. Eventually, after his death and after a new civil service and a new management of finance and industry have taken hold, the remaining members of the imperial line can be allowed to go where they like. New vested interests will by that time be able to prevent the restoration of a monarchy.

Perhaps that is a little dull reading, but what Lattimore's suggestions would have meant to Japan is VERY clear in 1956! American Korean War prisoners held in Red China have been barbarically and shamefully used as political hostages to great advantage to the Communists. If the Japanese Emperor had been held in Red China as a hostage, the demands Russia and the Chinese Reds could have made on Japan would have been endless!

Mr. Dooman now begins to tell of the important part the status of Emperor Hirohito played, and then goes into the extraordinary story of "premature" referred to briefly in this chapter.

Mr. Dooman. You will notice that all through my testimony I have referred constantly to this question of the Emperor. 727-8

In March or April of 1945, Colonel Dana Johnson, who was Chief of Psychological Warfare in Hawaii, came to Washington and saw Mr. Grew and myself. His conclusion, drawn from interrogating high-ranking Japanese prisoners of war, was that the Japanese were ready to surrender but that the various statements and the trend of public opinion with regard to the question of the monarchy was such that so long as the Japanese were left with the impression that the Emperor was personally to be tried as a war criminal and punished, that the monarchical system would be disestablished, so long as those ideas were assumed to be public opinion and would be implemented as American policy after Japan's surrender, that the Japanese would not surrender . . .

(Note: An AP dispatch from Tokyo dated August 6, 1955, quotes the Tokyo newspaper, *Yomiuri*, as stating that "it was largely on the insistence of Gen. Douglas MacArthur that Emperor Hirohito was not tried as a war criminal.")

D.C. Evening
Star

Mr. Sourwine. Did he tell you that was his opinion?

Mr. Dooman. He did, sir.

On April 17, there was a change of government (Note: the Koiso Government fell on April 4), a general retired

as Prime Minister and there was a reconstitution of the Government at the head of which was Admiral Suzuki, who was then Chamberlain to the Emperor and who had been throughout his career a moderate. He (Col. Johnson) took that as a very clear signal that the Japanese were ready to surrender, ready to talk about this matter.

Furthermore, we had the advantage of reading messages between the Japanese Government and their Ambassador in Moscow, and it was clear from these and other indications that the Japanese were ready to surrender if only it were made clear that this trend of opinion that had been developed by the leftist press in the United States, namely, that the Emperor would be tried as a war criminal and the monarchical system disestablished, it was made clear that those were not policies of the United States.

We then started on preparing a document. About the middle of May, Mr. Henry Luce came back from a visit to the Pacific, and he was very much aroused. He said that the failure of the American Government to persuade the Japanese to surrender was causing, was doing, great damage to the morale of the American forces who had fought through Saipan and Tarawa, and who were anticipating then the assault on Japan and were fearful of the losses that would have to be paid there.

Mr. Grew, who saw Henry Luce, explained to him that we were working on that effort, we were working on a plan along those lines.

It was, I think, on the 24th of May, if that happens to be, if my recollection is correct.

Mr. Morris. 1945?

Mr. Dooman. 1945. It was on a Saturday that Mr. Grew called me in and instructed me to have ready Monday morning a paper which he would then present to the President outlining the policies that the United States would follow if Japan surrendered.

I then prepared that paper and took it to Mr. Grew on Monday morning.

So far as the portion relating to the Emperor is concerned, my original draft reads as follows—this was paragraph 12 (reading):

The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives—
namely, those previously enumerated—

have been accomplished and there has been established beyond doubt a peacefully inclined, responsible government of a character representative of the Japanese people. This may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty if the peace-loving nations can be convinced of the genuine determination of such a government to follow policies of peace which will render impossible the future development of aggressive militarism in Japan.

(Note: Paragraph 12 was rewritten at Potsdam to read as follows:

The occupying forces of the Allies shall be withdrawn from Japan as soon as these objectives have been accomplished and there has been established in accordance with the freely expressed will of the Japanese people a peacefully inclined and responsible government.)

Decade of
American
Foreign
Policy p. 50

Mr. Grew approved the draft and called a meeting of the Policy Committee of the State Department. The Policy Committee of the State Department at that time consisted of the Assistant Secretaries of State and the Legal Adviser. He read this document to them, and there was no dissent until he came to that paragraph which I have just read. There was then a violent reaction on the part of Mr. Acheson and Mr. MacLeish.

729

Mr. Morris. What position did both of those gentlemen hold at that time?

Mr. Dooman did not answer the question. In May of 1945 Acheson was Assistant Secretary of State, and Archibald MacLeish was Assistant Secretary in charge of public relations. It should also be noted that others besides Assistant Secretaries attended these policy meetings. Senior officers such as Leo Pasvolksy and Alger Hiss were generally present unless they were out of town. At this meeting Mr. Dooman speaks of, Pasvolksy, Hiss and Secretary of State Stettinius were in San Francisco attending the United Nations meeting. The official name of this policy committee was the Secretary's Staff Committee. This had been called The Policy Committee the previous year.

The testimony continues:

Mr. Dooman. I was not present at the meeting but the whole idea of allowing the monarchy to remain was distasteful.

Mr. Morris. To Messrs. Acheson and MacLeish?

Mr. Dooman. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. Mr. Dooman, if you were not present at the meeting, I think you ought to explain how you knew what took place.

Mr. Dooman. This was immediately told to me by Mr. Grew after the meeting.

Mr. Sourwine. What you are describing, then, is Mr. Grew's description of what took place at the meeting?

Mr. Dooman. That is correct. Mr. Grew said that this committee was, after all, advisory to him, and that he was ultimately responsible, and that he would take the responsibility for presenting that document to the President with the recommendation that he include that document within a speech which he was to deliver at some appropriate occasion.

On the 28th of May, with Judge Rosenman, he went in to see the President. The President read it over and he said that he would approve, accept, the document, provided that it was agreeable to the armed services.

On the 29th of May, Mr. Grew, Judge Rosenman, and myself attended a meeting in Mr. Stimson's office.

The Chairman. Whose office?

Mr. Dooman. Mr. Stimson, who was then Secretary of War.

This was at the Pentagon. There were present Secretary Forrestal, Mr. McCloy, Mr. Elmer Davis, who was then Director of the Office of War Information, Mr. Grew, myself, General Marshall, and I should say in addition about 10 to 12 of the highest military and naval officers—who they were I do not remember at this time.

We had prepared copies of this paper for distribution so that each member present would have a copy.

Mr. Stimson, who was in the chair at the meeting, said then he approved the document right along, he went right along with the paper. In fact, he thought, as a matter of fact, that we did not give sufficient allowance to the Japanese for their capacity to produce as they had in the past such progressive men as Baron Shidihara, Hamaguchi, and Wakatsuki, and others. These are former Japanese Prime Ministers.

Mr. Forrestal read it over and he agreed. Mr. McCloy agreed also.

The Chairman. Agreed, or approved?

Mr. Dooman. Approved. Mr. Elmer Davis reacted very violently and would have none of it.

Mr. Morris. What position did he hold at this time?

Mr. Dooman. He was, as I said, Director of the Office of War Information. Various other officers approved of it, but there was a feeling that the publication of that document—

Mr. Morris. Vincent was not present?

Mr. Dooman. No. As a matter of fact, information on this was restricted to a very small number of people, those people that I have just indicated.

Mr. Sourwine. You were present at this conference?

Mr. Dooman. I was present.

Mr. Sourwine. When you speak of Mr. Davis having reacted violently, you were there and saw the reaction?

Mr. Dooman. Yes.

Mr. Sourwine. How did Mr. Davis react, what was the nature of his violent reaction?

Mr. Dooman. He did not approve, he did not approve of anything which might be construed in any way as forming a basis for a negotiated surrender.

Mr. Sourwine. Is that what he said?

Mr. Dooman. Yes; that was, in effect, what he said. However, the thing was pigeonholed because of the view among the military people that the publication of this document at that time would be premature.

Mr. Morris. What military people?

Mr. Dooman. Well, principally, General Marshall.

Mr. Morris. Did not General Marshall express disagreement?

Mr. Dooman. No; he went along with the paper but his statement was that the publication of the document at that time would be, and this word I remember textually, "premature." With that, the paper was set aside for the time being.

We must interrupt Mr. Dooman again at this time in order to point out an important factor. Richard N. Current in his book, "Secretary Stimson," writes that General Marshall's judgment that the document was

"premature" did not convince the Secretary of War because he immediately requested the Operations Plans Division of the War Department to prepare two studies on the subject which they did:

Current
225

In the first of these the OPD concluded that the enemy's protracted resistance was based on the hope of obtaining a conditional surrender, and in the second, that a public declaration of war aims, amounting to a definition of unconditional surrender, would be advisable as a means of "political and psychological pressure" supplementing military preparations. A month or so later (July 12) the OPD recommended holding to the invasion plans, but added: "There is much to be gained by defining, as completely as possible, the detailed U.S. war aims in Japan."

It is obvious that the OPD did not think that the document for surrender was "premature." However, since they had had reports from General Wedemeyer that the Japanese were attempting to surrender through Chiang Kai-shek, and also at that time, the United States was "listening in" on the conversations between Moscow and Tokyo and knew the Japanese were trying to surrender through Russia, why was not this also in the "studies" given Mr. Stimson? Is it possible that Stimson was so advised, but this part of the report was not published?

That the surrender paper was not immediately acted upon shows that, although General Marshall was unanimously outvoted, he carried the "motion."

Mr. Dooman continues:

IPR 730

Mr. Dooman. . . . However, a very short time after that, it was a matter of 2 or 3 weeks—

Mr. Morris. Will you tell us the time again, the week and month, if possible.

Mr. Dooman. The 29th of May 1945, that this meeting took place in Secretary Stimson's office. Within a very short time, I should say a matter of a fortnight, information was available in the State Department that Dr. Lattimore had called on the President and had remonstrated very

strongly against any position or decision taken by this Government which would enable the monarchy to remain in Japan.

(Note: Lattimore drew up a memorandum for President Truman dated June 10, 1945, and a special memorandum for his interview with the President dated July 3, 1945.)

Mr. Sourwine. What do you mean "information was available in the State Department," Mr. Dooman? . . .

Mr. Dooman. It was Mr. Grew who told me . . . Now, Mr. Lattimore had been using every opportunity for a period of a year or more to propound the doctrine that the Japanese people would overturn the monarchy and that there were a group of people in the State Department, Fascists and reactionaries, who were going to keep the Emperor in power against the will of the Japanese people.

But, to me, it was very queer . . . —now, mind you, up to that time, there had been no decision within the State Department on the question of the Emperor. There was a trend of thinking but there was no decision until the recommendation was made to the President. To me, it was very queer that immediately, well, within a matter of weeks, 2 or 3 weeks after that decision was made, that Mr. Lattimore went to the President and remonstrated with this decision . . .

Mr. Dooman. I would like to identify this document that I have been talking about if I may . . . This paper, then, was taken by Mr. Stimson to Potsdam. I arrived myself at Potsdam on the 13th of July, and I was told by Mr. McCloy, who was then there, that Mr. Stimson was in active discussion with Mr. Churchill with regard to that document and I heard later, I believe also from Mr. McCloy, that there was an agreement between Mr. Stimson and Mr. Churchill, and that they had then gone to Mr. Truman and Mr. Byrnes and had received an acceptance of the document. It was then telegraphed to General Chiang Kai-shek, and on May 29 (Note: he means July 26th) it was promulgated then as the Potsdam Proclamation to Japan, and it was on the basis of that document that Japan surrendered.

IPR 9-3086
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9

731

Forrest Davis, writing in the *Freeman* magazine, Nov. 19, 1951, makes an interesting observation.

"Why," he asks, "was the proclamation of July 26th 'premature' on May 29th? Upon what did Marshall base his decision?"

Grew 1424

Mr. Grew wrote that the reason given was because the battle for Okinawa was still going on and it might appear to the enemy as a show of weakness if we presented them with a peace overture. But, he also points out that the Americans had already reached the "mopping up" stages on Okinawa by that time.

IPR 746

We now come to a passage in the testimony which presents a good example of how American State Department officers worked closely with the Chinese and Japanese Communists, some of whom were employed by our very "hush, hush" and "cloak and dagger" organization, the OSS. This testimony concerns John K. Emmerson, and the story would indicate that Emmerson was confident that the United States would eventually use Japanese Communists to build a new government for defeated Japan as he had previously recommended. The success of the Yen'an program (mentioned in the following testimony) in manufacturing Japanese Communists out of Japanese prisoners, is described in General Willoughby's "MacArthur, 1941-51." This process of brain-washing was later used on American prisoners in Korea. But the man who, in 1945, recommended that OUR Japanese prisoners be "reeducated" by the Communists, is as of this writing, Counsellor of Embassy at Karachi, Pakistan!

Willoughby
316-327

IPR 3
p. 746

Mr. Morris. Mr. Dooman, do you know what the attitude of the State Department, or any individuals in the State Department, was with respect toward Japanese Communists?

Mr. Dooman. Yes.

Mr. Morris. Did you have any personal experience with Japanese Communists?

Mr. Dooman. Yes . . . Well sometime in May I believe it was, May or June, I think it was May, there returned—

Mr. Morris. 1945?

Mr. Dooman. 1945.

There returned from China a Foreign Service officer

named John K. Emmerson, who, before the war, had been one of my subordinates at the American Embassy in Tokyo. I understood that he had been sent to Yen-an. Yen-an in China then was the capital of the Chinese Communists. There were present at that time in Yen-an a Nosaka, the leading Japanese Communist, and other leading Communists.

Mr. Morris. Is Nosaka the same as Susumo Okano, head of the Japanese Communist Party?

Mr. Dooman. I believe the latter is a pseudonym. I believe that Emmerson had been sent to Yen-an to study methods used by the Japanese Communists in Yen-an in indoctrinating Japanese prisoners of war taken by the Chinese. As I said, he returned to Washington in about May of 1945.

The Chairman. Who did?

Mr. Dooman. Emmerson. He brought back a report describing at considerable length the method used by the Japanese Communists with respect to Japanese prisoners of war, and as I recall, he recommended that Japanese prisoners in American stockades be then turned over to Japanese Communists in the United States for indoctrination along methods used by the Japanese Communists in Yen-an.

At that time he was also invited to come over to OSS, the Office of Strategic Services, where I was helping with my own services in the field of psychological warfare to address a group on what he had found in Yen-an. At that time he displayed a large number of posters and papers of various kinds and he also showed me a number of letters that he had brought from Yen-an. These letters were written by Japanese Communists in Yen-an to *certain Japanese Communists who were then employed by OSS* in psychological warfare against the Japanese. (Emphasis mine.)

Mr. Morris. That was the episode, Mr. Dooman?

Mr. Dooman. Yes.

Mr. Dooman, continuing, now gives us an inside picture of how Communist propaganda was pushed through various government agencies. It concerns John K. Fairbank, Harvard professor, who worked during the war for the Office of War Information of which Elmer Davis was the Director. According to several Congressional hearings, the OWI employed an unusual number of Communists. When Mr. Davis appeared

Katyn 1993

before a House committee investigating the Katyn Forest massacre in Poland, he brushed aside all queries concerning Polish Communists working for OWI in the following manner: "If I had taken seriously all of the stories about agents of the Communists in the Office of War Information I would have had nothing else to do but to fire the whole staff."

IPR 3
P. 751

Mr. Morris. Mr. Chairman, we have had John K. Fairbank's association with the Institute of Pacific Relations set forth in the record at great detail.

We have also had testimony on the part of three witnesses in connection with his association in connection with the Communist Party.

I am asking Mr. Dooman if he had encountered at all Mr. John K. Fairbank in his associations.

The Chairman. All right.

Mr. Dooman. I understood Mr. Fairbank was in that section of the Office of War Information which dealt with psychological warfare against Japan.

Now, the practice was that—I believe it was—once a month a group would come over from the Office of War Information with a draft program of the propaganda that was to be directed against Japan for the ensuing month, and the various targets and subjects which were to be dealt with were set forth on a piece of paper, and the purpose of their visit to the State Department was to get clearance on these targets.

As I say, my contacts with Mr. Fairbank were limited primarily to those visits to the State Department when he brought over these programs of proposed psychological warfare.

Mr. Morris. From your association, what was his view toward these—

Mr. Dooman. I don't know what responsibility or what part Mr. Fairbank played in the formulation of these programs—that is, the setting up of the targets—but I found that invariably in these programs there would be found an item directing the psychological warfare toward creating in the minds of the Japanese an attitude of resentment and opposition to the Emperor and to the monarchical system.

At that time we had not come to any decisions as to what our policy should be in that respect, and I invariably red-

penciled these items referring to the Emperor. However, they would always appear either overtly or covertly in the next program that would be presented.

There was, in other words, a persistent effort on the part of the Office of War Information to get our approval toward psychological warfare directed at the relationship between the Japanese people and the Emperor.

* * *

Mr. Morris. Have we neglected anything that we should know, Mr. Dooman? . . . 754

Mr. Dooman. Well, my purpose, Mr. Morris, has not been to give you any evidence as to whether this, that, or the other man was a Communist or not, because I am in no position to give you any such evidence.

My purpose in testifying here was to indicate in general that policies put forward by the left-wing press, from the Daily Worker right down through the line, were in effect substantially translated into United States policies and to indicate from personal knowledge how that operation was carried out.

Mr. Morris. That is right.

May the record show, Mr. Chairman, that at no time was Mr. Dooman asked whether or not any particular person was a Communist.

The Chairman. The record will speak for itself in that regard.

Chapter V

THE "RESIGNATION" OF MR. GREW

Roth 35

THE spring of 1945 was the year and the season which sealed the fate of Undersecretary of State Joseph C. Grew and the group of "reactionaries" working under him. On June 20th, as you have read in Mr. Dooman's testimony in the previous chapter, the Communist Political Association transmitted the "Party directive" to the CPA and to the readers of Political Affairs (July 1945), that all people of Grew's stripe be eliminated from the Department of State. This action was provoked by a number of acts on the part of Mr. Grew. He had not turned out to be the "genuinely anti-fascist conservative" Fred Field had at first labeled him. (See, Chapter II: "If he makes mistakes in policy," Field promised, "we'll raise hell.") Although Andrew Roth dubbed him a "gullible aristocrat," Roth overlooked the fact that Mr. Grew was also stubborn. If Joe Grew had seen a green Buick parked in front of his home, no one was going to make him believe it was a black Pontiac in back of the house. What he saw, he saw; and what he knew, he knew; and all the eloquent persuasion in the most adept hands couldn't change his mind. There were times when he was induced to "sway" a little for political expediency, such as his interview given the New York Times in which he stated he had never spoken one way or the other about the Emperor. But in the privacy of the State Department circles he would not compromise. And what Mr. Grew would or would not do was potentially important at this time because Mr. Stettinius was absent in San Francisco and Mr. Grew was Acting Secretary of State.

Yet, Joe Grew had one basic failing—the same failing of so many people which even today endangers the security of our nation—he was unable to see the

conspiracy going on around him. In his eyes, all men were honest, if somewhat blind to facts. Being unable to realize he had enemies, there was of course no program on his part to outwit them. And so, in the spring of 1945, he made a number of serious errors in the view of his alert antagonists. In his book, "Turbulent Era" he naively writes of these "errors" without any realization of their connection with his "resignation" from State. The first was the incident of May 19, 1945.

On that date he spent a restless and sleepless night, his mind in a turmoil of deep concern for the nation in the light of our "floundering" diplomacy. In desperation he arose at five in the morning, determined that, if he put his worries on paper, it would calm his mind, at least for the moment. The memo had no other purpose.

But so great was his anxiety that he was unable to keep it to himself. The following day—"I read my memorandum to two high American officials competent in Russian affairs, W. Averell Harriman and Charles E. Bohlen."

This is the memo in part:

Washington, May 19, 1945

Grew 1445

"... But as 'a war to end wars,' the war will have been futile, for the result will be merely the transfer of totalitarian dictatorship and power from Germany and Japan to Soviet Russia which will constitute in future as grave a danger to us as did the Axis . . . Once Russia is in the war against Japan, then Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea will gradually slip into Russia's orbit, to be followed in due course by China and eventually Japan . . . A future war with Soviet Russia is as certain as anything in this world can be certain. It may come within a very few years. We shall therefore do well to keep up our fighting strength and to do everything in our power to strengthen our relations with the free world . . .

"As soon as the San Francisco Conference is over, our policy toward Soviet Russia should immediately stiffen, all along the line . . ."

The tragedy is that this analysis came in 1945. It should have come as a commentary on the Burns' estimate in 1942 and policy should have "stiffened" *then!* Even in 1945, however, much could still have been done.

see Chap. II

Without error, Grew had predicted the outcome of the war in Europe and the fate of China and Korea; as of this writing, Japan is beginning to slip down the ways into "Russia's orbit." Mr. Grew gives us no hint that he had read the edict of Georgi Dimitrov and the Communists' plans for Asia, but he saw and read the signs. When he advocated that "We shall therefore do well to keep up our fighting strength," he was of course completely unaware that *at that very time*, two weeks after the fall of Germany, the Communists were putting on a concentrated and successful campaign to "bring our boys home" in order to pulverize our armed forces. Nor did he appear to realize that the "over-selling" of the United Nations as a peace organization would strengthen this demand to demobilize.

Grew 1445

This memo of May 1945 was indeed "dangerous thinking." Not only that, but Grew made the grievous error of showing the memo to two of Hopkins' most loyal "aides" who were chiefly responsible for the territorial agreements made with Stalin at Yalta—Hariman and Bohlen.

Acting Secretary Grew went on from there, and on May 28th began his long and anguished campaign to persuade the President to make a realistic proposal to Japan. "At 12:35" on that date, he went to see Truman "accompanied by Judge Samuel Rosenman" who was one of the President's special counsels and advisers. Joe Grew pleaded that "If some indication can now be given the Japanese that they . . . will be permitted to determine their own future political structure, they will be afforded a method of saving face without which surrender will be highly unlikely . . . The President said that he was interested in what I

Grew 1428

said because his own thoughts had been following the same line." Grew 1431

Error No. 3 was perhaps the most "unforgivable" of them all. He unknowingly urged the arrest of two men important to the Communist Party, John S. Service and Andrew Roth. Service, working in the Far East Division, had recently returned from China and had been suspected for some time for following the Communist "line." In this event he had been discovered giving secret documents to the editor of the magazine, "Amerasia." Roth was a lieutenant in the Naval Intelligence Reserve who was guilty of the same offense, and was at that very moment in the process of writing his book in which Mr. Grew came in for most unfavorable comment. This was the notorious "Amerasia Case." "Amerasia" had a small circulation (mostly among our foreign service officers), and was a mouthpiece for the Communist Party. The case involved six persons and was piloted as far as a grand jury, at which time some fast footwork by the United States prosecuting attorneys ended the affair in what could be called a "white wash." The fines were small for two of the defendants, the case against Roth was dropped, and Service and the others escaped scot free. Service was later reinstated in the Department of State with a letter of apology, ironically enough from Mr. Grew.

IPR 13-4842
IPR R-71

Acting Secretary Grew became involved because one of the defendants was a State Department officer. In the spring of 1945 Assistant Secretary of State, General Julius Holmes, told Grew that the FBI had evidence on six persons, one a foreign service officer, for the theft of confidential documents from the State and Navy Departments. Grew did not ask the names of the six, but before his own subordinate could be prosecuted the Acting Secretary of State had to give consent. This he did.

Grew 1452

Some time later, General Holmes informed Grew that there had been a hitch—that the prosecution had

Grew 1452-3

been held up allegedly by the White House. General Holmes and Mr. Grew immediately went to see President Truman to find out why. But the Chief Executive knew nothing about it. In fact he was so outraged that Mr. Grew writes, "I have seldom seen a man more angry . . . The President had the telephone off the hook while we were still with him and he told Justice (Department) in no uncertain terms that he wished nothing whatever to interfere with the prompt and thorough prosecution of the cases."

Grew 1453

Mr. Grew later discovered that the "hold-up" was caused by the same policy that exists even today. It seems the President was having "current conversations with the Soviet Government," and the inevitable consequence of the prosecution would "greatly embarrass the President." White House advisers had given the "hold-up" order assuming the President would agree to it.

Four months after Service had been reinstated with apologies from Mr. Grew, he was appointed to the Staff of the Political Advisor in Tokyo embassy. Seven years later, Service was dropped from the State Department for security reasons.

Error No. 4 had initiated the series of "errors." On May 12, 1945 Mr. Grew made the tactical blunder of suggesting that, in view of the fact that Russia was already breaking the Yalta agreements concerning Europe, perhaps the agreement pertaining to Asia should be reassessed before the next Big Three meeting at Potsdam. In identical memoranda to the Secretaries of War and Navy, he asked:

Grew 1455

In order to determine the policy of the United States Government in the Far East in connection with the political effects of the expected Soviet entry into the Pacific War and the relationship of the Yalta Agreement on this subject, I would appreciate receiving from you the views of the War Department (Navy) on the following questions:

1. Is the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war at the earliest possible moment of such vital interest

to the United States as to preclude any attempt by the United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to certain desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to such entry?

2. Should the Yalta decision in regard to Soviet political desires in the Far East be reconsidered or carried into effect in whole or in part?

3. Should a Soviet demand, if made, for participation in the military occupation of the Japanese home islands be granted or would such occupation adversely affect our long term policy for the future treatment of Japan?

Grew 1456-7

In the opinion of the Department of State it would be desirable politically to obtain from the Soviet Government the following commitments and clarifications regarding the Far East prior to any implementation on our part of the Yalta Agreement:

1. The Soviet Government should agree to use its influence with the Chinese Communists to assist this Government in its endeavors to bring about the unification of China under the National Government headed by Chiang Kai-shek. The achievement of Chinese unity on the basis considered most desirable by the United States Government should be agreed to by the Soviet Union before the United States Government should make any approach to the Chinese Government on the basis of the Yalta Agreement. The difficulties in regard to Sinkiang should be settled by amicable agreement between the Soviet and Chinese Governments.

2. Unequivocal adherence of the Soviet Government to the Cairo Declaration regarding the return of Manchuria to Chinese sovereignty and the future status of Korea.

3. Definite agreement of the Soviet Government that when Korea is liberated, whether before final capitulation of Japan or after, it be placed immediately under the trusteeship of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union. This agreement should make clear that the four trustees are to be the sole authority for the selection of a temporary Korean Government.

4. Before giving final approval to the annexation by the Soviet Union of the Kurile Islands it might be desirable to receive from the Soviet Government emergency landing rights for commercial planes on certain of these islands.

Pentagon
Papers 71

The reply to this from the War Department concurred in by Secretary Forrestal (Navy) was dated May 21, 1945 and was over Stimson's name. It was a sharp reply to the man who would suggest that we obtain "certain desirable political objectives" from Soviet Russia. And it is astonishing, to say the least, in the light of American military tradition. The memo is long, but every sentence is so provocative, I can't feel justified in omitting any of them:

Grew 1458-9

1. The War Department considers that Russian entry into the war against Japan will be decided by the Russians on their own military and political basis with little regard to any political action taken by the United States. The War Department's view is that while the U.S.S.R. will seek and will accept any political inducement proffered by the United States as a condition to her entry into the war against Japan, such political inducements will not in fact affect the Russian decision as to when, if ever, she will enter the war. Russian entry will have a profound military effect in that almost certainly it will materially shorten the war and thus save American lives.

Military considerations therefore do not preclude an attempt by the United States Government to obtain Soviet agreement to desirable political objectives in the Far East prior to the entry of the Soviet Union into the Pacific war.

2. *The concessions to Russia on Far Eastern matters which were made at Yalta are generally matters which are within the military power of Russia to obtain regardless of U.S. military action short of war.* (Emphasis mine.) The War Department believes that Russia is militarily capable of defeating the Japanese and occupying Karafuto, Manchuria, Korea and Northern China before it would be possible for the U.S. military forces to occupy these areas. Only in the Kuriles is the United States in a position to circumvent Russian initiative. If the United States were to occupy these islands to forestall Russian designs, it would be at the direct expense of the campaign to defeat Japan and would involve an unacceptable cost in American lives. Furthermore, the Russians can, if they choose, await the time when the U.S. efforts will have practically completed the destruction of Japanese military power and can

then seize the objectives they desire at a cost to them relatively much less than would be occasioned by their entry into the war at an early date.

From the foregoing, it appears we can bring little, if any, military leverage to bear on the Russians in so far as the Far East is concerned, unless we choose to use force. From the military point of view it would be desirable to have a complete understanding and agreement with the Russians concerning the Far East. If it is believed that the reconsideration of the Yalta agreement will assist such a complete understanding and agreement, then the War Department would favor it, but it is not believed that much good will come of a rediscussion at this time.

3. With regard to Soviet participation in the military occupation of the Japanese homeland, the War Department considers this to be a matter for political decision. From one military standpoint, this participation appears desirable, since it would reduce the military requirements of the U.S. for occupation purposes. On the other hand, our experiences with the Russians in the occupation of Germany may in the future lead to considerations which would point to the wisdom of exclusive occupation by our own forces. The discussion of this subject prior to Russian entry into the Japanese war does not appear necessary at this time.

The War Department concurs in the desirability of obtaining the four commitments and clarifications desired of the Soviet Government by the Department of State. If the present schism in China continues and, at the same time, Russian forces advance to areas giving them close contact with the Chinese Communists, our present problems in China will become more complicated, unless a prior satisfactory understanding has been reached with the Russians. However, as a preliminary, some sort of understanding between the Chinese Communists and the Generalissimo seems to be in order as of first importance.

As to emergency landing rights for commercial planes in the Kuriles, it would probably be best to make a specific proposal on this matter to the Russians in case it is desired to discuss the subject with them. However, Russia has the military capability of implementing unilaterally the Yalta Agreement (except possibly the Kuriles). Hence, as pointed out above, measures other than U.S. military assistance

must be found to persuade the Russians to give their agreement to the four points listed in the State Department memorandum.

So you see, away back in 1945, the United States policy was "fear" of Russian might. And at that time we had the largest navy, and the greatest standing army in the world!

Grew 1406-7 Our obstreperous "boy," Mr. Grew, got his feet in even more hot water when, as Acting Secretary of State, he dipped his fingers into the propaganda machine and gummed up the works for a short minute. He emphasized in his memoirs that throughout the war he took the position "that propaganda by any branch of our Government against the Emperor of Japan, or any effort to bomb the Emperor's palace, should be withheld . . ."

As Acting Secretary of State I was fortunately able to influence this situation at home in the face of considerable difficulty with certain agencies of our Government and certain sections of the press and with certain radio commentators who charged me with desiring to preserve the old feudal system in Japan.

The last mistake was to take place on June 16, 1945 when Mr. Grew sent another memo to Samuel Rosenman, again harping on the necessity of a statement by the President to Japan. Grew did not know how to take "no" for an answer, or rather, he did not understand the motive behind the "no." On May 29, 1945, General Marshall had said that such a statement would be "premature" and Grew had gathered this was because the battle of Okinawa was still going on and such a statement might appear to be a sign of weakness. But when Joe Grew wrote his last memo it was only five days before the victory of Okinawa, which had been raging for two and a half months, was announced. In order to reach the President, he had to go through Judge Rosenman:

To Samuel I. Rosenman, June 16, 1945

Grew 1435

The campaign in Okinawa is likely to be finished in the not distant future and I am wondering whether, with the announcement of its fall, a suitable opportunity would not be presented for us to make some sort of public statement again calling upon the Japanese to surrender . . . more lives of Americans may ultimately be saved.

But this, too, was to meet defeat. The President, on June 18, 1945, said ". . . that while he liked the idea he had decided to hold this up until it could be discussed at the Big Three meeting." That same day Truman held a briefing session with Stimson, Forrestal, McCloy and his Joint Chiefs in preparation for the Potsdam Conference. The Pentagon papers published the minutes which make very unusual reading. Admiral Leahy suggested that ". . . our insistence on unconditional surrender would result only in making the Japanese desperate and thereby increase our casualty list. He did not think that this was at all necessary."

Grew 1437

Pentagon
papers 84

President Truman's reply, according to these published minutes, is extraordinary if not "what on earth!" What on earth was he talking about? And who persuaded him not to take the Admiral's advice. Truman has stated many times that his one concern was the saving of American lives. Here is the President's reply to Admiral Leahy's suggestion:

THE PRESIDENT stated that it was with that thought in mind that he had left the door open for Congress to take appropriate action with reference to unconditional surrender. However, he did not feel that he could take any action at this time to change public opinion on the matter.

Pentagon
papers 84

One can almost hear a forlorn sigh as Mr. Grew penned his "amen": "The President having ruled against the step at this time, there was of course nothing more to be done . . ."

Grew 1437

Two days later, June 20, 1945, the Communists had had enough and issued their manifesto. Word was

passed along to their "friends" in the State Department and in the White House, who knew how to carry out the orders with great finesse.

The day after that, June 21, 1945, the battle for Okinawa ended. The total casualties were enormous and horrible. But during the battle, in May and June, the Japanese were trying to persuade the Russians to help them negotiate for peace—first by way of the Soviet Ambassador to Japan, Malik, and then directly to Moscow. They were asking the Russians to tell the United States they wanted to surrender—and certain of our officials knew this.

One might ask the question—why was Mr. Grew allowed all this time to play "monkey wrench" with "established policies?" There are several answers. In the spring of 1945 so many important events were happening, or about to happen, that all Hell might break loose if the boat were rocked. President Roosevelt died in April just before Stettinius had to leave for the San Francisco United Nations conference. This left the "reactionary" Mr. Grew as Acting Secretary of State with a new President who was an unknown quantity; Germany surrendered in the beginning of May; the ailing Hopkins went to Moscow for his important talks with Stalin; and the Potsdam Conference, to be held in July, had to be set up.

It was not the time for a change, particularly since enough men in high places remained to defer the action in regard to Japan as "premature." The date for Soviet entry into the Pacific war was known, so it was just a matter of stalling for a few short weeks.

It would have been bad strategy to fire the "reactionaries" in the closing days of the war. The Communists know so well when to stir up a hornet's nest and when not to, a theory borne out by Roth's direction, i.e., "In politics, as in war, when a frontal attack is too costly, it is frequently advisable and no less effective to utilize a flank attack."

Their first step was a new Secretary of State, a

maneuver made easier by the advent of a new President. As has been the custom in the past all members of the Cabinet submitted their resignations when President Truman took office. However, Mr. Truman did not immediately accept the resignations, asking the Secretaries to stay on until he got his feet on the ground.

It was on July 1st when James F. Byrnes was appointed to be Secretary of State in place of Stettinius. Grew immediately informed President Truman that he was going to tell Byrnes that he could take advantage of his resignation any time he wanted to, but— ". . . I would certainly not let anyone down, and if Mr. Byrnes should wish me to stay at least for a time I would not be unwilling." Nothing happened in July, since the delay until Potsdam had been achieved.

Grew 1521

However, when Grew went to see Mr. Byrnes on August 16th, after the surrender of Japan, the Secretary frankly told him he would like to have an under-secretary of his own choice although he would like Grew to remain until September. But Mr. Grew proved unwilling to "stay at least for a time" and resigned then and there.

Here is an interesting detail about Mr. Grew's resigning: While Mr. Grew was still in Byrnes' office, Byrnes sent word to his secretary to telephone Dean Acheson who was vacationing in the Adirondacks. On the same evening, August 16, it was announced that Acheson would replace Grew. Surely Mr. Grew must have realized from such quick action, the subject had been long discussed with his successor.

Even before he had met with this abrupt acceptance of his "resignation" Mr. Grew had met with another maneuver from his enemies (and one quite often used even today). Mr. Grew's publishers make a footnote of it:

After a month of the Byrnes regime, Mr. Grew later commented, he saw that an inner group was making the major decisions, and that he was not being consulted.

Grew 1522

This was the "writing on the wall" that even a stubborn "blindness" should have seen.

The team of Grew, Ballantine and Dooman found itself isolated from their usual contacts and conferences, and the policies being "put forward" were entirely against its views and better judgment. It soon became apparent to them that their usefulness to the government had come to an end. After Mr. Grew left the Department on August 16th, the others, Dooman and Ballantine, soon followed.

A number of people in Washington at that time understood the true nature of this triple "resigning" for what it was, but, of the three, only Mr. Dooman realized he was, in fact, fired.

The new Undersecretary, Dean Acheson, immediately gave John Carter Vincent the duties of both Dooman and Ballantine.

To this day, Mr. Grew purports to be puzzled and somewhat hurt by statements that he was fired. He tried to explain in his book that this was not so. He pointed out that he had spent 41 years in public service and wished to retire; that he was suffering from gallstones; and that he had been trying to resign ever since Truman became President. In another footnote, he further explains:

Grew 1523

Charges were made in 1945 and have been repeated since, as, for instance, in the Chicago Tribune, July 14, 1950, that Mr. Grew was forced out of office by "left wing" pressure. "Myths have arisen about that point," Mr. Grew stated on July 21, 1950. "Actually I resigned on my own initiative and had to exert a little pressure to get my resignation accepted. The left wingers chortled that they had pushed me out, but they really had nothing to do with it."

In May 1952 Mr. Grew added: ". . . Probably nothing that I may say or write will stop these myths."

Mr. Grew is right in his prediction, unless he is "pretending" in the old-fashioned, grand manner. The

"myth" of August 1945 has been confirmed by events. Mr. Grew had to be fired. Being instinctively and automatically a loyal American and not understanding our "New Look" toward Russia, he was messing things up!

The story of Joseph Grew is important because it explains a part of the reason why our foreign policies since 1933 have consistently resulted in disaster, and also, how the enemy maneuvers. That Mr. Grew did not fully sense the betrayal of himself and the United States was a powerful weapon in the hands of the leftists and Communists then working in our State Department and White House. Strangely enough, Mr. Churchill, in "Triumph and Tragedy" delicately hints that he was aware of this "element." He wrote that "very different ideas were being pressed upon the new President from influential quarters in Washington. The sort of mood and outlook which had been noticed at Yalta had been strengthened . . . These pressures must have been very strong upon Truman . . . I could only feel the vast manifestation of Soviet and Russian imperialism rolling forward over helpless lands."

Churchill
T & T 570

Grew's anguish over the "stone wall" which he constantly faced during his last months in office, he expressed in an almost pathetic "cry in the wilderness":

"During this era I felt that the great majority of the American people as well as elements in the Government were woefully blind to the fundamental philosophy and doctrine of the Soviets. Few had studied or even read those Soviet bibles, the works of Marx and Engels, Lenin and Stalin himself, on which that philosophy and doctrine were firmly based . . . They were blind to the Soviet doctrine that communism and capitalism cannot continue to exist peaceably side by side, and that war between the two camps is eventually inevitable. They were blind to the patent fact that the only language understood by the Kremlin is the language of strength, force and power; that

Grew 1447

friendly appeasement in any form is regarded as a clear sign of weakness and an invitation to further demands or encroachments."

But let us see how "blind" Mr. Grew himself was. Did he not know that the American people were blind because of the misinformation they were receiving from their leaders who "handled" the press and radio channels? If he had stopped to analyse the manipulations of those "elements in government," would he still believe that they were "woefully blind"?

Had Mr. Grew read further than the *doctrines* of the Communist leaders, and delved into the voluminous hearings of the House Un-American Activities Committee he would have discovered *their local and practical methods* of infiltration and deception. If Mr. Grew had been aware of the Communist Manifesto for the domination of Asia, at least he could have recognized that the "elements in Government" were following the Communist line without omitting the dotting of an "I" or the crossing of a "T." It was the tragic case of the blind calling the deceivers blind.

Chapter VI

POTSDAM AND THE ADVISERS

The Potsdam Conference.

Forrestal makes a last desperate effort.

The Japanese are also desperate.

Military Intelligence makes a report on Red China.

Surrender is set for Nov. 15, 1946.

U.S. rejects aid in the Pacific from other allies.

The Potsdam Proclamation.

NOTHING was done to stop the slaughter of youth in the Pacific until the Potsdam Conference which began July 17th and ended August 1st, 1945. The Conference had three purposes: to discuss the problems arising from the defeat of Germany in the preceding May; to talk about getting Russia into the Pacific War; and thirdly, to smooth down the bristling fur of the Russian bear which had been accompanied by ominous grunts and growls ever since Yalta. Harry Truman, never a timid fellow, was assigned the task to "grin down the bear." And this he tried to do for, according to Jonathan Daniels' "The Man of Independence": "He kept a grinning admiration of 'Old Joe' which some dull patriots in America later decided was strange if not somehow disloyal."

Daniels 286

Although a good part of the Conference was taken up by Pacific problems, Chiang Kai-shek was not invited. If the Chief of the Chinese nation were present, it was argued, Japan would then have an excuse to break her neutrality pact with Russia and launch an attack on her!

This was the old reason given for not inviting Chiang to Teheran and Yalta, to which was added the "danger" that the Chinese might leak the information to the enemy. While these excuses might have had a shadow of validity at Teheran and Yalta, there was

not even the shadow of a shadow for such excuses at Potsdam in July 1945.

Why did the new President and his aides rush to Potsdam to confirm the top-secret agreements made at Yalta? The Soviets had already been breaking the Yalta agreements concerning Poland and Rumania with mass murder and the spread of terror. Stettinius mentioned this when he wrote that ". . . the military leaders and I discussed the failure of the Soviet Union to abide by the Yalta agreement on the Balkans." But this apparently did not break our faith in Russia as our "real friend." However, our officials had even more evidence of Russia's contempt for common decency. They were well acquainted with the inexcusable treatment of American soldiers whom the Russians "liberated" from Nazi prison camps, refusing even to give information as to their number, identification or whereabouts. Likewise, in the Pacific area the Russians had, throughout the war, spat on our national honor when they confiscated our B29's which were forced down in Russian territory after bombing raids on Japan. General Arnold wrote in his book, "Global Mission," that our crews were interned and "treated almost like captured enemies" as late as 1944 and 1945. Admiral Standley cites an incident in 1942 in "Admiral Ambassador to Russia" how these airmen finally escaped from the prisons of our "ally" and made their way to Iran. This escape is an example of the contempt American fighting men have for Russian threats because, when Admiral Standley pleaded with Molotov for their release, Molotov replied, "To escape from the Soviet Union is impossible."

Stet 97

Sherwood
558

Arnold 48a

Standley
232-4

Arnold 48a

But then as now, it had not been the policy of our government to demand the release of our boys "or else" from the Red jailors. Our policy seems to have been well summed up by General Arnold's plain spoken words: "Don't do anything; it might make somebody mad at us!"

Four Americans having much concern with the war against Japan were not invited to the Potsdam

Conference: Undersecretary of State Grew, Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, and Admiral of the Fleet Chester Nimitz.

Grew was obviously in the dog house and had been for some time. But his absence from Potsdam could be rationalized by the fact that he was obliged to be Acting Secretary of State while Byrnes was away at the Conference. As for MacArthur and Nimitz, the major conferences were only open to the "European brass," although Wedemeyer, Chennault and Stilwell did manage to rate the "bush league" Cairo Conference in 1943, and Wedemeyer was at the Casablanca meeting. Years later, MacArthur's startled "I?" when asked by Senator Knowland whether he had been invited to go to Yalta spoke volumes, as did the General's succinct answer, "No, sir."

MacA 1-128

Forrestal, on the other hand, had been fairly popular with the elite Washington conference group until his patriotism combined with his intelligence forced Mr. Grew to share his dog house with him. Forrestal had been reading reports, making personal inspections, and had started asking questions. Unlike Mr. Grew, the Secretary of the Navy was not only well acquainted with those "certain elements" but he also understood their aims. Naval intelligence was perhaps the best of our wartime intelligence agencies (excluding the FBI), and Forrestal was reading daily the many intercepted messages between Japan and Russia in which the former was attempting to negotiate a surrender. Moreover, Forrestal had recently made a complete tour of the Pacific war theater where he saw the war being fought and talked with the officers and men doing the fighting. He was "dangerous."

Knowing the territorial loot Truman was intent on giving the Russians at Potsdam, and realizing the tragic needlessness of such concessions, Forrestal came to the conclusion he must act, and quickly. He flew to the Conference in a desperate hope of being able to place a deterring hand on the President's shoulder.

But the day he arrived the conference came to an end and the damage was done.

Forrestal was not alone in his attempt to bring the Japanese cry for peace to official attention. Senator Homer Capehart, Republican from Indiana, had come across the information and publicly announced on June 28th that the Japanese had made peace offers "within recent weeks which would be acceptable to me personally." The following day Mr. Grew made a short denial. But apparently the Senator's statement to the press attracted public interest which the short denial did not pacify. On July 10th, Mr. Grew presented a long and detailed statement to the press which, in view of his past actions and convictions against unconditional surrender, was extraordinary. In part his statement is as follows:

Kase 200-1
also State
Dept. source.

We have received no peace offer from the Japanese Government, either through official or unofficial channels. Conversations relating to peace have been reported to the Department from various parts of the world, but in no case has an approach been made to this Government, directly or indirectly, by a person who could establish his authority to speak for the Japanese Government . . . The nature of the purported "peace feelers" must be clear to everyone. They are the usual moves in the conduct of psychological warfare by a defeated enemy . . . The policy of this Government has been, is, and will continue to be unconditional surrender.

Hunt 375

The idea of considering the "peace feelers" as trick psychological warfare apparently came from higher authorities than the Undersecretary. Frazier Hunt's book, "The Untold Story of Douglas MacArthur," reveals this to be true. In March of 1945 General George C. Kenney came to Washington on a mission for General MacArthur. In a talk with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he did his best to tell them that the war in the Pacific was over and that there was no "necessity for holding back until the Russians came in." General Marshall said he did not agree with

this view. "He insisted that she still had a great army and was full of fight. Likewise, he made it clear that *he had little faith in the Japanese overtures for peace.*" (Emphasis mine.)

General Kenney later said he didn't give up hope and made a bee-line to the White House to talk with President Roosevelt. After he'd told his story he met with another exasperating stone wall. The President, he said, merely grinned at him and replied, "That is not what my Chiefs of Staff tell me."

talk with
Kenney

On July 12, 1945, five days before the Potsdam Conference opened, the Emperor of Japan, frustrated by the unproductive talks between Japanese Ambassador to the Kremlin and the Soviet officials, ordered Prince Konoye on a mission to Moscow. In Konoye the Emperor had a devout pacifist. The Prince on numerous occasions had considered making a dramatic plea for peace by flying to the United States unannounced to "talk personally to President Roosevelt and solicit his personal intervention for peace."

Kase 189 also
USSBS
Japan's
Struggle to
End the War
7-8

(Prince Konoye committed suicide in December of 1945, the day before he was to be taken to jail as one of the war criminals.)

Kase 192
Kase 190

General Marshall in his Biennial Report to the Secretary of War (July 1, 1943 to June 30, 1945) presents a picture of the situation in the Pacific at this time. He reported that "From California to the coast of China the vast Pacific abounded with American power . . . The enemy's shipping had been largely sunk or driven from the seas. The few remaining fragments of his once powerful naval force were virtually harbor bound and the industries and communications of Japan were rapidly crumbling under the mounting tempo of our aerial bombardment . . . The day of final reckoning for a treacherous enemy was at hand."

Biennial
Report 154-5

The campaign inside government circles in Washington to "get Russia into the war," however, was intense, while the press and radio pushed strenuously

for the trial of the Emperor as a war criminal. The Daily Worker, which heretofore had made few mentions of Japan, and none of the Emperor, now went "all out."

Increasing alarm filled the minds of many—those who were trying to get Russia into the war before it was too late, and those on the opposite side of the fence who dreaded the consequences if this were to occur. It was early in July when General of the Army, Dwight D. Eisenhower, went to Antwerp to meet President Truman and his party on their arrival for the Potsdam Conference. In his book, "Crusade in Europe," written some years later, General Eisenhower wrote:

Eisenhower
441-2

Another item on which I ventured to advise President Truman involved the Soviets' intention to enter the Japanese war. I told him that since reports indicated the imminence of Japan's collapse I deprecated the Red Army's engaging in that war. I foresaw certain difficulties arising out of such participation and suggested that, at the very least, we ought not to put ourselves in the position of requesting or begging for Soviet aid. It was my personal opinion that no power on earth could keep the Red Army out of that war unless victory came before they could get in.

In this view General Eisenhower had the complete agreement of Admiral Leahy:

Leahy 385

I also had told the President of my jaundiced view of Russia's going into Manchuria. This also was discussed at length by the Joint Chiefs, but the Army already had won that argument and the decision had been confirmed at Yalta.

A member of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral King, in the discussions with the President, June 18th, on various aspects of the Pacific war had—

King 606

... emphasized the point that, regardless of the desirability of the Russians entering the war, they were not, in

his opinion, indispensable, and he did not think that we should go so far as to beg them to come in. While the cost of defeating Japan would be greater without Russian aid, there was no question in King's mind but that we could handle it alone. He thought the realization of this fact should greatly strengthen the President's hand in the forthcoming conference in Potsdam.

Also the politically naive Mr. Stettinius gave the proposal an incredulous glance when he wrote:

Even as late as the Potsdam Conference, after the first atomic bomb had exploded at Los Alamos (Note: he means Alamogordo) on July 16th, the military insisted that the Soviet Union had to be brought into the Far Eastern war.

Stet 98

James Forrestal commented in his "Diaries" that on July 28th Secretary Byrnes said he was "anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in."

Forrestal 78

So here again we find that "the Army," in the person of General Marshall, won an argument on high strategy against the advice of a majority of generals, admirals and statesmen.

In 1945 the administration set a precedent which has become common government practice ever since. It suppressed a document embarrassing to its policy. And this one was certainly a hot potato. This was a July 5, 1945 summary of a report on "The Chinese Communist Movement" which was a study made by the Military Intelligence Service, and presented by General P. E. Peabody, its chief. Several months of intense research had gone into the project, the staff of military and civilian experts having examined over 2,500 reports, pamphlets, and books covering a period from 1919 to 1945. The conclusions reached in the report begin with these words: "The Chinese Communists ARE Communists . . . The 'democracy' which the Chinese Communists sponsor represents 'Soviet democracy' . . ."

IPR 7A-2310

IPR 7A-2310

2315 This was a "dangerous" statement because, as we all know, the policy of "certain elements" at that time and up to the Korean war, was that the Red Chinese were "agrarian reformers." Also, it was in direct contradiction to the following dispatch by an American official in Chungking which was quoted in the intelligence report—"it is unfortunate that the present day Communist Party (in China) bears that name." But the intelligence report goes on to quote Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader, in his booklet, "New Democracy" (Jan. 1941), who was more candid than the American official when he said, "We (Chinese) cannot separate ourselves from the assistance of the Soviet Union."

2317 In this same booklet, Mao gives a warning to the free world—"Whoever prepares to oppose the Communists has to prepare to be crushed." (Emphasis mine.)

2308 This summary and report put its finger directly on the heart of the Yalta agreement (although it was still a secret) when the summary pointed out: "There are indications that Soviet Russia envisages the establishment of Soviet domination . . . in the areas of North China adjacent to Soviet Russia: that is in Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria, and possibly also the northern provinces of China Proper."

A recommendation and distinct warning can be found in the Fundamental Conclusions. The fifth conclusion in the summary reads as follows:

2305 In order to prevent the separation of Manchuria and North China from China, it is essential that, if Soviet Russia participates in the war, China not be divided (like Europe) into American-British and Russian zones of military operations.

The story of the summary and report issued by the Military Intelligence Division is one of unusual interest. The summary was presented in May 1945, three months before the Potsdam Conference, and

marked "secret." 110 copies of the summary were made and were distributed in July to 19 government agencies and overseas military theaters—15 went to the White House and three to the State Department. Shortly after it was distributed, it was recalled.

The fat got thrown into the fire when on August 5, 1949, Secretary of State Acheson made public the famous one-sided White Paper on China. Everyone who had been following our "blunders" in China with real anxiety, read the White Paper carefully, and Congressman Walter H. Judd, Republican of Minnesota, one of the few who had knowledge of the intelligence report, noticed it was never mentioned in the White Paper. He gave out a press release in which he called on Dean Acheson to tell why he did not include either the report or the summary on Red China.

Acheson answered the question by following the formula: "the best defensive is an offensive." On August 24, 1949, he declassified the report and made it public while at the same time issuing a press statement ridiculing Walter Judd. And, in making the report and summary public, the press had access to only two copies, each consisting of 450 typewritten pages. No short summary was made to help the reporters.

But the story is even stranger. The ONLY member of the press who made any effort to get the report was a correspondent for Tass, the Soviet News agency. And the only way in which these documents have become available to the average interested citizen was through Alfred Kohlberg, an old-timer in the fight against the Chinese Reds who became known as "The China Lobby." He borrowed one of the two copies possessed by the State Department, had it photostated, and presented it to the McCarran committee during its investigation of the Institute of Pacific Relations. It was published as volume 7A of the published IPR hearings.

Whoever "They" were who decided that this summary and report should be suppressed undoubtedly had knowledge of the secret Yalta agreement con-

cerning Japan. It's an easy guess that President Truman was never shown either the summary or the report of our Military Intelligence Service. I was not surprised either when Admiral Leahy told me that he had never seen or heard of these documents until he had read the manuscript of this book! The Admiral's office was in the White House and 15 copies were sent there.

I am curious to know what went on in Harry Truman's mind at that time. I wrote him a letter and asked him, but he never replied. Neither do his "Memoirs" answer the question I put to him. He had been President only three months, a job for which he had had no schooling whatever. Only a year before, he'd been a United States Senator, and then vice-president for three months before he was catapulted into the world's most important office. During the time he was vice-president he had never been invited to go to an Allied conference, nor even to the important conferences in Washington. He was completely uneducated in high-powered, international politics. The Potsdam Conference was the first meeting our new President had with Churchill (succeeded midway by Atlee) and Stalin, and again it is important to know what his attitude was toward these men as he met them with the "cards stacked against him," so to speak. Jonathan Daniels in his book, "The Man of Independence," gives us the best insight. And the man of Independence, Missouri, evidently thought the Big League was no different from the Missouri Bush League:

Daniels 278

From the beginning Truman liked Stalin, as he liked Churchill but in a different way . . . "Stalin is as near like Tom Pendergast as any man I know" . . . "I got the impression," Truman said later, "that Stalin would stand by his agreements, and also that he had a Politburo on his hands like the Eightieth Congress . . ."

Again we must take into consideration the advisers with whom Truman had had no close, if any, relation-

ship. The President was accompanied by his new Secretary of State, Jimmy Byrnes, who had been with Roosevelt at Yalta even though he had played only a small part in the negotiations. Mr. Byrnes gave a graphic picture of the importance of the advisers in his book. He said that they had brought along memoranda covering almost every subject that might be brought up. "We worked hard on board the Augusta . . . Every morning throughout the trip, Ben Cohen, H. Freeman (Doc) Matthews, and Charles E. (Chip) Bohlen would meet with me in my cabin to consider these papers. A new Secretary of State could not have asked for a finer trio of advisers."

Byrnes 67

Ben Cohen, Mr. Byrnes wrote, ". . . has had a hand in important issues ever since the early days of the Roosevelt administration. He was with me through all my work at the White House . . . I regard his mind as one of the best I have ever encountered . . . Doc . . . is representative of the finest men in our career service and I relied upon him heavily . . . Chip . . . was invaluable to me."

With few exceptions, they were almost the same advisers who went with Roosevelt to Yalta. At this time, of course, Roosevelt was dead, and Hopkins' illness had finally forced him to retire. However, "Harry the Hop" had already laid the ground work for Potsdam at his meeting with Stalin the preceding May, and the policies were faithfully carried out.

Before Truman left for the Conference he had been given all kinds of confidential information and conflicting advice. He had been advised by Admirals King, Leahy and Nimitz that the Japanese Navy and Air Force were liquidated, that "the defeat of Japan could be accomplished by sea and air power alone," and that there was "no necessity of actual invasion of the Japanese home islands by ground troops." At the same time, the Enemy Branch of the Foreign Economic Administration, headed by Henry N. Fowler, contradicted this with the statement that the Japanese were still powerful. General Marshall agreed. The Office of War

King 598

IPR 10-3386

Information, headed by Elmer Davis, backed up by a certain element in the State Department were advising him that the Japanese Emperor system should be abolished. Owen Lattimore even paid a call on the President to convince him of this view. General Marshall insisted that it was necessary for Russia to enter the war in order to "save millions of American lives."

Surely the drafted paper, which Truman had discussed with Mr. Grew and others, must have presented a puzzle to him while the Army continued with plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands. This was the question I asked him in my letter. I wanted to know how he reconciled all this conflicting information and advice.

Kase 165

Meanwhile, Russia had not waited until the fall of Germany to transport her troops from the European war to Siberia in preparation for the attack on Manchuria. Apparently Stalin believed as early as March that the war in Europe was already won because in that month Japanese intelligence had noticed Russian troop movements behind the Manchurian border.

Kase 165-6

Baldwin 80-1

Baldwin 80

Japan, anticipating the invasion of her home islands, had used the remaining vessels of her merchant marine to transfer the remnants of her highly trained Kwantung army to Japan. In contrast to this, General Marshall had estimated that the strength of the Japanese troops on the Asiatic mainland was 2,000,000 first rate and well trained troops. Hanson Baldwin, military affairs editor of the New York Times, noted in his book, "Great Mistakes of the War" that the best of the Kwantung Army had been shifted in the fall of 1944 to the fronts where fighting was going on.

MacA 1-58

Even in the Japanese home islands the situation was hopeless. As General MacArthur stated before the "MacArthur hearings" in 1951: ". . . they had at least 3,000,000 of as fine ground troops as I have ever known, that laid down their arms *because they didn't have the materials to fight with.*" I have emphasized these words because they state a fact which "the Army" always chose to ignore.

And now we come to a very curious incident occurring at Potsdam. A year before, at the Quebec meeting in September 1944, it was decided that Russia would enter the war against Japan (as Stalin had promised at Moscow and Teheran) 90 days after the surrender of Germany and that the target date for Japan's surrender should be 18 months, or a year and 6 months from the fall of Germany. This was arrived at in the following manner. "While the British Chiefs of Staff proposed an estimate of two years after the defeat of Germany, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who had been using a one year period, recommended as a compromise an 18-month period, 'to be adjusted periodically to conform to the course of the war.'"

Pentagon
papers 31

But no "adjustment" was ever allowed. Since the British are brought into this unusual picture by the Pentagon papers, it would be more than interesting to see the British documents on this Quebec 1944 meeting.

What makes this estimate curious is the fact that General MacArthur stated to the press on April 4, 1955 that "On September 21, 1944 (a few days after the Quebec meeting) I reported that the campaign was 'entering its decisive phase' . . . and that 'defeat now stares her (Japan) in the face.' " This was 10 months before Potsdam. Students of history will find the chronology of these dates and the state of affairs as they existed more than interesting. For in spite of all that occurred between September 1944 when this decision was taken, and the Potsdam Conference; in spite of the reports from MacArthur and Nimitz of the imminent collapse of Japan; in spite of the drawn up surrender papers in Mr. Truman's hypothetical pocket; and in spite of great progress with the atomic bomb—this decision was reaffirmed at Potsdam!

Admiral Leahy wrote: "At the Combined Chiefs session on July 19th (1945) the target date for forcing unconditional surrender of Japan was set for Nov. 15, 1946." Let me add that when I first read this passage I thought it must be a misprint—surely he meant 1945.

Leahy 410

But other memoirs proved the typesetter not in error.

To some of those who witnessed it, this decision must have seemed most unrealistic. But what was the reaction of President Truman? One of those present at Potsdam has told that, on the day Stalin arrived and had his first meeting with the President, the former told the President that he had received a message from the Japanese Government expressing an intention to send Prince Konoye to Moscow to negotiate for surrender. According to the story, Truman asked, "What are you going to do about it?" And Stalin's reply was—with a laugh and a shrug, "Nothing."

Nowhere in the history book do I find any questions from Truman on the logic of the target date for Nov. 15, 1946.

As the famous Alice once said and so aptly, "Things get curiouser and curiouser." Two days after the Combined Chiefs decided the war would last more than a year longer, we find that decisions even more curiouser were to be made. According to Admiral King's book, on July 21st, the American Joint Chiefs sent a dispatch from Potsdam to MacArthur and Nimitz that they might expect the "capitulation" of Japan "within the very near future."

King 611

The big question is, who gave the signal that it was time to permit Japan to surrender?

The American press at home reflected about one tenth of the information that our generals, admirals and statesmen had. The contrast between the Joint Chiefs' and later the Combined Chiefs' decision that the war would not end for a year and two months, and the front pages in our press is worth looking over:

- July 16, 1945 Tokyo Admits Possibility Japan May Have to Surrender
- July 18, 1945 United States Warships Roam for Hours Off Japan Without Opposition
- July 23, 1945 Japanese See Final Fight at Home; Admiral Says Fleet and Planes Impotent
- July 24, 1945 Jap Envoy to Berlin Reported Planning to Urge Surrender

July 26, 1945 Tokyo Radio Suggests Japan Would Accept
Easier Peace Terms

On August 4, 1945 a story appearing on page 4 of the Washington Evening Star gave one of the most important news reports of that day, two days before the atomic bomb was dropped and ten days before the actual surrender:

AP. with the US 3rd Army in Germany, Aug. 4—Herbert von Dirksen, former German ambassador to Tokyo and London, said yesterday the German Government was advised last January that Japan was forming a new government, with Baron Kantaro Suzuki as Premier to try to come to an understanding with the United States and Great Britain . . . "I wish your government had seen fit to explain unconditional surrender to us," he said.

Unfortunately the propaganda in our press against the Emperor was having more effect on both our own and the Japanese public than these signs of peace appearing in the headlines. During the Potsdam Conference Mr. Kase wrote that ". . . what interested us most deeply was the trend of expression in regard to the status of the Emperor."

Kase 201

By this time the American press was "laying it on thick," and the Daily Worker was hot on the Mikado's trail too. It is interesting that on July 19, the Daily Worker reported on an editorial in the New York Herald Tribune whose then foreign editor was Joseph Barnes, later to be named under oath as a Communist. (He denied the accusation and went with the Simon and Schuster publishing house.)

IPR R-151

THE DAILY WORKER, July 19, 1945

Tuesday's N.Y. Herald Tribune in a front page story by its Washington reporter Jack Steele, disclosed . . . that the imperial government, together with the Emperor would remain in power . . . It should be noted that the Herald Tribune's editorial yesterday takes this seriously and argues strongly against such an approach.

Perhaps no paper in the United States carries as much influence as the New York Times. Its columnist, Arthur Krock, had won the respect and confidence of thousands of people across the country. And yet we find the Times' editorials as well as Mr. Krock parroting the Communist line. Mr. Krock wrote on July 5, 1945:

"Unless the imperial Japanese power is removed—even though it is wielded from behind the throne—no peace with Japan will be more than an armistice."

Perhaps Mr. Krock was only following the editorial policy of his employers, for a few days later, on July 14, 1945, the Times' editorial proposed that the Emperor as well as the military caste should now be attacked. The Times admitted the Kamikaze pilots were fighting *for* the Emperor but somehow arrived at the queer conclusion that they would stop if we attacked the Emperor.

Kase 201

On this note, an interesting sequence of broadcasts to Japan occurred. On July 21st, the U.S. Navy, although unable to explain our meaning of unconditional surrender, tried to come as close as was possible to saying the Japanese could select their own government, which would naturally mean the inclusion of the Emperor. In a broadcast to Japan the Navy's Psychological Warfare Department said that "The Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration are the sources of our policy."

This was widely reported in the United States, and the following day Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State, rushed to broadcast to Japan that the United States would never modify the terms of unconditional surrender, but that the treatment of Japan after surrender was another matter.

Although the Japanese, grasping at straws, read some sign of hope in the last phrase of the statement, MacLeish inadvertently let it be known that the Atlantic Charter and the Cairo Declaration would be interpreted by the United States in its own way.

From his office in Washington, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal kept a close watch on both Potsdam and the war in the Pacific. His diaries of those days tell many unusual stories notwithstanding the fact that they were carefully "edited" and much was deleted by the Truman administration after Forrestal's death, and, notwithstanding the fact that one of the compilers of "The Forrestal Diaries" was Walter Millis. Millis' political philosophy can be summed up by the fact that the St. Louis Post Dispatch reviewed an article he wrote for the Saturday Review in which he strongly attacked the Loyalty Security program and called the FBI "secret political police." (For instance, in the "Diaries" the "premature" meeting of May 29th in the Pentagon was mentioned, but NOT the "premature" conversation.) One of the many interesting entries is as follows:

St. Louis
Post Dis-
patch Sept.
20, 1955

"24 July 1945

Forrestal 76

. . . on the first of July, Sato (Ambassador to Moscow) sent a long message outlining what he conceived to be Japan's position . . . He strongly advised accepting any terms . . . The response to this message was that . . . the war must be fought with all the vigor and bitterness of which the nation was capable so long as the only alternative was the unconditional surrender."

This was one of the messages which inspired Secretary Forrestal's dramatic and futile flight to Potsdam.

It is a curious thing that there are not found in the Forrestal Diaries the much more important intercepted messages beginning with July 10th when the Japanese were finally desperate enough to take any terms they could get. In fact, these later messages between Sato and Tokyo do not appear in any publication or memoir I have found except in the reports of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey. Neither are they found in the recently published Yalta papers or the Pentagon papers. Here is an extraordinary story as told by the USSBS:

"On 10 July . . . Sato was again instructed to put

USSBS
Japan's
Struggle to
End the War
P. 7

the matter directly to the Vice Commissar for Foreign Affairs in Moscow. Russia asked for more details concerning the mission and Sato was directed to explain the mission as follows: . . . (2) to ask Russia to intercede with the United States in order to stop the war. *The Soviets replied* on 13 July that since Stalin and Molotov were just leaving for Potsdam *no answer could be given until their return to Moscow*. On 12 July meanwhile the Emperor had called in Konoye and secretly instructed him to accept any terms he could get and to wire these terms direct to the Emperor. Konoye also testified that when Sato was sounding out the Russians he reported the Russians would not consider a peace role unless the terms were unconditional surrender, and that this reply had a great influence on the Emperor." (Emphasis mine.)

Were these other messages kept from Mr. Forrestal, or were they omitted from his published "Diaries"?

The strong argument put up by the Army was that the real necessity for getting Russia into the war was the enormous number of casualties we anticipated in the invasion of the Japanese home islands. And the invasion was a plan the military did not abandon. The final report made by the American and British Combined Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Leahy writes, "presumed that defeat of the Enemy's armed forces in the Japanese homeland would be prerequisite to the unconditional surrender of the enemy, a premise with which I did not agree."

Leahy 414

Everyone who had even second hand knowledge of the Japanese character and their fanatic ability to fight, realized that, with the Emperor at stake, almost every patriotic man, woman and child would fight with his last breath. Mr. Kase tells how they made preparations for their last hopeless defense when he wrote that "As there were no guns or swords to arm them with, they were told to improvise spears out of sharpened bamboo sticks! Men and women were herded together and compelled to drill with these primitive weapons morning and evening."

Kase 141

The elderly and trusting Mr. Stimson writes that he was informed that the grand total of armed might necessary for the invasion would be 5,000,000 men, exclusive of those not directly concerned. They also informed him that the casualties expected would be over a million. These figures were presented to the Secretary of War by the military and the Interim Committee on the atom bomb.

Stimson 619

This estimate was given by General Marshall, and those who went along with him cited the awful toll of dead and wounded at Okinawa as an example of what could be expected in Japan. The figure of five million men with one million casualties, or 20 percent, in a battle with an already defeated enemy is hard to understand. But this was the argument for the necessity of Russian participation in the defeat of Japan as presented to President Truman, Secretary Stimson and the other Joint Chiefs of Staff.

At the end of the Potsdam Conference, General Eisenhower again remarked to the President that he hoped he had not had to make any concessions to get the Russians in, and Secretary Forrestal pungently concluded that "fifty divisions could not have kept them OUT . . ."

Forrestal 79

I came across some very interesting notes in Admiral Leahy's book and also in the testimony of the MacArthur hearings which place a peculiar light on our insistence on Russia's coming to our aid. All during the talks between ourselves and the Russians—Stalin and his lieutenants were very insistent that in the event Russia went to war against Japan, we must supply her with all the materials necessary to keep an army going. That was not just general talk. As early as Oct. 17, 1944, there was a specific demand for 850,000 tons of dry cargo and 206,000 tons of liquid cargo. On May 30, 1945 Russia requested an additional 1,870,000 tons! These and later demands were generously and magnanimously met. By the time of Potsdam, the Russians were sufficiently equipped and stock-piled to

Yalta Papers
370 & 374
Arnold,
Dean, etc.
Pentagon
papers 74

be a major power in the Pacific—and they still weren't in the Pacific war!

Whitney 186

So anxious were Russia's "real friends" in Washington to share with them "all that we have," our fighting forces in the Pacific were beginning to feel the pinch. Major General Courtney Whitney in his book, "MacArthur: His Rendezvous with History" tells about a shocking incident. He wrote that when the Japanese were putting up a desperate resistance on Luzon and our boys were having a rough time of it, General MacArthur received orders from Washington which "at this critical moment" upset MacArthur's timetable. ". . . one hundred of his transport ships," General Whitney writes, "were to be withdrawn immediately, to be used to carry munitions and supplies across the North Pacific to the Soviet forces in Vladivostok. He protested bitterly . . . the abrupt removal of these transport ships jeopardized his entire Philippine campaign . . . with the result that tremendous quantities of munitions and supplies of all kinds were rapidly stacked up in Siberia. Later, of course, *they were the basis of Soviet military support of North Korea and Red China.*" (Emphasis mine.)

Leahy 410

Leahy 413

But Russia wasn't the only nation with forces available for the Pacific. China had vast armies which needed only equipment to fight, and they were already on the spot. In Admiral Leahy's book we find that we had several offers from other allies, none of whom demanded any "territorial adjustments," (to borrow Mr. Bohlen's expression) for their good deeds. The Admiral tells us that the British, Dutch and French, as well as Australians and New Zealanders all volunteered help. Our excuse to the British was that it "was pretty much of an American show," while the others presented "language and logistic difficulties." Apparently someone enjoying White House authority did not anticipate logistics and language would present difficulties with the Russians!

Why were the logistic problems for Russia ignored and who did the ignoring? Vice Admiral Oscar C.

Badger testified at the MacArthur hearings in 1951 that at the Cairo Conference in 1943, the British and American Combined Chiefs of Staff discussed the subject of whether there was a need for Russia's help in the Pacific. He reminded the committee before which he was appearing that the Teheran Conference was to follow the Cairo meeting within a few days and that "an immediate decision was necessary in order that they might advise Mr. Stalin accordingly."

MacA 4-2730

Admiral Badger went on to explain that the Allied agencies, after careful study of their evidence and statistics, concluded that the U.S.S.R. was "so weak logistically in the Far East" that they were almost completely dependent for their supplies coming from American Pacific coast ports. He also pointed out the important fact that once Russia declared war on Japan, Russian ships would no longer be free from Japanese attack and—

the logistic staff recommended that the U.S.S.R. be advised not to enter the war against Japan. In other words, weakness in the Far East of the Soviet Union was definitely recognized, was definitely a fact, and their participation in the war against Japan at that time was undesirable.

MacA 4-2731

But at Yalta and again at Potsdam someone was calling the plays and giving the signals, and it is tempting to guess it was Stalin himself. Who on our team was interpreting the signals and putting them into effect? The extraordinary thing is that the obvious was always ignored. Apparently Stalin went on the theory that if you spoke about something of great importance in a casual way, the importance would not get across. The offhand manner in which he told Truman of the proposed visit of Prince Konoye to Moscow seemed not to have impressed the President. There is no mention that Truman repeated the news to anyone. But three days before the end of the conference, and after the decision to use the atomic bomb, Stalin formally announced, but without fanfare, that on

Leahy 420

July 18th he had received a request from Japan to mediate. He explained that the proposals had been "too vague" for him to give an affirmative answer. He also added that on that very day, July 28th, he had received another vague proposal and that he would make the same reply.

USSBS
Japan's
Struggle to
End the War
p. 7

Now we know from the United States Strategic Bombing Survey reports that at the time of Potsdam the Japanese were not at all "vague" but quite definite, and definitely desperate in their "struggle to end the war." What is more, the United States was intercepting all the Japanese messages between Moscow and Tokyo. Obviously Mr. Truman was not aware of this vitally important information. Who kept this from him?

But even without this information, what would the average Mr. John Q. Citizen, in Harry Truman's shoes, have done after hearing Stalin's announcement? With no experience in such high diplomatic affairs but a normal reaction to Russian trickery, Mr. Citizen would undoubtedly have smelled a Russian rat. He more than likely would have delayed the plans for dropping the atomic bomb and would have sent a hurried message to our embassy in Moscow to ask a neutral diplomat to check into the story. The Swiss, for instance, could easily have contacted the Japanese Embassy and corroborated Stalin's statement. But no such thing happened. And nowhere is there recorded any astonishment or intelligent interest among our statesmen who were present. Admiral Leahy later wrote that "It was clearly evident that Stalin was at that time determined to enter the war against Japan, which plainly was to the advantage of Russia, now that Japan was certain to be defeated."

Leahy 420

Although the Potsdam Proclamation, setting forth our terms for Japanese surrender, has become an important document in the history of World War II, at the time it was only an afterthought which was finally made use of on Mr. Stimson's insistence. From its inception in late May until President Truman left for Potsdam, Mr. Grew was relentless in his campaign to

sell the idea that its use would hasten the end of the war. With a little pathos, Mr. Grew writes in his memoirs that, when Byrnes became Secretary of State, he tried to see him to tell him how important and urgent the paper was. But Mr. Byrnes was too busy preparing for the coming conference. It was not until the day before Byrnes left for Europe that Mr. Grew was finally able to hand him the draft of the Proclamation. However it was not Byrnes who acted upon the paper. Perhaps his advisers on whom he "relied heavily" advised him against it.

Grew 1424

But, even Mr. Stimson was unable to hang on to the famous Paragraph 12 which provided for the retention of the Emperor. In its final draft, the paragraph was rewritten in vague language, by whom we don't know, and broadcast to Tokyo on July 26th, 1945.

Strangely enough, although he filled two volumes with his memoirs of his 41 years in the State Department, Mr. Grew ended his story without including some of his worries over vitally important matters in the summer of 1945. It was for others to record the end of Grew's "Turbulent Era." Secretary Forrestal, for instance, noted in his "Diaries" that on July 6, 1945, he had spent an evening with Mr. Grew and, while talking over the Proclamation, Mr. Grew said "he was afraid it would be ditched on the way over (to the Conference) by people who accompany the President—Bohlen among others . . ."

Forrestal 73

Mr. Grew went on to tell the Secretary of the Navy that these "people" seemed to believe that we could not make any clarification of the term "unconditional surrender" lest it might appear that we wanted to get the war over with before Russia could get in it! In view of this conversation, perhaps it is understandable that Mr. Grew did not care to include in his memoirs the contradictory statement to the press he was to make only four days later. (See page 140.) Indeed the last two months of his career must have been too contradictory and too painful to relate.

Forrestal 74

A good look at the final draft of the Potsdam Procla-

mation raises some questions. It had been constantly repeated—and Mr. Grew made the statement in Washington on July 10th—that Japan had never made formal offers to surrender to our Government. So it was ironic if not tragic that the Allies, not only knowing Japan wanted to surrender but also what terms they had been giving, never made an official offer to accept surrender to their government. In view of our negotiations and leniency with Italy, why didn't we do the same with Japan? Neither the United States Government nor the Allies jointly, ever sent a direct message to a Japanese official saying in effect, "If you want to surrender, here are our terms, among which you may keep your Emperor." Mr. Kase reminds us that the Proclamation sent to Japan by the United States, Great Britain and China, was not formally addressed to their government and was received only through their radio monitoring service. The Japanese were also wondering what Russia's position was regarding it. They were at that time still anxiously waiting for a reply to their peace offer to the Kremlin. Because of these considerations, Mr. Kase said, their "hastily convened cabinet decided to keep silence for a while . . ." Paragraph 12, he says, was viewed with grave misgivings by members of the peace party as well as by members of the war party.

Kase 210 also
USSBS
Japan's
Struggle to
End the War
p. 8

It seems that "They" did everything possible to delay the acceptance of the Proclamation, for when the Potsdam meeting ended there was added one more brand to the dying fire. The final communique from Potsdam to the world did not mention Japan at all, but dealt exclusively with the postwar punishment to be accorded to Germany which, Mr. Kase comments—

Kase 223

" . . . struck us as surprisingly harsh. It was, it looked to us, none other than a Carthaginian peace. This played into the hands of the military party, who warned the people of the horrible fate of a subjugated nation."

If there were "errors" by our statesmen, the Japanese made an important one which added further delay

to the surrender. Prime Minister Suzuki made a statement to the press that "it was the policy of the government to ignore the proclamation entirely." At least this was the English translation which the Tokyo radio flashed to America. It has since been argued that this was a wrong interpretation of the announcement, but no one in America asked for an explanation nor left any margin for error. On August 5th, 1945, the atomic bomb was dropped into history and destroyed the city of Hiroshima.

Chapter VII

THE ATOMIC BOMB AND SURRENDER

Why did we drop the atom bomb?

Major Jordan opens a diplomatic suitcase.

Mr. Stimson is persuaded to change his mind.

Why we share the atom.

THE final acceptance of the Japanese surrender and the dropping of the atom bombs were events so intertwined that they must be told together. Of the two, the atom bombs were of the greater consequence. While a war must of itself finally come to an end, the month of August 1945 marked the birth of the "Atomic Age" which will hover over civilization like an electronic smog for the rest of the world's existence. However, peace in the Pacific set off an emotional holiday across the country which allowed no time for a careful look at the newborn monster.

The decisions which make world history and upon which depend millions of lives are made by fallible men of varying types and characters. It's what makes men of destiny tick that arranges our lives in peace or war, prosperity or depression. All depends on whether their "drive" is motivated by an unselfish love of country, a misunderstanding of the true facts, or by expediency upon which a personal ambition may be realized. It is this important human element which is so often omitted from the history books.

In this chapter we will try to discover who really made the decision to use the atom bomb on an already defeated Japan. The "why" will have to remain a mystery until those who really know are inspired to tell "the whole truth." I can only list the "why's" of those who protested and whose voices were drowned in the tumult of the approaching peace.

Most people know the events of the Japanese surrender. Surely everyone was constantly at the radio

in those final days listening to every word which related to the closing of the war.

But before we go into the great decision of those responsible, a picture of the surrounding conditions must first be drawn. Two items found in the 1954 World Almanac should be inserted here and borne in mind throughout the rest of the chapter. These items are proof that the Russians were getting atomic information from the very beginning of the experiments.

Dr. Klaus J. E. Fuchs, German-born atomic research physicist at Harwell, Eng., pleaded guilty March 1 (1950), to violating the Official Secrets Act and received 14 years in prison. He had communicated valuable atomic information to Russian agents since 1942. At one time he worked at Los Alamos, N.M.

World
Almanac
1954 p. 149

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, convicted atom spies, died in the electric chair at Sing Sing Prison, Ossining, N.Y., June 19 (1953).

110

On July 16, 1945, the day before the Potsdam Conference met officially, the first atomic bomb experiment took place at Alamogordo, New Mexico. This important event caused Mr. Stimson to remark, "The news . . . made it clear to the Americans that further diplomatic efforts to bring the Russian into the Pacific war were largely pointless." But as we know, this elemental observation was not to be "the order of the day."

Stimson 637

The news caused great excitement in the American delegation and both Mr. Truman and Mr. Churchill were quite unreserved in their elation. The next problem was when and how to tell Stalin.

According to Jonathan Daniels, Harry Truman, on becoming President was intent on two things: (1) that the United States should live up to all its promises, and act honorably in all things, and (2) he would not let the Russians push us around. In his understanding of world affairs, Mr. Truman was far behind the others, but his simple, forthright, and down-to-earth aims were his and our chief asset until his advisers began to teach

Daniels 270

him "expediency." And so at Potsdam Mr. Truman felt he was honor bound to inform Stalin of the successful experiment with the A bomb. He discussed the ways and means with Mr. Churchill and finally decided to break the news on July 24th, after a round table conference. Winston Churchill in his last book, "Triumph and Tragedy," relates this episode in great detail. It is especially interesting because the P.M. appeared to be highly puzzled by Stalin's reaction and, though his book was published in 1953, after the trial of Klaus Fuchs, he added no "hindsight" comment:

Churchill
T & T 669-
70

"Next day, July 24 . . . we all got up from the round table . . . I saw the President go up to Stalin, and the two conversed alone with only their interpreters . . . What was vital to measure was its effect on Stalin . . . He seemed to be delighted. A new bomb! . . . What a bit of luck! This was my impression at the moment, and I was sure that he had no idea of the significance of what he was being told. Evidently in his intense toils and stresses the atomic bomb had played no part. If he had the slightest idea of the revolution in world affairs which was in progress his reactions would have been obvious. Nothing would have been easier than for him to say, "Thank you so much for telling me about your new bomb. I of course have no technical knowledge. May I send my expert in these nuclear sciences to see your expert tomorrow morning?" But his face remained gay and genial and the talk between these two potentates soon came to an end. As we were waiting for our cars I found myself near Truman. "How did it go?" I asked. "He never asked a question," he replied. I was certain therefore that at that date Stalin had no special knowledge of the vast process of research upon which the United States and Britain had been engaged for so long . . ."

If Mr. Churchill can permit himself to speculate on a normal reaction for Marshal Stalin, let us do the same for the P.M. Would it not have been more natural for Mr. Churchill to have thought: "If Stalin shows no surprise at such historic news does that mean he knows about the atom bomb already? What a bit of BAD luck! The alarm should be communicated to

our security agents immediately or we are headed for a sticky wicket indeed!"

But neither Mr. Churchill nor Mr. Truman caught the dreadful significance of Stalin's indifference. (They weren't even suspicious when Stalin arrived at Potsdam a day late. The atomic bomb was tested at Alamogordo July 16th, the same day the Conference was to have begun. Did Stalin wait with his alleged "heart attack" until he had learned if the test in New Mexico was a success?) Had Churchill and Truman, on the contrary, started an intensive investigation they would have discovered not only Klaus Fuchs and the Rosenbergs, but perhaps it would have brought about the removal of J. Robert Oppenheimer as a security risk some ten years earlier—at least before 1954. Such a search would perhaps have delayed the Russian completion of the atomic bomb—and much concerning the hydrogen bomb. It is even possible that an earlier attempt of a certain American Army officer to bring his suspicion of Russian looting of our atomic secrets and materials to high authorities, would have been brought to their attention.

This link in the chain of events concerns Major George Racey Jordan who was liaison officer with the Russians at Great Falls, Montana, one of the important depots where Lend-Lease supplies took off for the Soviet Union. Several years after the war, in 1952, Major Jordan told his experiences in a book, "From Major Jordan's Diaries," one of the most shocking stories to come out of the war.

Great Falls was chosen for the staging base for Lend-Lease planes going to Russia after the Murmansk run had proven so costly. From Great Falls the planes flew to Fairbanks, Alaska, where Russian pilots took over and went on to the U.S.S.R. Later, these planes began carrying loads of Lend-Lease material rather than flying empty as they had been. What these planes transported to our "ally" concerns this story.

As we have seen in past chapters, Harry Hopkins, as head of Lend-Lease, chief of the Munitions Assign-

Arnold 471

ment Board, and unofficial head of the atomic bomb development, among others, was intent that Russia should "share all that we have," regardless of our own needs and those of our other allies. And at Fairbanks, writes General "Hap" Arnold, "We gave them everything it was possible to give them, even turning over to them the houses of our own officers and enlisted men and their families . . . They never gave us any thanks . . ."

Sherwood
896

Hopkins explained to Stalin in Moscow that although the Lend-Lease Act clearly stated that it applied only to materials "useful in the process of the war . . . The United States Government, however, had interpreted this in its broadest sense and had included in addition to munitions of war foodstuff and other non-military items."

Leahy 273

Leahy 280

This was indeed an "adjustment" of the law. When the British, on the other hand, had asked in 1944 for Lend-Lease other than materials "that would actually be used in the war," the Joint Chiefs of Staff turned them down, and Roosevelt later issued "an order to the Joint Chiefs of Staff that they were not to use lend-lease except to further the progress of the war."

But Russia was different. And we know now that the Soviets were, all during the war, stock-piling war materials in preparation for the Red conquest of China and the Korean War. Even "non-strategic" materials were extremely useful to her.

Deane 97-8

Russian demands were incontrovertible and on one occasion when they refused to give full details concerning the absolute need of a request for aluminum, nickel, copper wire and alcohol (items extremely scarce here), General Deane in his "Strange Alliance" related an extraordinary conversation he had with the head of the Commissariat of Foreign Trade, Anastas Mikoyan. The Russian bluntly "implied that his Purchasing Commission in Washington would have no trouble obtaining approval of the Russian requests regardless of what action I might take."

To General Deane's dismay this proved to be true. Although General Marshall cabled his approval of Deane's stand, the order was immediately reversed in a cable from Hopkins to Harriman "to attach no strings to our aid to Russia." From then on everything from aluminum, dress goods, house paint, frying pans and lipstick went to Russia unchallenged. A careful reading of the stories of World War II leaves no doubt that Hopkins wooed Russia on the alleged ground that Soviet "favor" must be assured for the future, regardless of the cost in goods, prestige, or our own security.

It was Major Jordan's job to expedite Lend-Lease going to Russia from Alaska. This necessitated his being familiar with the shipping documents, and in this way he gained detailed knowledge of what was going through. It was just plain luck that he decided to keep a diary on his daily duties. In those days he knew nothing of the atomic bomb and it was not until after the war that he fully understood the real significance of his voluminous notes. Among the shipments he listed in 1942 when our experiments with the atom were in their infancy were:

Graphite; natural, flake, lump or chip, costing American taxpayers \$812,437. Over thirteen million dollars' worth of aluminum tubes . . . We sent 834,989 pounds of cadmium metal for rods to control the intensity of an atomic pile; the cost was \$781,472. The really secret material, thorium, finally showed up and started through immediately.

Jordan 33-4

On one occasion the Russian colonel in charge behaved in such a suspicious manner that Major Jordan decided to make an unannounced, unsupervised and thorough inspection of the "personal luggage" about to take off on one of the planes. He had noticed that each Russian taking off for the USSR was accompanied by 50 suitcases weighing about two tons. Opening a suitcase and inspecting the documents, Jordan discovered maps of the Panama Canal Commission, documents

Jordan 69

relating to the Aberdeen Proving Grounds, and folders with naval shipping intelligence. He writes:

Jordan 77-81

I distinctly remember five or six State Department folders, bound with stout rubber bands. Clipped to each was a tab. The first read: "From Sayre." I took down the words because it ran through my head that someone of that name had recently been High Commissioner to the Philippines.

Then I copied the legend: "From Hiss." I had never heard of Alger Hiss . . . A suitcase opened midway in the search appeared to contain nothing but engineering and scientific treatises. They bristled with formulae, calculations and professional jargon. I was about to close the case and pass on when my eye was caught by a specimen of stationery such as I had never before seen.

Its letterhead was a magic incantation: "The White House, Washington," . . . It was a brief note . . . The name to which it was addressed, "Mikoyan," was wholly new to me.

Jordan 261-2

(Anastas Mikoyan was described to the Un-American Activities Committee in 1950 by Victor A. Kravchenko who had defected to the free world. He testified that Mikoyan was "second assistant to Mr. Stalin during the war," and that he was also in charge of Lend-Lease. Mr. Kravchenko told the committee that Mikoyan sent orders to the spies under his command in America to obtain "secret information about the industrial development in the United States, and especially in the military industry." The final word on the order, the witness said, was the following back-handed threat: "We shall appreciate you according to your ability to comply with this order." This was the same Mikoyan who smilingly played host to a number of senators and congressmen visiting Moscow in 1955.)

Major Jordan goes on with his story of the White House note which he said began with "My dear Mr. Minister":

. . . eleven words, in the top line of the second page, impressed me enough to merit a scribble on my envelope. That

excerpt ran thus: "—had a hell of a time getting these away from Groves." (Jordan didn't know if the name was "Oscar" or "Carrie.") Jordan 79

The name "Groves," Jordan explains, referred to Major General Leslie R. Groves, commander of the Manhattan Engineering District, later called the Manhattan Project. The Major rightly points out that General Groves was one of the few Washington high officials who thoroughly disliked the Russians.

Jordan continues:

. . . The first thing I had done, on finding the White House note, was to flip over the page to look for a signature. I penciled it on my envelope as "H.H." . . . It was to chronicle, on the spot, my identification of the author as Harry Hopkins. Jordan 80

If General Groves and his subordinates resisted orders from Harry Hopkins they were indeed very brave men!

I remember distinctly having had to remove the letter from a metal clip. It held two other exhibits—obviously the things which Oscar or Carrie, had such difficulty in "getting away from Groves." One was a thick map. When unfolded, it proved to be as wide as the span of my extended arms. In large letters it bore a legend which I recorded: "Oak Ridge, Manhattan Engineering District." 80-81

The other was a carbon of a report, two or three pages long, which was dated Oak Ridge. If it had a signature, I did not set it down. At the top of the first page, impressed with a rubber stamp, or typed, was the legend: "Harry Hopkins" followed by the title "Special Asst. Coordinator" or "Administrator." I gathered that this particular copy had been earmarked for Mr. Hopkins. In the text of the report was encountered a series of vocables so outlandish that I made a memo to look up their meaning. Among them were "cyclotron," "proton" and "deuteron." There were curious phrases like "energy produced by fission" and "walls five feet thick, of lead and water, to control flying neutrons." . . . For the first time in my life, I met the word "uranium."

Although all of this was "Greek" to him, the Major felt it was of great importance to our war machine. The awful realization came over him that what he had found in the few "diplomatic" suitcases he had opened was only a drop in the bucket. Every plane leaving for the U.S.S.R. was literally loaded with such information. Jordan was a simple American businessman who had no ideas of politics, spies and subversion, and he naively thought someone ought to stop Harry Hopkins from giving maps of our scientific plants and our scientific secrets to the Russians. In January 1944 he made a trip to Washington to report his unusual and alarming findings. In the Capital he met with a strange and formidable reception! The juggernaut of controlled bureaucracy was poised and ready for "little David."

Jordan 192-3

Jordan's first contact in the Capital was Chief Air Inspector, Brigadier General Junius W. Jones. "General Jones," he wrote, "afterwards denied that he ever met me." He talked to Jones for 15 minutes and the General promised to send one of his inspectors to Great Falls, which he did. Then Major Jordan went to the old State Department building where he had been told to see John Newbold Hazard, liaison officer for Lend-Lease. But Hazard did not see the Major. Instead a young assistant emerged from Hazard's office, and what he had to say to the caller paints a fair picture of how carefully the directive to "treat Russia as a real friend" was followed:

Jordan 193

"Major Jordan," he began, "*we know all about you, and why you are here. You might as well understand that officers who get too officious are likely to find themselves on an island somewhere in the South Seas.*" (Emphasis mine.)

After several rebuffs from other officers, Major Jordan returned to Great Falls with the seat of his pants sizzling. He was angry and alarmed.

Our heroic "David" reviewed in his mind the whole untenable situation, got out his slingshot and bravely

set out once again for Washington and Goliath. He selected the Army Counter-Intelligence as one agency which might listen. This time he struck pay dirt. They made an intensive investigation of his charges, and presented a report dated March 28, 1944. The report strongly recommended further investigation and that the State Department be contacted in order that "corrective measures be taken."

Jordan 194

Jordan writes that "When the report and indorsement arrived at the State Department, it was necessary to make at least a show of activity. The matter was assigned to Charles E. Bohlen . . ." Bohlen handled the matter in a correct if not enthusiastic manner. He called a proper meeting of the chiefs of all intelligence agencies as well as agencies having to do with Lend-Lease. He then had an interview with a member of the Soviet Embassy and provided him with the U.S. customs and censorship regulations. He had done his duty, and from then on the whole matter was ignored by both the United States authorities and the Russians. And the Russians, Major Jordan said, "found out everything, from alpha to omega."

Jordan 195-6

Jordan 108

There can be no doubt that Major Jordan's "discoveries" at Great Falls and Fairbanks never reached President Truman, nor the Prime Minister for that matter. Somewhere along the line of command there was a concrete wall "five feet thick" through which much intelligence could not get. And I wonder if this situation does not exist even today.

In "Triumph and Tragedy," Mr. Churchill seems hurriedly anxious to "step over" any controversy concerning the advisability of the bomb's use and the loss of its secrets. He writes that ". . . there never was a moment's discussion as to whether the atomic bomb should be used or not . . . nor have I ever doubted since that he (Truman) was right."

Churchill
T & T 639

His lack of curiosity is not comprehensible, either at the time or in the revealing after-years. Klaus Fuchs does not even appear as a footnote in his book.

The bloodcurdling debut of the atom bomb on Japanese cities will be a subject for heated discussions for a long time to come. President Truman's decision had been based on reports and recommendations from the scientists and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The resolve could not have been his alone.

Byrnes 261

Those who defend the confirmation of the Yalta agreements at Potsdam explain that the A bomb had not been tested by dropping it from a plane and they didn't know if it would be a dud or not. The scientists, however, apparently were convinced it was a sure thing. Mr. Byrnes wrote that on July 1, 1945, just before Truman went to Potsdam, ". . . the Interim Committee unanimously recommended to the President that the bomb be used against Japan as soon as possible. With the exception of Mr. Bard, the committee recommended that it be used *without warning*." (Emphasis mine.)

Byrnes 259

Because this was such an important recommendation, it is well to notice who the members of the Interim Committee were. They were: Secretary Byrnes representing the President; Under Secretary of the Navy Ralph Bard; Assistant Secretary of State William L. Clayton; Dr. Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development; Dr. James B. Conant, President of Harvard University and later American Ambassador to Germany in the Eisenhower Administration. (When President Eisenhower sent his name to the Senate for confirmation he met with violent opposition from the conservative Republicans); Dr. Karl T. Compton, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who, until his death in 1954, stoutly defended the use of the bomb; and George L. Harrison, President of the New York Life Insurance Company, special consultant to Secretary Stimson and serving as chairman of the committee in the absence of Mr. Stimson. The Committee was assisted by Dr. Arthur H. Compton, Dr. Enrico Fermi, Dr. E. O. Lawrence, and Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer.

Mr. Byrnes goes on to say that during this discus-

sion with the Interim Committee it was “. . . feared that, if the Japanese were told that the bomb would be used on a given locality, they might bring our boys who were prisoners of war to that area.” Byrnes 261

Was there no one present to point out that for some time the Americans had been dropping leaflets over Japan warning them which cities were to be attacked before devastating those cities with “conventional” bombs? If the Japanese wanted to bring our prisoners to those cities, there is no doubt they would have.

According to Mr. Byrnes another excuse for not giving a warning of the atom bomb was because at Alamogordo the test was on the ground and that “. . . would not be conclusive proof that the bomb would explode when dropped from an airplane.” Byrnes 261

Perhaps this argument justly applies to the decision made July 1st but, after August 5th when the first bomb was dropped and proven successful, why did we not adequately warn the Japanese we would drop the second bomb? Although leaflets were dropped, giving the names of ten target cities, no time was allowed the Japanese to reply. Who was the mastermind who had such control over the thinking of our statesmen?

Again Mr. Byrnes relates that he told Mr. Truman that “. . . we relied on the estimates of the military situation presented by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” Byrnes 261

Thanks to Secretary Byrnes we know that President Truman had it well in his mind to use the bomb more than two weeks before the Potsdam Conference. Strangely enough, Jonathan Daniels does not mention the meeting of July 1st in his book. He quotes Truman as saying “There at Potsdam the decision to use the bomb was made.” At this last official meeting were Stimson, Eisenhower, Marshall, Byrnes, Leahy, “. . . and another Naval officer, probably King.” It is also strange that Harry Truman in his memoirs lumps all his conferences about the bomb in one sentence, giving no dates. Daniels 280

What apparently tipped the scales for Truman, as related by Mr. Daniels, was General Marshall's answer

Daniels 281

to the President's question—"how many American casualties a landing on the Tokyo plain would involve?" The General's reply, according to Mr. Truman, was "It would take a million men for the landing and a million to hold it and that he thought such a landing would involve half a million casualties."

Mr. Truman told Mr. Daniels that "all at the conference urged using it." But let us see how history books have recorded the opinions of some of Mr. Truman's advisers. Admiral Leahy wrote:

Leahy 441

It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender . . .

It was my reaction that the scientists and others wanted to make this test because of the vast sums that had been spent on the project . . . My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children.

The Secretary of the Navy, Forrestal, wrote in his diary on August 10th, 1945:

Forrestal 83

The Secretary of War (Stimson) made the suggestion that we should now cease sending our bombers over Japan; he cited the growing feeling of apprehension and misgiving as to the effect of the atomic bomb even in our own country. I supported his view and said that we must remember that this nation would have to bear the focus of the hatred of the Japanese.

From the following paragraphs of Admiral King's book, I should gather that, although he did not speak in the negative, he could hardly have "urged using it." As we know, the Admiral bore in mind that all decisions of the Joint Chiefs had to be unanimous:

King 621

The President in giving his approval for these attacks appeared to believe that many thousands of American

troops would be killed in invading Japan, and in this he was entirely correct; but King felt, as he had pointed out many times, that the dilemma was an unnecessary one . . . The Army, however, with its underestimation of sea power, had insisted upon a direct invasion and an occupational conquest of Japan proper. King still believes this was wrong.

General Eisenhower is reported to have been unenthusiastic about the bomb in Alden Hatch's book, "General Ike." Hatch wrote that "Eisenhower begged the Secretary (Stimson) to consider the consequences carefully."

Hatch 274

General "Hap" Arnold, Chief of the Air Force, had little to say about the decision. He cautiously wrote that "it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse."

Arnold 598

Among the American wartime hierarchy there were two approving voices; those of Byrnes and Stimson. The former wrote that "Certainly, by bringing the war to an end, the atomic bomb saved the lives of thousands of American boys." And "Stimson believed . . . the dominant objective was victory. If victory could be speeded by using the bomb, it should be used . . ."

Byrnes 264

Stimson 629

General Marshall takes no credit for his share in the decision. In his only recorded "memoir," his Biennial Report to the Secretary of War, he wrote what was apparently the mother of the Byrnes echo: ". . . it was decided to use this weapon immediately in an effort to shorten the war and save thousands of American lives."

Marshall 157
Biennial
Report

Things were happening fast in the closing days of the war. The Japanese were still foolishly hoping that Russia would help them surrender without any damage to their Emperor. They were grasping at the straw that Russia had not signed the Potsdam Proclamation and therefore was not at war with Japan. On July 30th Japanese Ambassador Sato again saw Rozovsky and repeated to him the difficulty of accepting un-

Kase 223

conditional surrender which did not specify its meaning. A few days later, and notwithstanding Washington's knowledge of these talks in Moscow, the first atom bomb was dropped on August 5th. With the "wrath of the gods" raining obliteration on a devastated Nippon, a desperate Sato again requested an interview with Molotov. The answer was to be another crushing blow. It was at this meeting, August 8, 1945, that Molotov announced Russia's declaration of war against Japan effective the next day. The Russians moved a few hours later.

Pentagon
Papers N-92

Truman 425

The Soviets never did consider common courtesy as a part of their agenda. Although Stalin had told Hopkins in May that Russia would be at war with Japan on August 8th, and told Truman at Potsdam it would be late in August, Admiral Leahy has told me that President Truman learned of the declaration of war when it was broadcast on the radio! Truman wrote in his "Memoirs": "Without warning . . . Molotov sent for Ambassador Harriman on Aug. 8 and announced to him that the Soviet Union would consider itself at war with Japan as of Aug. 9."

Kase 231

"On August 9, 1945," Mr. Kase writes, "the six members of the Supreme War Council met from 10 A.M. to 1 P.M. All agreed on one point, namely, the preservation of the imperial house. Should the Allies refuse that, we had no choice but to fight on to the bitter end."

At long last the controversy over the question of the Emperor came to an end caused by a dispatch which Mr. Kase drew up himself in the early hours of August 10th after the 15 hour conference. In it he said:

Kase 238-9

The Japanese Government are ready to accept the terms . . . with the understanding that the said declaration does not compromise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler.

The Japanese message came by way of the Swiss Legation in Washington, but the question of the

Emperor once again brought delay because of the whim of Secretary Byrnes. "Admiral Leahy urged that the Japanese offer be accepted promptly," reports Mr. Byrnes, but "I told the President I would like a little time to think about a reply to the message. 'I do not see why we should retreat from our demand for unconditional surrender' I said." And so the debate over the Emperor went on for two days more.

Byrnes 209

The future Governor of South Carolina went off to his private office to mull over his reply and to solicit the help of his then trusted aide, Ben Cohen, whose mind he believed to be "one of the best." Cohen, Counselor of the State Department, was one of the so-called brilliant young lawyers brought to Washington as a member of the original White House "brain trust." He progressed to the State Department with Byrnes, and later went with the American delegation to the United Nations until 1953.

(In 1955 President Eisenhower had, at the suggestion of the State Department, decided to appoint Ben Cohen as U.S. representative to the United Nations. Before the appointment was made public, Senator Styles Bridges and Senator William F. Knowland told Secretary of State John Foster Dulles that not only would they not defend Cohen, but they would fight the appointment. Senator Knowland remarked that Republicans, including the late Senator Taft, had swallowed Charles Bohlen in 1953, but they wouldn't swallow Ben Cohen in 1955. The President did not send Cohen's name to the Senate.)

Again there occurred a small incident which was indeed a big hint to Undersecretary Grew that his usefulness to the Department was about at an end. I have been told that Grew, having heard that Byrnes was working on the draft of the surrender paper, went to the latter's office. Several times he opened the door only to find Byrnes busily engaged with Cohen. Each time Byrnes indicated that he did not wish to be disturbed. Finally, Grew told Byrnes that he knew that they were working on the Japanese note and

that he thought he could be of some help. Byrnes rather grudgingly invited him in and also allowed Grew to call in James Dunn, Eugene Dooman and Joseph Ballantine. When the draft was handed to the newcomers for their perusals, they took exception to the stipulation that the Emperor was to sign the surrender terms. Mr. Grew said he was certain that the British would object. Their exceptions were overruled by Byrnes and Cohen but, when the British had looked over the draft, they demanded that this stipulation be deleted and it was.

The American reply arrived in Tokyo August 13th.

This, finally, was the end of the war—at least officially. Looking at official dates, the Soviets would appear to have been at war with Japan just one day before the Japanese formally requested terms on August 10th. However, Dean Acheson testified in 1951 that the Russians had moved into Manchuria “about 3 or 4 days before the first atomic bomb was dropped.” Not only that, but the Soviets were enjoying their war so much they were reluctant to stop when the bell rang on August 14th. The Japanese commander in Manchuria had to appeal to the Soviets by radio on August 16th to please stop their attacks. But the Ruskies paid no mind to this and on August 18th they were unopposed when they took Mukden, and they didn’t let up until they got Kirin and Changchun on August 20th. All in all they had about 18 days, enough to give them a seat at the peace table in 1955.

The Japanese surrendered on August 14th, 1945, the formal ceremony taking place September 2nd on board the U.S.S. Missouri. Philosophically Mr. Kase wrote: “The capitulation of Japan, it seems, may not necessarily be the end of a book but merely the beginning of a new chapter.”

Lost in the multitudinous reports of VJ-day, a small item appeared in the New York Times August 14th:

Chungking, China, Aug. 11 (delayed) AP—The Chinese Army newspaper, Sao Tang Pao said today Japan had been

MacA 3-1917

White Paper
1944-49
p. 601

Kase 230

ready to offer up her war leaders as hara-kiri victims and retreat to her 1931 boundaries as conditions of peace, even before the first atomic bomb fell and the Soviet Union entered the Pacific war.

And so it was "the beginning of a new chapter" as the history of the last ten years has proven. Since that time eleven small nations who put their hopes in the Atlantic Charter and their big brother the United States, have been gobbled up in part or in whole by Russia. The remaining free countries are gradually turning towards the expedient: the exchange of freedom for "peaceful coexistence" and trade with Soviet Russia. And it was Japan, we know, whose overtures for peace were ignored by our country back in 1945, and who in desperation had turned to Russia for peace!

The explosion of the atomic bomb caused a chain of reactions which was not electronic but political. The most immediate reaction came from the Communist Party of the United States in its role as a functionary of the Soviet Government. But before I go into that, let us take up the discussions of a large number of people who were close to the decision to use this new weapon against Japan.

I have asked the opinion of a few men who were close to the picture and whom I happen to know personally. Almost all of them disapproved. Perhaps I have asked only one group of people, or not enough people, but the score is heavily against its use. Some said it was their belief that the bomb was used for the purpose of building up a hatred by the Japanese for the United States which time could not erase. One person having intimate knowledge of the prosecution of the war gave as his personal opinion that since the Russians, via Klaus Fuchs, Hopkins and others, had detailed information of the bomb's development, they were anxious to have it tested on a living city. And this could only have been done before Japan surrendered. It is possible that it is purely coincidental, but Harry Truman in his "Year of Decisions" pub-

Truman 419

lished in 1956, added one of the recommendations of the Interim Committee which is strangely similar to my friend's conclusion. Truman wrote, "It was their (the Interim Committee) conclusion that no technical demonstration they might propose, such as over a deserted island, would be likely to bring the war to an end. *It had to be used against an enemy target.*" (Emphasis mine.) An "enemy target," of course, is the same as a "living city."

Bulletin of
Atomic
Scientists
May 1, 1946
P. 3

Who were some of those who protested the use of the bomb in June of 1945? The Metallurgical Laboratory in Chicago appointed a seven man "Committee on Social and Political Implications" for the purpose of studying the proposed use of the new weapon. And this group strongly opposed the recommendations of the Interim Committee. The chairman of the Chicago group was James Franck who presented a report to Secretary Stimson warning that "the military advantages and the saving of American lives . . . may be outweighed by . . . a wave of horror and repulsion sweeping over the rest of the world . . ."

They went on to suggest that "demonstration of the new weapon might best be made, before the eyes of representatives of all the United Nations, on the desert or a barren island . . . After such a demonstration the weapon might perhaps be used against Japan if the sanction of the United Nations (and of public opinion at home) were obtained, perhaps after a preliminary ultimatum to Japan to surrender . . ."

Bulletin p. 16

"We believe," the report went on, "that these considerations make the use of nuclear bombs for an early unannounced attack against Japan inadvisable."

In order to make their recommendations even stronger, they were supplemented by a petition signed by 64 scientists associated with the Metallurgical Project which was sent direct to President Truman.

The unanimous opinion of these combined seventy-one scientists was ignored by President Truman and Mr. Stimson—if they ever saw the report or petition. Mr. Stimson makes no mention of the Franck Com-

mittee in his book, nor for that matter do Byrnes, Forrestal or Leahy, or Truman. Yet, how could such an important report and petition escape attention?

Apparently someone must have read the report because the recommendation that the bomb be demonstrated before the United Nations and an ultimatum to Japan be made was presented for consideration in the conferences in Washington. At this time Mr. Byrnes warned that, if the demonstration proved to be a "dud," it would damage our effort to bring the war to an end, while Henry Stimson had been apparently sold on the idea of speed because he said "We had no bombs to waste. It was vital that a sufficient effect be quickly obtained with the few we had."

Byrnes 261

Harper's Feb.
1947

Yet what was the hurry? Perhaps it was Mr. Stimson's thought that the bomb should be dropped before Russia got into the war.

But if Henry Stimson was absorbed in the necessity for speed, General Marshall, on the other hand, wrote in his Biennial Report that "From Potsdam General Spaatz received orders to drop the atomic bomb . . . any time after the 3rd of August." WHAT was wrong with dropping it before the 3rd of August? What applecart would it have upset? This is one of the most puzzling orders in the whole Potsdam episode.

Biennial
Report 157

The puzzle goes even further and involves a contradiction between Truman's version of events and that of the Army Air Force records. This is revealed in "The Army Air Forces in World War II," vol. 5, pages 713 and 714 where the order to Spaatz is discussed:

Signed by Handy (Gen. Thomas T.) as Acting Chief of Staff, and with the approval of Stimson and Marshall, the directive contained an unqualified order for the 509th Composite Group to "deliver its first special bomb as soon as weather would permit visual bombing after about 3 August."

Now, ever since the end of the war Mr. Truman has insisted the order and decision was made by him-

self, and him alone; and that the order was sent from aboard the Augusta which was taking the President home from Potsdam. This would have been about August 2 or 3. One of the authors of the Air Force book, Professor James Lea Cate, wrote to the former President in 1953, pointing out that his statements did not jibe with the Handy order. It would seem that Harry Truman didn't catch the significance or the facts as stated in the professor's letter. On January 12, 1953, he replied that—

Army Air
Force in WW
II, vol 5
insert, 912-3

"In your letter, you raise the fact that the directive to General Spaatz to *prepare* for delivering the bomb is dated July twenty-fifth. It was, of course, necessary to set the military wheels in motion, as these orders did, but the final decision was in my hands, and was not made until we were returning from Potsdam." (Emphasis mine.)

Army Air
Force in
WW II, vol
5 insert 714

Truman obviously thought the order to Spaatz was only to "prepare" to drop the bomb. He apparently did not realize that, whether he had made up his mind or not, "the Army" had already anticipated him and given a direct ORDER. Professor Cate and his collaborator, Wesley Frank Craven, point out that the order to Spaatz "is dated 25 July, one day before the Potsdam Declaration and two days before Suzuki's rejection of it on the 28th, Tokyo time. There is no reference to the ultimatum and no instruction as to procedures to be followed should the Japanese offer to surrender before 3 August."

They go on to say that "the directive to Spaatz could be interpreted to mean that the decision to use the atomic bomb had been made before, and without real regard for, the ultimatum issued at Potsdam."

And indeed, it would have been an even more frightful blot on American history if the bomb had been dropped after Japan had offered to surrender. It seems our devastated enemy was going to "get it," after August 3, regardless of his reply to the Potsdam Proclamation. Harry Truman's order from the Augusta was

merely surplus baggage. No records have been found that it was ever sent. It didn't need to be!

Although it was only two years (or more likely less) between the time Mr. Truman had his correspondence with Professor Cate and the writing of "Year of Decisions," he seemed to have forgotten all about the letters when he came to his chapter on the atomic bomb. Not only that, but the story is different. The former President inserted General Handy's order to General Spaatz (which was not a photostat) and it carries the dateline of "24 July 1945." The photostat carries the dateline of July 25th. But, the story Harry Truman tells would lead one to believe that the order to Spaatz was the ONLY one he gave. He does not mention his order from aboard the *Augusta*. He passes over this and glosses over the implications of the Handy order with: "I also instructed Stimson that the order would stand unless I notified him that the Japanese reply to our ultimatum was acceptable." It was the only mention of such a qualification I can find in either official documents or the volumes of memoirs.

Truman 420

421

I should add that nowhere can I discover who sent the order from Potsdam to General Handy in Washington. If it was Mr. Stimson he does not say so in his book. But one can hardly believe that Mr. Stimson was capable of omitting the President's words and intentions "to prepare" to drop the bomb.

Who was in such a hurry to drop the bomb no matter what—no matter what the President decided, and no matter if Japan had surrendered? My friend's speculation that Russia wanted it tested on a living city makes me wonder.

This brings to mind the curious chronology of "set" dates. At Yalta, the Combined Chiefs—that is, the American and the British—adopted on Feb. 9, 1945, a report to the President and the Prime Minister on the possible surrender of Germany. The Chiefs recommended "that the planning dates for the end of the war against Germany should be as follows:

Yalta Papers
830

- a. Earliest date, 1 July 1945
- b. Date beyond which the war is unlikely to continue—31 December 1945"

This was a procedure which commanding generals have been following for an eternity. Why was it not done in regard to the war against Japan? The surrender time for Japan was first set at the second Quebec Conference in 1944 on the premise that Russia would enter the war 3 months after the fall of Germany; and Japan would surrender 18 months after that event. This was discussed at Yalta in February 1945 and *reaffirmed* at Potsdam in the following July!

Let us look at the chronology:

- May 8, 1945 Germany surrenders.
- May 28, 1945 Stalin tells Hopkins Russia will enter the war on August 8th.
- May 29, 1945 Proclamation to Japan deferred by General Marshall as "premature."
- June 18, 1945 President Truman defers Proclamation to Japan until it can be discussed at Potsdam.
- July 13, 1945 Stalin refuses to answer Japanese request to negotiate peace until after Potsdam.
- July 16, 1945 Atomic bomb is tested at Alamogordo.
- July 16, 1945 Potsdam Conference is delayed a day because of Stalin's alleged heart attack.
- July 17, 1945 Potsdam Conference begins.
- July 24, 1945 Truman tells Stalin the U.S. has the A bomb.
- July 25, 1945 Orders are sent to General Spaatz to drop atomic bomb after August 3rd. (After Potsdam?)
- July 26, 1945 Potsdam Proclamation to Japan issued by United States, United Kingdom and China. Russia does not sign.
- Aug. 2, 1945 Potsdam Conference ends.
- Aug. 5, 1945 Atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima.
- Aug. 8, 1945 Russia declares war on Japan.
- Aug. 9, 1945 Atomic bomb dropped on Nagasaki.
- Aug. 10, 1945 Japan offers to surrender.

That everything was delayed until after Potsdam does seem very strange.

Now we have noted that Secretary Byrnes' excuse for not warning Japan of the A bomb was because "it was a real possibility" it might be a dud. But that this assumption was in error can be found in the hearings which were provoked by General MacArthur's recall from Japan in 1951.

A member of the committee, Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Republican from Iowa, asked permission to place in the record two telegrams "with regard to the question of information on the possibility or the probabilities of the success of the atomic bomb project prior to the Yalta Conference." The first telegram was one which he sent to General Groves, head of the Manhattan Project, dated June 25, 1951:

MacA 4-3119

IT HAS BEEN STATED THAT YOU AND THEN SECRETARY OF WAR STIMSON INFORMED PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT AT THE WHITE HOUSE JUST BEFORE HE LEFT FOR THE YALTA CONFERENCE TO THE EFFECT THAT IT WAS 99 PERCENT CERTAINTY THAT THE A-BOMB WOULD BE SUCCESSFUL. ALSO THAT YOU TOLD HIM THE FIRST BOMBS WOULD PROBABLY BE READY IN AUGUST 1945 AND THAT THE BOMBS WOULD BE EXTREMELY POWERFUL. CAN YOU CONFIRM ABOVE BY WIRE TO ME.

B. B. HICKENLOOPER

The reply was:

THE STATEMENT REPORTED IN YOUR TELEGRAM OF TODAY REFERENCE INFORMATION GIVEN TO PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT IS CORRECT.

LESLIE R. GROVES

Senator Hickenlooper sent a similar telegram to William Considine who was a colonel during the war

representing the Manhattan Project, and who had been sent to Malta, just before the Yalta Conference, to deliver papers to Secretary of State Stettinius. These papers were to inform the Secretary of the probable success of the atomic bomb. Colonel Considine also sent an affirmative telegram to the Senator.

Prior to this testimony, the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, who had been Assistant Secretary at the time of Yalta, was a witness. Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican from Wisconsin, interrogated him:

MacA 3-1985

Senator Wiley. What was the significance of the bomb not having been dropped at the time we negotiated at Yalta?

Mr. Acheson. Well, I pointed out in my statement, Senator, that when we were discussing the question of bringing the Russians into the Far Eastern war in time to occupy and contain all these troops, which we did not want brought back for the fight on the island of Honshu, that the bomb had not been tested, and nobody knew at that time whether we had a bomb or whether we hadn't a bomb. It was not tested until some months later, and then it went off.

Since the Japanese had lost almost all their transports, Mr. Acheson does not say if he expected the Japanese troops in Manchuria to swim back to Japan.

But why did we use the bomb at all? The United States Strategic Bombing Survey report flatly said: ". . . prior to 31 December 1945, and in all probability prior to 1 November 1945, Japan would have surrendered even if the atomic bombs had not been dropped, even if Russia had not entered the war, and even if no invasion had been planned or contemplated."

USSBS
Japan's
Struggle to
End the War
13

We come now to one of the most interesting passages in all the wartime memoirs. It is found in Henry L. Stimson's "On Active Service in Peace and War" written for him by McGeorge Bundy. It is the story of how one of our highest officials had his mind changed for him by his advisers.

Mr. Stimson was 80 years old when the book was published in 1947. He had taken part in many critical developments in our history, having served as Secre-

tary of War under Taft and Secretary of State under Hoover. He had lived in a world already passed, and, coming from retirement again to take the position of Secretary of War in 1941, he was not attuned to the "New Deal Era." His appointment had been one of political strategy—as a Republican, he was the symbol of nonpartisanship in the fight against fascism. And as devoted and loyal as he was to the cause, the old gentleman was never fully accepted by the White House elite corps. President Roosevelt "relegated him to a distinctly subordinated role" in the high strategy conferences, and "after Pearl Harbor he was included in few." Nearly all his communications to the White House were made through "go-betweens." His memoirs are filled with lengthy memoranda "To the President" which he hoped Harry Hopkins would place in the Chief's hands.

Current 213

The perpetual habit of the White House clique to ignore the Secretary of War left the elder statesman forever "stewing in his own juice." His preference for America over Russia was obviously troublesome to his White House "superiors." He apparently had never seen the directive to "treat Russia as a real friend," and when he advocated "the Army's need (of Lend-Lease material) against those of the Russians" his "superiors" hit the ceiling. And he had the temerity to demand of Russian Ambassador Oumansky that our Attaché in Moscow should be allowed to inspect the Russian front before the United States provided Russia with more arms. Stimson's biographer (Bundy) wrote that "Such posers were more verbal than practical, however. Whatever the American annoyance at Russian secretiveness, it was not United States policy to squabble over details, and Oumansky and his successors got more than they gave."

Stimson 526

His "low priority" caused the old gentleman such anxiety that in one instance he finally got through to the President by telephone. He noted in his diary: "I told him frankly that, if the process of whittling down the powers of the Secretary of War should continue, I

Stimson 556

would be in a very embarrassing position . . ." He did get one of his rare interviews with Roosevelt a day or so later, but it bore no results.

The "work plan" as set up for Mr. Stimson, seems to have been devised to keep him busy with domestic affairs, and even then his four advisers took most of those sticky problems from off his weary shoulders.

Stimson 342

His chief advisers, in addition to "the Army," were four in number: Robert Patterson, Undersecretary of War; Robert A. Lovett, Assistant Secretary for Air; Harvey H. Bundy who "became the Secretary's personal agent in dealing with scientists and educators," and John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary, who later became one of President Eisenhower's unofficial advisers. Stimson's biographer states that the Secretary of War "often trusted their judgment against his own" and that "very little of what Stimson did was done without their advice and help."

But Mr. Stimson's devotion to his job was only surpassed by his love of his country as can be seen from his many protesting memos "To the President." The revelation and awful portent of the atom bomb appears to have affected this elderly and gentle man more than it had anyone else. On April 25, 1945, before the bomb was tested, Stimson wrote a memo to President Truman in which he attempted to visualize the "atomic age," and pointed out to the President that it would be an impossibility to keep the bomb's production a secret forever.

President Truman accepted the Secretary of War as a member of his official family (although the White House advisers still kept him at arms length), and for the first time he was invited to a Big Three conference when he went to Potsdam. But at Potsdam, his advice was again of little concern to the officials in charge, and it must have been his inability to hold the President's attention, even when he was able to talk to him, which caused him to write a memo on the bomb once again. Stimson's fears coincided with those of Secretary of the Navy Forrestal, and Stimson ex-

pressed himself even more clearly and more pointedly than he did in his first memo.

1. With each international conference that passes and, in fact, with each month that passes between conferences, it becomes clearer that the great basic problem of the future is the stability of the relations of the Western democracies with Russia.

Stimson 639-40

2. With each such time that passes it also becomes clear that that problem arises out of the fundamental differences between a nation of free thought, free speech, free elections, in fact a really free people (and), a nation which is not basically free but which is systematically controlled from above by secret police and in which free speech is not permitted.

3. It also became clear that no permanently safe international relations can be established between two such fundamentally different national systems . . .

* * *

6. The great problem ahead is how to deal with this basic difference which exists as a flaw in our desired accord. I believe we must not accept the present situation as permanent for the result will then almost inevitably be a new war and the destruction of our civilization.

* * *

7. The foregoing has a vital bearing upon the control of the vast and revolutionary discovery of X (atomic energy) which is now confronting us. Upon the successful control of that energy depends the future successful development or destruction of the modern civilized world. *The committee appointed by the War Department which has been considering that control* has pointed this out in no uncertain terms and *has called for an international organization for that purpose.* After careful reflection *I am of the belief that NO world organization containing as one of its dominant members a nation whose people are not possessed of free speech, but whose governmental action is controlled by the autocratic machinery of a secret political police, can give effective control of this new agency with its devastating possibilities.* (Emphasis mine.)

I therefore believe that before we share our new discovery

with Russia we should consider carefully whether we can do so safely under any system of control until Russia puts into effective action the proposed constitution which I have mentioned. . . .

And now we come to the most remarkable part of the story. No paraphrasing of mine could do justice to Mr. Bundy's authorship. But it is here we see the method of persuasion:

Stimson 641

"Returning from Potsdam, Stimson found himself nearing the limits of his strength, and after two weeks made crowded by the atomic attacks and their announcement followed by the surrender negotiations, he retreated from Washington for three weeks of rest. In the quiet of the Adirondacks he thought again about the atom and Russia. Twice McCloy came from Washington to talk with him, and at the other end of the secret telephone were Harrison and Bundy; the War Department civilian staff was thinking long and painful thoughts about the atomic triumph.

641

"Stimson was worried. Granting all that could be said about the wickedness of Russia, was it not perhaps true that the atom itself, not the Russians, was the central problem? Could civilization survive with atomic energy uncontrolled? And was it practical to hope that the atomic 'secret'—so fragile and short-lived—could be used to win concessions from the Russian leaders as to their cherished, if frightful, police state? A long talk with Ambassador Harriman persuaded Stimson that such a hope was unfounded; the Russians, said Harriman, would regard any American effort to bargain for freedom in Russia as a plainly hostile move. Might it not then be better to reverse the process, to meet Russian suspicion with American candor, to discuss the bomb directly with them and try to reach agreement on control? Might not trust beget trust; as Russian confidence was earned, might not the repressive—and aggressive—tendencies of Stalinism be abated? As he pondered these questions—and above all as he pondered a world of atomic com-

petition—Stimson modified his earlier opinion and on September 11 he sent to the President a memorandum urging immediate and direct negotiations with the Russians looking toward a 'covenant' for the control of the atom."

And indeed, Mr. Stimson did more than "modify" his previous memo to the President for he completely reversed himself. The following excerpt from his memorandum to Truman dated 11 September 1945 is the kernel of the nut:

. . . unless the Soviets are voluntarily invited into the partnership upon a basis of co-operation and trust, we are going to maintain the Anglo-Saxon bloc over against the Soviet in the possession of this weapon. Such a condition will almost certainly stimulate feverish activity on the part of the Soviet toward the development of this bomb in what will in effect be a secret armament race of a rather desperate character. There is evidence to indicate that such activity may have already commenced.

Stimson 643

The last sentence makes me curious. Who told this to Mr. Stimson and what "evidence" did they have?

What was the hurry for Mr. Stimson's memo to the President? Since the old gentleman had gone to the Adirondacks for a badly needed rest (he was approaching 78 by then), why could not Mr. McCloy, Mr. Harriman, Mr. Harrison and Mr. Bundy have waited until he returned to Washington a few weeks later? Had the Secretary's previous memo made such an impression on President Truman that he was going to act on it? Who was it who was so anxious that we go into partnership with Russia in the secrets of the atomic bomb?

Since the Eisenhower Administration's policy on the control of atomic energy is of this writing a daily headline, let us examine the initial reaction of the Communist Party at the time the first bombs were dropped.

On August 13, 1945, four days after the second bomb had devastated Nagasaki, there appeared in

p. 5

the Daily Worker an article written by William Z. Foster, who had been recently made head of the Communist Party in the United States. You can be sure that whatever Foster wrote then and continues to write now is considered by the comrades as the true line coming from Moscow.

Atomic power, as scientists and engineers confidently inform us, is capable not only of unparalleled destruction in war, but also of far reaching consequences in industry . . .

If . . . the new atomic power which is a product of international science, is to be directed to constructive uses, the general military control of it will have to be vested in the Security Council of the United Nations . . . (Emphasis mine.)

The need for democratic control of atomic power is especially urgent right here and now in the sphere of its military use . . . We must further realize that the reactionaries in our own country, who have in their mind's eye the imperialist domination of the world, also would not hesitate to use this devastating weapon recklessly in order to accomplish their own reactionary purposes.

In this article he mentioned the "reactionaries" with all the intense hatred a Communist can manage for his enemies. And when Foster used the word "democratic" the meaning to the comrades was obviously "Communist."

How well was this "Party line" followed? Let us have a look.

Already we have seen that Mr. Stimson's advisers had persuaded him to recommend to the President that the Soviets be invited into a partnership, and even before that, the Interim Committee had "called for an international organization" for the purpose of control.

Every conceivable kind of influence and pressure was used to maneuver the United States into sharing our atomic secrets with Russia. Secretary Forrestal was strongly against it and stated that the bomb and the knowledge that produced it were "the property

of the American people." In his "Diaries" we find the report of a Cabinet meeting on September 21, 1945, ten days after Mr. Stimson's last memo to the President. Walter Millis who edited the Forrestal Diaries after Forrestal's death wrote that "The idea of a sole trusteeship (by the United States) (if that was what Forrestal had in mind) seems to have got no support, but the idea of submitting the matter for adjustment *under the machinery of the United Nations, became basic to subsequent American policy.*" (Emphasis mine.)

Forrestal 96

Forrestal 102

At another meeting held on Oct. 16, 1945, Secretary Byrnes also strongly advised against giving information to the Russians, but without results.

The steam roller became a speedy vehicle and it was no time at all before President Truman made United Nations control our official policy. In November of 1945 the President invited Prime Minister Attlee of England, and Prime Minister Mackenzie King of Canada to a White House conference, both countries having played a minor role with us in developing the atomic bomb during the war. After this trio had settled on their plan, they invited the late Senator Arthur Vandenberg, Republican from Michigan, and Tom Connally, Democrat from Texas, the then ranking members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to come to the White House. This was Nov. 15, 1945. After they had explained what they were going to announce to a press conference which was to follow immediately, "Connally, in blunt Texas fashion, told the Secretary (Byrnes) that he and the President were treating atomic energy as if it were their private possession and that they had no authority to propose sharing atomic energy information with other nations or to plan its future control without Congressional consent."

Vandenberg
226

Even this "consultation" was perfunctory since, a few minutes after Tom Connally's scorching protest, President Truman announced the plan for "International Control of Atomic Energy." It was strangely

and ominously similar to the words of William Z. Foster written only three months before. Here was the kernel of the nut: “. . . at the earliest practicable date a Commission should be set up under the United Nations Organization to prepare recommendations for submission to the Organization.” The Commission was set up Jan. 24, 1946.

But there was more than just “control” of the atom bomb and atomic energy. The next step was to try to persuade the United States to destroy every means for making the bomb and also the bombs we already had! Six months after Foster’s manifesto, Feb. 13, 1946, Dr. Philip Jessup, then professor at Columbia University, and later ambassador at large, and Dr. I. I. Rabi, who later succeeded J. Robert Oppenheimer as chairman of the General Advisory Committee on atomic energy (which includes advice to the President), were among those who signed a letter appearing in the New York Times. The letter proposed that production of the atom bomb and atomic materials be suspended and that materials produced on a standby basis by the United States be dumped in the ocean! The letter also indicated destruction of existing stocks should be considered in negotiations.

In later years, Dr. Jessup’s close association with known Communists in the Institute of Pacific Affairs was such that it prevented his being confirmed by the United States Senate as a delegate to the United Nations in 1951. He later returned to his former position at Columbia University in New York City.

Dr. Rabi held then and still holds important positions in almost every important atomic development group. In 1954 he appeared as a character witness for Robert Oppenheimer, emphasizing Oppenheimer’s “upstanding character” and loyalty. He went on to say that if the decision were up to him, and having learned what the investigating committee already knew, “. . . I would have continued him in his position as consultant . . .”

The importance of the Jessup-Rabi letter to the

New York Times is punctuated by the fact that four months later, on June 19, 1946, Andrei A. Gromyko, USSR Representative to the Atomic Energy Commission of the United Nations, made a proposal for a convention which is strangely similar. He said, "The object of such a convention should be the prohibition of the production and employment of atomic weapons, the destruction of existing stocks of atomic weapons and the condemnation of all activities undertaken in violation of this convention."

Decade of
American
Foreign
Policy 1088

The whole subject of atomic control is still pending, but where did Jessup and Rabi get their bright idea which stony-faced Gromyko liked so much?

Former Senator Claude Pepper, Democrat from Florida, thought it was a good idea too, but he went even further in a speech on the Senate floor in April 1946. He recommended that the United States should not "gang up" on Russia, and that "*before the conference convened*" we "destroy every atomic bomb which we have and smash every facility for their manufacture." (Emphasis mine.)

Forrestal 154

The Communist plan for the United Nations control gained headway. Let it be remembered that all the draft papers with various policy recommendations for the new United Nations—including atomic energy—were considered in 1945 and 1946 by the Office of Special Political Affairs, the head of which was none other than Alger Hiss. In March of 1947 at a State-War-Navy meeting, Forrestal noted in his "Diaries" that ". . . The Secretaries were in general agreement that Senator Austin should endeavor to bring up as an item of first priority in the Atomic Energy Committee the matter of establishing a charter for *an international agency for inspection, supervision and control of atomic energy.*" (Emphasis mine.)

Forrestal 259

On September 23, 1949, President Truman announced that there was evidence that "an atomic explosion occurred in the USSR." The evidence had been noticed in August. The secrets of the atomic bomb had slipped through our fingers.

Decade of
American
Foreign
Policy 1123

In major policies, you will notice, the Communists always play "heads I win, tails you lose." And so it was in this case. The Communists didn't get everything at once—the complete sell-out was stalled on the question of inspection, as it still is in 1956. But surely these long discussions produced much information for them. You can't talk about how to share your recipe for baking a cake without also sharing some of your "trade secrets"! Furthermore, we know the Russians had a great deal of information in 1945. All they needed was time, and while they kept us talking and hoping, our program was slowing down.

The manifesto of William Z. Foster of August 13, 1945 had been successfully carried out. And the Communists were assured of further success when in 1950, UNESCO, one of the specialized agencies of the United Nations, began organizing an International Center for Nuclear Research to encourage *regional* research centers, among other things. The proposal was made by the United States. Four years later, on January 10, 1954, the following dispatch appeared in the Los Angeles Examiner:

United Nations: Free world governments are keenly interested in the experimental project being developed in Europe on research without secrecy in the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Twelve Western Governments are in the process of ratifying a treaty for building collectively a laboratory in Switzerland to be operated under the UN auspices but devoted to non-military keynotes.

The Western Governments signing the treaty mentioned in the dispatch consisted of Belgium, Denmark, France, German Federal Republic, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and communist Yugoslavia. It is remarkable that Yugoslavia should be included while the supposed bulwark of freedom, the United States who first made the proposal to UNESCO in 1950, was not among those named. We, of course, are not part of that region! Was there no American present who had the natural

inspiration to say, "Here you!—the United States is the country that invented the atomic bomb. Where do we come in on regional centers?"

On March 15, 1954, an Associated Press dispatch informed us:

The United States plans soon to propose to Russia specific measures for organizing a world pool of atomic energy for peaceful purposes. United States officials have consulted with their British and French colleagues, it was reported Sunday, and have decided to carry forward negotiations for Soviet acceptance of President Eisenhower's atomic pool project a while longer in secret, two-nation talks.

D.C. Times
Herald

And this brings up another entry in Forrestal's "Diaries"—"Mr. Lilienthal stated that control of production of atomic energy for industrial purposes could not be separated from the control of production of atomic weapons."

Forrestal 259

Can no one see that peaceful use of atomic energy must also provide the "know-how" and some of the equipment and plant facilities for making atomic weapons? Whether you use a match to light a stove, or to burn down a house, it is made by the same factory. A short item from a column of Constantine Brown, dated May 20, 1954, ought to be a warning of things to come.

Underground sources in China have sent reports to Washington evaluated as "probable" that by the end of next year the Chinese Communists will have about 12 divisions armed and trained with nuclear weapons. There is an around-the-clock activity, these reports say, in the vast area of Sinkiang, where the Communists are establishing military and manufacturing plants staffed by German, Czechoslovakian, Russian and Polish engineers and scientists.

Washington
Evening
Star May 20,
1954

Ever since the United States dropped the atom bombs on Japan, the Reds and their faithful parrots have been crying, "shame on America!" The campaign was built up to a crescendo in 1955 when Hiro-

shima was held up to the world as a victim of American brutality. The August 4, 1955 issue of Moscow's New Times, carried a lead article called "The Spirit of Geneva" advocating sweetness and light. However, the last article in the magazine was entitled "Hiroshima" in which the Communist author points his finger and says, ". . . the atomic blow at the densely populated peaceful city was totally unwarranted."

Chapter VIII

THE MACARTHUR HEARINGS

*The MacArthur hearings of 1951,
and the testimony of General MacArthur,
General Marshall,
Secretary Acheson,
Admiral Badger,
General Wedemeyer,
General O'Donnell,
and General Hurley.*

IN the spring of 1951, when the Korean War was almost a year old, the members of Congress began receiving mail from their constituents asking questions the lawmakers could not answer. There was a growing uneasiness among the citizens, especially those with boys in Korea. Instinctively they knew that the "police action" was turning into a strange kind of war. The unusual situation of American soldiers suffering from a shortage of ammunition was the complaint in many a GI's letters to mom and dad. And mom and dad clearly remembered that during World War II the United States proved to be so powerful industrially that it was not only able to supply a fighting force of 13 million, but also provided the bulk of "steel" for our allies. How could it be that in a small war, with a fighting force of only 300,000, against a "backward enemy," our boys were short of bullets?

Letters from fighting men also complained of being immobile when they should have been advancing. The homefront press reported from Washington that orders had been given General MacArthur not to bomb the enemy's installations, airbases, or strategic bridges along and north of the Yalu River. It is no wonder that the public began to wonder if there was a reluctance to

win, an unprecedented policy in American fighting history.

Speeches were made on the Senate floor delving into the immediate history of Korea, and a number of people pointed out the significance of Dean Acheson's speech before the Washington National Press Club in February of 1950—four months before the start of the war. As Secretary of State, Mr. Acheson told the members of the press (and thus Russia as well), that our line of defense in the Pacific would not include Korea. His statement was as good as a "go ahead" signal to the Communists—an assurance that if North Korea invaded South Korea no interference would come from the United States.

And again the citizens began to learn that, although the United States Congress voted for \$10,230,000 for defense material to be sent to South Korea and President Truman signed the Public Law No. 430 Oct. 28, 1949, someone in our government had seen to it that South Korea was to receive only \$200 worth of signal wire. Here is the most blatant defiance of Congress and of the President by someone in the executive branch of our government. Yet no investigation was made and no one fired for insubordination or sabotage. The words of Owen Lattimore as they appeared in the *New York Compass*, July 17, 1949 seem uncommonly prophetic: ". . . The thing to do, therefore, is to let South Korea fall but not to let it look as though we pushed it."

The Korean War, probably more than anything else, caused the public to review the five years elapsing since the end of World War II. The sensational Amerasia Case and the two Hiss trials had convinced them that Russian spies were in high places. The world map showed them that the U.S.S.R. dominated half of Europe and had just swallowed up China, and forced the Nationalist government to flee to Formosa. Now our boys were dying in Korea. For what?

A number of senators and congressmen delved into the cause of the Korean war and the trail led them directly to the old line of contention—Yalta. It was

plain that what occurred at Yalta was the first in a succession of steps, the omitting of any one of which could have prevented the Korean debacle.

The dismissal of General MacArthur brought the matter to a head, and the result became the well-known "MacArthur hearings." The investigation by the Joint Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees was an "executive" or secret hearing which prevented the press from direct reporting. And hereby hangs a little stub tale! The decision was taken by the committee members themselves, the majority of Democrats carrying the vote. The Republican senators felt that the hearings should be completely open to the public and proceeded to bring the issue to the floor of the Senate for debate. A vote was called a number of times without obtaining the needed majority. On the day of the last desperate effort to gather absentees and convert others, I met Senator John McClellan, Democrat from Arkansas, in the Senate dining room. I committed the unpolitic act of asking him why he had not voted for open hearings. He explained that many questions would be asked bearing on military secrets and it would be against national security to have the answers made in public.

Being an old-time hearing-goer, this was not good enough for me. I retorted that it had been the custom in past Congressional hearings that when such a security question arose, the witness would say so, and the question was withheld until the committee met in closed session. Senator McClellan laughed and quickly walked away.

Senator McClellan is well-known for his patriotism, and his work against communism, but his vote to keep the hearings in executive or closed session was on a strict party line, the late Senator Pat McCarran of Nevada being the only Democrat who voted against closed hearings.

I have brought this incident up for the purpose of showing how much our past and recent history has been influenced by men "hewing to the party line."

When the Republican Administration came in in 1953, those Republican members of Congress who had for the past twenty years been fearless and persistent in exposing wrong doing in government, were suddenly and strangely silent. Former Secretary of State Dean Acheson frankly told my husband that President Truman was afraid to accept the Korean armistice terms of the Reds for fear of impeachment talk. But the new Republican President was able to accept those same terms without fear of opposition from members of Congress.

Senators in both parties vote to protect their administration from embarrassment. I do not mean that it is quite as simple as that, because politics in the "dirty" sense of the word enters into it too. An administration can penalize an "unfaithful" member of Congress in many ways—by not giving him patronage, withholding campaign funds, or running a candidate of its own choosing against him in the primaries. It takes an unusually strong-hearted patriot to overlook these "difficulties." The political reason for having General MacArthur testify in closed hearings was obvious. His "Old Soldiers Never Die" speech before the Joint Session of Congress had caused such a revival of old fashioned patriotism and aroused such mass indignation, that the Democrats couldn't stand several more days of MacArthur on radio and TV.

The hearings produced five large, printed volumes. In them can be found the discussion of almost every single factor pertaining to the Far East as well as extraneous political and military matters. All the issues in this book were reviewed, and questions designed to resolve the confusion and distortion of information were put to the several witnesses. Yet, for some strange reason, many important questions remained unasked. Although the staffs of the two committees lacked proper time for preparation, there was all kinds of volunteered help from outside. A number of senators interested in the Far East had their own staffs devote days and weeks to research, presenting to individual

senators vastly important and pertinent questions. At the same time, China experts all over the country sent questions to the committee. And all the while, the Republicans were boasting that they were going to put Acheson and Marshall on the spot. Nothing of the sort happened, and few of the volunteered questions were used. Here was the golden time to ask questions of people intimately acquainted with recent events while they were still clear in their minds. But General MacArthur was never questioned about the Pacific War, and General Marshall and Secretary Acheson were challenged with only delicate respect.

Those who had hoped that the mysteries of the Korean and Pacific wars would be cleared up suffered from the exhaustion of lost hope while they watched opportunity glide away on the wave of time like a piece of flotsam vanishing on an ocean tide.

On the subjects of the refusal to investigate the Japanese peace offers or feelers; the alleged necessity of the Soviet entry into the war against Japan; the justification for the Yalta agreements, and the decision to drop the atomic bomb, the witnesses expressing their views fell into two opposite groups—there were no middle-of-the-roaders. Those agreeing with each other are listed as follows:

General MacArthur
Admiral Badger
General Wedemeyer
General O'Donnell
General Hurley

General Marshall
Secretary Acheson
Averill Harriman
(Statement, not testimony)

(Note: General MacArthur was interrogated only briefly and indirectly on the above subjects at the hearings, but his views are known from other sources.)

In reading the following excerpts from the hearings the political personalities of the participants stand out very clearly. Certain members of the committee made every effort to prove General Marshall and Secretary Acheson correct in their views. On occasion the inter-

rogator attempted to put words in the mouths of the witnesses in order to make his point. And the testimony shows in bold relief the personal character of the witnesses. Some gave straightforward answers, while others were masters of evasion. Some clearly placed the interest of their country first, even ahead of their personal and professional fortunes.

An attempt was made by some members of the committee to discover who was responsible for the Yalta agreements on China. Senator William F. Knowland, Republican from California, asked General Marshall, the only witness who had been present at Yalta, if, while at the Conference he had been familiar with the provisions regarding Manchuria. The General's answer was vague. "I don't think I was, sir," he said. He added that the decision was "entirely separate from the military."

What a very short memory General Marshall had! Earlier, I mentioned the fact that, according to the Yalta papers, President Roosevelt met with his Joint Chiefs and Ambassador Harriman on February 4th to discuss these provisions regarding Manchuria. General Marshall was a member of the Joint Chiefs! It is hard to understand how such a high ranking general could forget such an important meeting.

Stet 92 Don't imagine that Harry Hopkins didn't have a hand in this decision too! At Yalta Secretary of State Stettinius, whom Roosevelt impishly called "Junior," asked the President if he needed any help from the State Department delegation on the Far East questions. Stet 92 "The President stated that, since it was primarily a military matter and since Mr. Harriman had had many private discussions about it with him and with representatives of the Soviet Union over a period of time, he thought it had best remain on a purely military level." And then, Stettinius went on, the President, "Harriman, and Hopkins continued discussing the Far Eastern question with Stalin and Molotov." "Junior" had been told that he had "heavy burdens" with other matters and need not be concerned.

Another witness before the committee, General Patrick Hurley, who was ambassador to China in 1945, ripped into Secretary Acheson, and tore apart the agreements concerning Japan and China. He told the committee that for the first time in American history our nation had expressed fear of another nation. He began by quoting from Secretary Acheson's "Letter of Transmittal" to the President dated July 20, 1949. It was the foreword" to the State Department's infamous White Paper on China.

General Hurley. (On) July 20, 1949, Secretary Acheson said: MacA 4-2840

AT YALTA, MARSHAL STALIN NOT ONLY AGREED TO ATTACK JAPAN WITHIN 2 OR 3 MONTHS AFTER VE-DAY BUT LIMITED HIS "PRICE"—

and I am using the exact language, the price—

. . . WE . . . WERE PREPARED TO AND DID PAY THE REQUISITE PRICE. TWO FACTS MUST NOT, HOWEVER, BE LOST SIGHT OF IN THIS CONNECTION. FIRST, *THE SOVIET UNION*, WHEN SHE FINALLY DID ENTER THE WAR AGAINST JAPAN, *COULD IN ANY CASE HAVE SEIZED ALL THE TERRITORIES IN QUESTION AND CONSIDERABLY MORE REGARDLESS OF WHAT OUR ATTITUDE MIGHT HAVE BEEN.* (Emphasis mine.)

Let us examine that statement a moment. Russia had already solemnly agreed and finally over the signature of Marshal Stalin himself to—

SEEK NO AGGRANDIZEMENT, TERRITORIAL OR OTHER—

and it had also agreed—

TO RESPECT THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO CHOOSE THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT UNDER WHICH THEY WILL LIVE.

* * *

. . . Mr. Acheson has been telling you . . . that the territorial integrity and political independence of our ally,

China, were given away in secret because our State Department was convinced that Russia would not keep her commitments and was in a position to seize all the properties that we gave her in secret.

* * *

MacA 4-2839

. . . America was in a position at Yalta to speak the only language the Communists understand, the language of power. The President of the United States at Yalta was in command of the greatest land, Navy and Air Force ever assembled on earth . . .

When a "hot" subject is before a Congressional hearing, the questioning progresses much like a football game. The "hot pigskin" in this case was passed, intercepted, fumbled, got out of bounds, and time would be called when the play would start all over again. During the MacArthur hearings, Manchuria and the agreement to permit Russia to send troops there, produced plain and fancy football. Senator Wayne Morse, the renegade Republican, later Democrat from Oregon, and the Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, "pass" the pigskin back and forth in an attempt to make a touchdown:

MacA 3-2228

Sen. Morse. One member wants me to ask you on Yalta on the question of the Yalta Conference as follows: Did not the Japanese have a large stock of arms and ammunition in Manchuria in 1945?

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; I believe they did.

Senator Morse. He points out in a note to his question that some have estimated that these arms were sufficient to supply some five hundred thousand to a million troops for 5 years. Do you know whether that would be a fair estimate?

This estimate is so fantastic that even Mr. Acheson ducks the question.

Secretary Acheson. I don't know about that, sir.

Senator Morse. Did not the Japanese have large arsenals in

Manchuria capable of replacing much of this material as it was used up?

Secretary Acheson. There were arsenals in Manchuria.

Secretary Acheson does not say that the arsenals were practically out of commission because they lacked materials for manufacture.

Senator Morse. As a result of the Yalta agreement were not the Chinese deprived of the use of the two best ports in Manchuria, Port Arthur, and Dairen?

Secretary Acheson. I don't think so, Senator.

Senator Morse now put a question to the Secretary which would elicit a more definite answer—he has made his speech and wants to get the pigskin clearly over the goal posts:

Senator Morse. . . . Is the reason that you do not think so because you feel that the Yalta agreement did not exclude the use of these ports by Chinese ships; that it would have been possible under the agreement reached at Yalta for a cooperative relationship of use to exist between Russia and China in regard to Port Arthur and Dairen?

Secretary Acheson. That was true with the Port of Dairen. Port Arthur was a naval base so that is one reason for my statement.

The other one was that the Russians were in a position, regardless of the agreement at Yalta, to get the rights, which they subsequently got through the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1945.

Senator Morse. Did not the joint Russian control of the Manchurian railroads complicate the supply problem of the Chinese Nationalists?

Secretary Acheson. I do not think so, sir.

And so the touchdown was made. Any speaker or lecturer wishing to impress an audience with the soundness of the Yalta agreements needs only to quote Senator Morse and Dean Acheson from this sworn testimony.

Senator Morse continues to question Mr. Acheson, and although the Secretary is essentially a diplomat and not a military man, the Senator asks him questions concerning military strategy. And perhaps that is correct, because some people say Acheson was in charge of the Korean War, and would have known much about the military problems in World War II.

MacA 3-1882

Senator Morse. Now, in regard to the questioning as to why the surrender of the Japanese troops in Manchuria was not either to the Generalissimo or to the United States forces, am I correct in my understanding that the very physical aspects of the problem would have made that impossible, first, because as far as Nationalist troops were concerned, they were down in the southwest of Asia; and this problem of surrender was up in the northwest of China—northeast of China—and, second, we did not have any American forces in that vicinity at all; did we?

Secretary Acheson. No, sir; we did not . . .

Note that Acheson does not answer the first part of the above question.

Senator Morse. Is it not true also, in respect to a military surrender, you just don't surrender to an individual; you just don't fly someone in, in this case to Manchuria, either the Generalissimo or a deputy of the Generalissimo, or an American officer, or a commission of American officers, and surrender to them; but that in cases of military surrender you have to have a sufficient military force present on the scene to enforce the terms of surrender.

Secretary Acheson. That is right.

Senator Morse. Is it not true that the only military force that existed in Manchuria in any great number capable of carrying out the terms of the surrender *happened* to be Russian forces? (Emphasis mine.)

Secretary Acheson. That is right.

In contradiction to the theory of Morse and Acheson, General Kenney in his book, "The MacArthur I Know," tells the following remarkable facts about the arrival of General MacArthur in Japan on August 30th.

He wrote that "Less than five hundred airborne infantry were on the ground when MacArthur and all his top generals of the South West Pacific landed . . ." The Generals, he continues, were in the habit of carrying pistols in their shoulder holsters. But before the group left, MacArthur suggested that this time they leave them behind. "If the Japs didn't really mean what they had said about surrendering, those pistols wouldn't do us much good . . ." With good reason—there were about fifteen, fully armed divisions within a few miles of MacArthur and his "five hundred."

Kenney
180-1

"A number of Japs told me afterwards," General Kenney went on, "that the sight of all those generals and officers of MacArthur's staff walking around unarmed . . . told them more than anything else that they had lost the war."

Now let us watch Senator John Sparkman, Democrat from Alabama, get into the act with Secretary Acheson:

Senator Sparkman. . . . Did I understand correctly you to say that the reason was (for the Japanese in Manchuria to surrender to Russia) that at that time the Nationalist Chinese were far in the Southwest of China?

MacA 3-1917

Secretary Acheson. Yes, sir; they were removed by many hundreds and thousands of miles from the scene of surrender.

There were also several hundred thousand heavily armed, very effective Japanese troops, and it took a little force to receive the surrender of that group of armed men . . .

The opposing team got hold of the pigskin earlier when Senator Knowland interrogated General George C. Marshall on the subject.

Senator Knowland. Now at the Yalta Conference . . . Could you tell us what the discussions were and what your recommendations were relative to the desirability or need for the Soviet Union to enter the war in the Far East?

MacA 1-562-
3

General Marshall. The Chiefs of Staff were certainly unanimous, for that was a very essential factor in bringing the

war to an early termination, we anticipated *a very powerful influence from the Kwantung Army (Japanese Army) in Manchuria* and probably the portions that were in Korea . . . it was the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff that it was highly important that the Soviets carry out the campaign against Manchuria and against Korea.

Senator Knowland. Were the Chiefs unanimous in that viewpoint?

General Marshall. I think they were unanimous. We can ascertain that, but I am quite certain they were . . .

Both Acheson and Marshall kept talking about the powerful Kwantung Army, yet intelligence makes it clear that Marshall, at least, knew that this army had been greatly reduced.

And now Senator Morse has trouble with a fullback from the opposing team. He is leading General Albert C. Wedemeyer over the same course of questions, and it is apparent that he does not like the answers he is getting. His footwork is worth watching as he tries to get an answer from the General which is to his liking:

MacA 3-
2492-3

Senator Morse. . . . Now it has been brought out in these hearings, General, that of course the surrender of the Japanese in Manchuria was to the Russians. Is not that because there was not anybody in Manchuria to whom they could surrender with forces enough to enforce the surrender other than the Russians?

General Wedemeyer. No, sir. The Russians came into the war, as I recall it, on August 8, sir, and their forces advanced south, quickly overrunning the Japanese Manchurian force.

Your statement, in my judgment, is correct as far as you went: however, the Russians were directed to receive the surrender by this general order No. 1, and directed to receive the equipment, take over the equipment, and—

Senator Morse. But my point: We did not have other Allied forces up in Manchuria at the time to take the surrender and enforce it. That is, it does not do much good, does it, to fly—suppose you had flown some American officer in there to take the surrender, you would have to

back up the surrender with enforcement. Otherwise, it would have been an empty gesture, and the only forces you had there to enforce the surrender were the Russian forces.

General Wedemeyer. No, sir. That is the part I did disagree with you about because of my personal experience there, Senator.

Senator Morse. That is what I wanted to clear up.

General Wedemeyer. The Japanese were completely cooperative as soon as they got their order to lay down their arms. We had no trouble with them whatsoever, sir. It wasn't necessary—one person could go and take charge of thousands of them. There was no resistance whatsoever; they became docile and cooperative.

General Wedemeyer's testimony clearly agrees with the opinion Admiral Leahy made at Potsdam. He wrote in his book, that "It was estimated that once the forces in the homeland had capitulated, surrender of Japanese elements elsewhere would not be too difficult to achieve."

Leahy 414

Senator Morse continues:

Senator Morse. Well, that is the way it turned out.

MacA 3-2493

General Wedemeyer. That was my personal experience in the theater, sir, though, throughout.

Senator Morse. That is the way it turned out. But when you are considering the surrender of a large force of enemy, whether it is Japanese or Germans, or Italian, or whoever it might be, laying your plans for the surrender, you always take into account do you not, the desirability of having a force in being in the area of the surrender that can enforce that surrender in case the enemy should change his mind?

General Wedemeyer. You are absolutely right; yes sir.

I felt that Senator Morse left a number of questions unasked, and to satisfy my curiosity, I wrote General Wedemeyer for a supplement to his testimony. Here is his reply:

"I can assure you that the Generalissimo and I were

perfectly capable of making arrangements to receive the surrender of enemy troops anywhere in the Theater. We did accept the surrender of the Japanese in the central part of China at Nanking although we were located 800 miles to the west in Chungking, the war-time capital. Also we sent appropriate representatives to receive the surrender in southeast China, more than 1,500 miles from Chungking. Actually the British sent representatives from Ceylon and India, to receive the surrender of the Japanese in Hongkong."

I also asked General Wedemeyer to give his views on the testimony of Secretary Acheson when he stated that there were "several hundred thousand heavily armed, very effective Japanese troops" in Manchuria. General Wedemeyer's reply was:

"It is true that upon conclusion of the war there were approximately 1,200,000 armed Japanese concentrated throughout China but the vast bulk of them were concentrated south of the Great Wall. *Our intelligence informed us that the Japanese forces in Manchuria were greatly depleted.* (Emphasis mine.) However, those that were there had sufficient weapons to fight effectively. I am trusting to memory but I believe that there were only about 200,000 Japanese troops concentrated throughout that vast area, Manchuria."

Another subject which came up for discussion was a part of the Manchurian question. "The military" insisted that if Russia entered the war by sending her troops into Manchuria, she would be able to keep the Japanese busy. This would prevent the Japanese from taking their troops to the mainland to meet our invasion troops.

In the following testimony Senator Alexander Wiley, Republican of Wisconsin, insists on an answer from Secretary Acheson. He asks the question three times before he gets even a partial answer, and Acheson in the meantime, talks about every other subject:

Japan at that time? Was there? We had command of the sea.

* * *

Secretary Acheson. The general military situation at the time of Yalta was that in Germany the Rhine had not yet been crossed, and it was not crossed until some time in March 1945.

In the Pacific, American troops had entered Manila on the first day of the conference; the battles of Iwo Jima and Okinawa still lay ahead; information as to the Japanese Army showed an army of approximately 5 million.

Senator Wiley. We had command of the sea then, didn't we?

Secretary Acheson. The estimates were that these operations would involve an American force of approximately 5 million men. Military estimates were the war would continue at least through 1946, and it was felt that the casualties would be very high, some estimates being as high as a million.

Senator Wiley. I mean, did we have command of the sea at that time?

Secretary Acheson. We had command of the seas in general. It would have been perhaps a difficult thing to prevent the transfer back of the people who were only a hundred miles across, if they went through Korea . . .

Later on, General Hurley reminded the committee of a well-known fact. He said that "In January, before the secret (Yalta) agreement was adopted the following February . . . A great part of the Japanese Army was isolated in the islands and on the mainland. Japan had neither the ships nor the air force to return the Japanese Army to the Japanese Islands. The victorious American Navy under Admiral Nimitz was in a position to prevent the return of the Japanese Army to the Japanese Islands . . ."

MacA 4-2838

He continues:

Yet, Secretary Acheson tells you that the American people and the American Government feared the final assault on Japan would cost more than a million American casualties.

MacA 4-2839

If we believe this statement made by Secretary Acheson,

we must also believe that the final conquest of a broken and beaten Japan would cost more in American casualties than all the battles of the Pacific, all the battles of the islands, all the battles of Burma and China, all the battles of the Atlantic, all the battles of Africa, all the battles of the Mediterranean, all the battles of Italy, all the battles of England, all the battles of France, all the battles of Holland, all the battles of Belgium, and all the battles of Germany. America had less than 1,000,000 casualties in all those battles.

(Note: The grand total of World War II casualties according to the World Almanac was 1,078,674.)

Vice Admiral Oscar Charles Badger, who had an assignment in the Pacific during those days, was interrogated by Senator Knowland along these same lines and had a substantially different story to tell, from Dean Acheson's version.

MacA 4-
2785-6

Senator Knowland. . . . Might I ask whether during the period of 1945, leading up to VJ-day, it was the common viewpoint of those in the Navy at that time that the Japanese could be brought to surrender without the Soviet Union coming into the war . . . ?

Admiral Badger. Oh, yes; definitely. As an indication I might give you an incident. Do you remember an expedition where we went into the bombardment of a Japanese city, and particularly in the ordnance and steel plant in Muroran: (May or June 1945) we went in between two narrow straits and up a bay; we were a good 6 hours or 5 hours, at least 30 knots, getting to our point of opening fire, and came on out. Well, we were pretty well—there we were with Japan on three sides of us . . . And during that entire thing, inside both shores, not as wide as Chesapeake Bay, no wider, we went in there and did our business, poured, gosh knows, how many projectiles on the target, and came out and not a single Jap airplane or anything else came at us, and the natural answer was, they must be pretty far gone if they are going to let us come in and do something like this.

. . . We were not thinking in terms of the Russians coming in. We were thinking in terms of the collapse of Japan . . . both Admiral Halsey, who talked the matter

over with me at that time, and I thought . . . that that Muroran thing was all the evidence that we needed that they were right flat on their backs.

Major General Emmett O'Donnell, Jr. was questioned by Sen. Bourke Hickenlooper concerning the necessity for a land invasion of Japan scheduled for November 1, 1945:

General O'Donnell. . . . once we were in the Marianas (Saipan, July 1944) we were convinced it was over; because they were taking the most horrible pounding . . . I thought—we all thought—I thought personally in a couple of weeks it would be all over.

MacA 4-3111

* * *

Senator Hickenlooper. I am just trying to develop what was the thinking . . . as to the probability that we could starve Japan out or wreck her will to fight short of an actual landing . . .

3112

General O'Donnell. . . . I think you will find that the Air Force and Navy thought we could do it and the ground forces did not think we could do it . . .

Senator Hickenlooper. And it was known in the winter of 1945; and it was known we were sinking their shipping in great volume.

General O'Donnell. Yes, sir.

In the days when the elderly, wing-collared Tom Connally, Democrat from Texas was in the Senate, he became famous for his tart, southern-fried language. He typified the "political wheel horse" who defended his party, right or wrong. So it was only natural that he should have tried to defend the Yalta agreements. In the following tit for tat with General Wedemeyer, the General got into "Old Tawm's" flowing silver hair:

Senator Connally. So far as the concessions made at Yalta are concerned, it is true, is it not, that we believed—hindsight is sometimes better than foresight—that the entry of Russia into the war would help us defeat Japan and save perhaps hundreds of thousands of American lives?

MacA 3-2389

General Wedemeyer. Yes, sir; that is true, Senator Connally, and your military leaders must have advised the President that it was necessary to bring the Russians in in order to save American lives and to bring about an early victory.

The thing that disturbs me right now as an American is the fact that the Japanese were trying so hard, as I understand it, sir—you could check on this information—trying hard to accomplish an armistice.

They wanted to use Moscow people as their intermediaries and they couldn't get any response to their efforts to stop the war, this before I think we dropped the atomic weapon.

Senator Connally. And we did not know of that at the time either, did we? We had no knowledge of it?

General Wedemeyer. Well, I think we did, sir, because we had means of knowing what the Japanese were striving to do, that is via the radio, and I think that reports were made to our Government to that effect. I believe I read where Admiral Zacharias or some such name made such a statement.

Senator Connally. Yes, I know. He made a lot of statements.

The contradictions in the testimony of witnesses were extreme. Yet there was no effort on the part of authorities to discover who was telling the truth. High brass and "high pockets" diplomats are no longer embarrassed by the Justice Department. They are no longer concerned morally, nor are they particularly worried over perjury—when cornered they hide behind White House orders, or suffer a convenient loss of memory.

You will now see an entirely different story from Secretary Acheson and Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall, who had been Army Chief of Staff during the war:

MacA 3-1984

Senator Wiley. What basis in fact exists for the frequently made assertions that the Japanese attempted to bring the war to an end several months before the atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, prior to the Yalta Conference, and certainly prior to the Potsdam Conference . . .

Secretary Acheson. . . . I do not believe that there was any attempt by the Japanese to bring the war to an end before the negotiations which finally led to its being brought to an end.

There was considerable active correspondence between Japanese in various capitals and Japanese in Tokyo as to proposals which might be made to save for themselves more than they were able to save at the time of the surrender.

Earlier, Senator Knowland had asked the same questions of General Marshall.

Senator Knowland. . . . Do you have any knowledge, directly or indirectly, that there had been preliminary offers of surrender from Japan?

MacA 1-561

General Marshall. I have no recollection of any that were received, with any degree of authenticity with regard to them . . .

I would say this: That during the early months of 1945, there were a series of communications between Japanese Ambassadors, or ministers in Europe—I think notably from Berlin, before they closed in on Berlin; from Moscow, before the Soviets declared war on Japan; from Madrid—I think it was either Madrid or Lisbon; and from Stockholm, I think; and also, I believe from Switzerland . . . they were appeals largely from those Ambassadors to the Prime Minister of Japan, to proceed immediately to obtain a surrender.

After several weeks of testimony behind closed doors, the Democrats who were the majority, decided against making a report. It is understandable since a true report would have placed the Democratic Administrations (both Truman's and Roosevelt's) in an extremely bad light. Neither Senator Russell, chairman of the Armed Services Committee and acting chairman of the joint committees hearing the testimony, nor Senator Connally, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, were capable of making a "doctored" report. They could only agree to file no report.

However, a group of Republican senators on the committees believed a report should be made. It was

signed by an interesting group of Republican senators in view of more recent history. They were:

Styles Bridges of New Hampshire
Bourke B. Hickenlooper of Iowa
Harry P. Cain of Washington
William F. Knowland of California
H. Alexander Smith of New Jersey
Alexander Wiley of Wisconsin
Ralph E. Flanders of Vermont
Owen Brewster of Maine

The Republicans who did not sign the report but filed separate ones of their own were as follows:

MacA

5-3559-60
5-3662-65
5-3659-62

Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts
Wayne Morse of Oregon
Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. of Massachusetts

The late Charles W. Tobey of New Hampshire did not take any action at all.

The Report on the war with Japan signed by the Republican group was the only conclusion that the testimony and facts could extract:

MacA 5-3591

Under questioning, it was established that at the time of Yalta the Japanese Navy was at the bottom of the ocean and American airpower had destroyed the Japanese industrial potential. Furthermore, with the economy of Japan dependent on imports, there was absolutely no doubt, from a military point of view, that the Japanese home army would wither on the vine This myth, that the Russian participation in the Japanese war was a military necessity has been refuted adequately . . . The result of Yalta remains a triumph for Communist diplomacy.

The five published volumes of testimony will be invaluable to future historians who will find them a frightening exposé of American history. But it was only "the end of a chapter." After the Truman Administration had refused to permit American soldiers to win

the Korean War and had dismissed their commander in 1951, this strange history continued. We then settled down for two years of truce talks, while the Reds feverishly built up their badly depleted forces and their defenses on the China mainland.

On April 16, 1953, our new President, Dwight Eisenhower, assured the American people that "... an armistice in Korea that merely releases aggressive armies to attack elsewhere would be a fraud." Yet we signed an armistice which prepared the ground for the fall of Indo-China and released thousands of Red troops which now are threatening Formosa. We have "viewed with grave concern" the many instances in which the Reds have broken the signed armistice. Among the most flagrant of these are the American boys kept as political hostages, and the formidable military build-up in North Korea.

In his State of the Union speech in early 1953, President Eisenhower had announced we would unleash Chiang Kai-shek; the implication being the Generalissimo would be free to try to liberate his homeland. But on March 2, 1955, the President startled the public by saying that if Chiang attempted to liberate the mainland of China, "The United States is not going to be a party to an aggressive war." This appeared to be a reversal of policy, discouraging all captives of the Reds from attempting to free their lands by force.

For almost two years President Eisenhower repeatedly said that under no circumstances would he participate in a "Big Four" meeting with the Russians until their leaders had shown by deeds and not words, that they meant to live peaceably with the rest of the world. And yet, in July 1955, the famous "summit" conference took place, even though Russia had in no way indicated "by deeds" that she had changed her spots.

President Eisenhower's normal, American reaction towards the Reds has been unerringly reversed in every instance. It doesn't take much effort to see that the

"protégés" of Harry Hopkins continue to play an important role in our destinies. Sitting by the side of President Eisenhower as his adviser and interpreter at Geneva in 1955 was a man who was "discovered" at Cairo in 1943 by Harry Hopkins. For it was during that Conference that Hopkins was so impressed with this young career diplomat he persuaded President Roosevelt to appoint him to a White House post. From then on, his "star was very much in the ascendent." This was Charles E. Bohlen.

Sherwood
775

July 28, 1955

I do not mean to imply that Charles Bohlen was the chief and only adviser at Geneva. There were others. One of the most important, according to the New York Times' Arthur Krock, was Herman Phleger who Mr. Krock describes as "one of the really strong men of the Eisenhower administration." There was also at Geneva, Harold Stassen, Secretary on Disarmament whose influence in the White House is not to be overlooked. And within telephone distance from Geneva was brother Milton Eisenhower on a European tour at the time. The President proudly tells that Milton, a long-time New Dealer and former friend of Harry Hopkins, is his most trusted adviser. One of several magazine articles pointing this up was written by Demaree Bess in the September 17, 1955 issue of the *Saturday Evening Post*. The title of the article tells the story; "When He (Milton) Talks Ike Listens." The President's young brother has been almost continually in government or UNESCO service since he went to the Department of Agriculture with Henry Wallace in early New Deal days. Although he now has no official position, he is the real power behind the President.

Two other important unofficial advisers in the White House are Paul Hoffman, first Chief of the "Marshall Plan" and presently intimately associated with the Ford Foundation; and John McCloy, former Assistant Secretary of War in the Roosevelt administration, and first high Commissioner of Germany under President Truman. Never mentioned but not to be forgotten is the late Harry Hopkins' trusted aide, Gen-

eral James H. Burns, author of the important 1942 memorandum. (See appendix.) Like Milton Eisenhower, he has never lost his usefulness in government during the last 20 years. An old friend of Milton, General Burns is now retired. But his advice is still sought by the official family of the Chief Executive.

There are many, many others of the New Deal family still in important positions in our government. Whoever our President and Secretary of State may be, now and in the future, Americans have a right to ask, "Who are your advisers?"

Until Soviet agents and their unwitting tools are removed from our midst, the United States of America can never win another war, hot or cold. Not until these influences are removed will the American flag again be the trusted protector of American fighting men.

To sum it all up THE ONLY ENEMY THE AMERICAN SOLDIER NEEDS TO FEAR IS THE ENEMY AT HIS BACK.

APPENDIX

Memorandum for Harry Hopkins from Gen. James H. Burns, 1942

Sherwood
page 642

6. WITH REFERENCE TO OUR NEED FOR RUSSIA AS A REAL FRIEND AND CUSTOMER IN THE POST-WAR PERIOD.

If the Allies are victorious, Russia will be one of the three most powerful countries in the world. *For the future peace of the world, we should be real friends* so that we can help shape world events in such a way as to provide security and prosperity.

Furthermore, Russia's post-war needs for the products of America will be simply overwhelming. She must not only rehabilitate her war losses in homes, industries, raw materials and farms, but she must provide the resources for the inevitable advances in her standards of living that will result from the war.

7. From the above, it seems evident that Soviet relationships are the most important to us of all countries, excepting only the United Kingdom. It seems also evident that we must be so helpful and friendly to her that she will not only battle through to the defeat of Germany and also give vital assistance in the defeat of Japan, but in addition willingly join with us in establishing a sound peace and mutually beneficial relations in the post-war world.

8. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVING RELATIONSHIPS.

(a) Arrange for a conference between the President and Mr. Stalin at some appropriate time and place.

(b) *Establish a better spirit of "Comrades-in-arms" by sending General Marshall, Admiral King and General Arnold or other appropriate military representatives to confer with corresponding Russian officials in Moscow or some other appropriate location and to discuss freely our plans, our capabilities and our limitations.*

(c) *Do everything possible in a generous but not lavish*

way to help Russia by sending supplies to the limit of shipping possibilities and by sending forces to Russia to join with her in the fight against Germany.

* * *

(e) Send to Russia an ambassador of top rank as to national standing, vision, ability and willingness to serve the country first.

(f) *In general, treat Russia as one of the three foremost powers in the world.*

(g) *Establish the general policy throughout all U.S. departments and agencies that Russia must be considered as a real friend and be treated accordingly and that personnel must be assigned to Russian contacts that are loyal to this concept.*

* * *

(i) *Offer Russia very substantial credits on easy terms to finance her post-war rehabilitation and expansion.*

(j) *Agree to assist, in every proper and friendly way, to formulate a peace that will meet Russia's legitimate aspirations. (All emphasis mine.)*

Chapter VII

JAPAN AS A POLITICAL ORGANISM by T. A. Bisson;
Pacific Affairs, Dec. 1944, pp. 399, 400, 418, 419

. . . As to the Emperor's influence with respect to aggression and territorial aggrandizement, no elaboration need be made. He supplies the tribal ideology which knits the coalition together, with its unrivalled motivation of the "sacred mission" of a "master race." The aggressive instincts of Japan's dominant groups are buttressed by a divine imperative: to extend the "benevolent sway" of the Emperor over previously unfavored regions. Under these conditions, with an Imperial influence tending invariably in a given direction, the effort sometimes made to pass off the Emperor as a puppet without political responsibility of any kind or as an institution which can be directed toward good ends hardly merits serious consideration. "To regard the Emperor system as something which is by nature politically neutral and can be used for good or ill as if it were some inanimate object like a pistol, in which

inheres no social values but which takes on such significance only when it is used, is a gross misunderstanding of its history. In the complexities of Japanese social development the institution of the Emperor has inevitably given the Japanese state structure a certain bias which has predisposed it to the side of reaction!"

Before the occupation force leaves Japan, it should have enforced the following measures: (1) Destruction of military, naval, and air armaments. (2) Conversion of munitions factories to civilian production, as far as possible; otherwise destruction. (3) Payment of reparations to China consisting of industrial equipment produced in Japan, with raw materials supplied by China. (4) Establishment of import controls to guarantee continued enforcement of steps (2) and (3). (5) Abolition of the army and navy, including *inter alia* the conscription system. (6) Punishment of war criminals, including the Emperor; exile or imprisonment of the middle and higher officers. (7) Dissolution of the Ex-Servicemen's Association and of the secret societies; punishment of the leaders of the secret societies guilty of criminal acts. (8) Dissolution of the Tokkoka (secret police) and the Kempeitai (army gendarmerie) and punishment of officials guilty of criminal acts. (9) Preliminary reorganization of the police system, with right of habeas corpus guaranteed. (10) Preliminary reorganization of the personnel and curricula of the education system. (11) Establishment of a free press and opening of Japan to unrestricted news cable, telephone, and radio contact with the outside world. (12) Recommendation of certain additional measures in so far as these have not been already accomplished.

The measures thus recommended, but left to the Japanese for implementation, would include the following: (13) Assembly of a freely elected constitutional convention for the purpose of drafting a new Constitution based on the will of the people and including a bill of rights. (14) Abolition of the Emperor system by the constitutional convention, with accompanying warning that this will be a key factor in determining the future attitude of the United Nations toward Japan. (15) Completion of the reorganization of the police system. (16) Completion of the reorganization of the educational system. (17) Application of limitations on the economic power of the monopolies,

either by government regulation or outright nationalization. (18) Introduction of agrarian reforms.

No final peace agreement should be concluded when the army of occupation withdraws. Relaxation of steps (3) and (4) and (5), conclusion of a final peace agreement, and readmission of Japan into the community of nations should be made contingent on satisfactory progress toward effectuation of the recommended measures, as well as adequate maintenance of those previously enforced.

The steps in this program are interrelated and interdependent. The crucial political reforms, included under steps (13) and (14), may be safely postponed to the post-occupation period only if the provisionally established democratic leadership gives promise of stability and effectiveness. Otherwise, the occupation must either be prolonged or the constitutional convention must be assembled under the aegis of the occupation authorities. Steps (17) and (18) are relegated to the last position, not only because these measures are peculiarly unsuitable to enforcement by an alien fiat, but also because steps (2), and (3), and (4) are presumed adequate to curb the monopolists' ability to equip a Japanese military force with heavy armaments.

Implicit in this program, and fundamental to its application, is the assumption that a *new* and a *democratic* Japanese political leadership is taken to mean what the words actually say. They do not mean that the old system continues to operate, with "moderates" holding the Cabinet portfolios. They do assume that the old organs of government are side-tracked, that the officials heading these organs are not recognized as holding power based on consent of the people, and that the entire system is permitted and, if necessary, helped to collapse. They mean that a totally new set of government organs, manned by a totally new personnel, is encouraged to develop and that only this new set of organs and this new personnel will be recognized as the Japanese government.

USSBS
Japan's
Struggle to
End the War
Chairman's
Office 1 July
1946

APPENDIX A-5. MEMORANDUM OF KONOYE CONVERSATION WITH HIROHITO, FEBRUARY 1945

Early in February 1945 the Emperor initiated a number of private interviews with the elder statesmen and his intimates to solicit their views on Japan's war situation and

advice concerning the immediate future of the Empire. On 14 February 1945 Prince Konoye had such an interview with the Emperor. In advance of that, Prince Konoye prepared a memorandum of his views which were verbally presented to the Emperor. An English translation of the memorandum, prepared by T. Ushiba, Konoye's long-time private secretary, is reproduced below. . .

Parts of the following translation are not literal renditions of the original Japanese but represent an accurate summary of salient points. . . .

* * *

"I think that there is no longer any doubt about our defeat. A defeat is, of course, a serious stain on our history, but we can accept it, so long as we can maintain our Tenno system. Public opinion in America and Britain on the whole is not yet, at least, so bad as to demand a fundamental change in that system. What we have to fear, therefore, is not so much a defeat as a Communist revolution which may take place in the event of defeat.

"Conditions, internal as well as external, point to the danger of such revolution. In the first place, there has been a notable ascendancy of Soviet Russia in world politics. In the light of her recent activities in Europe, we must judge that she has not abandoned the hope of bolshevizing the whole world. She is prosecuting such a policy vis a vis the Far East, and I fear interference in our domestic affairs.

"With regard to internal affairs, potentially dangerous factors include the rapid deterioration of the people's living conditions, increase in the voice of the laboring classes, rise of pro-Soviet feelings as enmity against America and Britain increases, attempts by an extremist group in the military to achieve radical changes in internal politics, activities of younger bureaucrats sympathetic with that group, and disguised activities of the Communists behind both the military and bureaucrats.

"A majority of younger officers seems to think that the present form of the Japanese Government is compatible with Communism—a conception which, in any opinion, constitutes the basis of the radical thought of the military. The Communists are influencing them with the theory that, even under communism, Japan can maintain

the Tenno system. I have now come to seriously doubt whether the whole series of events from the Manchurian Incident to the present war have not been what they have purposefully planned. It is a well-known fact that they openly declared the aim of the Manchurian war was to achieve drastic reforms in domestic affairs. A central figure of theirs also declared that the longer the China Incident continues, the better, for otherwise, the intended reform would not be accomplished. Of course, the "reform" aimed at by the military may not necessarily be a Communist revolution, but the group of bureaucrats and civilians (both left and right) who are in a close collaboration with the military are definitely intending to bring about such a revolution. In the light of this conclusion, I now realize that I have, during the last ten years, come across many events the meaning of which I did not then fully appreciate. (As) Prime Minister twice during that period, and over-eager to bring about national unity by accepting as much as possible of the doctrine advocated by those radical elements, I failed to perceive the true intentions hidden behind their arguments. I do not pretend to find any excuse for my short-sightedness, but I feel responsible for it.

"In the last few months, the slogan 'Hundred Million Die Together' has become increasingly louder, seemingly among the right-wing people but has its real basis in the activities of the Communists.

"Under such circumstances, the longer we continue the war, the greater will be the danger of revolution. We should therefore stop the war as soon as possible.

"The greatest obstacle to ending the war is the existence of the military group which has been "propelling" the country into the present state ever since the Manchurian Incident—the group which, having already lost all hope of successfully concluding the war, nevertheless insists on its continuation in order to save face. If we try to stop the war abruptly, these military extremists together with both the right and left wings might attempt anything—even a bloody internal revolt, and thereby nullify our efforts. The prerequisite to the conclusion of the war, therefore, is to wipe out the influence of these dangerous people and reform the Army and Navy. I must urge Your Majesty to make a serious decision to that end."

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