

# **“ MANCHUKUO ”**

**IN RELATION TO WORLD PEACE.**

**THINGS NOT TOLD IN THE REPORT**

**OF THE**

**COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY**

**BY**

**HARRY HUSSEY**

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V. K. WELLINGTON KOO.

## “ MANCHUKUO ”

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A stupendous drama is being enacted at the present time in Asia, a drama that has taken nearly half a continent for a stage, whole nations as the actors, the world as an audience, and more than a year to play but a part of the first act.

The plot has now developed sufficiently to show that, if this drama is allowed to continue, it will probably ruin not only the nations most vitally interested, but also many nations that are the present time only spectators. It will destroy also all faith between nations, and the instruments that have been devised to make it possible for nations to live in peace, with the result that militarism, in a worse form than ever before known, will again dominate the world. The stage of half a continent may thus be enlarged to include half the world, and many nations, that are but spectators today, may become participants to-morrow in what may end as the greatest tragedy of history.

This sketch has been prepared in an effort to give the spectators a clearer view of the stage and the surroundings on which this great drama is being played, a synopsis of the events up to the present time, a brief history of the nations and the people that are taking the more important parts, with their aims, and a forecast of what may happen if this drama is allowed to continue.

## MANCHURIA

The geographical area known to the outside world as Manchuria (and which is the centre of the stage at the present moment) has, from earliest times, been essentially a part of North China, not only politically but also racially and culturally.

It was the Chinese armies of Emperor Wu, of the early Han Dynasty of China, that first brought order and a stable government to this area, in 109 B.C. The boundaries of Manchuria were further extended by the Chinese armies of the Tang, Sung, and later the Ming Emperors of China, until they included all of modern Manchuria, Korea, and a large part of eastern Siberia.

Many of the Mongol tribes that formed Genghis Khan's armies (that conquered more of the world than has ever before, or since, been conquered by a single race), came from the mountains and plains of Manchuria. In 1260 these Mongols established the Yuan Dynasty of China, and united China, Manchuria and Mongolia into one empire. The Yuan dynasty was followed by the Chinese Ming Emperors, and Manchuria continued to be a part of the Chinese Empire until 1636, eight years before the fall of the Ming dynasty.

The sovereignty of China over Manchuria was again consolidated and made effective beyond all question in 1644, when the Manchus, aided by their Chinese allies, captured Peking, and later all China, and established the Ching dynasty with one of their own leaders on the Chinese throne. Manchuria, the homeland of the new Emperors of China, was very definitely incorporated as an integral part of China by the Manchus, and such it has remained to this day.

Manchuria, until a few years ago, was known to the Chinese as the Three Eastern Provinces, and consisted of Fengtien, (Liaoning), Kirin and Heilungchiang provinces. In 1928 Jehol province was added and the official Chinese name became The Four North-Eastern Provinces. In this narrative we will use the better-known name of "Manchuria".

The Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations reports (page 128) on Manchuria of to-day as follows :

" The millions of Chinese farmers now settled permanently on the land have made Manchuria in many respects a simple extension of China south of the Wall. The Three Eastern Provinces (Manchuria) have become almost as Chinese in race, culture and national sentiment as the neighbouring Provinces of Hopei and Shantung."

### **The Manchu**

The term " Manchu " (meaning " Oriental brightness " in the Tibetan language) is of relatively recent origin, and was first conferred on the sons of Nurhachi by the Mongol lamas in an attempt to hide the humble origin of his family. Nurhachi, the founder of the Ching, or Manchu, Dynasty called himself the Khan of Chinchow, as Chinchow had been the name of Southern Manchuria since the time of the Tang Dynasty.

The original home of the Manchus was the valley of the Mutan or Huika river. Southern Manchuria was but a temporary home in their migration from North Eastern Manchuria to China. At the time the Manchus first made their appearance in Southern Manchuria, at the beginning of the 12th century, Central and Southern Manchuria was the home of different tribes of the Tungas race and a

considerable number of Chinese who had been forming settlements along the Liao river since Emperor Wu of the Han Dynasty first encouraged Chinese immigration to Manchuria in 109 B.C.

The Manchus do not represent a race in the ethnical sense but were originally composed of Nuchens and Mongols. After their defeat of the Kitans, they occupied Southern Manchuria and came in contact with the Chinese who had settled along the Liao river, and with representatives from the Chinese Court at Peking. The first rulers of the Manchus were but tribal chiefs who received their official appointments from the Chinese Emperors. It was not until the year 1636, eight years before they occupied Peking, that they declared their independence of China.

The Chinese in Manchuria at that time represented a much higher civilization than the Manchus and included many men of wealth and education, who, for different reasons, had been banished to Manchuria. They were encouraged by the Manchus to intermarry with them, and they became the teachers and often the leaders of the Manchus. The Manchus so readily acquired the Chinese ideas of government, war, education, family life and the arts and customs of China that when they occupied Peking in 1664 and established the Ching Dynasty they made no attempt to change the system of government administration, educational system or customs of the Chinese people. China, not Manchuria, is the present home of the Manchu people. The Manchus do not speak the Manchu language but they take pride in speaking the purest Chinese that is spoken to-day.

The adoption of Chinese customs and the intermarriage of the Chinese in Manchuria with the original Nuchen and Mongol tribes forming the Manchus had been so extensive before the conquest of China by the Manchus that the Manchu must be considered as of Nuchen-Mongol-



Chinese origin. Except for certain peculiarities of dress of a few of the higher class Manchus in China, the Manchus differ less in appearance from the Chinese than the Chinese of different provinces often differ from each other. The Manchus of to-day, who are descended from a people who have had their homes in China for two hundred and sixty years, consider themselves as Chinese, in everything except origin. They are loyal to the present government of China, many of them hold important government positions, and they are as opposed to the attempt to separate Manchuria from China as are the other Chinese.

### **Area, Population and Geographical Features of Manchuria**

Manchuria is a country with an area as large as that of France and Germany combined, estimated at about 380,000 square miles, nearly one half of which is capable of being cultivated. The total population is estimated at about 30,000,000, of whom more than 29,000,000 are Chinese, 650,000 Koreans, 200,000 Japanese and 150,000 other nationalities, — mostly Russians.

Manchuria is traversed north and south by two large mountain ranges, the Great and Little Khingans in the North-West and the Changpai range near the South Eastern boundary. Between these mountains stretch the great Manchuria plains, probably the most fertile agricultural lands in China. The mountainous regions are rich in timber and minerals, especially coal, iron and gold.

The principal exports of Manchuria are Soya beans and bean products, koaliang, millet and other agricultural products, coal, iron, lumber, salt, hides and skins. The total foreign trade of Manchuria for 1929 was valued at Haikwan Tael 755,255,360, or about g. \$483,000,000.

### **Recent Immigration of Chinese to Manchuria**

Since the establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, the Chinese government has done much to encourage the movement of Chinese farmers from the more crowded areas of Shantung, Hopei and other Northern provinces to Manchuria. The government has built many hundreds of miles of railway to open up the country. It has constructed important irrigation systems, opened good roads, established efficient police protection and a modern educational system, found markets for the products of the farmer, established Chinese banks and encouraged foreign banks and foreign business houses to establish branches in Manchuria, has given very low railway rates to Chinese colonists on all the government-owned railways and has established organisations to assist the Chinese immigrants on their arrival in Manchuria.

These measures resulted in a tremendous migration of Chinese farmers into Manchuria, increasing the population by more than ten million people in fifteen years, — probably the greatest migration of a single people ever recorded in history.

In addition to the immigration of Chinese farmers to Manchuria the Japanese government has at various times attempted to induce Japanese farmers to settle in Manchuria, offering certain bounties to any Japanese who would take up and cultivate land. As the Japanese could not compete with the Chinese, and disliked the long, cold winters, this attempt was a failure and the Japanese farmers returned to Japan. The Japanese now in Manchuria are confined almost entirely to the cities and towns in the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Manchurian Railway Zone.

## **Early Government of Manchuria — Chang Tso-Lin**

Previous to 1907, Manchuria was governed by China as a special extra-mural dominion with a form of government differing in many respects from the government of the other provinces of China. Each of the three provinces of Manchuria had a military governor, who had complete charge of all military and civil affairs within his province.

In 1907, this form of government was abolished by the Peking Government. The three military governors were replaced by a Viceroy for all Manchuria ; and civil governors, under the Viceroy, were put in charge of the administration of each province.

When the revolution broke out in China in 1911, Chang Tso-lin had already become the strong man of Manchuria. He saved his province from the turmoil of civil war by resisting the advance of the revolutionary troops. After the Republic was established, the Manchurian government voluntarily joined the Republic of China and accepted Yuan Shih-kai as President.

Chang Tso-lin was born in Manchuria of middle class farmer parentage. While a young man he collected together a group of young Chinese, who like himself had a strong dislike for Russia, and organised them into a body of irregular troops that gave valuable assistance to the Japanese in the Russo-Japanese war. As China was neutral in this war, the Chinese government declared him an outlaw. After the war the Japanese interceded for him and he was pardoned by the Chinese government and taken into the Chinese army. By sheer ability he rose to be governor of the Three Eastern Provinces of Manchuria and later of most of North China.

Chang Tso-lin gave Manchuria a very efficient government. By his firmness he was able to protect the integrity of China from the encroachments of both the Japanese and the Russians in Manchuria. As the Japanese government always resented his policy of keeping Manchuria an integral part of China, his relations with Japan, especially during the latter part of his life, became strained. From the early part of 1926, when he disregarded Japanese advice and left Manchuria to take up his residence in Peking, the Japanese government definitely worked for his downfall.

Marshal Chang Tso-lin, with many of his old friends and officials of the government of Manchuria, was killed June 4th, 1928, by an explosion which occurred while his private train was passing under the Japanese-guarded bridge of the South Manchuria Railway in the railway zone just outside the city of Mukden. The Marshal was returning at the time from Peking to his home in Mukden. Most of the people who are familiar with the circumstances believe that Marshal Chang Tso-lin was killed either by the Japanese military party in Manchuria, or by a group of Japanese composed of the rougher element of Japanese (the notorious Japanese ronin), and certain retired army officers living in Manchuria.

### **The Government of Manchuria from December 29th, 1928**

On December 29th, 1928, the government of the Three Eastern Provinces, or Manchuria, voluntarily placed itself under the new National Government of the Republic of China. The Three Eastern Provinces were re-organised, the Jehol Special District was added to Manchuria, Feng-tien Province became known as Liaoning Province and the

official name of Manchuria was changed to The Four North-Eastern Provinces of China.

At the time of the Japanese invasion, Manchuria, like the other provinces of China, was administered directly by the Central Government at Nanking. The supreme administrative body in Manchuria was the North-Eastern Political Committee under the Chairmanship of Chang Hsüeh-liang. This committee consisted of twelve subordinate committees, each subordinate committee in charge of a separate department of the Government.

The four provinces were divided into Hsien, or districts. Each Hsien was administered by a Hsienchang, or District Magistrate, who had an advisory body, or Hsien Council, consisting of all the heads of departments or bureaux of the Hsien with the Hsienchang as Chairman. There was also an Assembly in each Hsien composed of members elected by the people for a term of three years. This Assembly decided on the budget of the Hsien, supervised the accounts, the raising of money and any other business brought up by the people or the District Magistrate. This gave the people the opportunity to elect representatives to the one branch of the government with which they came in most direct contact, and in which they were most interested. Many of the larger cities also had a special municipal government to aid in administration.

The government of Manchuria, like that of the other provinces of China, was based on the "Sanmin" or the Three People's Principles, as laid down by the late Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, founder of the Kuomintang Party. As Manchuria and China had both passed through the first, or Military Administration Period, they were in the period of Political Tutelage, during which they enjoyed the limited form of representative government outlined above. According to the provisional constitution of China, this was to be only a period of transition while the people were receiv-

ing the instruction and political education necessary to prepare them for a complete representative form of government.

### **The Kwantung Leased Area and the Railway Zone**

The administration of law and order in Manchuria has been made difficult at times by the manner in which the Japanese administer the Kwantung Leased Territory and the South Manchuria Railway Zone. The Japanese have changed the original character of the railway zone from a commercial enterprise, as it was originally intended to be, into a political and military area which they attempt to administer as they would a part of the Japanese Empire.

This railway zone, with a width for the most part of only a few yards on either side of the railway tracks, as now administered by the Japanese, is like a poisoned dagger running into the very heart of Manchuria. By the aid of this zone the Japanese carry on much of their political intrigue in Manchuria. They have made it a safe refuge for the Chinese criminal and political agitator and, as the Chinese Authorities have no control within the Railway Zone, it offers a safe place from which to distribute narcotic drugs, arms and ammunition into Manchuria.

The Chinese Eastern Railway was built under the same original Agreement with China as the South Manchuria Railway, yet the present Government of the U.S.S.R. makes no such military or political use of the Chinese Eastern Railway zone as the Japanese Government makes of the South Manchuria Railway Zone.

## Income and Expenditure of the Government of Manchuria

Much has been written by Japanese writers about the overtaxed farmers of Manchuria. The facts are that the farmers of Manchuria are probably the lowest taxed people in any country in the world.

In 1919 the entire income of the Government of Manchuria was estimated at \$22,796,757. The population of Manchuria at that time was 22,082,000, making a tax of slightly more than one silver dollar per person. According to the information furnished by the Chinese Assessor to the Commission of Enquiry, this tax was raised and expended as follows :

### *Estimated Receipts for 1919.*

	<i>Fengtien</i>	<i>Kirin</i>	<i>Heilungkiang</i>
	\$	\$	\$
Land Tax	3,710.691	1,950.135	1,460.271
Goods Tax	3,120.182	2,026.680	2,206.346
Regular taxes and sur-taxes	2,364.718	1,822.968	287.903
Assessments and fees	197.290	1.456	42.827
Enterprises	243.509		1,226.380
Miscellaneous Receipts	1,717.474	414.373	3.495
	<u>\$11,353.865</u>	<u>\$6,215.612</u>	<u>\$5,227.230</u>

### *Estimated Expenditure for 1919.*

	<i>Fengtien</i>	<i>Kirin</i>	<i>Heilungkiang</i>
	\$	\$	\$
Foreign affairs	82.200	79.206	25.820
Home affairs	1,385.652	1,190.918	1,585.242
Finance	878.605	568.188	295.388
Army	5,077.354	2,709.916	1,964.656
Judiciary	547.524	480.704	188.432
Education	182.406	235.000	30.000
Communication		81.000	97.957
Agriculture and Commerce	70.308	54.000	414.893
	<u>\$8,224.049</u>	<u>\$5,398.932</u>	<u>\$4,602.478</u>

The government of Manchuria was undoubtedly one of the few governments in the world that had a surplus in 1919. In 1925 the total income of the government had increased to \$27,283,683 but the population of the country had increased to 25,500,000, making the average tax still little over one dollar per person.

In 1928, the last year for which the figures are available and a year of large railway construction and military expenditure, the total tax received (not including the salt tax, but including the wine and tobacco tax of \$15,000,000) was \$83,000,000. With a population of 29,000,000, the average per capital tax was about \$2.80.

As the larger part of this revenue is derived from taxes which are paid principally by the urban population, such as the Wine and Tobacco, Business and Consolidated Tax, it is apparent that the farmer is very lightly taxed. Certainly his lot is much happier than that of the farmer across the border in Korea, who is taxed more than fifty per cent of his earnings as his contribution towards the support of his government.

### **Military Forces in Manchuria**

Manchuria, being one of the most exposed of the frontier provinces of China, has always been the headquarters of one of the largest military units of the Chinese national armies. The military forces in Manchuria previous to September 18th 1931, were called the North-Eastern Frontier Defence Army, and were under the command of Marshal Chang Hsüeh Liang as Commander-in-Chief and General Chang Tso-hsiang and General Wan Fu-lin as Vice-Commanders.

The North-Eastern Frontier Defence force was divided into three armies : the North-Eastern Frontier Army with



headquarters at Mukden, the Kirin Province Frontier Army with headquarters at Kirin and the Heilungkiang Province Frontier Army with headquarters at Tsitsihar.

The unit of the Frontier Armies was a brigade, one brigade consisting of three regiments, one regiment of three battalions and one battalion of four companies. The North-Eastern Frontier Army consisted of 39 infantry brigades, 13 cavalry brigades,—fifteen regiments of artillery and an Air Force, Transport, and the other usual Corps.

### **Railways and Water Transportation in Manchuria**

Since 1900 more than three thousand miles of railways have been constructed in Manchuria, making a total of over 3,700 miles for the three Provinces. Of the railways in Manchuria, the Chinese have built and operate 1,800 miles, 1,200 miles are under Chinese-foreign management and only 700 miles are operated by the Japanese. Up to 1932 the Japanese had actually built less than 250 miles of new railways in Manchuria, or less than 7% of the total mileage of the three provinces. This fact detracts somewhat from the claims of the Japanese that they have contributed so heavily to the railway growth of Manchuria.

In addition to the railways, the Government of Manchuria has also built many miles of highways. In 1931, the Chinese had sixty five bus lines operating more than two hundred and fifty busses on 7,000 miles of road.

To handle the large increase in foreign trade, the Government of Manchuria has opened three ports to foreign trade and was building a new modern port at Hulutao when operations were stopped by the Japanese forces. These ports are in addition to the Japanese ports of Port Arthur and Dairen.

The Government of Manchuria has also spent large sums of money in the development of commerce on the extensive inland waters of Manchuria. It has established at Harbin the North Eastern Dockyards, the North-Eastern Waterways Bureau to look after the conservancy work on the Sungari River, the Liao River Conservancy Bureau to do the same for the Liao River, the North-Eastern Commercial Navigation School to train the necessary personnel for the administration of shipping affairs, and it also assists the Shipping Guild, which is a mutual-aid institution run on the system of mutual insurance.

In addition to the above, the Government of Manchuria has united with the prominent privately-owned shipping companies on the Sungari River to form the North-Eastern Government and Commercial Joint Navigation Bureau. This bureau operates forty-eight ships and sixty nine tugs with a large number of lighters. There were a total of over one hundred modern ships, one hundred and forty tugs and eighteen hundred junks operating on the Sungari River in 1930. The main rivers of Manchuria are the Sungari, Amur, Yalu, Liao, Nonni and the Hulan with a total navigable mileage of over 5,000 miles.

The postal, telegraph, telephone and wireless services are owned and operated by the Government. They have always been kept in a high state of efficiency.

### **Educational Facilities**

It was not until 1902 that a modern public school system was introduced in Manchuria, replacing the time-honoured system of competitive literary examinations. According to an official investigation, the results of which were submitted to the Commission of Enquiry by the

Chinese Assessor, there were in operation in Manchuria in 1929 the following schools :

	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Number of pupils</i>	<i>Teachers</i>	<i>Annual Budget</i>
18	Kindergarten	864	82	\$
12,357	Primary Schools	836,770	23,380	15,329,792
172	Middle Schools	29,723	1,919	2,825,788
55	Vocational Schools	3,499	308	344,858
118	Normal Schools	10,173	830	1,143,336
11	Universities and colleges	5,127	816	3,292,000
		886,156	27,335	\$22,935,774

This is a remarkable record, especially in a country where we have been led by propagandists to believe only a weak and inefficient Government existed. Needless to say, these schools and all the plans for future extension of this system have been almost entirely swept away by the Japanese invasion of 1931.

### Judicial System

Manchuria had at the time of the Japanese invasion a comparatively well-developed judicial system, founded on the regulations of the National Government of the Republic of China.

The Supreme Court at Nanking was the highest court of Manchuria. There was also a Divisional Supreme Court at Mukden with jurisdiction restricted to Manchuria. Each of the four provinces also had a High Court, one or more Divisional High Courts and a number of District and Divisional District Courts. These courts were in addition to the Hsien Judicial Offices, presided over by the District Magistrate which handled the local cases. Manchuria has also nineteen modern prisons and one hundred and twelve old-style prisons.

### **Police in Manchuria**

A very efficient police force was maintained throughout the Four North-Eastern Provinces, up to the time of the Japanese invasion. The administration of this police force was under the direction of a Chairman, supervised by the Ministry of the Interior. A special Bureau was maintained in each of the four Provincial capitals under the chief of the Bureau who supervised the Hsien Chiefs, the Public Peace Bureaux, and other police institutions, made the appointments of police officers, distributed the funds and attended to the training of police officers.

In addition to the above organisation, there existed the Paoweituan, or local Protection Corps, as auxiliary police. The Paoweituan is one of the oldest institutions in China, dating back to the Chow Dynasty,—or more than three thousand years. The Paoweituan has survived as an indigenous and virile institution during all the political changes which China has witnessed during the centuries. It is a local organization composed of the young men of the district organised for local protection. In places where police organisations already exist, the Paoweituan assists the police. Where no police organisations exist, it assumes the duties of the police with the additional duties of looking after the census registrations, the tax collections and similar duties. The members of the Paoweituan are young men, intensely loyal, and are the patriots who are so successfully defending their homes against the invasion of the Japanese in Manchuria at the present time. No army has yet been known to subdue a province in China with the Paoweituan against them, and the Japanese forces are finding these ill-equipped but brave units a serious stumbling-block in their conquest of Manchuria.

## Currency in Manchuria

Manchuria has probably suffered as much as any other country from a depreciated and unsettled currency during the last fifteen years. In addition to the after-effects of the Great War (which affected the currencies of China and Manchuria as they did the currencies of Germany, France, Russia and the other European and American countries), Manchuria had, in addition, the adverse effects of the civil wars in China as well as the unauthorised presence of several foreign currencies that circulated within Manchuria in competition to the local currencies.

Much of the difficulty of stabilizing the local currency by the Government of Manchuria, especially during the last three years, has been due to the over-issue of the silver notes of the Yokohama Specie Bank and the gold yen notes of the Bank of Chosen and the frequent attacks of these two banks on the currency of the Chinese banks.

Manchuria has various kinds of notes and coins in circulation in the provinces but the most important issue is the Fengpiao, or Mukden dollar. The Fengpiao is the standard currency in the provinces of Manchuria and also circulates to a small extent in Hopei province. It was first issued in 1906 and was redeemable in small silver coins. It was well received by the people and remained at par until the run on all Chinese banks in 1916 at the time of the collapse of the monarchist movement of Yuan Shih-kai. The Fengpiao passed through a difficult time and had many ups and downs, due in part to over-issue and other unwise acts of the banks, until June 25th, 1929, when it was finally stabilized at sixty dollars Fengpiao notes to one standard silver dollar. This rate was strictly maintained, and the Government of Manchuria was fol-

lowing an intelligent currency policy when the final crash came with the invasion of the Japanese armed forces on September 18th, 1931.

### **Banking Facilities in Manchuria**

Manchuria was well provided with banking facilities. In addition to the large number of old-style Chinese banks which did a large business in Manchuria, there were the three Provincial Banks (the Provincial Bank of the Three Eastern Provinces, the Provincial Bank of Kirin Province and the Provincial Bank of Heliungkiang Province), each with many branches throughout Manchuria. The two National Banks (the Bank of China and the Bank of Communications with Head Offices in Mukden) also have branches in all the important cities throughout the Four Provinces.

The following foreign banks had branches in Manchuria : the Yokohama Specie Bank, the Bank of Chosen, and fifteen other smaller Japanese Banks, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (British), the Chartered Bank of India, Australia and China (British), the National City Bank of New York (American), the Banque Industrielle de Chine (French), and the Daili Bank (U.S.S.R.). There are also a number of small foreign and Chinese-foreign local banks in the larger cities.

The Chinese Postal Savings and Remittance Bank furnished widespread and efficient facilities for savings and postal remittances.

In addition to the above banks, there were a number of Chuhsuhui or savings associations, which developed in Manchuria within the last few years, and had furnished important banking facilities to the people of the middle and lower classes.

## **Banditry in Manchuria**

Banditry has probably existed for centuries in Manchuria. An examination of the geography of the country and the types of its neighbours will show why such a condition was inevitable. The very size of Manchuria and the lack of communications to many parts of the country make control difficult. The mountains forming the western boundary make an ideal home for the outlaws of the Mongolian tribes, while the eastern mountains provide protection for the Korean bandits. To the north, the marauding Russians and other desperate characters from the forests and steppes of Siberia have raided Manchuria so often that the Chinese name for these people, "Hung hu tze" (meaning 'red head') has become the name for bandits throughout Manchuria.

Unfortunately, in addition to the difficulty of bandit suppression inherent in the size and situation of Manchuria, there is evidence that the presence of the Japanese has intensified the problem directly and indirectly. The Kwantung Leased Territory and the Railway Zone, in which the Chinese Government has no administrative authority, form an asylum into which criminals of all nationalities can, and do, seek refuge from Chinese justice. Furthermore, the same Railway Zone provides a safe channel through which arms and ammunition reach the bandits from Japan.

That Japan was the source from which the bandits secured the larger part of their rifles and ammunition is shown by the fact that, according to the evidence furnished the Commission of Enquiry by the Chinese Assessor most of the arms recently captured from the bandits were of Japanese manufacture, or were of the type of rifles that were captured by the Japanese armies

during the Russo-Japanese War. This is most significant, as the manufacture of arms in Japan is a Government monopoly, and no arms could be sent to Manchuria without the knowledge of Japanese officials.

Not only have the Japanese furnished arms to the bandits in Manchuria, but they have to a great extent instigated bandits to serve their political interests in Manchuria. On page 83 of the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the Commission states: "According to the Chinese document quoted above (document number 22 of the evidence furnished the Commission by the Chinese Assessor), banditry has been encouraged by the smuggling of arms and munitions on a large scale from Dairen and the Kwantung Leased Territory. It is asserted, for instance, that the notorious bandit chief, Lin Yin-Shin, was provided in November last with arms, munitions and other means in order to establish the so-called Independent Self-Defence Army, which was organised with the help of three Japanese agents and destined to attack Chinchow. After the failure of this attempt another chief got Japanese help for the same purpose, but fell into the hands of the Chinese authorities with all his material of Japanese origin."

According to the same Chinese document, there have been many Japanese who have become famous as bandit chiefs in Manchuria, among them being Tenki, who operated in Kirin Province, Tenraku, a former Japanese army officer, Shigenabu (originally chief of the Japanese police at Changchun), Kohama (formerly manager of a Japanese Company in Antung) and others.

But in spite of all these difficulties, banditry was fairly well controlled in Manchuria up till the time of the Japanese invasion in 1931. Foreigners living in Manchuria seldom hesitated about making trips to any part of Manchuria for sport or other purposes. This point was emphasised by Dr. Dugal Christie in his article as printed in



“ The Scotsman ” of February 13th, 1932. It is also well known that the Japanese Government has, for years, been sending unprotected surveying parties into remote parts of Manchuria without fear of bandits.

Since the Japanese invasion in 1931, banditry has increased in Manchuria. On page 109 of the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the Commission states : “ Since September 18th, 1931, there has been an unparalleled growth of banditry and lawlessness in the countryside, partly due to disbanded soldiery and partly due to farmers who, having been ruined by bandits, have to take to banditry themselves for a living.”

But the term “ bandit ” as used in Manchuria before the Japanese invasion, must not be confused with the term as now used by the Japanese authorities in describing present conditions in Manchuria. On page 81 of the report of the Commission of Enquiry, the Commission states : “ It has been the practice of the Japanese to describe indiscriminately as ‘ bandits ’ all the forces now opposed to them. There are, in fact, apart from the bandits, two distinct categories of organised resistance to the Japanese troops or to those of “ Manchukuo ”, namely the regular and irregular Chinese troops.”

These irregular troops mentioned in the report and described as “ bandits ” by the Japanese are largely the Paoweituan or Local Protection Corps previously described. As these young men who form the Paoweituan were not allowed to meet the Commission of Enquiry, hundreds of them wrote and stated that they would fight for forty years if necessary to defend their homes against the Japanese. When we read in the Japanese reports that their troops have killed hundreds of “ bandits ” in Manchuria they mean hundreds of these young men who, though poorly equipped, are trying to defend their families and their homes against the invasion of Japanese troops.

The villages that the Japanese are bombing so frequently are the homes of these young men of the Paoweituan.

### **Wars and Unrest in Manchuria**

The Japanese propagandists have tried to give the impression that Manchuria has been a country of wars, rebellions and unsettled government and a backward country with little real development of its natural resources.

Between the years 1904-5, when the Japanese and Russian armies overran the entire country, and the invasion of the Japanese armies again in 1931, there have been no wars or large military disturbances within the boundaries of Manchuria except a few weeks of fighting between the armies of Manchuria and the U.S.S.R. on the extreme Northern boundaries of Manchuria, and a rebellion of a small part of Marshal Chang Tso-Lin's troops under General Kuo Sung Lin in November, 1925. Manchuria has not only been comparatively free from military operations but has also had few political changes during that period.

### **Losses from the Soya Bean Pool**

Much has been written recently about the losses to the farmers of Manchuria due to the purchase of soya beans by the three Provincial Government banks of Manchuria, with the suggestion that government officials made huge sums of money from these purchases.

As Manchuria is largely an agricultural country, one of the most important functions of all the Chinese banks in Manchuria is the financing of the production and handling of agricultural products, and particularly of the Soya

Beans. When the depression of 1930 forced the price of beans to an unusually low price and made the sale of beans by the farmer very difficult, the three Provincial Banks, with the Frontier Bank, in order to protect themselves as well as the farmers, formed a Soya Bean Pool similar to the Canadian Wheat Pool, the Brazilian Coffee Pool and other pools in foreign countries.

The Soya Bean pool had not only all the difficulties that similar pools in other countries experienced but it had a more serious difficulty in the unfair attacks on its banks and currency by the Japanese Banks and the Japanese exporters of Soya beans. The history of the Soya Bean Pool is about the same as the history of similar pools in foreign countries. The Banks and the officials of the Banks, instead of making huge sums as stated by the Japanese propagandist, lost a very large amount of money, as did the banks in North and South America and Europe that financed the various pools in foreign countries.

### Summary

From what precedes, it is clear that Manchuria was not, up to the time of the Japanese invasion in September 1931, the unhappy, bandit-infested and disorganized country which the Japanese would have us believe; nor was its government the inefficient, corrupt and backward organ which interested parties have tried to picture to the world.

On the contrary, for many years Manchuria enjoyed a great measure of peace and prosperity, and showed every promise of further progress until an alien military occupation ruined countless thousands of peaceful farmers and merchants, disorganised all organs of law and order, and plunged the whole country into tragically unnecessary warfare and bloodshed.

That the government in Manchuria made many mistakes and was far from perfect is undeniable. When, however, due consideration is given to the problems which that government had to face, which were intensified by the size of the country, the rapid increase in population and the interference and obstruction from Russian and Japanese sources, an impartial critic will conclude that the government has made a very creditable showing during the past fifteen years in railway construction, in assistance to agriculture, in encouragement to trade and industry, in police organisation, in education,—in short, in all branches of public activity.

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## THE CHINESE GOVERNMENT

The National Government of the Republic of China is based on the "Sanmin" or Three People's Principles as laid down by the late Dr. Sun Yet Sen. At the present time, China has only a provisional constitution, and the form of her administrative organisation is decided by the Kuomintang and the "Organic Law of the National Government" as adopted December 26th, 1931, and other administrative regulations.

The National Government at Nanking consists of Five Yuans or Boards, as follows: the Executive Yuan, which is the highest executive office of the government; the Legislative Yuan; the Judicial Yuan; the Examination Yuan and the Control Yuan. There is also a President, a state council of thirty-six members, a Ministry for Foreign

Affairs, Military Affairs, Navy, Finance, Industry, Education, Justice, Communications, Railways and of the Interior.

Unfortunately, the present crisis with Japan caught China during the time of transition in the formation of her National Government, which made it appear to the outside world that the Chinese people are divided. While undoubtedly differences of opinion among certain leaders on important policies are making it difficult for China to complete the formation of her Constitutional Government, there are no differences of opinion among the Chinese people or their leaders on the present Chinese-Japanese dispute. They are united in a determination to oppose Japan with every resource they have until they have secured the return of their Three Eastern Provinces.

In addition to the ordinary difficulties that would naturally be encountered in trying to work out a system of government for a country as large and as varied as China, this problem has been made more difficult by a series of attempts by Japan during the last twenty years to perpetuate civil strife in China so as to prevent the National unification of the country. Japan does not want a united China, strong enough to successfully defeat her plans for absorbing large parts of China as she is now attempting to do in Manchuria ; nor does Japan want a successful republican form of Government in Asia so close to her own shores, as it would naturally have a tendency to undermine the permanency of the present imperialistic government of Japan.

There has been no secrecy about Japan's plots and schemes against the unification of China. Her most prominent statesmen have commented both in Parliament and in public speeches on the assistance Japan gave to Yuan Shih-kai in his monarchical plans ; to Prince Su's attempt to restore the Manchus ; on the ammunition and

arms that Japan sent to the Mongols under Bapuchapu in their attack on China, etc.

The present Russian government has also greatly increased the difficulties of the Chinese people in their efforts to establish a constitutional Government. In addition to furnishing General Feng Yu-hsiang with arms, ammunition and money to attack the Government of China in the North, the Russian Government sent the famous Borodin with a number of assistants to organise the Communist Party in the Southern Provinces. Under his guidance, the Communist Party became so powerful in South China that at one time it came dangerously near controlling the entire Kuomintang Party. It was only after the courageous stand of General Chiang Kai-shek and other leaders in 1927 that the Communists were finally expelled from the party and Borodin was forced to leave China.

Unfortunately, it was impossible to rid China entirely of Communism at that time. Taking advantage of the unsettled conditions of the country and the Japanese invasion of Manchuria and attacks on Shanghai, Nanking and Tientsin, Communism has again appeared in the Central and Southern Provinces in such strength that it is seriously interfering with the work of the Chinese Government.

In considering the difficulties of China in forming a strong Central Government we must remember that China is a group of large provinces united by strongest ties of race, tradition and culture. Some of these provinces are as large in area and population as France or Germany. These provinces have enjoyed for centuries a large measure of control over their local affairs, and therefore it is only natural that during this period of transition there are differences of opinion among the provincial leaders as to the form of government which should be ultimately

adopted as the National Government of China. In spite, however, of all her difficulties, China has been able to make definite progress during the last twenty years towards a stable form of government.

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### THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT

While the Japanese have told us many things regarding the weaknesses of the Chinese Government, they have told us very little about their own government. There is also a growing impression that even what they did tell us has been, at times, somewhat misleading, especially when they told us about the unselfishness of the great Tokugawa and other military families in voluntarily giving up their control over Japan so that Japan could have an Emperor and a constitutional government like the Western nations. It takes only a casual study of the working of the Japanese government during the last twenty years to see that Japan has never had a modern government, that the same military families that controlled Japan four hundred years ago just as completely control Japan to-day.

While the constitution of Japan, which came into effect in 1890, appears on the surface to establish a modern form of government, it was designed to keep the actual power in the hands of the military families. By Article 55 of the Constitution, the Premier, as Head of the Cabinet, is responsible for all the acts of the Government, but the fact that the Minister for War and the Minister for the Navy must be high military and naval officers, makes it

possible for these military families, by simply refusing permission for any military or naval officer to accept a post in the Cabinet, to prevent any person not approved by them from forming a Cabinet. They can, also, overthrow any Cabinet or Government at any time by having the Minister for War or the Minister for the Navy resign from the Cabinet.

Even the Constitution can be set aside whenever the military party considers it necessary. Article 76 of the Constitution was intended to make the Premier the Head of the Government, but, by the "prerogative of the Supreme Command", the Minister for War, the Minister of the Navy and the General Staff still have the privilege of direct appeal to the Emperor, over the head of the Premier. The Privy Council and the Elder Statesmen, who are supposed to be "advisers" to the Throne, are chosen only from these old military families.

Whenever the Military Group desire it, they can, by putting a Prince closely related to the Emperor as the nominal Head of the Army and Navy, make it impossible for any act of any of the personnel of the Army or Navy to be criticised in Parliament, in the press or by individuals without incurring the most severe penalties, as such criticism could be punished as criticism of the Royal Family or the Emperor. By the use of this power, many of these military families of Japan, instead of being but small Barons as they were four hundred years ago, have now become among the most wealthy and most influential families in the world.

Japanese propagandists constantly declare that the Chinese Government has little control over its armies, but they are careful not to mention the more accurate fact that the Japanese Government has absolutely no control over the Japanese war-lords or Japanese armies. This condition has been disclosed to the world repeatedly



during the last year, when promises made by the Japanese Foreign Office and the Japanese diplomats have been callously broken by the Japanese military leaders.

While the diplomatic corps, the professional classes and the business men and bankers of Japan include many well-educated, widely-travelled and brilliant men, these individuals have little influence in the Government of the country, especially in times of crisis. The actual power in Japan is in the hands of men, many of whom have never been outside the boundaries of Japan and often for years have never left the confines of their large estates. Because of Japan's victories over Russia in 1904-1905, these military leaders believe that Japan is the strongest military and naval nation in the world to-day, and that all important international questions can best be settled by armed forces. As they have never had to pay the slightest respect for the rights of others in the past, they have no respect to-day for the rights of any other nation.

Many of the modern Japanese leaders, such as Professor Tarada, Professor Yokada, Dr. Kagawa and Professor Nitobe (before he was induced to leave for America) have clearly seen that the present policy of these military families towards China and the other countries will finally ruin Japan regardless of any temporary success they might have. Under the leadership of Baron Shidehara, they attempted to oppose the present policy of the Japanese army and navy party. Shidehara was expelled from office and seriously injured, Baron Taku Dan was assassinated, as was also Premier Tsuyoshi Inukai. Any leader who seriously opposed this party met this fate or was imprisoned, until the prisons of Japan were filled with political prisoners. The last two governments of Japan have been overthrown by assassination, and, even though the assassins who killed Premier Inukai surrendered to the authorities, they have not been punished as they belonged

to the powerful navy and military party. Japan has had more assassinations of prominent leaders within the last year than have all the other civilized countries combined within the same period. There is no free expression of public opinion in Japan. The newspapers are muzzled, and individual critics are imprisoned or assassinated. The military party is extremely unpopular in Japan but there are no channels open to the people to express their true sentiments.

As the present policy of the Military Party of Japan makes it necessary for Japan to support a Navy and Army far beyond the financial resources of the country, and as these powerful families have been able to put most of the burden of taxation on the farmers and industrial workers, the farmers of Japan and Korea are probably the most heavily taxed people in the world to-day. While the slightest evidence of unrest in Japan is put down with the severest punishments, there is a strong belief by close students of conditions in Japan that the present policy of the Japanese Government towards China (which has not only greatly increased the expenditures of the Government, but has also cut off more than forty per cent of the trade of Japan) must lead to an uprising in Japan and Korea.

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## THE JAPANESE PEOPLE

While the Military Party and the military leaders of Japan undoubtedly deserve the most severe censure, no such censure should necessarily be made of the

Japanese farming class, the industrial labourers, small manufacturers and merchants, many of the professional class, professors and religious leaders.

The Japanese farmers are among the hardest workers, most patient, honest and best-natured people in the world. The same can be said of most of the other working classes of Japan. Many of the teachers, religious leaders and other educated classes have often stood out against the injustices of their military party and have suffered much for expressing their opinions.

The extreme loyalty and love for their country of the Japanese farmers and other labouring classes have often been taken advantage of by the military leaders to induce these people to enlist in the army, pay excessive taxes and otherwise support unjust causes which, if they knew the facts, they would have refused to countenance.

It remains to be seen how these people will accept the draft Budget for 1933-1934 recently adopted by the Japanese Cabinet. This Budget calls for the expenditure of the unprecedented total of 2,235,000,000 yen, one half of which is absorbed by the estimates for the Army and Navy. Even with the present high taxes this leaves a deficit of almost one billion yen. The Japanese papers describe this as the largest in the country's history, and the "Kohumin" warns the government that the financial scheme embodied in the Budget threatens to lead the nation to the verge of bankruptcy.

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## **JAPANESE INVESTMENTS IN MANCHURIA**

According to the Japanese Year Book on Manchuria published in 1931, the total Japanese investments in Manchuria in 1929 amounted to yen 1,510,754,000, — or

about g.\$750,000,000 at normal rates of exchange. (g.\$335,000,000 at the present rate of exchange). This same authority states that 54% of these investments consisted of the South Manchuria Railway and associated industries. These figures represent the inflated values of 1929. The "protection" of these investments is one of the principal reasons advanced by the Japanese for the need of Japanese troops in Manchuria.

In comparison with the foreign investments of other countries, however, this sum does not seem to be of such vast importance as has been claimed by the Japanese. For example, British investments in South America, Canadian investments in Cuba and Mexico, American investments in Canada etc., are of much greater importance in international financial relations. American investments in Japan are greater than Japanese investments in Manchuria. It would, in fact, be interesting to know how much of Japan's investments in Manchuria is actually the re-investment of American, British and other foreign money.

It is very significant, also, to remember that the Japanese are not the only nation with investments in Manchuria; other foreign nations have about half a billion yen invested in Manchuria, but none of these nations has ever considered it necessary to "protect" these investments with an army.

Finally, what of the fate of the Chinese investments in Manchuria? Here is an investment many times greater than that of Japan and all other foreign countries combined, which has been ruthlessly snatched away by an alien military occupation.

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## JAPAN'S ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN MANCHURIA

The Japanese have told us that Japan needs Manchuria as a place to take care of the overflow of her excess population. Japan has today a population of 437 persons per square mile compared with 468 for the United Kingdom, 330 for Germany, 349 for Italy, 670 for Belgium and 254 for China, or about the average for the four first-named European countries.

If it is necessary to find a country for the overflow of the Japanese people, Manchuria is evidently not that country. Manchuria is already occupied by a race more competent to meet the conditions existing in that country than the Japanese. Even with the assistance of the Japanese government, Japanese immigration is decreasing in Manchuria. There are large areas in the Northern part of the Japanese Empire of land very similar to the land in Manchuria that are still unoccupied by the Japanese. If it is necessary for the world to provide a place for the overflow of the Japanese race, it will have to be in some climate that is more congenial to the Japanese than the rigorous climate of Manchuria.

There is also a wrong impression in regard to the quantity of raw materials and food products that are exported from Manchuria to Japan. According to the Japanese Bureau of Statistics for 1930, in the list of the twenty-seven articles listed as the most important exports from Manchuria, only eleven of these articles are exported to Japan. Of these, Japan receives from Manchuria only the following percentage of her total imports of these articles : wheat 7.17 %, hides 3.78 %, sulphates 47 %, wool .06 %, timber 20 %, bran 29.98 % and 68.3 % of her Soya bean

products (largely fertilizer). Japan also receives 33.84% of her imports of pig iron from the Japanese-owned Ashan Iron Works. It is evident from these figures furnished by the Japanese Bureau of Statistics that Japan is not as dependent on Manchuria for her food supply or raw materials as she has led us to believe, nor is it necessary for Japan to occupy Manchuria in order to secure for her people a constant supply of food.

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### **CHINA'S ECONOMIC NEED OF MANCHURIA**

While the Japanese are telling us about their large investments in Manchuria, their need of Manchuria as a place for their overflow population and as a source of their necessary raw materials and food supply, we must not forget that for every dollar that the Japanese have invested in Manchuria the Chinese people have invested more than one hundred dollars in that country, that China's need of Manchuria as a place to take care of the overflow in her population is much greater than Japan's need of Manchuria for that purpose and that China also requires Manchuria as a source of her necessary food supply.

On page 38 of the report of the Commission of Enquiry the Commission report as follows: "The Chinese people regard Manchuria as an integral part of China and important to them for economic reasons. For decades the Chinese have called Manchuria the 'granary of China' and more recently have regarded it as a region which furnishes seasonal employment to Chinese farmers and labourers from neighbouring Chinese provinces. The

Three Eastern Provinces have always been considered by China and by the foreign powers as a part of China, and the *de jure* authority of the Chinese government there has never been questioned.”

That the Chinese consider Manchuria as a home for her surplus population is shown by the fact that in addition to the 300,000 to 500,000 seasonal workers that go to Manchuria yearly from China, more than 20,000,000 Chinese from the Northern Provinces of China have permanently settled in Manchuria. With Manchuria a part of China, it has been estimated that the population of Manchuria will reach 75,000,000 within forty years (Page 124 of Commission Report). Since the invasion of Manchuria by the Japanese troops, this immigration of Chinese farmers has not only stopped but many Chinese are returning to China. According to the report of the Commission of Enquiry (page 88) more than 100,000 Chinese residents left Mukden during the days following the Japanese attack on that city.

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## THE BOYCOTT

The Boycott is one of the principal complaints brought forward by the Japanese against China, the Japanese claiming that the boycott is a form of war. As a substitute for war, it should meet with the approval of the entire world, which is seeking for some means of making war less horrible. The boycott is the natural weapon of a country like China that has always been slow to resort to war as a means of settling international disputes.

It is the spontaneous act of the Chinese people whenever a great injustice is done China by a foreign power.

The present Chinese boycott against Japan had become so intense that in October of last year, great fires were built in the streets of the large cities of China in which Chinese of every class voluntarily threw all the Japanese articles they possessed, regardless of their value. The Chinese people are determined to purchase no Japanese goods and to have no dealings with the Japanese until the present injustices of the Japanese against China are righted. Chinese students have visited every part of China to tell the Chinese people of the Japanese boycott. Under such conditions the boycott is a very effective instrument against a country like Japan, whose very life as a nation is dependent upon her foreign trade, a large part of which was previously with China.

The report of the Commission of Enquiry (on page 117) describes the Chinese boycott as follows: "Another feature of this boycott, as of previous ones, is the wish not only to injure Japanese industries but to further Chinese industries by stimulating the production of certain articles in China which have hitherto been imported from Japan. The principal result has been an extension of the Chinese textile industry at the expense of the Japanese-owned mills in the Shanghai area."

This report also makes the following statement: "No one can deny the right of the individual Chinese to refuse to buy Japanese goods, use Japanese banks or ships, or to maintain social relations with Japanese. Nor is it possible to deny that the Chinese, acting individually or even in organised bodies, are entitled to make propaganda on behalf of these ideas, always subject to the condition, of course, that the methods do not infringe the laws of the land."

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## THE QUESTION OF PARALLEL RAILWAYS

Soon after the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth between Japan and Russia, the representatives of the governments of China and Japan met at Peking in what has been called the Peking Conference. By the formal "Treaty and Additional Agreement of December 22nd, 1905", which eventuated from this Conference, China gave her consent to the transfers and assignments made by Russia to Japan by the Portsmouth Treaty. These included all the rights of Russia to the Kwantung Leased Territory, the railway from Port Arthur to Changchun, with all its branches, together with all the coal mines belonging to the railway.

In February 1906, the Japanese Government, through Mr. T. Kato, Minister for Foreign Affairs, communicated to Mr. Huntington, American Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo, for transmission to the State Department, a document which was referred to by the Japanese Foreign Minister as "protocols" of the Peking Conference, with the added suggestion that they were "to be kept strictly secret in deference to the desire of the Chinese Government". These were the famous secret "protocols" that the Japanese Government claimed were part of the Treaty of 1905, by which the Japanese claimed that the Chinese Government agreed not to construct any railway in the neighbourhood of, and parallel to, the South Manchuria Railway. The Chinese Government has always denied the existence of any such protocols, claiming that the alleged "protocols" were but minutes of meetings.

The report of the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations on page 44 refers to these secret "protocols"

as follows: "In view of the longstanding importance of this dispute (regarding existence of secret protocols), the Commission took special pains to obtain information on the essential facts. In Tokyo, Nanking and Peiping, all the relevant documents were examined, and we are now able to state that the alleged engagement of the Chinese plenipotentiaries of the Peking Conference of November-December 1905 regarding so-called "parallel railways" is not contained in any formal treaty; that the alleged engagement in question is to be found in the minutes of the eleventh day of the Peking Conference, December 4th, 1905. We have obtained agreement from the Japanese and Chinese Assessors that no other document containing such alleged engagement exists beyond this entry in the minutes of the Peking Conference."

For the Japanese government to formally notify other governments that it has in its possession certain "protocols", which evidently did not exist, and to request the other governments to keep this knowledge strictly secret, thereby keeping the other governments from verifying the facts, is a mistake not usually made by modern governments.

This extraordinary action of the Japanese government in claiming "treaty rights" where no such treaty existed has for more than twenty five years seriously interfered with the railway development of Manchuria. For instance, in 1907, China concluded an agreement with Pauling and Company, a British Company, for a loan of the capital necessary for the construction of a railway between Hsimintun and Fakumen. The Japanese Government protested that this contract conflicted with the "treaty rights" of Japan as embodied in the "secret protocol" of the treaty of 1905 with China. Naturally, the British Government took the word of the Japanese Government and this contract was cancelled. Later the Chinese Govern-

ment was offered agreements for the capital necessary for the construction of other railways in Manchuria but because of similar protests from the Japanese Government such contracts were not completed. By these methods the Japanese hoped to be able to secure an absolute monopoly of all new railway construction in Manchuria.

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## THE TWENTY-ONE DEMANDS AND TREATY OF 1915

On January 18th, 1915, without any provocation on the part of China, without the occurrence of any incident which could explain Japanese action, and without going through any form of negotiations whatever, the Japanese Minister in Peking suddenly addressed to the President of China, the famous "Twenty-One Demands". The four provisions of the Twenty-One Demands that affected Manchuria were as follows: The Japanese Government demanded (1) The extension of the term of Japanese possession of the Kwantung Leased Territory to ninety-nine years (1997); (2) The prolongation of the period of Japanese possession of the South Manchuria Railway and the Antung Railway to ninety-nine years (2002 and 2007 respectively); (3) The grant to Japanese subjects of the right to lease land in the interior of "South Manchuria",—that is, outside those areas opened by treaty or otherwise to foreign residence and trade; (4) The grant to Japanese subjects of the right to travel, reside and conduct business in the interior of South Manchuria and to participate in joint

Sino-Japanese agricultural enterprises in Eastern Mongolia.

The Japanese Government demanded these most valuable concessions and benefits from China without any return consideration to China whatsoever and threatened to declare war on China if China did not grant these demands within forty-eight hours.

The Japanese Government chose the year 1915 to make these demands on China,—the year probably of greatest anxiety of the Great War, and at a time when there was considerable worry about the attitude of Japan towards her allies. Many of the Japanese militarists, always admirers of Germany, were stating that Germany would win the war and that the Japanese were on the wrong side. They openly advocated Japan's withdrawal from the Allies and joining with Germany, pointing out to the Japanese people that if they were on the side of Germany, they could seize all the possessions of England and France in the Orient. Under these conditions, it would have been almost fatal to the cause of the Allies to have war break out between China and Japan. It would have thrown Japan, without doubt, on the side of Germany.

This possibility was considered as very serious in China during the year 1915, so serious that, to the personal knowledge of the writer, several influential diplomats visited President Yuan Shih-kai and advised him to oppose the Japanese as long and as vigorously as possible, but, if necessary to avoid war, to concede to the Japanese demands. These diplomats gave as their personal opinion that if China were forced to take this step the Allies would see that this injustice to China was righted at the conclusion of peace. The failure of the Allies to assist China in this matter at the Peace negotiations in Paris was the main reason for the refusal of China to sign the Versailles Treaty.

From a Chinese standpoint President Yuan Shih-kai probably had no other course. It later became known that the Japanese had complete plans for the invasion of Manchuria and Mongolia in case China refused to accept their ultimatum, and actually began moving troops and ships.

At the Paris Peace Conference in April 1919, at the Conference on the Limitation of Armaments held at Washington in 1921-22, and at every other opportunity that presented itself, the representatives of the Chinese Government have demanded the abrogation of the Agreements of May 25th, 1915, which embodied the Twenty-One Demands. Among the reasons given by the Chinese for the abrogation of these agreements were: that the treaties were signed by China under duress and were contrary to the spirit of International Law; that Japan had made no return to China for the concessions that she had obtained; and that the treaties were never ratified by the Chinese Parliament as required by the constitution of the Republic of China.

Each successive Parliament that has come into power in China since 1919 has declared these agreements of 1915 as null and void. The Chinese nation still celebrate May 9th, the date of acceptance of the Japanese ultimatum, as a day of national humiliation.

Even in Japan the methods of the Japanese Government in obtaining the Agreements of 1915 from China were subject to criticism. Following the Japanese ultimatum to China, Mr. Hara, who afterwards became Prime Minister, presented to the Japanese Parliament a bill which was signed by about 103 members of Parliament which read as follows:

“The negotiations carried on with China by the present Government have been inappropriate in every respect; they are detrimental to the amicable relationship between

the two countries and provocative of suspicions on the part of the Powers ; they have the effect of lowering the prestige of the Japanese Empire ; and, while far from capable of establishing the foundation of peace in the Far East, they will form the source of future trouble.”

In an article submitted to the Third Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations held in Kyoto in 1929, the Japanese professor, Masamichi Royama, fully understanding Japan's policy towards China, made the following statement :

“ The fact remains undeniable that in the diplomatic dealings with China, so far as Manchuria is concerned, Japan's progress has been characterised by her sole desire to strengthen and enlarge her own position, disregarding often its psychological effect on the people of China. The Sino-Japanese negotiations in 1915, embodied in the so-called ‘ Twenty-One Demands ’, illustrates this in a striking manner. Any fair-minded Japanese willing to take a wider view of the proper relations between the two countries would scarcely hesitate to describe his country's diplomacy in this matter as a blunder ”.

Public opinion, the pressure from other nations and the attitude of the Chinese people have forced Japan to eliminate or modify many of the original demands included in the “ Twenty-One Demands ”, but Japan is still insisting on retaining the four provisions of these demands that affect Manchuria and that would give Japan a permanent hold on the Kwantung Leased Territory, the South Manchuria and Antung Railways with the large associated iron and coal mines, and would also give the Japanese the right to lease land in the interior of South Manchuria.

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## MINOR CAUSES OF FRICTION BETWEEN CHINA AND JAPAN

In addition to the more important and larger events that led up to the present difficulties between China and Japan, the Government representatives of both countries submitted to the Commission of Enquiry a long list of what might be termed minor acts of annoyance between the two countries.

The Chinese list was made up largely of Japan's violations of Treaties and infringements on Chinese sovereignty such as the following cases taken at random :

The manœuvring of Japanese troops on the Tumen River and at Hunchun; the Japanese troops' attack on the headquarters of the Chinese volunteer force at Tieh-ling; forcible occupation of Chinese farms at Linyu Hsien as target grounds for the Japanese Constabulary; the Japanese troops' assistance to Mongolian bandits; the destruction of a Chinese vessel and the killing of Chinese by Japanese warships in the vicinity of Mago; the maintenance of Japanese Post Offices in South Manchuria; the smuggling and selling of narcotic drugs by Japanese in China; the smuggling of arms and ammunition by the Japanese steamship "Toyo Maru"; the shelling and killing of fishermen at Pingtan Hsien by the Japanese warship "Tunikaze"; the attack on the Chinese Custom House at Antung, and others.

The Japanese list contained what were called the fifty-three outstanding cases which were largely of China's violations of the "secret protocols" of the 1915 Treaty, which, according to the report of the Commission of

Enquiry, do not exist. The other cases on the Japanese list can best be described by quoting the following from the Japanese Government publication entitled "Sino-Japanese Entanglements."

"The Chinese policy towards Japan is best seen in the light of a series of more than three hundred cases or incidents that featured the intercourse between the two nations during the last few years. Of the more recent incidents, mention may be made of the question of the agreement concerning the appointment of a Japanese Minister to China (the appointment of Minister Obata was objected to by the Chinese as Mr. Obata was the Japanese official who presented the Twenty-One Demands). In Manchuria, the detention of Japanese patrol soldiers by Chinese police officers, Chinese soldiers firing on Japanese guards, Chinese bandits attacking five Japanese patrol soldiers, killing one of them. In open violation of the treaties, the governors of provinces have been ordered to stop buying Japanese goods. Where a Japanese was once addressed with all respect due to a person of social respectability, he is now often addressed in the low jargon of the street. An extreme case is when soldiers at drill, ordered to number off, gave an expression for 'down with Japan' instead of numbers."

In this same report, the Japanese gave a list of eighty-two cases of outrages committed by Chinese pirates on ships of various nationalities during the last three years. Of the eighty-two cases listed by the Japanese, the actual extent of loss from these attacks by "pirates" on forty-one of the vessels attacked was, according to this same report, less than one hundred Chinese dollars (about twenty-two dollars gold). In many cases listed there was no loss, or the loss reported was less than one gold dollar.

A striking feature that is so noticeable in a study of the evidence as submitted by the Japanese Assessor to the



Commission of Enquiry is the importance placed by the Japanese on very petty incidents. For instance, the Japanese list dozens of reported damages to Japanese interests in China, as stated above, in which the total damage amounts to less than ten dollars each. They devote pages to the attacks on Japanese subjects or Japanese groups where no serious injuries occurred, using this evidence to prove the weakness of the Chinese Government. During the period from 1922 to the time of the Japanese attack on Mukden, probably not more than nine, or at most ten, Japanese subjects have been reported as killed in all China, yet, during that same period more than six hundred and fifty Chinese have been killed within the Japanese Empire, whose deaths have been reported to the Japanese Government. The property loss to Chinese living in Japan during that period has been more than five million yen.

These facts cannot but leave the impression that the Chinese Government has, during the last ten years, provided more effective protection to the lives of foreigners living in China than the Imperial Government of Japan has been able to provide to foreigners living in the Japanese Empire.

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## THE TSINAN INCIDENT

While not directly a part of the present Manchurian question, the attack on Tsinan, the capital of Shantung Province, by Japanese troops in 1928, and the massacre of Chinese in Japan by members of the "Self-Warning Corps" in 1922, were such large factors in influencing

Chinese boycotts against the Japanese in China that some mention should be made of these incidents.

The Chinese Assessor's report to the Commission of Enquiry on the Tsinan incident contains the following: "On the 3rd of May the Japanese troops stationed at Tsinan, despite protests from the Nationalist Government, indiscriminately opened fire, without the least provocation, on the Chinese troops and civilians alike. The Japanese troops resorted to the use of machine guns and heavy guns to bombard Chinese public buildings and residences. A squad of Japanese soldiers invaded the office of the Commissioner for Foreign Affairs and murdered Commissioner Tsai Kung-shih and ten of his staff. The Commissioner's office was subjected to a systematic search. As a result of this attack by the Japanese soldiers, more than one thousand Chinese were killed and a greater number wounded or missing. The damage to public and private property amounted to \$3,310,000."

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### **MASSACRE OF CHINESE BY "SELF-WARNING CORPS" IN JAPAN**

Regarding the massacre of Chinese in Japan the Chinese Assessor's report contains the following: "Immediately after the great earthquake a large number of Japanese young men and reservists organised themselves into what was called the "Self-Warning Corps" with the object of suppressing illegal activities of Koreans in Japan. The members of this corps, however, together with soldiers and policemen, slaughtered a great many Chinese, many

of them merchants, labourers and a few students in Tokyo and Yokohama on September 2nd, 3rd and 4th, 1922. Altogether five hundred and twenty Chinese were wilfully killed by the members of the "Self-Warning Corps" and soldiers and policemen. This was a case of inhuman wholesale massacre unprecedented in the history of international relations."

In neither of the above cases has the Japanese Government paid any indemnity or punished the Japanese responsible for the outrages.

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### THE WAN PAO SHAN CASE

The Wan Pao Shan case, although comparatively unimportant in itself, is important in showing a typical but in no way a rare case of the high-handed manner in which the Japanese officials in Manchuria sent Japanese troops into the interior of Manchuria, far beyond the boundaries of the railway zone, against all treaties, international law, and in violation of the sovereignty of China.

The facts of the case are as follows : in April, 1931, a Chinese broker leased from a Chinese farmer a plot of land about eighteen miles from Changchun. Before this lease was approved by the Chinese authorities, as required by the contract and Chinese law, the Chinese broker re-leased the land to 180 Koreans. Chinese law and custom regarding water rights for irrigation purposes appear to be about the same as the water rights of other countries, which allot water to the land in the order in which the land is taken up. Evidently this land had no water rights or, at least,

the rights of this land for water were preceded by those of the land closer to the river.

Notwithstanding this and the fact that the lease for the land had not been completed by the Government, the Koreans started digging a canal through the property of the Chinese farmers and the construction of a dam across the Itung river regardless of the rights of the other farmers and of navigation. The Japanese Consul sent six Japanese police to protect the Koreans doing the work, paying no attention to the fact that they were in Chinese territory.

In answer to the protests of the Chinese authorities, the Japanese sent sixty additional policemen armed with machine guns. These police occupied the homes of the Chinese farmers by force and by the end of June the canal and the dam were completed. This so enraged the local farmers that they attempted to destroy the canal but they were fired on by the Japanese police. The Japanese police were not withdrawn until September 15th, five days before the Japanese attack on Mukden.

The Chinese claim that this Wanpaoshan affair was a premeditated act by the Japanese in an attempt to create an incident justifying the invasion by Japanese troops, which later took place. The Koreans knew they had no right to settle in that part of Manchuria, and they would never have attempted to invade the rights of the Chinese unless they had been assured beforehand of Japanese protection. It was only the good judgment and coolness of the Chinese police and officials that kept this incident from being another of the prepared incidents like the Nakamura case and the destruction of a small section of the South Manchuria railway at Mukden.

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## THE SECOND ANTI-CHINESE RIOTS IN KOREA

Although the Wanpaoshan incident was a comparatively unimportant affair and received little comment in the Chinese and Japanese papers, very exaggerated and distorted reports appeared in all the Korean and Japanese papers in Korea. As the small Korean papers had no reporters in Manchuria, their source of information was solely through Japanese channels. Although no Koreans were even seriously injured during the Wanpaoshan affair, the Koreans were told that the Chinese were slaughtering the Koreans in Manchuria.

This caused much excitement among the lower class of Koreans and they started attacking the Chinese, the first attack occurring in Jinsen on July 3rd. These riots spread to Seoul, Heijo, Fusan, Genzan, Singishieu and other cities of Korea and continued until July 5th. During these riots 142 Chinese were killed, 546 wounded and 91 were reported missing. The Chinese also suffered a property loss of over 4,000,000 yen.

The remarkable feature of these riots was that, although the riots occurred in all the large cities of Korea where the Japanese have armed forces organised to put down the political riots of the Koreans within a few hours, they took three days to stop the anti-Chinese riots. The Japanese Government has so far made no settlement of any kind to the Chinese for their losses during these riots.

The anti-Chinese riots in Korea were the direct cause of the Chinese Boycott against the Japanese in 1931.

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## THE CAPTAIN NAKAMURA CASE

According to the report of the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations, Captain Shintaro Nakamura was a Japanese military officer, under orders of the Japanese army, on a secret mission to the interior of Manchuria at the time when he met his death. In disguise, he represented himself to the Chinese officials as an agricultural expert when he applied for a visa to his passport. It was later found that he was armed and carried patent-medicines which, according to the Chinese, included narcotic drugs for non-medical purposes. He was warned at the time he received his visa that the region in which he intended to travel was a bandit-ridden area and this fact was noted on his passport. After receiving a visa for one part of Manchuria, he went to an entirely different part of the Province.

Notwithstanding this warning from the Chinese officials, Captain Nakamura left the Ilkotu Station on the Chinese Eastern Railway and travelled southward in the direction of Taonan. According to the Japanese reports, Captain Nakamura was arrested and killed by Chinese soldiers (in all other cases of attacks on Japanese in Manchuria the Japanese have always used the word "bandit" instead of soldier). The Chinese claim that Captain Nakamura was killed by Koreans because of an assault on a Korean woman, a member of a family of Koreans with whom he had stopped for the night.

Whatever the cause of his death, the Government of Manchuria made every possible effort to settle this case amicably. Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang sent Major Shihayama, a Japanese adviser, and later Mr. Tang Er-ho, a

high Chinese official, on special missions to Tokyo to assure the Japanese Government that he was sincerely desirous of securing an early and equitable termination of the Nakamura case. He had Commander Kuan Yu-heng, who was responsible for law and order in the district where Captain Nakamura met his death, arrested and brought to Mukden. He sent a second commission of investigation to the scene of the killing but before this commission had time to make its report the Japanese had attacked and taken Mukden.

The Chinese claim that the importance of this case of the death of a Japanese officer travelling in disguise in a bandit-infested area was greatly exaggerated and that it was but a pretext for the Japanese military occupation of Manchuria. Why the Japanese had a secret military mission under Captain Nakamura in the interior of Manchuria at that time or, as was later acknowledged by the Japanese, they had had secret military surveying parties working for more than a year on the Western boundaries of Manchuria, has never been explained by the Japanese. The Chinese claim that it was but preparation for the Japanese military invasion of Manchuria that later occurred.

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## **THE EXPLOSION ON THE SOUTH MANCHURIA RAILWAY**

According to the evidence submitted by the Japanese to the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations and included in the Commission's report to the League, the facts of this famous case are as follows :

Lieutenant Kawamoto of the Japanese army, with six men under his command, was on patrol duty on the night of September 18th practising defence exercises along the track of the South Manchuria Railway North of the city of Mukden. About ten o'clock they heard a loud explosion and, running back two hundred yards, they discovered that a portion of one of the rails on the down track had been "cleanly severed fully thirty-one inches". After dispersing the attacking party, which he estimated at about five or six persons, he heard the South-bound train from Chanchun approaching. Fearing the train might be wrecked when it reached the damaged rail, his men placed detonators on the track to stop the train, but the engineer paid no attention to the detonators and proceeded at full speed, and according to Captain Kawamoto, when the train reached the gap of fully thirty-one inches, he saw the train sway and heel over to one side, but it recovered and passed on without stopping and arrived in Mukden station punctually on time.

The above is the evidence of Lieutenant Kawamoto before the Commission. It is shown that either the Lieutenant was mistaken about the explosion and that no explosion occurred, or that a train going at full speed passed over a gap between the rails of "fully thirty-one inches" without leaving the track,—a feat railway engineers claim is an absolute impossibility.

In view of the above evidence, the Chinese contention that no explosion ever occurred, that Lieutenant Kawamoto's nerves were rather excited that night over the knowledge that he had just received of the coming attack on the city of Mukden, and the important part that he was to play in this attack, and what he mistook for an explosion was but one of the Japanese army signals, will probably be taken as being nearer the actual facts of what transpired that night. Certainly the engineer



and his assistant on the train that passed over the tracks immediately after the supposed explosion saw no damage to the tracks or they would have at least slackened the speed of their train.

Yet it was this explosion and damage to the tracks that was given by the Japanese as the reason for their attack and capture of the city of Mukden with its large loss of life and damage to property.

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### **ATTACKS ON MUKDEN THE NIGHT OF SEPTEMBER 18th**

There is much evidence to show that the Japanese attack on the city of Mukden was a well-planned, pre-meditated attack known to the Japanese officials and certain civilians several days in advance of the actual attack.

The attack took place on the very night that the Japanese army was holding night manœuvres which, by an odd coincidence, placed the Japanese troops in ideal positions for an attack on Mukden city and the Chinese barracks. It also occurred on the day after the arrival of a large number of new troops from Japan to replace certain troops in the Mukden area but before these old troops had left for Japan.

Foreigners living in Mukden report that what they thought were a number of large garages located in the Japanese section of Mukden, they found, on the night of the 18th, were the protection for large gun place-

ments with guns already located and trained on the Chinese barracks. They also report that on the night of the attack on Mukden, large numbers of Japanese civilians suddenly appeared fully armed and under officers in many different parts of the city of Mukden at points they could not possibly have reached at that hour unless they had been armed and had received their orders many hours in advance.

Another most unusual occurrence as mentioned in the report of the Commission of Enquiry (page 69) was that, although the highest officer in Mukden at that time was a colonel, General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of all the Japanese forces in Manchuria, stated that the first news that he received of what was happening in Mukden was from a newspaper agency at eleven o'clock the following day. General Honjo was at the army headquarters with direct telephone (which he is so proud to show all foreigners), telegraph and wireless connections at all times with his junior officers in Mukden. Equally incredible was much of the other evidence furnished by the Japanese army officers to the Commission of Enquiry regarding their actions on the night of September 18th. They were very clumsy in their attempts to keep the actual facts from becoming known.

Although the extent of the attack by the Japanese on September 18th came as a complete surprise to the Chinese, the fact that the Japanese were planning some kind of a manœuvre against them was very evident to the Chinese officials in Mukden as early as September 4th. They reported their suspicions to Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang who was, at the time, sick in the Rockefeller Hospital in Peiping. On September 6th Marshal Chang sent to General Wang I-Cheh in Mukden a telegram (the contents of which were shown the Commission of Enquiry) instructing him that no matter what the Japanese did, he must

not use force in opposing them and that he must avoid any conflict whatsoever. As an additional precaution, the Chinese troops in the immediate neighbourhood of the Japanese were disarmed, and all the gates leading in the direction of the Japanese barracks were walled up.

Even after the Japanese had actually started their attack and he was notified by telephone, Marshal Chang, in order not to give the Japanese any excuse for further military operations, again instructed his troops not to fire on the Japanese but to withdraw from their barracks and, if necessary, from Mukden.

The Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations, after a very exhaustive examination of all the evidence connected with the Japanese attack on Mukden, stated on page 71 of its report that "the military operations of the Japanese troops during this night (September 18th) cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence".

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## **LATER ACTIVITIES OF THE JAPANESE ARMIES IN MANCHURIA**

Even though General Honjo, Commander-in-Chief of all the Japanese forces in Manchuria, testified that he knew nothing about the attack on Mukden until noon of the following day, according to the report of the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations, the Japanese troops scattered all the way from Port Arthur to Changchun, and even parts of the Japanese garrisons in Korea, started into operation simultaneously on the night of

September 18th. This is a coincidence that can only be explained by the fact that they had received their orders many days before any explosion occurred on the tracks of the South Manchuria Railway.

The Japanese troops in Manchuria on September 18th, according to the Japanese reports to the Commission of Enquiry (page 71), consisted of the 2nd Division of 5,400 men and 16 field guns, the Railway Guards of 5,000 men and the gendarmerie of 500 men. Four thousand additional Japanese troops, with artillery, arrived from Korea on the 22nd. The Japanese did not report to the Commission the large number of ex-service men and officers they had in Manchuria who were evidently mobilised and armed hours before the attack on Mukden.

As all the Chinese troops in Manchuria were ordered not to oppose the Japanese, and most of them obeyed this order, the Japanese troops occupied the cities of Changchun on September 18th, Kirin September 21st Liaoyuan and Hsinmin on September 22nd, and all the small towns between Port Arthur and Changchun without serious fighting.

After the completion of the above-mentioned military operations, a statement appeared in the semi-Japanese Government publication, "The Herald of Asia", stating that the Japanese military operations were then regarded as completed and that no further Japanese troop movements were anticipated by the Japanese Government.

Notwithstanding this and the assurances given by the Japanese to the League of Nations and to the American Government, Japanese troops continued to advance into the interior of Manchuria. On October 8th, they sent a squad of six scouting and five bombing planes to Chinchow and dropped eighty bombs on that city, in addition to firing indiscriminately on the new Government headquarters with machine guns. Chinchow was at that

time the headquarters of the provisional government of Liaoning Province. In the middle of October, they started their attack on Tsitsihar, and occupied that city on November 19th after a series of minor battles at the Nonni River Bridge.

On November 8th and again on November 26th, the Japanese attacked the Chinese in Tientsin. While no clear reason was ever given by the Japanese as to why they made these attacks, the Chinese claim that they were started by the Japanese to give them an excuse for occupying Tientsin as they later attempted to occupy Shanghai. The Japanese did prepare five armoured train, which they intended to send from Manchuria to Tientsin, but evidently wiser advice prevailed, as they were never sent. It was at this time that the Japanese either kidnapped or otherwise persuaded Mr. Pu-yi, ex-Emperor of China, to leave Tientsin for Dairen.

In direct opposition to the Japanese Government's acceptance of the League of Nations resolution of December 10th, the Japanese continued to land large reinforcements in Manchuria. On December 15th they landed the 4th Brigade of the 8th Division, followed a few days later by the Staff of the 20th Division and another brigade from Korea.

As this large movement of Japanese troops indicated an attack on Chinchow, the Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an attempt to stop further fighting, offered to withdraw all Chinese troops in the Chinchow area to within the Great Wall, if the foreign powers would agree to maintain a neutral zone north and south of Chinchow. The Japanese would not agree to this and immediately attacked and captured the city regardless of all assurances to the contrary by the Foreign Office of the Japanese Government to the foreign powers. In order not to embarrass the League of Nations and the Government

of the United States in their efforts to find a peaceful solution of the troubles in Manchuria, and to give the Japanese no further excuse for advancing further into Chinese territory, the Chinese troops were again ordered not to fire on the Japanese troops and they withdrew within the Great Wall at Shanhaikwan.

The capture of Harbin soon followed, and the Japanese troops advanced into the interior of Manchuria in all directions from that point. The Japanese are now transporting a number of small river gun boats to Harbin for use on the Sungari River. During the month of August, the Japanese troops attempted to take over Jehol province, but after a few minor engagements with the troops of that province they decided to await further reinforcements.

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### **CHINESE TROOPS IN MANCHURIA NOW OPPOSING THE JAPANESE**

While the regular troops of Marshal Chang Hsüeh-liang have been withdrawn within the Great Wall, the Chinese volunteers of Manchuria, composed of the young men of the Paoweituan, or Local Protection Corps, the Big Sword Societies, and the larger part of the Provincial troops of Kirin and Heilungkiang under Generals Ma Chan-shan, Ting Chao and Li Tu continued to oppose the invasion of the Japanese troops. Although it has been the practice of the Japanese to describe indiscriminately as "bandits" all Chinese troops that are opposing them in Manchuria, the above-mentioned troops are well-trained, well disci-

plined regular troops of the Government of Manchuria. They are carrying on a well-planned campaign of guerilla warfare against the Japanese troops and have been able to attack even the cities of Changchun, Mukden and Harbin, the headquarters for large bodies of Japanese troops. As these soldiers are largely the sons of the farmers of Manchuria and are fighting for their homes, as they appear to have sufficient ammunition and are receiving support from Chinese not only in China but also from America, the Straits Settlements, Java, and from every other country where Chinese are living, it is probable that they will continue to fight the Japanese as long as any Japanese troops remain in Manchuria.

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### **“ MANCHUKUO ”**

The “ independent ” state of “ Manchukuo ” (meaning “ Manchu State ”) was organised by the Japanese military authorities almost immediately following their capture of Mukden and while the Government of Manchuria was still functioning in the other parts of the Province.

According to the report of the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations (page 89), on September 20th, just two days after the capture of Mukden, the Japanese authorities approached General Tsang Shih-yi, President of the Liaoning Provincial Government, and invited him to organize a Provincial Government independent of the Chinese National Government. On General Tsang’s refusal to form an independent government, he was

imprisoned by the Japanese military authorities and not released until December 15th.

The treatment received by General Tsang Shih-yi while imprisoned by the Japanese convinced him that he could save his own life only by agreeing to accept office as ordered by the Japanese.

Again according to the Commission report, after General Tsang Shih-yi refused to assist the Japanese in forming an independent government for Manchuria, the Japanese approached Mr. Yuan Chin-kai, a former provincial governor. They persuaded him to head a committee of nine Chinese to aid in restoring order, to help the large number of refugees that had been made homeless by the Japanese invasion, and to restore the money market. When the Japanese acclaimed this committee as the first step in the formation of an independent state, Mr. Yuan Chin-kai immediately publicly declared that he had no intention of giving assistance in organising a state independent of the Government of China.

The Japanese met with the same difficulties in Kirin and Heilungkiang provinces. They continued to find it impossible to persuade any prominent Chinese to assist them in organising an independent government. As they had to have a prominent name as a figurehead for their new government, they induced the ex-Emperor of China, Mr. Henry Pu-yi, an inexperienced boy, to assume office as "Regent" by holding out to him the hope of assistance in regaining the throne of his ancestors. Evidently Mr. Henry Pu-yi had not read the tragic history of Korea or of the circumstances in which the last Emperor of that country was assassinated prior to the annexation of Korea by Japan!

The Commission of Enquiry report, on page 107, makes the following comment regarding the present officials of the government finally formed by the Japanese



authorities. "The higher Chinese officials of the present "Manchukuo" Government are in office for various reasons. Many of them have been retained either by inducements or intimidation (by the Japanese) of one kind or another. Some of them conveyed messages to the League Commission to the effect that they had been forced to remain in office under duress, that all power was in the hands of the Japanese, that they were loyal to China and that what they had said at their interviews with the Commission in the presence of the Japanese was not necessarily to be believed."

The Commission also received 1,550 letters (page 107 of report), from Chinese in Manchuria who wished to testify before the Commission of Enquiry but who were prevented from doing so by the Japanese military authorities. (No estimate was made of the thousands of similar letters that were confiscated by the Japanese postal authorities.) All the letters received, except two, were bitterly hostile to the new "Manchukuo Government" and to the Japanese. Foreign neutral residents who had talked with many Chinese in the interior of the country also reported to the Commission that the Chinese in the interior of the country seemed to be unanimously against the new "Manchukuo" Government.

Many of the documents that were presented to the Commission by delegates introduced to the Commission by the Japanese as "Manchukuo" authorities, were found to have been written by the Japanese. In many cases the delegates, presenting the documents later, informed the Commission of this fact and stated that they were not the expression of their feelings (page 107 of Report).

The Commission of Enquiry Report has the following information regarding the present Manchoukuo officials: "Although the titular heads of the Departments in the

Manchukuo Government are Chinese residents, the main political and administrative power rests in the hands of the Japanese officials and advisers.”

This is but a small part of the comments and conclusions of the Commission of Enquiry on the “Manchukuo Government”. A more complete and detailed summary of the Commission’s conclusion on this point and on the independence movement will be given later, but enough evidence has been quoted to show that the present “Manchukuo Government” was started, engineered and put through by the Japanese military authorities, that it is not an expression of the will of even a small part of the people of Manchuria and that the present “Manchukuo Government” is not a Chinese Government but is the Japanese Government acting through a group of dummy officials who have been forced or induced to accept their present positions.

In considering the future of Manchuria, we must not forget that the larger part of the twenty or more millions of Chinese immigrants who have made Manchuria their home are from Shantung province, the home of Confucius, and are the most loyal of all the Chinese people, with a traditional hatred of the Japanese. We must also remember that Shantung Province was the home of the many thousands of Chinese coolies that were taken to Europe and who were so valuable in the Great War. These returned to Shantung Province with money and with a land hunger that overcrowded Shantung province could not satisfy, so they joined the great migration to Manchuria.

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## THE JAPANESE ATTACK ON SHANGHAI

There have been many theories and explanations given as to why the Japanese started their military and naval operations against the Chinese in the Shanghai area. The Japanese claim that it was to protect the lives of Japanese living in Shanghai and to stop the anti-Japanese boycott that was so seriously interfering with their trade with China.

Neither of these explanations was ever taken very seriously by the other foreigners living in Shanghai at that time. It was well known that no threat had been made against Shanghai, and that the only Chinese troops in the neighbourhood were the regular troops of the National Government, which were under perfect discipline. The Shanghai International Settlement has a very efficient police and volunteer force that can amply protect Shanghai, especially as no armed Chinese are ever allowed within the boundaries of the Settlement. No one knows better than the Japanese that a Chinese boycott cannot be stopped by an armed invasion of Japanese troops : boycotts are started, not stopped, by armed invasions !

Mr. K. K. Kawakami in his recent book "Japan Speaks", which was published with the assistance of Mr. Tsuyoshi Inukai, at that time Prime Minister of Japan, writes as follows : " Whatever the official explanation (of the Japanese Government), whatever the extenuating circumstances, Japan's single-handed intervention in the Shanghai area is a blunder of the first magnitude." Mr. Kawakami claims that Japan was unwittingly made the catspaw of the " die-hard " foreigners in the attack

on Shanghai. If Mr. Kawakami had been in Shanghai during the Japanese attack on that city, he would have found many statements from the "die-hards" that fully justified his theory as to the lack of wisdom of his nationals in attacking Shanghai, but he would have lost some confidence in the accuracy of his statement as to the cause of the attack.

A more reasonable explanation is that the Japanese Government believed that it could, without much effort or expense, seize control of the Chinese city of Chapei and other Chinese sections in the Shanghai area and, as Shanghai is the banking and business centre for most of China, the Japanese could, by holding these sections, so completely paralyse Chinese banking and business in Shanghai and throughout China, that the Chinese Government would soon be forced to come to terms in regard to Manchuria. It later developed that the Japanese Government had also made plans to seize the commercial centres of Tientsin, Canton and Hankow in case the seizure of Shanghai should prove not be sufficient to bring the Chinese Government to terms.

The Shanghai Committee of Enquiry, in its first report to the League of Nations on the situation in Shanghai, with reference to the apparent determination of the Japanese to attack the Chinese in the Shanghai area regardless of any concessions made by the Chinese Government, makes the following statement: "In spite of this change in the diplomatic situation (the Chinese accepting entirely the Japanese demands) there was a popular belief that the Japanese naval authorities were determined to take action in any event."

Unfortunately for the plans of the Japanese Government, the Chinese army was not on this occasion ordered to retire: it resisted and, instead of a few hours of fighting, as the Japanese expected, the Chinese army

successfully held back the Japanese military and naval forces until the truce of March 4th.

The military operations between the Chinese and the Japanese forces in this area took a most unexpected course. The early attacks of the Japanese naval forces were easily driven back by the Chinese soldiers of the 19th Route Army. Even when reinforced by the 9th Division and a large part of the 12th Division of the Japanese Imperial Army, with ample supplies of modern aeroplanes, tanks, artillery of every description and with the assistance of the guns of many Japanese warships, the Japanese forces, although they outnumbered the Chinese, could not dislodge the poorly equipped Chinese troops from their hastily prepared trenches. In staff work, rifle and artillery firing and in hand-to-hand fighting, the quick-thinking Chinese soldiers proved to be superior to the soldiers of what was formerly thought to be the invincible Imperial Army of Japan.

An example of the courage of the Chinese troops was shown in the defence of the mud forts at Woosung (called a fortress in the Japanese reports). These forts were built more than seventy five years ago and their latest gun was mounted in 1907. The Japanese attacked these forts almost daily for over five weeks. At times they were assisted by more than thirty Japanese warships (many of which could be brought within five hundred yards of the forts) and many large bombing planes, yet about six hundred Chinese soldiers held these old mud forts against these attacks and frequent landing parties for more than five weeks, until they voluntarily gave them up when their line was moved back. The final occupancy of these forts was described in "Sino-Japanese Entanglements", a book published as a military record by the Japanese, as follows: "our landing party, supported by an infantry force, effected a landing and

took the 'Woosung Fortress' by assault", forgetting to state that the forts were deserted at the time.

The defence of the Woosung Forts by a handful of Chinese soldiers against such overwhelming odds, and the fighting of the Chinese soldiers of the 19th Route Army in the Chapei area, may well be classed with the most heroic military feats of history.

While the reasons for the Japanese military and naval attack on Shanghai may be somewhat obscure there is no doubt about the results accomplished by the Japanese by this attack.

They entirely destroyed large sections of Chapei, a Chinese city with an estimated population of over one million people. They also destroyed most of the Chinese villages and farm buildings within an area of two hundred square miles. No estimate has been made of the number of civilians they killed but it must have been many thousands as they bombed many cities entirely outside the battle area.

They also succeeded in weakening the reputation of their army as a modern fighting force. In letting the "ronin" (Japanese military rowdy) loose in the parts of Shanghai and the neighbouring territory under their control they created a reign of terror that will long be remembered by people living in Shanghai at that time.

These conditions became so intolerable that the Municipal Council of the International Settlement of Shanghai asked the Consular Body to protest to the Japanese authorities. The Japanese Consul-General admitted to the Consular Body that excesses had been committed by his nationals in Shanghai and he "promised" certain minor improvements in the conditions.

Regarding this period of utter lawlessness instigated by the Japanese, the Shanghai Committee of Enquiry in its second report to the League of Nations states as follows :

“ Japanese naval authorities took complete control of Hongkew district inside Settlement, barricaded streets, disarmed the (International Settlement) police, and paralysed all other municipal activities of the Settlement authorities, including fire brigade. Police posts were prevented from all communications with their headquarters. Shanghai Municipal Council was forced to evacuate all schools and hospitals. Numerous excesses, including summary executions, were committed by (Japanese) marines, reservists and roughs. Reign of terror resulted, and almost entire non-Japanese population of area away.” The Japanese “excesses and executions” mentioned above included the holding up, robbing and murdering of many hundreds (estimated at over 2,000 in Shanghai alone) of Chinese of every class in Hongkew, a very important part of the International Settlement of Shanghai.

The Japanese attack on Shanghai crystallised the public opinion of the other nations against Japan. It increased the intensity of the anti-Japanese boycott, and made the Chinese people more determined than ever to resist as long as a Japanese soldier remained in China. The failure of the Japanese troops in Shanghai, without doubt, encouraged the Chinese soldiers and volunteers in Manchuria to renew their attacks on the Japanese forces in the Three Eastern Provinces.

The fighting in the Shanghai area was finally ended by the signing of the Sino-Japanese Agreement on May 5th, 1932. This agreement makes no mention of any of the points that Japan claimed were the reasons for her attack on Shanghai.

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## **JAPAN'S REASONS FOR THE INVASION OF MANCHURIA**

In view of the preceding facts, the question naturally arises : why did the Japanese invade Manchuria and why does Japan want that country ?

The Government of Japan it at the present time sending its best orators to tell the people of America and other countries that Japan invaded Manchuria in order to make Manchuria a bulwark for China, Japan and the rest of the world against the spread of Russian Communism. The Japanese did not give this reason for invading Manchuria to the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations when it was in Manchuria on its tour of investigation of this very question. At that time, Japan was courting Russia in an effort to secure Russia as an ally against the League of Nations. As Russia would have nothing to do with any such an alliance, Japan has now become the champion of the world against Russia.

Unfortunately for this late suggestion of the Japanese, the Chinese people have had considerable experience with both Japanese militarism and Russian Communism. From their past experience, the Chinese people have come to the conclusion, as have many others familiar with the present governments of both Japan and Russia, that the form of absolute militarism as represented by the Japanese government to-day is a much greater menace to the Chinese race, and also to the world, than even Communism could ever become.

It is also very evident to any student of the Far East that Manchuria, under the control of the Japanese Government, would be such a menace to the security of China and



also to the security of the Far Eastern Siberian possessions of the U.S.S.R. that war (that might well become another World War), between these nations would only be a matter of such time as it would take China and Russia to prepare for the conflict.

Another reason that the Japanese Government is now putting forward for her armed invasion of Manchuria is that she is giving the inhabitants of the country a good government in place of the weak government of the Chinese. Even if the Chinese Government of Manchuria were as weak as the Japanese say it was, it was able to make Manchuria a much more attractive place for the farmers of Manchuria than Korea is for the Korean farmers under the Imperial Government of Japan. The Korean farmer had to contribute more than one-half of the total of his small earnings towards the support of the Japanese Government, while the farmers of Manchuria were paying probably the smallest tax of any farmers in the world. The farmer of Manchuria is a free man who looks you in the face, while the Japanese Government has turned the Korean farmer into a timid, frightened creature living on the verge of starvation. A comparison of the many efforts of the Koreans to gain their independence from Japan, with the present efforts of the farmers in Manchuria to keep from coming under the government of Japan, tells every eloquently how the people most interested and best informed value Japan's promises to bring "good government" to the people of Manchuria. There were more riots and more people killed in riots during the year 1931 in Korea than have been killed by bandits in the last ten years in Manchuria.

The Japanese Government is also telling European and American business men that the Japanese control of Manchuria would give them greater opportunities in that country. Unfortunately, these same business men remember

the same promises to them made by the Japanese government when the Japanese annexed Korea. They also remember that all the many prosperous foreign firms that were doing business in Korea at that time have disappeared. Foreigners living in Manchuria know very well that if Japan succeeds in gaining control of that country it will mean the end of their business in Manchuria.

It was for far deeper and stronger reasons than any so far given by the Japanese government to the other nations of the world that made that government defy, and break her obligations to, the League of Nations, that made that government repudiate in fact the Nine Power Agreement and the Kellogg Pact, that made it risk an economic boycott from the rest of the world and the loss of her foreign trade; a possible war with China and Russia; and that risked making the Japanese people an outcast among the nations of the world.

To find the real reasons that made the Japanese government take such enormous risks, we should study not the reasons the Japanese government gives to foreigners, but the reasons the military leaders of Japan give to the Japanese people and to their Emperor. We must also study the plans that these military leaders have made for themselves and for the Japanese nation. These plans bear a striking similarity to the plans the German military leaders (whom the Japanese militarists always admired and followed) had before the Great War for the German people.

Fortunately for the study of these facts there are available the statements of Count Okuma in 1914 and 1918, General Honjo's report to the General Staff, Viscount Mutono's declaration in 1917, Baron Goto's articles on China, and Baron Tanaka's famous Memorial that is reported to have been presented to the Emperor of Japan on July 25th, 1927. This Memorial claims to embody the plans and policies of the Japanese military leaders (the real

rulers of Japan) as decided upon at a series of meetings held in Tokyo between June 27th and July 7th, 1927.

According to paragraph 52 of Document No. 1 presented to the Commission of Enquiry by the Chinese Assessor, this Memorial reads as follows: "The Nine-power Treaty has reduced our (Japan's) rights and privileges in Manchuria and Mongolia to such an extent that there is no freedom left for us. The very existence of our country is endangered..... Japan cannot remove the difficulties in East Asia unless she adopts the policy of blood and iron.... But in order to conquer China, we must first conquer Manchuria and Mongolia. In order to conquer the world we must first conquer China. If we succeed in conquering China, the rest of the Asiatic countries and the South Sea countries will fear and surrender to us. Then the world will realise that Eastern Asia is ours and will not dare to violate our rights. This is the plan left to us by Emperor Meiji, the success of which is essential to our national existence."

There were two additional recommendations in the Tanaka Memorial that were not included in the above. These recommendations were as follows: "Japan should appropriate one million yen from the 'secret funds' of the Army department for the purpose of sending four hundred retired army officers, disguised as teachers and traders, scientists and Chinese citizens, to Mongolia and Manchuria to instigate revolt against China. Koreans should be utilised by Japan for the colonization of, and as a spearhead for, the penetration into Manchuria and Mongolia."

The authenticity of this Memorial has naturally been denied by some of the Japanese officials but the subsequent events since its appearance agree so well with the program expounded in it, and the recommendations in the memorial are so similar to the recommendations in

General Honjo's letter and the other documents available, that it is difficult not to consider it as an embodiment of Japan's real policy towards China. The destruction of Chapei, Woosung and neighbouring villages demonstrates clearly that the expression "blood and iron policy" must be taken in its most literal sense.

The victories of Japan in the Russo-Japanese war, Japan's victory over Germany at Tsingtao (described in the Japanese school books as the defeat of the German Empire), Japan's remarkable industrial expansion during and after the Great War when the other countries were otherwise engaged or exhausted, and the apparent inability of the great powers to recover from the effects of the war, have convinced the Japanese military leaders that the Japanese are the chosen people to dominate the world for the next cycle of history.

You need but to talk with any group of Japanese military or naval officers to realise how capable they are of working out such a campaign for world supremacy as is outlined in the Tanaka Memorial. You need also but to recall what they have already done towards the accomplishment of this plan to realise how seriously they take such plans.

If the Japanese should succeed in adding the thirty million people and the territory of Manchuria to the Japanese Empire, it would make Japan but little inferior in population and natural wealth to the United States. With the military spirit of the Japanese people, there would thus be created a military power that would be capable of carrying out much of the program described in the Tanaka Memorial.

While the Commission of Enquiry was in Manchuria, the Japanese made no attempt to conceal their plans for raising a large army in Manchuria of Chinese soldiers with Japanese officers. They realised that the "Manchukuo"

army was loyal to China and would be of little value to them. If the Japanese are allowed to stay in Manchuria for two or three years, they hope to have an army of sufficient size and strength to defy Russia or any other nation to interfere with their plans for the conquest of North China.

This military threat of Japan to the Far Eastern possessions of Russia will without doubt force the U.S.S.R. to enlarge her military forces to protect her territory. Up to the present time China has relied on her treaties with other nations and on the League of Nations to protect her territory in the present crisis. When China signed the Nine-Power Treaty and the Kellogg Pact, and subscribed to the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Chinese people thought the other nations who signed these documents would do as they solemnly promised. Many prominent Chinese have warned us that if these agencies should fail China at this time, China will be forced to arm herself sufficiently to protect her possessions. In view of the trouble that an Oriental nation like Japan has caused when she became a military nation, who can predict what a nation of 480,000,000 people would do if she should be driven to become a military nation like the Japan of to-day ?

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### **JAPANESE NARCOTICS TRAFFIC IN MANCHURIA**

In September 1931, the world witnessed the invasion of Manchuria by Japanese troops. For many years prior to that date, however, a less spectacular—but equally dangerous—invasion of Manchuria by an army of Japanese

narcotics merchants has been in progress. Under the protection of extraterritorial rights, hundreds of Japanese have been engaged in selling opium, morphia, cocaine, etc. to the Chinese population throughout the country. Most of these drugs are imported at Dairen, and the South Manchurian Railway affords a convenient and safe route by which they are distributed in the interior.

In the Kwantung Leased Territory, the Japanese authorities operate an Opium monopoly,—ostensibly to retail opium solely to Chinese residents. This Monopoly, which is the source of immense profits, has been the subject of scandals which have been aired in the Japanese Parliament, and as long ago as 1920 the Japanese Government announced that the Monopoly would be abolished within a year. In November 1930—ten years later—the Customs at Shanghai seized over 13,000 lbs. of Persian Opium consigned to the same Opium Monopoly!

More serious, even, than the question of opium is the traffic in morphia, cocaine and similar habit-forming drugs. Throughout Manchuria there are hundreds of Japanese “medicine shops”, practically all of which sell narcotics. The International Anti-Opium Association estimated that in one year over 870,000 oz. of morphia (in addition to heroin, cocaine, etc.) found their way into China from Japan. This quantity—most of which went to Manchuria, would provide at least 1,600,000,000 injections. An investigation conducted by Mr. H. G. W. Woodhead, C.B.E., in 1931 confirmed the well-known fact that this immense traffic in Manchuria is practically monopolised by Japanese and Koreans.

In John Palmer Gavit's book “Opium” (page 151), Professor W. W. Willoughby is quoted as follows: “There is no question that during recent years great amounts of morphia have been illegally introduced and sold in China... The responsibility for this has been laid almost wholly

upon the Japanese... the drug being brought into the country, it has been charged, either under the guise of military supplies, or through the Japanese parcel post system. The Japanese Government has insisted that it has never given any official sanction to the trade, but has been compelled to admit the extensive participation of its nationals in it, and has expressed its intention to make greater efforts in the future to control its subjects in this respect."

Japan prohibits the illicit narcotics traffic in Japan by severe and well-enforced laws. Why are not these laws enforced against Japanese subjects in Manchuria who sell to Chinese? Why do the Japanese courts impose mere nominal penalties when offenders are caught red-handed by the Chinese authorities and handed over to them? The number of Japanese engaged in the narcotics traffic, the extent of their operations, and their practical immunity from punishment at the hands of their own authorities have given rise to the widely-held belief that the Japanese have encouraged the dissemination of narcotics in Manchuria with the deliberate intention of undermining the resistance of the Chinese people.

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## **THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY**

On September 21st, three days after the first attack of the Japanese troops on Mukden, the Chinese Government appealed to the Council of the League of Nations, under Article 11, to take immediate steps to prevent further

developments of the situation in Manchuria that was endangering the peace of Nations.

On September 30th, the Council passed a Resolution, the important articles of which are as follows: "The Council recognises the importance of the Japanese Government's statement that it has no territorial designs in Manchuria. The Council notes the Japanese representative's statement that his Government will continue, as rapidly as possible, the withdrawal of its troops, which has already begun, into the railway zone in proportion as the safety of the lives and the property of Japanese nationals is effectively assured and that it hopes to carry out this intention in full as speedily as may be."

"The Council notes that the Chinese representative's statement that his Government will assume all responsibility for the safety of the lives and property of Japanese nationals outside the zone as the withdrawal of the Japanese troops continues."

While the Japanese Government's representative was making the above statement to the Council of the League of Nations in Geneva, the Japanese armies in Manchuria, instead of withdrawing into the railway zone as stated above, were advancing in every direction outside the zone. According to the evidence later presented to the Commission of Enquiry by the Japanese (page 71 of the Report), the Japanese armies attacked the Nanling barracks at Changchun on September 19th, the Kuanchentze barracks on September 20th, attacked and captured the city of Kirin, two hundred miles from the railway zone, on September 21st and also during that time attacked and captured every Chinese city and village adjacent to the railway zone between Port Arthur and Changchun. On October 8th, the Japanese troops bombed Chinchow and attacked the Chinese troops at the Nonni River just south of Tsitsihar.



The Council held a further session from October 13th to the 24th for the consideration of the Chinese-Japanese dispute. At this session the actions of the Japanese Government were severely criticised by the different members of the Council. The Council embodied its findings in the Resolution of October 22nd. Article 4 of this Resolution read as follows :

“ Being convinced that the fulfilment of these assurances and undertakings is essential for the restoration of normal relations between the two parties, the Council :

“(a) Calls upon the Japanese Government to begin immediately and to proceed progressively with the withdrawal of its troops into the railway zone, so that the total withdrawal may be effected before the date fixed for the next meeting of the Council (November 16th 1931).

“(b) Calls upon the Chinese Government, in execution of its general pledge to assume the responsibility for the safety of the lives of all Japanese subjects resident in Manchuria, to make such arrangements for taking over the territory thus evacuated as will assure the safety of the lives and property of Japanese subjects there, and requests the Chinese Government to associate with the Chinese authorities designated for the above purpose, representatives of other powers in order that such representatives may follow the execution of the arrangements.”

Thirteen of the fourteen representatives of the countries forming the Council voted in favour of this resolution, Japan registering the only dissenting vote. Yet, because the vote on this resolution was not unanimous (as it never could be with Japan voting), the Japanese Government paid absolutely no attention to the resolution even though it so clearly expressed the sentiment and the attitude of the Council and the Governments of the following countries that formed the Council, that voted in favour of the resolution : France, Great Britain, Italy, Germany, Ireland,

China, Yugoslavia, Guatemala, Panama, Peru, Poland, Norway and Spain.

The Council met again on November 16th in Paris and devoted nearly four weeks to the study of the situation in Manchuria. At the suggestion of the Japanese Government, the Council on December 10th passed a resolution, which, after reaffirming its resolution of September 30th, 1931, read as follows :

“ The Council decides to appoint a Commission of five members to study on the spot and to report to the Council on any circumstance which, affecting international relations, threatens to disturb peace between China and Japan, or the good understanding between them upon which peace depends.”

“ The Governments of China and Japan will each have the right to nominate one Assessor to assist the Commission. The two Governments will afford the Commission all facilities to obtain on the spot whatever information it may require. Each of the two governments will have the right to request the Commission to consider any question the examination of which it particularly desires.”

After certain reservations by both the Chinese and the Japanese Governments, the members of this Commission, later known as the Commission of Enquiry, were selected by the President of the Council and on January 14th were approved by the Council. The members of the Commission were as follows :

The Rt. Hon. the Earl of Lytton, P.C., G.C.S.I., etc., (British) ;

H. E. Count Aldrovandi (Italian) ;

General de Division Henri Claudel (French) ;

Major-General Frank Ross McCoy (American) ;

H. E. Dr. Heinrich Schnee (German) ;

H. E. Dr. Wellington Koo was appointed Assessor for China ;

H. E. Mr. Isaburo Yoshida was appointed Assessor for Japan.

In addition to Mr. Robert Haas, who acted as Secretary-General to the Commission, the Commission was also assisted by a considerable number of technical advisers, who, with the necessary secretaries, clerks and stenographers, made a total of about thirty members, not including the staffs of the Chinese and the Japanese Assessors.

The European members, with a representative of the American member, held two sittings in Geneva on January 1st at which Lord Lytton was unanimously chosen as Chairman of the Commission and a provisional programme was worked out.

The Commission arrived in Tokyo on February 29th where it was joined by the Japanese Assessor. The Commission spent eight days in Tokyo, where it was received by the Emperor, and had conferences with many members of the Japanese Government including the Prime Minister, Mr. Inukai, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Yoshizawa, the Minister of War, General Araki and the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Osumi. In Kyoto and Osaka, many meetings were arranged for the Commission with representatives of the business community.

On March 14th, the Commission arrived in Shanghai and was joined by the Chinese Assessor. In Shanghai the Commission had an opportunity to visit the ruins of Chapei and other areas devastated by the recent fighting. The members of the Commission also met the Chinese and foreign business leaders and some of the members of the Chinese Government.

From the time of the arrival of the Commission of Enquiry in Japan until it finally reached Mukden, the

Japanese authorities did everything possible to delay the arrival of the Commission in Manchuria, as they did not want the Commission to arrive until they had completed the organisation of their "Government of Manchukuo". In Shanghai, the Japanese requested the Commission to visit Canton, Hankow and other cities in the interior of China which had no possible connection with the difficulties in Manchuria.

As a concession to the Japanese (who referred the Commission to its instructions which gave Japan the right to request the Commission to examine any question which Japan desired examined), the Commission took more than one week of its valuable time in making the long journey to Hankow.

The Commission visited Nanking where they met the members of the Chinese Government. They also stopped one day in Tsinan and finally reached Peiping on April 9th. Here they were again delayed for ten days by the objections of the Japanese (through their puppet "Manchukuo" officials) to the entry of the Chinese Assessor into Manchuria. On this point, the Commission finally expressed itself as follows: "The Commission cannot allow its composition to be called into question. Any objection to its Chinese Assessor would be regarded by the Commission as directed against itself." After this strong statement from the Commission the Japanese withdraw their objections and the Commission proceeded to Manchuria.

The Commission remained in Manchuria about six weeks during which time they visited Mukden, Changchun, Kirin, Harbin, Anshan, Fushun, Chinchow, Port Arthur, and Dairen. Part of the Commission also visited Tsitsihar.

Although the Council of the League of Nations requested the Governments of both China and Japan "to afford the Commission all facilities to obtain on the spot whatever

information it may require ” the Japanese officials, sometimes through their “ Manchukuo officials ” and often directly, put many serious obstacles in the path of the Commission in its efforts to secure the facts regarding the conditions in Manchuria.

In every city visited in Manchuria, the hotels in which the Commission were living were surrounded by troops, and no Chinese were allowed to enter the hotels or meet the Commission unless personally introduced by the Japanese officials. Within one hour after the arrival of the Commission in Mukden the Japanese arrested five Chinese who had attempted to enter the Yamato Hotel. These Chinese were imprisoned in the Japanese jail, within the Japanese concession, and at least two of them were tortured. They followed the same procedure at Changchun.

The day before the arrival of the Commission in Harbin, members of the Japanese Consulate in that city called on a number of prominent Chinese and told them in detail (though they knew that the Chinese already had the information) what had happened in the other cities in Manchuria to the Chinese who had attempted to meet the Commission of Enquiry. The Japanese assured the Chinese that they were not threatening them but, as friends, they thought they should be told of the dangers of attempting to meet or talk with members of the Commission. The Chinese knew too well the object of that visit by the Japanese.

As an additional precaution to see that no Chinese met the Commission, every member of the Commission, including the staff, was shadowed during the entire stay in Manchuria, and even after the return to China, by Japanese detectives. Every member of the Chinese Assessor's office was followed by from three to five detectives including a Japanese photographer who photographed any person who attempted to talk with the Chinese

Assessor or his associates. On trips of inspection, great care was taken by the Japanese to see that no member of the Commission took advantage of the occasion to talk alone with any member of the Chinese Assessor's office, or with prominent Chinese.

The Chinese officials of the " Manchukuo Government " were furnished with lists of the probable questions that they would be asked by the Commission with the answers they were to give carefully prepared by the Japanese authorities. The Japanese introduced many delegations to the Commission, both Chinese and Korean, who presented written statements to the Commission. Regarding these statements, the Report of the Commission of Enquiry states (page 107): " We (the Commission) had strong grounds for believing that the statements left with us had previously received Japanese approval. In fact, in some cases persons who had presented them informed us afterwards that they had been written or substantially revised by the Japanese and were not to be taken as the expression of their real feelings. "

The Japanese officials made it impossible for the Commission to interview General Ma Chan-shan or other officers or officials of the Government of Manchuria who were fighting against the Japanese armies. They would not permit an investigation of the conditions in Korea, which included the anti-Chinese riots in that country, nor would they even discuss the possibility of the Commission investigating the Japanese Government or conditions in Japan although they insisted on such an investigation of the Chinese Government and conditions in China. Many other such incidents could be given to show the efforts of the Japanese to keep the Commission from knowing the real facts and conditions in Manchuria, but enough have probably been given to show that the Japanese Government officials hardly gave the Commission

the kind of assistance intended by the Council of the League of Nations when the Council requested the Japanese Government "to give (the Commission) all facilities to obtain whatever information it might require."

It was only the patience, skill and hard work of every member of the Commission of Enquiry and the courage of many Chinese, who did furnish the Commission with the necessary information, even when they knew that they were doing so at the risk of their lives, that made it possible for the Commission to make the thorough investigation they made.

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## **REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS**

The Commission of Enquiry presented its report to the Council on October 1st, 1932. It was received by most countries with much praise and with a feeling that it was a great work well done.

The London "News Chronicle's" description of this report as "wise and fair" about describes the opinion of the great majority of the newspapers in England and America. In the French papers the report was at first studied and commented on more from the point of how it would affect the foreign policy of France than as a possible solution of the problems of Manchuria. The fact that the report mentions, that due to wars and disputes resulting in the progressive surrender of sovereign rights, China has lost huge areas of territory (among other places), in Annam, Tongking, Laos and Cochin-China (provinces of Indo-China), rather damaged it in the eyes of such

important French papers as the Paris "Journal" and Paris "Temps". In China the report was received with considerable disappointment by the majority of the Chinese language papers but with a feeling that the report should be accepted by the Government, with certain reservations, as China had from the beginning put her entire faith in the Covenant of the League of Nations and other international agreements. In Japan the report received such comments as "Castles in the Air", "the proposals of the report are impossible", "the Commission is dreaming of a Utopia".

The Japanese Government received the report with the simple statement "The Commission's Report gives no reason to Japan to alter its Manchurian policy". Dr. Wellington Koo, China's Member on the Council, made the following statement: "My Government will be disposed to accept the Report as a basis for discussion with such observations and comments as she may feel called upon to present". Dr. W. W. Yen, China's Chief Delegate to the League of Nations, stated "We may not agree wholly on all points (with the report), but we do not consider it the right spirit for a party to a dispute to challenge the findings of a neutral commission of enquiry that was approved by both parties".

In studying the Report of the Commission of Enquiry, it should be kept in mind that the report was written in an attempt to heal and not to widen the breach between China and Japan by any severe condemnation of either nation. Members of the Commission while they were in Manchuria felt that their problem had been made more difficult by the almost universal criticism of Japan by the other members of the League of Nations up to that time. It also should be remembered that, according to certain Continental newspapers, one of the members of the Commission, insisted before he would sign the Report, that many changes be made in such parts of the Report



as too severely criticised the actions of the Government of Japan.

The report is made up largely of a very complete record and description of the recent developments in China and Manchuria and the issues between China and Japan. The Commission's comments and opinions on these important questions are as follows :

On page 71 of the report, the Commission makes the following comment on the attack on Mukden, which, according to the Japanese, was made in self-defence : " The Chinese had no plan of attacking the Japanese troops or of endangering the lives or property of Japanese nationals at this particular time or place. They made no concerted or authorised attack on the Japanese forces and were surprised by the Japanese attack and subsequent operations. The military operations of the Japanese troops during this night (Sept. 18th) cannot be regarded as measures of legitimate self-defence. "

On page 72 of the Report records the bombing of Chinchow as follows : " According to the Japanese account, the bombing (of Chinchow) was chiefly directed against the military barracks and the Communications University, where the offices of the Civil Government had been established. The Commission's comments were " The bombing of a Civil Administration by military forces cannot be justified and there is some doubt whether the area bombed was in fact as restricted as the Japanese allege. "

On page 81 the record explains an unfair practice of the Japanese authorities as follows : " It has been the practice of the Japanese to describe indiscriminately as " bandits " all the forces now opposed to them. There are in fact apart from the bandits, two distinct categories of organised resistance to the Japanese troops namely, the regular and irregular Chinese troops. "

On page 97, the Commission gives its opinion on the independence movement in Manchuria as follows: "It is clear that the independence movement, which had never been heard of in Manchuria before September 1931, was only made possible by the presence of Japanese troops. A group of Japanese civil and military officials, both active and retired, who were in close touch with the new political movement in Japan, conceived, organised and carried through this movement. The evidence received from all sources has satisfied the Commission that while there were a number of factors which contributed to the creation of "Manchukuo" the two which, in combination, were most effective, and without which, in our judgment, the "new State" could not have been formed, were the presence of Japanese troops and the activities of Japanese officials, both civil and military. For this reason the present regime cannot be considered to have been called into existence by a genuine and spontaneous independence movement".

On page 99, the Commission makes the following comments on the composition of the Government of Manchukuo: "In the Government of 'Manchukuo', Japanese officials are prominent, and Japanese advisers are attached to all important departments. Although the Premier and his Ministers are Chinese, the Heads of the various Boards of General Affairs, which, in the organisation of the new State, exercise the greatest measure of actual power, are Japanese. At first they were designated as advisers, but more recently those holding the most important posts have been full Government Officials on the same basis as the Chinese. In the Central Government alone, not including those in the local Governments or in the War Office and military forces, or in Government enterprises, nearly two hundred Japanese are 'Manchukuo' officials."

"Japanese control the Board of General Affairs and the Legislative and Advisory Bureaux, which in practice,

constitute a Premier's Office, the General Affairs Department in the Ministries and in the Provincial Governments, and the Self-Government Directing Committees in the Districts, and the police departments in the Provinces. In most bureaux, moreover, there are Japanese advisers, councillors and secretaries."

"There are also many Japanese in the railway offices and in the Central Bank. In the Supervisory Council, Japanese hold the posts of Chief of the Bureau of General Affairs, Chief of the Control Bureau and Chief of the Auditing Board. In the Legislative Council, the Chief Secretary is a Japanese. Finally, some of the most important officials of the Regent are Japanese, including the Chief of the Office of Internal Affairs and the Commander of the Regent's bodyguard."

Regarding the Chinese officials of the "Manchukuo Government" the Commission makes the following comment on page 107 of the Report: "Many of them (Chinese officials) were previously in the former regime and have been retained either by inducements or by intimidation of one kind or another. Some of them conveyed messages to the Commission to the effect that they had been forced to remain in office under duress, that all power was in Japanese hands, that they were loyal to China, and that what they had said at their interviews with the Commission in the presence of the Japanese was not necessarily to be believed."

On pages 107 and 108, the Commission gives the following opinions of the people of Manchuria on the "Government of Manchukuo".

"Many delegates representing public bodies and associations were received, and usually presented to the Commission written statements. Most of the delegates were introduced by the Japanese or 'Manchukuo' authorities, and we had strong grounds for believing that the state-

ments left with us had previously obtained Japanese approval. In fact, in some cases persons who had presented them informed us afterwards that they had been written or substantially revised by the Japanese and were not to be taken as the expression of their feelings."

"The letters received came from farmers, small tradesmen, town workers and students, and related the feelings and experiences of the writers. After the return of the Commission to Peiping in June, this mass of correspondence was translated, analysed and arranged by an expert staff specially selected for the purpose. All these 1,550 letters, except two, were bitterly hostile to the new 'Manchukuo Government' and to the Japanese. They appeared to be sincere and spontaneous expressions of opinion."

"The 'Manchukuo' police are partially composed of members of the former Chinese police. In larger towns, there are actually Japanese officers in the police and in many other places there are Japanese advisers. Some individual members of the police who spoke to the Commission expressed their dislike of the new regime, but said that they must continue to serve to make a living."

"The 'Manchukuo' army also consists in the main of former Manchurian soldiers reorganised under Japanese supervision. Such troops were at first content to take service under the new regime provided they were merely required to preserve local order. But since they have been called upon to engage in serious warfare against Chinese forces and to fight under Japanese officers side by side with Japanese soldiers, the 'Manchukuo' army has become increasingly unreliable."

"The Chinese business men and bankers who were interviewed by the Commission were hostile to 'Manchukuo'. They disliked the Japanese, they feared for their lives and property and frequently remarked: 'We do not want to become like Koreans.' The professional class,

teachers and doctors, are also hostile to 'Manchukuo'. They allege that they are spied upon and intimidated."

On page 109 the Commission report the following in regard to the conditions in Manchuria since the Japanese invasion : " Since September 18th, 1931, there has been an unparalleled growth of banditry and lawlessness in the countryside, partially due to disbanded soldiery and partly due to farmers, who having been ruined by bandits, have taken to banditry themselves for a living. Organised warfare, from which Manchuria has been free for many years, is now being waged in many parts of the Three Eastern Provinces between Japanese and 'Manchukuo' troops and the scattered forces still loyal to China. This warfare naturally inflicts great hardships on the farmers, especially as the Japanese aeroplanes have been bombing villages."

On page 111 the Commission makes the following statement : " After careful study of the evidence presented to us in public and private interviews, in letters and written statements, we (the Commission) have come to the conclusion that there is no general Chinese support for the 'Manchukuo Government', which is regarded by the local Chinese as an instrument of the Japanese."

On page 125 the Commission states : " No foreign power could develop Manchuria or reap any benefit from an attempt to control it without the goodwill and whole-hearted co-operation of the Chinese masses which form the bulk of the population of Manchuria, tilling the soil and supplying the labour for practically every enterprise in the country."

We have heard so much from the Japanese about Japan's dependence on Manchuria. The Report of the Commission is interesting as it makes the following statement regarding China's economic and fundamental interests in Manchuria.

On page 38, the Report states : “ The Chinese people regard Manchuria as an integral part of China and deeply resent any attempt to separate it from the rest of their country. The Chinese regard Manchuria as their ‘ first line of defence ’. As Chinese territory it is looked upon as a sort of buffer against the adjoining territories of Japan and Russia. Manchuria is also regarded as important to them for economical reasons. For decades they have called it the ‘ Granary of China ’ and more recently regarded it as a region which furnishes seasonal employment to Chinese farmers and labourers from neighbouring provinces.”

On page 127 of the Report the Commission makes the following comments on the conditions in Manchuria : “ It is a fact that without a declaration of war a large area of what was indisputably Chinese territory has been forcibly seized and occupied by the armed forces of Japan and has, in consequence of this operation, been separated from, and declared independent of, the rest of China.”

On page 128, the Report continues as follows : “ To cut off these provinces from the rest of China, either legally or actually, would be to create for the future a serious irredentist problem which would endanger peace by keeping alive the hostility of China and rendering probable the continued boycott of Japanese goods.”

On page 129 the Commission suggests : “ It is surely in the interests of Japan to consider also other possible solutions of the problem of security, which would be more in keeping with the principles on which rests the present peace organisation of the world, and analogous to arrangements concluded by other Great Powers in various parts of the world. She might even find it possible, with the sympathy and goodwill of the rest of the world, and at no cost to herself, to obtain better security than she will obtain by the costly method she is at present adopting.”

Surely the Government of no other nation has ever before received, or evidently so much deserved, such a rebuke from the League of Nations or any other great organisation as Japan has received in the Report of the Commission of Enquiry. Nor has any government of a country ever received better advice than is also given to the Government of Japan by this report of the Commission of Enquiry as recorded above.

The answer of the Government of Japan to all the appeals of the League of Nations, of the United States Government and to the Report of the Commission of Enquiry is : “ The Commission of Enquiry’s Report gives no reason to Japan to alter its Manchurian policy.” In other words, Japan defies the League of Nations and the World.

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## APPENDIX

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### TEXT OF U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE STIMSON'S NOTE OF JANUARY 7th, 1932

“ With the recent military operations about Chin-chow, the last remaining administrative authority of the Chinese Republic in South Manchuria, as it existed prior to September 18th, 1931, has been destroyed. The American Government continues confident that the work of the neutral commission recently authorised by the Council of the League of Nations will facilitate an ultimate solution of the difficulties now existing between China and Japan.

“ But in view of the present situation and of its own rights and obligations therein, the American Government deems it to be its duty to notify both the Imperial Japanese Government and the Government of the Chinese Republic :

“ That it cannot admit the legality of any situation *de facto*, nor does it intend to recognise any treaty or agreement entered into between those governments, or agents thereof, which may impair the treaty rights of the United States or its citizens in China, including those which relate to the sovereignty, the independence or the



territorial and administrative integrity of the Republic of China, or to the international policy relative to China, commonly known as the open door policy.”

“ And that it does not intend to recognise any situation, treaty or agreement which may be brought about by means contrary to the Covenants and obligations of the Pact of August 27, 1929, to which treaty both China and Japan, as well as the United States, are parties.”

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**EXTRACTS FROM LETTER OF MR. STIMSON TO  
SENATOR BORAH REGARDING  
NINE POWER TREATY—OPEN DOOR POLICY**

Communicated to the Council and Members of the League of Nations, February 25th, 1932.

The Honorable William E. Borah, Chairman,  
Committee on Foreign Relations,  
United States Senate.

My dear Senator Borah,

You have asked my opinion whether present conditions in China have in any way indicated that the so-called Nine Power Treaty has been inapplicable or ineffective or rightly in need of modification and if so what I consider should be the policy of this Government.

This treaty as you of course know, forms the legal basis upon which now rests the “ Open Door ” policy

towards China. That policy enunciated by John Hay in 1899 brought to an end the struggle among various powers for so-called spheres of interests in China which was threatening the dismemberment of that Empire. To accomplish this, Mr. Hay invoked two principles (one) equality of commercial opportunity among all nations dealing with China and (two) as necessary to that equality the preservation of China's territorial and administrative integrity . . .

In taking these steps Mr. Hay acted with the cordial support of the British Government. In responding to Mr. Hay's announcement above set forth Lord Salisbury, the British Minister, expressed himself "most emphatically as concurring in the policy of the United States".

For twenty years thereafter the open door policy rested upon the informal commitments thus made by various powers, but in the winter of 1921 to 1922, at a conference participated in by all of the principal powers which had interests in the Pacific, the policy was crystallised into the so-called Nine-Power Treaty, which gave definition and precision to the principles upon which the policy rested. In the first article of that Treaty the contracting powers, other than China, agreed :

(One) to respect the sovereignty, the independence and the territorial and administrative integrity of China,

(Two) to provide the fullest and most unembarrassed opportunity to China to develop and maintain for herself an effective and stable government,

(Three) to use their influence for the purpose of effectually establishing and maintaining the principles of equal opportunity for the commerce and industry of all the nations throughout the territory of China,

(Four) to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states and from countenancing action inimical to the security of such states . . .

This treaty thus represents a carefully developed and matured international policy intended on the one hand to assure to all of the contracting parties their rights and

interests in and with regard to China and on the other hand to assure to the people of China the fullest opportunity to develop without molestation their sovereignty and independence...

The Treaty was originally executed by the United States, Belgium, the British Empire, China, France, Italy, Japan the Netherlands and Portugal. Subsequently it was also executed by Norway, Bolivia, Sweden, Denmark and Mexico...

Six years later the policy of self denial against aggression by a stronger against a weaker power upon which the Nine Power Treaty has been based received a powerful reinforcement by the execution by substantially all the nations of the world of the Pact of Paris, the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact...

The recent events that have taken place in China, especially the hostilities which, having begun in Manchuria, have latterly been extended to Shanghai, far from indicating the advisability of any modification of the treaties we have been discussing, have tended to bring home the vital importance of the faithful observance of the covenants therein to all of the nations interested in the Far East...

This is the view of this Government. We see no reason for abandoning the enlightened principles which are embodied in these treaties. We believe that this situation would have been avoided had these covenants been faithfully observed and no evidence has come to us to indicate that a due compliance with them would have interfered with the adequate protection of the legitimate rights in China of the signatories of those treaties and their nationals...

Very sincerely yours,

(signed) HENRY L. STIMSON

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## THE PACT OF PARIS — KELLOGG PACT

*Article 1.* — The high contracting parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

*Article 2.* — The high contracting parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

This Pact of Paris was signed by practically all the nations of the world.

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## THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

The following articles of the Covenant apply to the present difficulties in Manchuria :

*Article 10.* — The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all the Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.

*Article 11.* — Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any Member of the League or not, is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations...

*Article 12.* — The Members of the League agree that if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they may submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council, and they agree in no case to resort to war until three months after the award by the arbitrators or the judicial decision or the report of the Council.

*Article 13.* — The Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission or judicial settlement, and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject matter to arbitration or judicial settlement.

The Members of the League agree that they will carry out in good faith any award or decision that may be rendered, and that they will not resort to war against a Member of the League which complies therewith. In the event of any failure to carry out any award or decision, the Council shall propose what steps should be taken to give effect thereto.

*Article 16.* — (1) Should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its Covenants under Articles 12, 13 or 15, it shall *ipso facto* be deemed to have committed an act of war against all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it to the severance of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse between their nationals and the nationals of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between

the nationals of the covenant-breaking State and the nationals of any other State, whether a Member of the League or not.

(2) It shall be the duty of the Council in such case to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval and air force the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the Covenants of the League.

(3) The Members of the League agree, further, that they will mutually support one another in the financial and economic measures which are taken under this Article, in order to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from the above measures, and that they will mutually support one another in resisting any special measures aimed at one of their number by the covenant-breaking State, and that they will take necessary steps to afford passage through their territory to the forces of any of the Members of the League which are co-operating to protect the covenants of the League.

(4) Any Member of the League which has violated any covenant of the League may be declared to be no longer a Member of the League by a vote of the Council concurred in by the Representatives of all the other Members of the League represented thereon.

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## **BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF PROMINENT LEADERS IN MANCHURIAN DISPUTE**

Dr. W. W. YEN, Chinese Minister to the United States and Chief Delegate for China at the League of Nations, was born in 1877 at Shanghai, received his preparatory education at the Anglo-Chinese College and St. John's University in Shanghai, and graduated from the University of Virginia (U.S.A.) in 1900. Dr. Yen has held many of the most important offices within the gift of his country, for, besides having held the posts of Minister to Denmark, Germany and the United States, he has been Minister of Foreign Affairs and twice Premier of China.

Dr. V. K. WELLINGTON KOO, Chinese Minister to France, Representative of China on the Council of the League of Nations and Chinese Assessor to the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations, was born at Shanghai in 1887, studied at the Anglo-Chinese College, Yu Tsai College and St. John's University, Shanghai, and completed his education in America at Cook Academy and Columbia University, where he specialized in International Law and Diplomacy. He was sent as Minister to Mexico while only twenty-eight years old. His diplomatic career has included the following important positions: Minister to the United States; Minister to England; Delegate to the Paris Peace Conference and the International Labour Conference in 1919; Chief Delegate to the League of Nations, 1920; Delegate to the Washington Conference in 1921. In China he has held the posts of Minister of Finance, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Premier.

Mr. QUO TAI CHI, Chinese Minister to Great Britain and Delegate to the League of Nations, is a native of Wusueh. Born in 1889, he obtained his early schooling at Wuchang, and later went to America, to continue his studies at Williston Seminary and at the University of Pennsylvania, where he specialized in Political Science. Mr. Quo has been a member of the Chinese Delegation to the Paris Peace Conference, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs of Kiangsu, and Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was appointed Minister to Italy in 1929. Mr. Quo was the Chief Chinese Delegate on the Commission which negotiated the Agreement terminating the Sino-Japanese hostilities at Shanghai in 1932, and signed the Agreement on behalf of China.

CHIANG KAI SHEK, Chairman of the National Government of China and Commander-in-Chief of the National Army, was born in Chekiang Province in 1888, educated at the Paoting Military Academy, and spent the years 1907 to 1911 in further study at the Tokyo Military Academy in Japan. In 1911, he returned to China and joined the Revolutionary Army. He was one of Dr. Sun Yat Sen's closest friends and advisers, and in 1923 was appointed Principal of the Whampoa Military Academy at Canton. In 1926 General Chiang led the Northern Military Expedition of the Kuomintang Party, defeated the armies of various reactionary "war-lords", and paved the way for the unification of modern China by the Nationalist Government. It was largely due to his influence and courage that the Communists were expelled from the Kuomintang Party. In 1928 Marshal Chiang was elected to the chairmanship of the Nationalist Government.

CHANG HSUEH LIANG, son of Chang Tso-lin, is Vice-Commander of the National Army and Commander-in-



Chief of the Northeastern Frontier Defence Force. He was born in 1898 at Hai Chen, in Manchuria, graduated from the Military Training School of the Three Eastern Provinces, joined the Army at the age of eighteen, became a Colonel in 1919, and rose to the rank of General in command of an army corps. After the death of his father in 1928, he was elected to succeed him as Commander-in-Chief in Manchuria, and it was in this capacity that he ordered his troops not to offer resistance to the Japanese army in September, 1931.

LO WEN KAN, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Chinese Government, is a native of Pangu, in Kwangtung, where he was born in 1888. Dr. Lo studied Law at Oxford University, England, and was admitted to the Inner Temple, London. Dr. Lo has held many responsible posts in the Government, including, besides the portfolio for Foreign Affairs, those of Director General of Customs, Minister of Finance, and President of the Supreme Court.

Admiral Viscount MAKOTO SAITO, Prime Minister of Japan, was born in 1858, educated at the Japanese Naval School and served as Aide-de-camp to the Emperor during the Sino-Japanese war. He was made admiral in 1912, Minister of War in 1913, Governor of Korea and Member of the Privy Council in 1927. He became Prime Minister after the assassination of Tsuyoshi Inukai in 1932.

Count YASUYA UCHIDA, Minister for Foreign Affairs in the present Japanese Cabinet, was born in 1865 and educated in the Imperial University at Tokyo. After serving as secretary in a number of Japanese Legations abroad he became in turn Minister to China, Ambassador to Austria, U.S.A. and Russia. In 1930 he became President of the South Manchuria Railway and in 1932 was

promoted to be Minister for Foreign Affairs. He was one of the signers of the 1905 Treaty between China and Japan which was supposed to contain the famous " Secret Protocols ".

Mr. ISABURO YOSHIDA, Japanese Assessor to the Commission of Enquiry of the League of Nations, was born in 1878 and educated at the Imperial University. He has served in the Japanese Legations in Peking, London and Washington and as Minister to Switzerland and Ambassador to Turkey. He was a member of the delegation to the Peace Conference in Paris and the Shantung Peace Conference in 1929.

Mr. YOSUKE MATSUOKA, chief spokesman for the Japanese delegation at the present meeting of the Council of the League of Nations. He is fifty two years of age, was educated at the University of Oregon, U.S.A., and has held several minor political posts in Japan and Manchuria. He was sent to Geneva largely because of his reputation as a fighter and as he better represented the policy of the military party of Japan than any of the more experienced diplomats. He is assisted occasionally by Mr. Matsudeira, a diplomat of long experience.

Baron KIJURO SHIDEHARA, Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs during the early part of the present Chinese-Japanese difficulties. He was the leader of the group that favoured a conciliatory policy towards China and had made considerable progress towards a better feeling between the two countries when his plans were interrupted by the attack on Mukden. Baron Shidehara made strenuous efforts at the time of the Japanese invasion of Manchuria to curb the military leaders and as Minister for Foreign Affairs he gave assurances to the foreign governments

that were ruthlessly overruled by the military party. He was struck by a military official and so severely wounded that many believe that he has since died of his injuries. His adviser, Baron Takuma Dan, was assassinated, and many other leaders of the peace party were imprisoned by the military party.

**TSUYOSHI INUKAI**, former Prime Minister of Japan, preceding Admiral Saito. He was the oldest member of the Japanese House of Representatives where, because of his cleverness, he was known as the "Old Fox". He was editor of the "Hochi Shimbun" and leader of the Seiyukai Party. He favoured diplomacy over military force as a means of settling the difficulties between China and Japan. Soon after he became Prime Minister he made the statement that "Japan would not take Manchuria as a gift". He also described the Japanese attack on Shanghai as a blunder. He was assassinated by a group of well-known military officials, who, though they surrendered to the police, have never been punished for their crime.

**Admiral KICHISABURA NOMURA**, Commander of the Japanese Naval forces in the attack on the Shanghai area in 1932. He was educated in the Japanese Naval school and took part in the Russo-Japanese war. He was severely wounded in the attempt by a number of Koreans to assassinate the Japanese military and diplomatic leaders in Shanghai during the peace negotiations.

**General SHINGI MUTO**, representative of the Japanese Government in "Manchukuo". General Muto was in command of the Japanese military expedition in the Siberian campaign and assisted in the establishment of the Far Eastern Republic. This Republic was formed on somewhat the same lines and for the same purpose as "Manchukuo". General Muto was assisted in Siberia

by the same General Honjo, who played such an important part in the same rôle in Manchuria. They are both influential members of the Japanese Continental Expansion Party.

General MA CHAN-SHAN, Commander of the Manchurian provincial troops now fighting against the Japanese armies in Northern Manchuria. He was born in 1887 at Huaiteh, Manchuria. He enlisted in the army in 1907 and was rapidly promoted until he became garrison commander at Heiho in 1929. General Ma has become a national hero on account of his defense of Tsitsihar against the Japanese regular troops. In addition to General Ma Chan-Shan, the following generals of the Manchurian Provincial armies are fighting against the Japanese armies in Manchuria: Generals Su Ping-wen, Feng Chan-hai, Kung Chang-hai, Yao Ping-chi, Liu Wang-hui and Chao Wei-pin.

Mr. HENRY PU YI (Hsuan Tung), Chief Executive of "Manchukuo", was born in Peking in 1906. He is the son of Prince Chun, whose wife was the daughter of Jung Lu, the favourite of the Empress Dowager. He became Emperor of China in 1908, — his father being appointed Regent. As a result of the Revolution, he was forced to abdicate in 1912 by Yuan Shih-kai, but was permitted to retain his titles and to continue to reside in a palace in the Imperial City, and was given an allowance of silver \$4,000,000 by the Republican Government. In 1924 he fled to the Japanese Concession in Tientsin, where he resided, under the name "Henry Pu Yi", until November, 1931, when he was secretly taken to Dairen by the Japanese. On March 9th, 1932, Mr. Pu Yi was installed by the Japanese as "Chief Executive" of "Manchukuo".

None of the other Chinese officials of "Manchukuo" are taking any prominent part in the present crisis. Most of them are mere figureheads and perform no official acts without the "advice" of their Japanese Advisers.

## COMMENTS OF THE "JOURNAL DE GENÈVE" ON THE MANCHURIAN QUESTION

(The following extracts have been taken from editorials by Mr. William Martin, one of the leading journalists of Europe, which appeared in the "Journal de Genève" on October 4th and November 21st, 1932, respectively.)

*(Translation.)*

### A CRUSHING VERDICT

(Written on the publication of the Lytton Report.)

If the "Journal de Genève" had had any doubts about the editorial policy it has followed during the past year in the Sino-Japanese conflict, if it had had some hesitation regarding the verification of certain facts it has mentioned, its worries would have entirely disappeared to-day, because the Lytton Report confirms the thesis we have supported in a more startling manner than we had ever dared to hope.

In order to appreciate the value of this confirmation, one must remember first of all how the Commission was selected by the Council. Far from being suspected of partiality for the Chinese, it was chosen rather in an effort to make it agreeable to Japan in order to assure its acceptance. The Commission not only consisted solely of representatives of Great Powers, each of which had reasons for concealing its passivity behind pretexts, but also three of its members were men with colonial experience, predisposed to take the side of the Japanese and to accept their arguments as they stood. It is no secret that at the time of

their departure, several were 100 per cent in favour of Japan — and we do not hesitate to confess that, at the start, this Commission did not inspire us with full confidence.

In the midst of a mass of information and opinion, two facts emerge with utmost clarity from the Report. The first is that the incident of the 18th September was a pure pretext. Perhaps it never happened; a train which passed a few minutes after the explosion noticed nothing wrong, although 36 inches of the rail, according to the Japanese, were destroyed. Even if something actually happened, the Commission evidently consider that, whatever it was, it was in accordance with the desires of the Japanese military. Their attack was prepared to such a point that an hour after the supposed explosion the 30th Japanese Regiment, whose garrison is at Port Arthur about 250 miles away, was able to participate in the attack on Mukden under the orders of Lieut. Col. Hirata!

The second startling fact is the unanimity with which the Manchurian population, without distinction of class or opinion, condemns the creation of "Manchukuo" as the work of the Japanese. The statements of the Commission surpass anything that could be imagined on this point. Out of 1550 letters which were received, only two were in favour of the new "government". Witnesses were restrained and terrorized, but nevertheless they found means, at the peril of their lives, to tell the Commission that what they were obliged to declare publicly did not represent their true sentiments.

## UNFORTUNATE JAPAN!

“ I hate people who always have their swords between their teeth ”, cried Bethmann-Hollweg in the Reichstag, before the war. This is exactly the attitude that the new Japanese delegate, Mr. Matsuoka, has adopted in private conversation since his arrival in Geneva.

“ I do not speak as a diplomat ”, he says, “ I speak as an ordinary man. I have come to Geneva to reconcile Japan and the League of Nations. That is not possible except by the recognition of Manchukuo. If this is not done, there will be no peace in the Far East. The whole Japanese nation is behind us, and we shall go to the very limit. ” Unfortunate Japan! She really does not have the representatives she deserves. The Japanese are essentially a sympathetic nation, against whom we have no hostility whatever—but what leaders! The Japanese, like all races as a matter of fact, have no desire to fight; they wish only for peace, and yet their chiefs are leading them little by little into the most dreadful of wars. And the most terrible thing is that perhaps Mr. Matsuoka is right: he has behind him a nation, deceived by its press,—a nation which will never understand that it has been deceived.

When Mr. Matsuoka adds that Japan cannot allow the Lytton Commission to judge the nature of the measures which Japan took on the 18th September 1931, “ for self-defence ”, he shows that he has no idea either of the mandate given to the Commission, or of the new international law. This is exactly the point at issue. Until the present time each nation was the sole judge of its own measures of so-called “ self-defence ”, but to-day, international tribunals decide who is the defender and who the attacker. If it were otherwise, what would be the value of the guarantees of pacts and treaties ?

**HARRY HUSSEY**  
**PORT DOVER**  
**ONTARIO**  
**CANADA**