

ENGLAND'S WORLD EMPIRE

SOME REFLECTIONS UPON ITS
GROWTH AND POLICY

BY

ALFRED HOYT GRANGER

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TO
E. O. H.
WHOSE SYMPATHETIC UNDERSTANDING DID SO
MUCH TO INSPIRE THE MAKING OF
THIS BOOK

FOREWORD.

This is not to be in any sense of the word a "War Book," although it owes its conception to thoughts arising out of the great conflict which is shaking the foundations of civilization. We read much these days of what will take place after the war, but what we read are only the opinions of individuals; what the consequences will be remains concealed in the mind of God. Here, in America, public opinion depends largely upon the dictum of the daily press, and the preponderant sympathy for the Allies, and especially for Great Britain and France, is both natural and, to a degree, excusable. With Great Britain we have a common language and common traditions, and with France we have the bond of gratitude and sympathy for generous help in our hour of need. Sentiment, rather than reason, has always controlled the sympathies of the human race. When the war is over there will be the beginnings of a New World, a world in which America must play her part. That she may play her part nobly is the hope and prayer of millions of her sons and daughters.

In order to prepare rightly for the future, it is necessary rightly to understand the past, and it is with the earnest hope of helping, in a small way, to a proper understanding of the past that I have told the

story of how Great Britain has built up her world-wide empire and how she has protected the nationality of weaker states. For this purpose I have consulted only English authors of wide reputation, or those, as in the case of Mr. Shuster, of Anglo-Saxon ancestry. For myself, I can say with pride, that all of the forebears of both my parents are of English stock, but as they settled in New England nearly three hundred years ago and have played their parts in the army, the navy and various departments of state, they have called themselves Americans in the best sense of the word. Because of my intense love for this America of ours, and my belief in the ideals and principles upon which this Nation was founded, I think it the bounden duty of every American citizen so to fortify and strengthen his knowledge of the past that he may be "prepared," in the highest sense of the term, to serve his country and aid her by every means in his power to solve the problems now facing her. That this brief account of how England grew into the mighty British Empire of today and the lessons which our country may learn from such a growth may be of help to some other American, is my earnest wish.

My deepest thanks are due to those who have so mightily helped me, those writers who are dead and those who are still amongst us. Without their aid this story could never have been told.

ALFRED HOYT GRANGER.

Philadelphia, 1916.

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PART 1.

THE UPBUILDING OF GREAT BRITAIN.

CHAPTER I.

ENGLAND AND SPAIN.

AT no period in her long history has England occupied so weak a position in the eyes of the world as she held when Elizabeth came to the throne, on November 17, 1558. The house of Hapsburg controlled the world, and while Philip of Spain, the most prominent member of this house, did not hold the title of Emperor as had his father, Charles V, his power was of greater extent and far more absolute than that of any Emperor. By the death of Queen Mary he lost control of England, but it is said that even before Mary's death he had conceived the idea, in such an event, of marrying Elizabeth and thus retaining the English crown as a part of the Hapsburg dominions. That his personal feeling towards Elizabeth was one of friendship he had shown many times, when Mary would have welcomed and abetted any scheme to put her out of the way. The middle of the Sixteenth Century was a period of tremendous upheaval. The counter-reformation, which had been brought into existence by Protestant fanaticism, was spreading over Central Europe, and after the council of Trent, which had purged and cleansed the Catholic Church and removed practically all of the things against which the

reformers protested, it seemed likely to restore uniformity in religion. Elizabeth came to the throne supported by Protestant nobles and a strong popular feeling in her favor. She was twenty-five years of age, and had been educated in the best of all schools, danger and adversity. She realized fully the weakness of her title to the crown, because of the brand of illegitimacy which Rome and her mother's divorce and tragic death had cast upon her, but she was fully determined to maintain her power against the world.

Several things were strongly in her favor at the very commencement of her reign. The first was her strong resemblance to her father, who, in spite of his brutality, tyranny and licentiousness, had first awakened in the minds of Englishmen a sense of their nation's possibilities; then, too, she was wholly English, her nearest foreign ancestor having been Catherine of Valois, wife of Henry V, who had later married Owen Tudor; she was a woman, and (if contemporary accounts are to be believed) quite as handsome as her cousin, Mary Stuart. At that time England had no distinctive policy of her own. All of the wars on the Continent, both before and during Elizabeth's long reign, were primarily religious wars. Philip of Spain, while consumed with ambition for the extension of his dominions, was a religious fanatic, and it may be truthfully said that his fundamental idea in desiring to increase his power was to strengthen and increase the power of the Catholic Church. In those days the simplest mode of increasing political power was through marriage. It was by means of

marriages that the descendants of Rudolf of Hapsburg had acquired control of Spain, Austria, Hungary, the Low Countries, Sicily, the major portion of Italy, Burgundy and, until the death of Mary, England as well. The only other ruling family which in any way competed with them was the House of Valois in France, but that family was fast approaching extinction, and upon the death of Henry III and the succession of Henry of Navarre to the throne of France, ceased to be a factor in European affairs. During the last years of Mary's reign, Elizabeth had seen her own country disintegrating through religious wars, France torn up with civil conflict, the Low Countries heroically striving to overthrow the power of Spain, Scotland smarting under the tyranny of the Guises, the Empire becoming strongly Protestant, and Philip tightening his hold upon the sovereignty of the world. Whether she foresaw the inevitable conflict between England and Spain, we know not, but of this we can be sure—that she realized that England had no chance to become any factor in international politics until she had had sufficient time to gather herself together and recover from the religious persecutions of the two preceding reigns. To bring about this unification of the nation, Elizabeth kept on friendly terms with Philip, while really attempting to undermine his power by aiding the Netherlands and also the Huguenots in France. The motive back of all her scheming and her coquetting with various princes, with the possibilities of her marrying, was to gain time for her country to recover from its religious troubles. What were Elizabeth's real religious

views will never be known. In the light of modern thought, her religion might be said to be her country's welfare. We know that she loved ritual and insisted upon uniformity of worship, but beyond that she never went. Because the Protestant nobles had supported her accession and she was not willing to involve her people in the furious struggles which were devastating France and the Low Countries, she made England Protestant, and repelled the teachings of the Counter-Reformation.

Between her accession and 1588, the year of the Armada, her policy had been one of "peace at any price," coupled with rigid domestic economy. It is true that during this period she had allowed private citizens to fit out buccaneering expeditions against the vast sea power of Spain—the stories of Drake and Hawkins still thrill the imagination of mankind. When Drake circumnavigated the globe and brought home his tremendous booty, captured from Spanish ships, he struck the first real blow to the sea power of Spain and blazed the trail for England's future greatness. Philip expostulated with Elizabeth, and she replied by knighting Drake and wearing some of his jewels in her crown. From that date the conflict between the two powers was inevitable. In 1580 Philip had taken possession of Portugal, and by this stroke had doubled his navy and his colonial possessions, and had made himself the mightiest single ruler that Europe had known, but in the vast extent of his dominions lay his real weakness. Elizabeth had not only made her people one on all questions of national policy, but

had prepared for the political union of Great Britain upon her death, by her close alliance with the Covenanters in Scotland and her recognition of James, the son of Mary Stuart, as her heir. In his infancy James had been put into the hands of the Protestant party, and whatever may have been his personal preferences, he was outwardly Protestant until his death. This fact gave a feeling of security to the people of Great Britain, as it assured the preservation of Protestantism as the State Religion. In our day of religious freedom and the religious indifference which has grown out of such freedom, it is hard to realize the importance of such settlement to the peace of the realm.

It was her desire to strengthen this feeling of religious unity that persuaded Elizabeth to espouse openly the cause of the rebellious Low Countries, and defy Spain. This espousal of the Netherlands marks a transition in her policy and hastens the conflict with Philip. In 1585 the Low Countries, finally giving up hopes of any real help from France, sent a petition to Elizabeth from the States-General, which read as follows: "Recognizing that there is no prince or potentate to whom they are more obliged than they are to Your Majesty, we are about to request you, very humbly, to accept the sovereignty of these Provinces and the people of the same for your very humble vassals and subjects." It is evident from careful reading of history that the people of the Netherlands were sincerely desirous of such a political union, but Elizabeth steadily declined to bring it about. Between the two peoples were many traits in common, and, as in

those days statesmanship could almost have been defined as ability to acquire territory, her refusal remains incomprehensible, unless we recognize the fact that for almost twenty-five years her fixed resolve had been to keep on friendly terms with Philip, while doing all in her power to weaken his strength by underhand means.

Sir John R. Seeley, in his "*Growth of British Policy*," says:

"We cannot, therefore, see how Elizabeth's refusal [to accept sovereignty of the Netherlands] can be justified on the grounds of statesmanship. It is none the less characteristic on that account. Great and daring actions were done in abundance by Englishmen in this latter part of Elizabeth's reign, but they were not done by Elizabeth. It is difficult to grasp the fact that a ruler of so high spirit, of so much energy and courage, did not possess the talent of action but did possess in a unique degree the talent, in certain circumstances equally valuable, of refraining from action. Perhaps most great statesmen are somewhat sparing of adventurous action; nevertheless, the great masterpieces of statesmanship are commonly sudden and rapid strokes of well-timed audacity. But though we trace almost all that makes modern England to Elizabeth, no such strokes were struck by her. Her statesmanship is almost purely negative; it consists solely in providing time and room and liberty for the energy of the nation to display itself. She does not lead the people but, in rare emergencies, she lets them go.

"She did indeed use brave words in her Declaration of 1585. But as she said in that document that her main object was peace, so it would appear from her subsequent conduct of the war that she intended to deter Philip from action rather than to take action herself. Peace and war were not in those days so sharply distinct as they are now. In 1585 there had been already many a sea fight and many a battle

in the Netherlands between Englishmen and Spaniards, and twice a Spanish ambassador had been expelled from England by Elizabeth. Philip indeed had shown a long-suffering spirit, and it was, therefore, not unreasonable for Elizabeth to calculate that her threats and declaration of war might determine him to make peace.

"Had she consciously adopted at this moment a war policy, we should have seen her devoting herself to military preparations, and she was assuredly not so blind as to imagine that war could be carried on with the greatest power in the world without a large expenditure of money. The mania of parsimony which possessed her may be understood, so long as she remained at peace, as the instinct of sound finance in an uneducated form. During the long peace of Elizabeth her cheese-paring economy may well be supposed to have done more good than harm. But what are we to think of the same propensity in time of war? We see that the campaign of 1588 in the Netherlands was ruined by the frenzied struggle of Elizabeth to carry on war without spending money. We see her starving her soldiers, reducing her servants to despair, and forfeiting her reputation among her allies by tricks of miserly economy unworthy of a great prince. Certainly, if we should judge her by this campaign, we should pronounce her one of the most incapable of war ministers, or, at least, we should be driven to suppose that she had not mental elasticity enough to comprehend what is involved in a great change of policy. It rather appears that she intended no change of policy, and that she did not understand or admit that her period of peace was over and that her period of war had begun. She intended, in short, to avert war by threatening war. As soon as she found that her measures had not produced this effect, she conceived a disgust for the war in the Netherlands.

"We understand both her prompt and firm refusal to accept the sovereignty of the Netherlands and her feeble conduct of the war, if we assume simply that a serious war with Philip never entered into her calculations. She could not accept the

sovereignty for herself simply because she meant the sovereignty to remain with Philip. Artois and Hainault had already submitted to him; Brabant and Flanders were already half conquered; these successes had been due partly to concessions made by Parma in the name of Philip. It was still, therefore, natural for Elizabeth to expect that Holland and Zealand would in the end submit, too, but to terms. The result which actually arrived was too unprecedented, the confused Dutch Republic of the Seventeenth Century was a thing too shapeless to be foreseen in 1585. No; Philip would win, but he might be forced to make considerable concessions to Holland and Zealand as he had done already to Artois and Hainault. Philip had all along recognized the extreme difficulty of suppressing the rebellion of the Low Countries so long as it received the support of England. Now, therefore, that new prospects, involving new efforts and expenses, opened before him in France so that some settlement of the Dutch difficulty seemed doubly imperative, Philip might certainly be brought to terms—so Elizabeth might calculate—if England should once more step decidedly forward and show that the decision of the question lay in her hands. In one word, what Elizabeth had in view was simply mediation. She proposed simply to draught a treaty which Philip on the one hand and the states of Holland and Zealand on the other hand should sign.”

That she failed in her purpose was due to causes entirely beyond her control. While she was negotiating and coquetting with various powers on the Continent she failed to recognize what her policy of peace had done for her people. The mass of public opinion was with the rebels in the Netherlands and for war with Spain. Hundreds of Englishmen had enlisted in the Dutch armies, while the adventures of Drake, Hawkins and others had awakened a desire in the

minds of the English people for a share in the profits to be derived from the new world. While Elizabeth hated and feared war, she was always amenable to the wishes of her people, and so everything hastened the war. It is not my purpose to repeat the story of the defeat of the Armada. In the light of the later victories which England has achieved on the sea, the victory over Philip's fleet was a very puny one. At the time it apparently only temporarily checked the power of Spain, but in its consequences to England and to the rest of the world its importance cannot be overestimated, as it marked the end of English isolation and launched her upon that naval policy which has been her greatness for the past three hundred years.

Philip lived for ten years after the defeat of the Armada, and at the time of his death he was still ruler of the greatest power in the world, but at his very doors another nation was springing into power under the more enlightened rule of Henry of Navarre. The house of Valois was extinct, and under the Bourbons France became in turn the supreme nation on the continent of Europe. This was not evident at the time of Philip's death, but by that time the world had ceased to fear Spain, and, when fear of her was removed, the rest of Europe realized that the Spanish power had begun to decline. During the remainder of Elizabeth's reign, while England was more or less involved in the struggles on the Continent, her people at home were little interested in Continental affairs. They no longer turned their eyes across the narrow English Channel, but rather out across the broad At-

lantic, which also washed their shores. In the wars which followed the defeat of the Armada, the part which England played was the part which she has generally followed since. In all naval affairs she took the lead and struck hard, but on land she assisted her allies with subsidies and allowed them to do the fighting. England continued ostensibly at war with Spain until 1609, when a truce was established which lasted until near the end of the reign of James I. During this period England had established herself upon the North American Continent and had thus fairly entered upon her career of World Empire. She did not again come into active conflict with any Continental power until the reign of Cromwell. By the destruction of Spanish naval supremacy she had entered upon what has ever since been her paramount policy, one might almost say, her prime religious belief, namely, that England must rule the oceans, and whoever dared oppose this policy must be crushed.

CHAPTER II.

ENGLAND AND HOLLAND.

DURING the years between the accession of James I and the beheading of his son, England was forced by domestic troubles to practically abandon any strong foreign policy. It is not my purpose to tell of the long struggle between the first Stuart kings and their peoples, which eventually developed into a bitter civil war, culminating in the execution of Charles I. That act for the moment stunned Europe, and no people were apparently more shocked by it than the majority of the English themselves. With the destruction of royal power, Parliament became supreme, but Parliament was not, at first, able to handle the question of government alone, and its mistakes soon led to the second civil war between Parliament and the army. In this struggle the army was completely victorious, and Oliver Cromwell became the first man in England. That he proved himself to be one of the great generals and statesmen of the world is an undisputed fact. Charles I's death had at once made his son, Charles, king of Scotland, and had ended the temporary union of the two kingdoms. Cromwell determined that the union of Great Britain and Ireland was absolutely essential for the safety and development of the British Isles, and successfully brought it about by his wars

with Scotland and Ireland and the establishment of the Commonwealth of Great Britain. The earlier union between England and Scotland might be called a family affair, but the union established by Cromwell was a national union and has never been broken. During these years of internal struggles at home an entirely new conditions of affairs had arisen on the continent of Europe, while in North America another England had been firmly established, wholly through individual efforts of British subjects. With the decline of Spanish power in Europe, which began after the defeat of the Armada, England, as we have shown, had begun to turn her eyes away from the continent of Europe to the possibilities of the new world across the Atlantic; but she was not alone in this. During her years of internal struggle, Portugal had broken away from the Spanish rule, and, under the wise guidance of the house of Braganza, had recovered most of her oversea possessions, including Brazil; France had also not been idle but had established strong colonies in Acadia (Nova Scotia) and along the St. Lawrence, and had pushed her discoveries far into the interior of North America and held the Mississippi Valley, while Holland held the valley of the Hudson River. As yet these advances into America had not in any way alarmed England, but as soon as Cromwell had subdued Parliament and made England for the first time in her history a great military power, he found that Holland had become vastly powerful upon the seas.

In 1641, when William of Orange married Mary Stuart, the daughter of Charles I, the interests of the

Stuart and Orange families became identical and were thus a menace to the Republican government in England. The death of William II of Orange, just before the birth of his son, who was to become England's great king, William III, removed for a time any menace to Cromwell's peace of mind, as the Low Countries immediately set up a Republican form of government. It would have seemed the natural thing for the two Protestant Republics to have formed at once a close alliance, but Cromwell was not ready for that. It will be remembered that in 1585 an embassy had been sent to England from the States-General, petitioning Queen Elizabeth to assume the sovereignty of the Netherlands, and that she had declined. After the death of the Prince of Orange, during the session of the Great Convocation of the Netherlands in 1651, two ambassadors, named Oliver St. John and Walter Strickland, were sent from England to propose "a more strict and intimate alliance and union whereby there may be a more intrinsical and mutual interest of each in the other than hath hitherto been for the good of both." That this embassy failed can only be explained by the great commercial rivalry and jealousy which had grown up between the two countries. The English navy, which had had its real beginning under Sir Francis Drake and his contemporaries, had in the intervening years grown great, and wherever it sailed had come in contact with Dutch ships. During the first civil war, Parliament had kept control of the fleet, but in the second civil war the fleet had been divided, a large portion of the navy being Royalist in feeling, so

that we see at the same moment two civil wars in England, the one on land and the other, under the rival leaderships of Prince Rupert and Blake, upon the sea.

Blake's victories over Rupert did much to unify the navy and fix in the minds of the British Government the idea, which has ever since been first in England's mind—that Britain must rule the sea. In England's maritime civil war it was practically impossible for Holland not to become involved. Her ships crowded the North Atlantic and the English Channel, and were the carriers of the world. They even carried a large percentage of British trade, so that the English demand for a political union did not appeal to the Dutch people in 1651. In 1585 the Dutch states had been engaged in a life and death struggle with Spain, and England's help seemed vital. Now Spain no longer ruled the waves, and the greater part of the world's trade traveled in Dutch bottoms. This time it was Holland which declined the proposed union. Alarmed at what she considered Dutch aggression, England entered upon what has ever since been her fixed policy—to write the maritime law of the world. Seeley says,

“A policy now begins which is not, to be sure, very scrupulous, but which is able, resolute and successful.”

Again, he says:

“Moral rectitude is hardly a characteristic of it, and if it is religious this perhaps would have appeared, had the Protectorate lasted longer, to have been its most dangerous feature. Nothing is more dangerous than imperialism marching with an idea on its banner, and Protestantism was to our Emperor

Oliver what the ideas of the Revolution were to Napoleon and his nephew.

"We may well, I think, shudder at the thought of the danger which was removed by the fall of the Protectorate."

In 1651, the year of its unsuccessful mission to Holland, England passed the Navigation Act, which remained in force for two hundred years. Seeley calls this "the act which laid the foundation of the English Commercial Empire."

It completed the work begun by Drake and carried on by Raleigh, and created an English commercial navy. Before this the English people had established colonies in America and factories in India, but the bulk of the carrying between England, America and India had been done by the Dutch merchant fleet. The Navigation Act excluded the Dutch from carrying any English trade and thus struck a deadly blow at the state with which, a few months earlier in the same year, England had attempted to form a political union. Another provision of the Navigation Act to which England has steadfastly adhered as vital to her self-preservation was the "right of search." To the Dutch people, who lived by the carrying trade of the world, this was a blow which could not be accepted without a struggle, and so we see war declared in 1652 between the two Protestant and Republican governments who should have been in closest alliance because they upheld, or professed to uphold, the same faith and the same ideals.

All the great wars of Europe in former centuries had been primarily religious wars, but from now on

we will find, if we search for the very beginnings of struggles, that questions of trade and not questions of ideals cause most of the great wars of the world. This war was brought about solely because of trade rivalry between the Dutch and the English. In 1624, 1646 and 1650 the question of legislation against the Dutch carrying trade had been brought up in the British Parliament. In March, 1651, the Dutch Republic entered into an alliance with Denmark which distinctly threatened British trade in the Baltic Sea and was the prime motive for the passage of the Navigation Act. England had begun to realize that her vocation was distinctly commercial and maritime, and to fulfill her manifest destiny it was absolutely essential that she must continually build and maintain her fleet. To do this she must have easy access to the world's supply of hemp, tar and timber. In those days these materials could only be found in the Baltic countries. Any arrangement between other powers which could interfere with her direct communication with these countries was a menace which England naturally felt was not to be endured. It was to her a matter of commercial life and death that the narrow strait which marks the entrance to the Baltic Sea should be kept open. It was equally natural that Holland, when she found herself on the eve of war with England, should desire to cut her rival off from access to those countries which produced the materials most needed for the maintenance of the British fleet. An alliance with Denmark made this possible. At that time Denmark was one of the important states in Europe, and, because

of the family connection between the Danish ruling family and the house of Stuart (James I having married a Danish princess), the Danish Government was hostile to the English Commonwealth.

When the news of the Dutch-Danish Treaty reached England, the British Government at once became alarmed. It was for the purpose of checkmating an alliance which might cut them off from the Baltic Sea that the British Government decided to send St. John and Strickland to Holland to propose that political union to which I have already referred. Mr. Geddes prints from the manuscript order Book of the Council of State, May 9, 1651, in his *Administration of John de Witt*, page 176, the following paragraph of instruction to St. John and Strickland:

"Whereas the trade of this nation through the Sound into the Baltique Sea is of very great concernment, both in respect of the usefulness of the commodities brought from thence, so necessary, among other things, for building and rigging of ships, which it is not convenient that we should only receive or not at the pleasure of other nations; but more especially in regard of the great number of ships we have employed in the transportation of these bulky goods whereby mariners are bred and they and our shipping maintained, and being also but short voyages, are often at home to be made use of in case of any public occasions of the state requiring their services; and, whereas, this trade being very much weakened otherwise, is in danger to be wholly lost by the agreement that hath been lately made between the King of Denmark and the States-General of the United Provinces, etc."

Of course, these instructions to their ambassadors were never intended to reach the eyes of the Dutch Government, but they plainly show the motive which

prompted the English Commonwealth to propose a union of the two republics. After the embassy had failed and the Navigation Act had been passed, the war was inevitable. Between the Baltic States were rivalries as bitter as those between Spain and the Netherlands or the great houses of Bourbon and Hapsburg. For a century Denmark and Sweden had been in a state of constantly renewing conflict, while the disputes between Sweden and Poland had been equally bitter.

When Holland, so powerful upon the sea, proposed a treaty of alliance, Denmark could not but feel that such an association would strengthen her greatly against her rival to the North, and, consequently, in the winter of 1652-53, a treaty was drawn up between the United Provinces of the Netherlands and the Kingdom of Denmark which closed the Sound between Denmark and the Scandinavian Peninsula to all English ships.

By this treaty Denmark agreed to enforce this closure of the Sound by a fleet, while the United Provinces agreed to share the expense of maintaining such a fleet and also to defend Denmark against any attacks which might be made upon her because of this treaty. I do not intend to enter into any of the details of the struggle which continued until April, 1654, and ended with the establishment of the supremacy of the British fleet. We have seen how the nation which, at the succession of Elizabeth in 1558, was but a small power occupying only a portion of the island of Great Britain and torn up with religious dissensions, had in a little

less than one hundred years defeated the greatest monarchy modern Europe had ever seen, and had also reduced to a second place upon the sea that other nation, so akin to her in racial characteristics, ideals and religious beliefs, which she herself had helped to upbuild. For some years more, in fact until the accession of a Prince of Orange to the throne of England in 1688, Holland continued to prosper upon the sea, but never to quite the same extent as she had done under Cromwell. When Charles II came to the throne he was wise enough to follow in general the foreign policy of the Commonwealth, except where it directly interfered with his personal relations with Louis XIV. It was of equal interest to the French king, who was busily building up a navy of his own, to cripple the naval power of both Holland and England, so we find his emissaries secretly fostering friction between the English and the Dutch.

When, therefore, Charles wished to form an alliance with France, his government supported him in Parliament, although it was to be another alliance between a Catholic and a Protestant power against a Protestant one. William Ashley Cooper, a statesman of the Cromwellian type, made an impassioned speech in Parliament, quoting Cato's words, "*Delenda est Carthago,*" and saying "Holland is our great rival in trade, on the ocean and in the New World. Let us destroy her, though she be a Protestant power; let us destroy her with the help of a Catholic power." That this destruction was accomplished is now a matter of history, but little did the statesmen of that day

believe that, by making the alliance which they so strongly advocated, they were helping to build up a rival both on the sea and in the New World who would draw them into a series of wars that would strain English strength and drain English coffers for more than a hundred years.

CHAPTER III.

ENGLAND AND FRANCE.

TO tell in detail the story of the struggle between England and France, which finally resulted in the elimination of the latter as a dangerous rival upon the seas, would cover several volumes, as this struggle practically began in the reign of Elizabeth and continued, intermittently, until the final defeat of Napoleon at Waterloo in 1815.

In the early part of Elizabeth's reign the Continental power which she really feared was not Spain, against whom she later waged a successful war, but France. The reason for this is easy to understand because her cousin, Mary Stuart, whom the Catholics in England regarded as the legitimate heir to Henry VIII, was the wife of the Dauphin and later, for a brief period, queen consort of France. At this time the house of Valois, so soon to suffer a total eclipse, divided with the house of Hapsburg the sovereignty of Continental Europe, and in the person of Mary Stuart claimed to be the rightful ruler of Great Britain, because Mary Stuart was the recognized queen of Scotland. This fact alone amply accounts for Elizabeth's reluctance to quarrel with Phillip. By the time that it was no longer possible to avoid war with Spain, the house of

Valois had become extinct, and Henry of Navarre, the champion of Protestantism in France, had succeeded to the throne and was engaged in a bitter civil war to secure possession of his inheritance, which Philip II, through his marriage to Elizabeth of Valois, was claiming for his own. We have shown how Elizabeth had become recognized in Europe as the Protestant Queen, because of the assistance which she had for so many years given to the Low Countries in their struggle with Spain. When she found herself facing actual war with Spain, what was more natural than that she should form an alliance with Henry of Navarre, a Protestant prince engaged in a life and death struggle to maintain possession of his throne.

The Spanish War was practically ended by the defeat of the Armada, although the state of war between the two countries lasted until 1597. In 1593, however, an event had taken place which greatly changed the condition of affairs on the Continent—Henry IV became Roman Catholic. By this act he removed the main cause of opposition to him in his own country and also put an end to the animosity of Philip and entered upon that policy of internal development, strengthened by foreign alliances, which so rapidly raised the house of Bourbon to a point of equality with the house of Hapsburg. After the death of Henry IV, France, under the ministry of the Cardinals Richelieu and Mazarin, shortly became the greatest power in Western Europe. During these years England was undergoing her own civil conflict, and later, under the dictatorship of Cromwell, was engaged in her struggle with the Dutch Re-

public. After Holland was reduced to second place upon the sea, Cromwell formed an alliance with his former rival and ostensibly waged war with Spain, but in reality his opponent was France, under Mazarin. In France, in spite of the fact that Mazarin had formally recognized the government of Cromwell, the sympathies were all with the house of Stuart, which was so largely French in blood; and in France, Henrietta Maria, daughter of Henry IV, and widow of Charles I had found an asylum for herself and her sons. Until the Revolution of 1688, which marked the beginning of modern England, the relationship between the Stuart kings, Charles II and James II, and their cousin, Louis XIV, was of the closest type. This period marks a lull in the struggle between France and England, but with the exile of James II and the accession of William and Mary, a new period begins.

Sir John Seeley says of this period:

"Between the Revolution (1688) and the Battle of Waterloo, it may be reckoned that we waged seven great wars, of which the shortest lasted seven years, and the longest about twelve. Out of a hundred and twenty-six years, sixty-four years, or more than half, were spent in war."

"No English historian has covered this period of struggle more thoroughly than has Seeley in his two great books, *The Expansion of England* and *The Growth of British Policy*, and as he conclusively proves that the struggle between England and France was the most important event in the history of the British Empire, I shall quote him very freely in this chapter in

order to show the motives which were back of this gigantic struggle. Summarizing the wars of this period, 1688 to 1815, Seeley says:

"Let us pass these wars in review. There was first the European War, in which England was involved by the Revolution of 1688. It is pretty well remembered since the story of it has been told by Macaulay. It lasted eight years, from 1689 to 1697. Then there was the great war called from the Spanish Succession, which we shall always remember because it was the war of Marlborough's victories. It lasted eleven years, from 1702 to 1713. The next great war has now passed almost entirely out of memory, not having brought to light any very great commander, nor having achieved any definite results—and yet this war, too, lasted nine years, from 1739 to 1748. Next comes the Seven Years' War, in which we have not forgotten the victories of Frederick. In the English part of it we all remember one grand incident, the battle of the Heights of Abraham, the death of Wolfe and the conquest of Canada. We have quite forgotten that that victory was one of a long series, which to contemporaries seemed fabulous, so that the nation came out of it intoxicated with glory, and England stood upon a pinnacle of greatness which she had never reached before. This is the fourth war. It is in sharp contrast with the fifth which we have tacitly agreed to mention as seldom as we can. What we call the American War, which, from the first outbreak of hostilities to the Peace of Paris, lasted eight years, from 1775 to 1783, was indeed ignominious enough in America, but in its latter part it spread into a great naval war, in which England stood at bay against almost all the world, and in this, through the victories of Rodney, we came off with some credit. The sixth and seventh are the two great wars with Revolutionary France, which we are not likely to forget, although we ought to keep them more separate in our minds than we do. The first lasted nine years, from 1793 to 1802, and the second twelve, from 1803 to 1815."

During the long period of time covered by these seven great wars it is not the wars themselves which are of interest to the student of history, but the motives back of these wars. If we look into these motives we will find that every one of them is fundamentally a war for the purpose of securing some sort of commercial supremacy. England fought Spain because of the "right of search" which was claimed by the Spaniards and having settled that question to her own satisfaction by eliminating the Spanish naval power, she immediately established that same principle of the "right of search" as being fundamental to the protection and preservation of her own naval supremacy. We Americans know how our fathers regarded that principle in 1812, and what it cost us, although today, so completely does the passage of time change public opinion, it seems to be the desire of our government and our press to defend Great Britain's assumptions. The fourth war mentioned by Seeley is what in our American textbooks is known as the "French and Indian War." During the able administration of Colbert, under Louis XIV, France had not only firmly established herself on the banks of the St. Lawrence River and in the peninsula of Nova Scotia, but she had also, under the intrepid leadership of La Salle, Bienville and others, pushed her discoveries into the heart of the North American Continent and taken possession of the whole of the Mississippi Valley to the Gulf of Mexico.

It would almost seem to the casual observer that France was destined to be the controlling power in

shaping the destinies of the North American Continent, but, unfortunately for her, the very extent of her possessions led to her loss of them. England possessed a compact settlement of hardy and intelligent colonies reaching from the Bay of Fundy to the peninsula of Florida and extending inland to the Appalachian Mountains. Nowhere in the world was the principle of self-government more deeply implanted than in the hearts of the British colonists, as was shown in 1775, when they entered into their long struggle for the defense of this principle. Under Colbert's administration France had not only greatly increased her foreign possessions but had also become the predominant power in all European affairs, so that wherever England turned she found herself opposed and thwarted by what she considered French aggression. The center of trade was no longer the Mediterranean Sea, as it had been even as late as the days of Elizabeth, but was now upon the Atlantic Ocean, as the Continents upon its Western shores offered to Europe boundless opportunities of development and the consequent trade possibilities resulting therefrom. British statesmen were keen to see that the control of the central valley of the North American Continent by a hostile power effectually prevented the growth and expansion of her seaboard colonies; they also saw that by the conquest of North America they would effectually cripple the arrogant pretensions of France. After the successful conclusion of the Seven Years' War, Europe settled down to what was expected to be a long period of peace and internal development, and

no country felt itself more secure than England, with all of North America except Mexico and Louisiana for her future expansion, and her supremacy upon the seas universally recognized.

In less than thirty years the conflagration broke out again, and this time it was started by these same ungrateful American colonists in whose behalf the Mother Country had fought a bloody war, for whose expansion she had freed a continent from foreign yoke, and really for whose development George III was bending every effort to build up a strong paternal government similar to that established by the house of Bourbon, which had made of France the most powerful nation in the world. We all know how Bourbonism was soon destroyed both in England and France. The English Government, under the wise guidance of William Pitt and Charles Fox, accepted the lessons which the American colonists had taught it and entered upon that reconstructed colonial policy which has so splendidly built up the present world-wide British Empire. After the war, which cost England all of her North American colonies except Canada and Nova Scotia, France entered headlong into her great Revolution, which shook the very foundations of European civilization and seemed, for a time, to threaten the destruction of monarchical government. Out of the French Revolution arose a new Europe, in which a revived French nation struggled through various forms of attempted self-government until, under the autocratic power of the most brilliant military genius since Julius Caesar, the Napoleonic Empire

dominated the entire Continent of Europe and entered into its final struggle for the overthrow of England's supremacy of the sea. Napoleon seems to have realized, from the commencement of his meteoric career, that England alone blocked the way to the permanent supremacy of France, and that, in order to attain to this supremacy, it was necessary for France to recover her lost place on the American Continent, and some control of the sea, and a careful study of his plans reveals how deep-laid were Napoleon's designs for such recovery. Seeley says:

"He sees in England never the island, the European State, but always the World-Empire, the network of dependencies and colonies and islands covering every sea, among which he was himself destined to find at last his prison and his grave.

"Thus, when in 1798 he was put in charge for the first time of the war with England, he begins by examining the British Channel, and, no doubt, glances at Ireland. But what he sees does not tempt him, although a few months afterward Ireland broke out in a terrible rebellion, during which, if the conqueror of Italy had suddenly landed at the head of a French army, undoubtedly he would have struck a heavier blow at England than any she has yet suffered. His mind is preoccupied with other thoughts. He remembers how France once seemed on the point of conquering India, until England checked her progress; accordingly he decides, and convinces the Directory, that the best way to carry on the contest with England is by occupying Egypt . . . and he actually carries out this plan so that the whole struggle is transferred from the British Channel into the boundless spaces of Greater Britain.

"When this war was brought to an end by the treaty of Amiens, in 1802, the results of it were such as to make a

great epoch in the history of Great Britain. In the first place Egypt is finally evacuated by France—in the colonial world England remained mistress of Ceylon and Trinidad.

“But the last war, that which lasted from 1803 to 1815, was this in any sense a war for the New World? It does not seem to be so; and naturally, because England from the very beginning had such a naval superiority that Napoleon could never again succeed in making his way back into the New World. Nevertheless, I believe it was intended by Napoleon to be so. By the treaty of Amiens England had engaged within a given time to evacuate Malta, and this, for certain reasons which need not here be discussed, she afterwards refused to do. Now, why did Napoleon want her to leave Malta, and why did she refuse to do so? It was because Malta was the key of Egypt, and she had good reason to believe that he would in a moment re-occupy Egypt and that the struggle for India would begin again. . . .

“The fact is that Napoleon’s intention in this war is obscured to us by the grand failure of the maritime enterprise which he had planned. . . .

“He drifts in a direction he does not intend, yet the Continental system and the violent seizure of Spain and Portugal (great New World powers) shows that he does not forget his original object. Moreover, Colonel Matterson shows in his *“Later Struggles of France in the East”* what a destructive privateering war the French were able to keep up in the Indian Ocean from their island of Mauritius, long after their naval power had been destroyed at Trafalgar. It was by the conquest of this island and its retention at the Peace of England that the Hundred Years’ War in England and France for the New World came to an end.”

England alone, among European powers, came out of the Napoleonic conflict unscathed. By her control of the sea her country had escaped invasion by the conqueror, although we know, from both the histories

and the romances of that period, that as long as Napoleon sat on the throne of France the English people never felt secure from invasion, and only when she had him completely in her power did she feel that she had at last reached her goal as the first power of the world. Even then, so long and bitter had been the struggle and at many times so close the contest, that Seeley says:

“In fact, in those times and down to our own memory the eternal discord of England and France appeared so much a law of nature that it was seldom spoken of.”

CHAPTER IV.

THE CONQUEST OF INDIA.

THE story of the British Conquest of India is totally different from that of British Expansion in other quarters of the globe, and in many ways resembles the conquests of Mexico and Peru by Cortez and Pizzaro. In all three cases the conquests were begun by private adventurers for private gain, but, just as the Spanish Government took over the lands possessed by their subjects in North and South America, so England, in 1784, when Pitt introduced his India Bill to Parliament, officially assumed the control of the affairs of the East India Company, and on the final dissolution of that company India became an integral part of the British Empire, with a Secretary of State for India who is a recognized member of the British Cabinet, has a seat in Parliament and is responsible for the administration of Indian affairs. All authorities in British history dwell, in their accounts of the conquest of India, upon the fact that Great Britain drifted into it as a consequence of the long-drawn-out struggle between France and England. Seeley is, as usual in dealing with the story of the upbuilding of Greater Britain, the most clear and concise of historians. He says:

"Our acquisition of India was made blindly. Nothing great that has ever been done by Englishmen was done so unintentionally, so accidentally, as the conquest of India. There has indeed been little enough of calculation or contrivance in our colonization. When our first settlers went out to Virginia or New England, it was not intended to lay the foundations of a mighty republican state. But here the event has differed from the design only in degree. We did intend to establish a new community, and we even knew that it would be republican in its tendency; what was hidden from us was only its immense magnitude. But in India we meant one thing and did quite another. Our object was trade, and in this we were not particularly successful. War with the native states we did not think of at all till a hundred years after our first settlement, and then we thought only of such war as might support our trade; after this time again more than half a century passed before we thought of any considerable territorial acquisitions; the Nineteenth Century had almost begun before the policy of acquiring an ascendancy over the native states was entered upon; and our present supreme position cannot be said to have been entered upon before the Governor-Generalship of Lord Dalhousie, a little more than a quarter of a century ago. All along we have been looking one way and moving another. . . . We call this Empire a conquest in order to mark the fact that it was not acquired in any degree by settlement or colonization but by a series of wars, ending in cessions of territory by the native Powers to the East India Company."

It is interesting to note that the East India Company, the world's first great trade monopoly, came into existence A. D. 1600, just after England had defeated Spain and had begun her maritime career. Shortly after its foundation the English colonization of North America began. That was truly the age of the great adventure, when the world seemed to open up after its

long sleep during the Dark Ages and offer golden opportunities to any brave soul who felt the call of the sea. It was just at this time that the first English trade settlements were made in India. The East India Company was created solely for purposes of trade, and for nearly a century and a half it devoted itself to these purposes. In 1748, when disturbances broke out in the Deccan, the Company, in order to quiet these disturbances, assumed some of the functions of government and war. In those days the distance between England and India was infinitely greater than today, and the home government was entirely too much absorbed in European affairs to pay much attention to what might be happening in far-off India. The Deccan disturbances were quelled, and the Company entered upon its second period, a period of conquest and assimilation which lasted until the company was destroyed by Act of Parliament in 1858. Of this period of conquest Seeley says (*Expansion of England*, page 180) :

“The conquest of India by English merchants seems a unique and abnormal phenomenon, but we should be mistaken if we supposed that there was anything peculiarly English, either in the originality which conceived the idea or in the energy which carried it into execution. So far as an idea of conquering India was deliberately conceived, it was conceived by Frenchmen; Frenchmen first perceived that it was feasible and saw the manner in which it could be done; Frenchmen first set about it and advanced some way towards accomplishing it. In India indeed they had the start of us, much more decidedly than in North America; in India we had at the outset a sense of inferiority in comparison with them, and fought in a spirit of hopeless self-defense. And I find,

when I study the English conquest of India, that we were actuated neither by ambition nor yet by a mere desire to advance our trade, but from the first to the last, that is, from the first efforts of Clive to the time when Lord Wellesley, Lord Minto and Lord Hastings established our authority over the whole vast peninsula, we were actuated by the fear of the French. Behind every movement of the native Powers we saw French intrigue, French gold, French ambition, and never, until we were masters of the whole country, got rid of the feeling that the French were driving us out of it, which had descended from the days of Dupleix and Labourdonnais."

James Mill, whose book, *A History of the British India*, was the first reliable treatise upon the British Conquest, says:

"The two important discoveries for conquering India were: first, the weakness of the native armies against European discipline; second, the facility of imparting that discipline to natives in the European service. . . . Both discoveries were made by the French."

The truth of the matter is that the natives themselves conquered India, and this came about solely because, in the modern sense of the word, there was no India, but only a vast conglomeration of rival principalities. The condition was very similar to that of Germany at the time of Napoleon. Then there were no Germans, as we now use the word, but there were Prussians, Bavarians, Austrians, Suabians, etc., whose rivalries Napoleon was able to make use of by setting the soldiery of one petty principality against another. Just in this way did the East India Company employ natives against, first the French and later against other natives. The sepoys made good fighters but poor officers. Dur-

ing this long struggle the East India Company secured the services of two of the most remarkable men in modern history—Lord Clive and Warren Hastings. About both of these men much has been written, both for and against, and about both hangs the glamour of romance because of the things they actually accomplished and also because, to the English mind, there has always been a tinge of romance and mystery about everything connected with India, largely due to the distance between the two countries and the difficulty to obtain exact facts. Macaulay's "Essay on Clive" is a panegyric on English valour. "None could resist Clive and his Englishmen," and yet careful and exact historians, like Seeley, tell us that four-fifths of the English army was composed of sepoys, and that they always kept pace with the English in courage and efficiency. The latest edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* describes Lord Clive as "the first of a century's brilliant successes of those 'soldier-politicals,' as they are called in the East, to whom Great Britain owes the conquest and consolidation of its greatest dependency."

Warren Hastings' career was even more full of those "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune" which always create an atmosphere of romance about a man. In his youth he was a bookkeeper at Calcutta in the services of the East India Company. In 1771, at the age of thirty-nine, he was made governor of Bengal and later became governor-general of East India. In this position he worked out the first systematic civil government and put an end to the worst forms of

corruption which had previously existed among government officials, and the wholesale plundering of natives. Speaking of the proceedings carried on under Clive and Hastings, Seeley says:

“Our first step to Empire was very plainly taken with a view simply of defending our factories. The Madras Presidency grew out of an effort, which in the first instance was quite necessary, to protect Fort George and Fort David from the French. The Bengal Presidency grew in a similar way out of the evident necessity of protecting Fort William and punishing the Mussulman Nawab of Bengal, Surajah Dowlah, for his atrocity of the Black Hole. So far the causation is clear. In the period which immediately followed the revolutionary and corrupt period of British India, it is undeniable that we were hurried on by mere rapacity.”

He calls Warren Hastings' actions at Benares, Oude and Rohilcund mere “money speculations.” Whatever they may have been, they gave rise to one of the greatest, if not the greatest, legal process in history. “The impeachment of Warren Hastings” is a story that will be read as long as the English language is spoken. It dragged on from February, 1788, to April, 1795, and ended in Hastings' acquittal in spite of the fact that he had pitted against him England's greatest orator, Edmund Burke. Posterity has endorsed his acquittal because of the genuine reforms which he introduced in India, but, during his lifetime, he was always the subject of bitter attack at home because of the cruelty with which he carried out his reforms. Six years before the trial against Hastings began, Henry Dundas, Treasurer of the Admiralty, who later became Lord Melville and First Lord of the Admiralty, addressed

the House of Commons for three hours (April 9, 1782) on the "causes and extent of the national calamities in the East." He laid before the House the misconduct of the Indian Presidencies and of the Court of Directors of the East India Company, showing that the former had plunged the nation into wars of conquest, had condemned and violated treaties and plundered and oppressed the Indian peoples, while the latter only blamed misconduct when it had produced no profit and had systematically glossed over the actions of the greatest delinquents, whenever these actions had brought profit to the Company. He ended his speech with a number of resolutions upon which the House solemnly voted. At this time there was a strong feeling in England against the proceedings in India, which produced all sorts of inflammatory articles, even poems. Thus Cowper wrote of his country:

"That she is rigid in denouncing death
On petty robbers, and indulges life
And liberty, and oft-times honor, too,
To speculators of the public gold.
That thieves at home must hang, but he that puts
Into his over-gorged and bloated purse,
The wealth of India's provinces escapes."

After the passage of Pitt's India Bill (1784) there was a distinct improvement in the government of India and far less increase of territory under the East India Company until the appointment of Lord Wellesley as Governor-General in 1798. He started the policy of intervention in native affairs, followed by annexation. During his administration and that of Lord Hastings,

his successor, the boundaries of British dominion in the peninsula were very materially increased. Under Clive and Warren Hastings the British may be said to have acquired control of the eastern coast from Madras to Calcutta; under Lord Wellesley and Lord Hastings the Mahratta power was completely overthrown and British power was established over the central and western portions of the country. This period of conquest ended in 1820. From then until the appointment of Lord Dalhousie as Governor-General of India and Governor of Bengal in 1848, there was comparative peace throughout the peninsula. Lord Dalhousie was Governor-General for nine years and his administration is in many ways the most notable of any of those carried out by the East India Company. The record of the administration by the Company is notable for the number of very remarkable men whose services it employed and among these men no one was more remarkable than James Andrew Ramsay, first Marquis and tenth Earl of Dalhousie. He was born on April 22nd, 1812, and died on December 19th, 1860. The *Encyclopædia Britannica* says of him:

“He crowded into his short life conspicuous public services in England, and established an unrivaled position among the master builders of the Indian Empire. Denounced on the eve of his death, as the chief offender who failed to notice the signs of the Indian Mutiny of 1857, and even aggravated the crisis by his overbearing self-consciousness, centralizing activity and reckless annexations, he stands out in the clear light of history as the far-sighted Governor-General who consolidated British rule in India.”

Seeley speaks of him as "a ruler of the type of Frederick the Great" and says that he "did deeds which are almost as difficult to justify as the seizure of Silesia or the Partition of Poland." Almost immediately after his arrival in India a fierce rebellion broke out in the Punjab district. Without waiting for any instructions from England, Lord Dalhousie quickly suppressed this rebellion and took over the entire district in 1849, taking into his own custody the infant Maharajah. He inaugurated what is called the "policy of lapses," which consisted in annexing to the British dominions any native Hindu state which had been created or revived by the British government, in which there was a failure of the lineal male line of succession. Under this policy, in 1849, he added to the British dominions the provinces of Satara, Jaipur and Sambalpur. By the same process, in 1853, he annexed Jhansi and Nagpur. In 1852, as a result of one of those uprisings among the natives which had constantly sprung up under the rule of the East India Company, Dalhousie had conquered Martaban, Rangoon and Bassein and in 1853 had also annexed Pegu. All of these annexations had been quietly approved by the British Government, but in 1856 his war with the King of Oudh, which was the immediate cause of the Sepoy Rebellion of 1857 and the final downfall of the East India Company, aroused a storm of indignation in England and brought about Lord Dalhousie's resignation.

The motto, "Unity of authority coupled with direct responsibility," seems to have been the keynote of

Dalhousie's policy. In pursuit of this policy he tried to force the King of Oudh to sign a treaty which left him, the King, with his throne and an empty title but deprived him of all administrative authority in his hereditary dominions. This treaty the King refused to sign and consequently his Kingdom was made a part of the British dominions. With this annexation the conquest of India may be said to be complete. That there was great dissatisfaction among the native peoples cannot be denied. Had the British regarded the religious feelings of the Hindus and Mohammedans, and not done violence to the prejudices of caste, the conquest might almost be described as one of benevolent assimilation and the Sepoy rebellion might never have taken place. The story of this rebellion as told by Colonel Malleon in his *History of the Indian Mutiny* is one of the gruesome horrors perpetrated by both sides, and its suppression profoundly stirred Europe because of the atrocities perpetrated, among them being the method of executing rebels by binding them to the mouths of cannons which were then exploded. The *Encyclopædia Britannica* in its account of the mutiny, says, "as early as 1764 it became necessary to stamp out mutiny by blowing thirty Sepoys from the cannon's mouth." Colonel Malleon gives as the principal cause of the mutiny the bad faith of the British Government towards the Sepoys. He says: "The Government punished the Sepoys for declining to fulfill a contract which the Government had broken."

For this he blames Lord Dalhousie, especially for his annexation of the Kingdom of Oudh. "Of these

acts," he says, "of the attempts, as I have termed it, to disregard the silent growth of ages and to force Western ideas upon an Eastern people and in the course of that attempt to trample upon prejudices and to disregard obligations, the mutiny was the too certain consequence." With the suppression of the mutiny all active opposition to British power ceased and in 1858 India came under the direct control of the crown. As in our Revolution England learned, from the opposition of the American colonists, how to administer her English speaking dependencies so as to win their support to the Empire, so from the mutiny of 1857 she gained an insight into the workings of the Oriental mind which she has never lost, and which gained for her the support of India in the present war. Warren Hastings was said to have increased the population of the British Empire by two hundred millions and the receipts of the state by from three to five million pounds. Even before the whole history of his administration was shown forth by the matchless eloquence of Edmund Burke, Richard Price writing his *Observations on the Nature of Civil Liberty, the Principles of Justice and the Policy of the War with America*, said in 1776:

"Turn your eyes to India. There more has been done than is now attempted in America. There Englishmen, actuated by the love of plunder and the spirit of conquest have depopulated whole Kingdoms, ruined millions of innocent people by the most infamous oppression and rapacity. The justice of the nation has slept over these enormities. Will the justice of Heaven sleep?"

Seeley, summing up his account of the conquest, while acknowledging that it was begun "in pursuit of trade and had great trade for one of its results," comes to the conclusion that under the direct control of the British government it has developed into a conquest of a higher plane, that of carrying Western civilization to the half-buried Eastern world.

CHAPTER V.

ENGLAND AND THE UNITED STATES IN 1812

AS a phase of her great struggle with Napoleon, England, to her own surprise, found herself once again involved in war with the United States. After the treaty of September 3rd, 1783, recognizing the independence of the former colonies, Benjamin Franklin said that the war ending with the surrender of Cornwallis was simply a war of Revolution and that the war for the real independence of America had yet to be fought. Few prophesies have come true more quickly than this one of Franklin's. The causes of the trouble began soon after the adoption of the Constitution by the several states, because of England's aggressive policies on the high seas. On November 11th, 1807, Great Britain issued a series of Orders in Council in which she forbade any neutral trade with France or her allies, except through Great Britain. The conditions on the continent were such that this order prevented neutrals from trading with all the continental nations but Sweden. The Orders in Council also declared that all neutral vessels bound for France or any country allied to France must touch at some British or Irish port, pay re-exportation duties and upon payment of such duties receive a British

license to trade with the continent of Europe; that there should be no exportation from France except in vessels which had complied with the above conditions and further that all vessels must return to a British port and unload.

In retaliation for the British Orders in Council, Napoleon issued his Milan Decree in which he declared that any vessel submitting to the conditions set forth in the British orders forfeited all its rights.

Preparatory to issuing her Orders in Council, Great Britain had, on October 19th of the same year, 1807, summoned for service all seamen who had ever served under the British flag. This was a direct slap at the United States as it was practically a claim that all American seamen over twenty years of age were British subjects. Neutral trade was almost completely destroyed by the two decrees. President Jefferson drove the last nail into its coffin by his famous Embargo Act of December 22nd, 1807. Previous to this time the Americans had built up what was, for those days, a large ship-building industry and the American flag was to be found flying bravely in all the Seven Seas. After the passage of the Embargo the harbors of New England and the Chesapeake Bay were crowded with silent ships; business was at a complete standstill and the future of America looked very dark.

In spite of the calamities to American prosperity during his two administrations Jefferson's personal popularity was undiminished. The people did not forget that in 1803 he had boldly set aside the constitutional limitations of his executive power, and had secured for

his country by his Louisiana purchase, the rich and fertile Mississippi Valley, so he was again urged to stand for re-election. This he refused to do, not because, like Washington, he was wearied by the strain of a gigantic struggle, but because he wished to establish a precedent that no man should be president more than eight years. The precedent thus established became an unwritten law which continued in force without a single attempt to set it aside for a period of one hundred and four years.

If Jefferson would not risk another election for himself, he nevertheless determined who should succeed him to the high office, as he made James Madison president. Under Madison's first administration conditions in the country remained unchanged. All Europe was at war then as it is to-day and then, as now, the whole world suffered in consequence. Early in Madison's administration Mr. Erskine, the British Minister in Washington, notified the State Department that he had been informed by Mr. Canning that the objectionable British Orders in Council would be cancelled on June 10, 1809. This news was received with universal rejoicing in America, but alas! almost before the public celebrations of joy were over, word came to this country that the Orders were still in force, that Mr. Erskine had exceeded his instructions and that he was recalled. Great Britain sent in Mr. Erskine's place as Minister Francis James Jackson, who proved as objectionable to our government as the notorious Genet whom Washington sent back to France. Jackson was recalled and for over a year there was no

British Minister in this country. In the spring of 1810 Congress passed a bill removing all restrictions on foreign commerce, but forbidding intercourse with either France or England, if either continued hostile to our trade. The public sentiment of the country rightly condemned this bill as a disgraceful piece of legislation savoring of bribery to one or the other of the great powers and it was eventually repealed. In 1811 William Pinckney, one of the ablest diplomats that our country has ever produced, returned from England, where he had spent five years of arduous labor in an attempt to gain for the United States proper consideration and treatment. England refused to regard this country as anything but a second-rate power whose rights upon the sea were worthy of no consideration.

When our trade with France was reopened, English vessels blockaded New York for the purpose of capturing all boats bound for France and impressing American seamen. The affair of the "Guerrière" and the "President," trivial as it was, brought matters to an issue and caused Great Britain to send Mr. Foster to represent her in Washington. The "Guerrière" had impressed, from a vessel bound for France, an American seaman named Diggio with several others. The Secretary of the Navy sent in pursuit of the "Guerrière" a forty-four gun frigate, the "President," to rescue Diggio and the other Americans, and protect our commerce and vindicate the honor of our navy. While under sail the "President" sighted a boat thought to be the "Guerrière." On the demand "What

ship is that?" a shot was fired which lodged in the main mast of the "President"; a skirmish ensued in which one boy on the "President" was wounded. At day-break the opposing ship was found to be a British corvette of twenty guns, named the "Little Belt." As a result of the skirmish seventy-two men on the "Little Belt" were killed and twenty-one wounded. Shortly after this affair Mr. Foster arrived in the United States, but when it was found that he had no power to repeal the obnoxious Orders in Council feeling in this country ran very high. The President and his cabinet were opposed to war, as was a large portion of Congress, but, as has so often happened in the world's history, the jingoes prevailed.

In December, 1811, a new session of Congress, the twelfth, entered upon its duties. This Congress, in its makeup, was very different from its immediate predecessors, because of the infusion of new and younger blood into its councils. Two members of the House, who afterwards became very prominent in American affairs, first came before the public at this time. They were Henry Clay of Kentucky and John C. Calhoun of South Carolina. Clay was elected to the speakership of the House, a position which he held for many years. That this Congress would accept from England nothing less than an unqualified repeal of the Orders in Council was soon evident, and this Mr. Foster had no authority to grant. A bill to raise the army from ten thousand to thirty-five thousand men passed both Houses and a loan of eleven million dollars was authorized. In April, 1812, Congress ordered the President to call for one hundred thousand

volunteers and to declare an Embargo for ninety days in order to make needed preparations in the navy. On June 1st the President sent to Congress a message in which he gave four reasons for war with Great Britain. They were:

First—The impressment of American seamen.

Second—The harassing of our shipping by British cruisers along our coast.

Third—The pretended blockade of European coasts and the plundering of American ships.

Fourth—The British Orders in Council.

In the spring of 1812 the administration had purchased from an Irishman named John Henry, for the sum of fifty thousand dollars, papers showing that during Jefferson's embargo he had been employed by the Governor-General of Canada as secret agent in New England to connive with the Federalists, who were supposed to be strongly pro-English in feeling, to bring about a separation of the New England states from the Union. Mr. Madison felt that these papers showed a widespread conspiracy to break up the union of the states. While the agitation in Congress was going on Mr. Foster, the British Minister, tried to prevail upon his government to repeal the Orders in Council, but, as Spencer Perceval, who was then prime-minister, would not consider for a moment any possibility of the United States declaring war upon Great Britain, the Orders continued in force. On the 11th of May Mr. Perceval was assassinated, and on June 23rd the Orders were repealed—but it was then too late, for on June 18th, 1812, Congress declared

that a state of war existed between the United States and Great Britain. This declaration of war was unique in its form, as it was the first formal declaration of war enacted by law through all the deliberative forms of two distinct and independent houses in a Congress elected by an entire people, and indicated the constitutional transfer of the power of declaring war from the executive to the legislative branch of a national government. This power had been vested in the Congress by the Constitution, ratified 1787, as a pledge of peace and a preventive of wanton warfare and was a gift first conferred on mankind by American institutions. The news of the declaration was received in England, according to Green, with surprise and derision. The British government considered our army and navy almost worthy of contempt and our republican institutions a menace to the peace of the world. Parliament declared that the Orders in Council, which had caused such resentment in the United States, had been a justifiable measure of self-defense which had finally been repealed before the news of the declaration of war had reached England. On July 31st, 1812, Great Britain, as a war measure, ordered an embargo for the detention of all American ships in European waters. In America the declaration of war, instead of unifying the nation, threatened the dissolution of the republic. When the President called out the militia, Massachusetts, Connecticut and Rhode Island flatly refused to contribute either men or money. To the citizens of those states the prosecution of the war seemed worse than hopeless—suicidal in fact.

The United States navy consisted of six first class frigates and twelve smaller vessels, while the English navy boasted of nearly a thousand ships. Against such odds there were certain existing conditions which gave some hope to America. England was heavily involved in the European struggle with Napoleon, and her navy was scattered; on the other hand the tiny American navy was in the hands of young and able men who had been brought up on the sea, and Canada, Britain's vulnerable point, was open to attack all along the border. The war opened with a defeat which would have discouraged an older nation, especially as the defeat was attended with disgrace. President Madison had appointed General Dearborn commander-in-chief of the army. When war broke out Dearborn was in Boston and for some time he dallied between there and Albany trying to gather in troops. At that time William Hull was governor of the territory of Michigan, and Detroit was a trading post of eight hundred inhabitants. Rumors came pouring into Detroit that the British were advancing in great force against this point. Without waiting a decent time for reinforcements, or even long enough to verify the reports as to the British advance, Governor Hull surrendered the territory without even attempting to resist. Great Britain at once jumped to the conclusion that at a reasonable advance of British soldiery the whole country would go to pieces and easily again come under the authority of the British crown. It is not my intention to go into the story of the war, which lasted nearly three years. The Americans were continually defeated

on land and won no decisive victory until Jackson won the battle of New Orleans, which took place actually after peace had been declared. On the sea, however, the little American nation first found herself. Since the days of the Armada England had practically met with no naval defeat, and, in consequence, had come to regard herself as "mistress of the seas." On August 19, 1812, a battle took place between the British ship "Guerrière" and the "Constitution," in which the former was defeated. This aroused great enthusiasm in the States and was regarded, even in Great Britain, as a blow to English naval supremacy. Henry Adams says of it: "A small affair it might appear among the world's battles; it took but half an hour, but in that half hour the United States rose to the rank of a first-class power." The year of 1812 was truly a glorious one in the annals of the history of the American navy. In that year, in addition to the skirmish between the "Guerrière" and the "Constitution," the United States ship "Essex" destroyed the "Alert," the "Wasp" and the British "Frolic," and the "United States" vanquished the "Macedonian." In this last battle Stephen Decatur, forever dear to the American sailor, was in command. The year's record of victories was rounded out by the defeat of the "Java" by the "Constitution" on December 29th, making two battles in which that ship had been victorious. When the news of these defeats reached England it seemed to Parliament incredible that such reports could be true. Canning said to the House of Commons: "It cannot be too

deeply felt that the sacred spell of the invincibility of the British navy is broken." During 1813 in the war on the sea, honors were more evenly divided.

It was in this year, on June 1st, that the famous fight between the "Chesapeake" and the "Shannon" took place. The story of this fight, like that of the Battle of Bunker Hill in the Revolution, is one that has always been peculiarly dear to the American heart, although in both cases the British won the victory. At Bunker Hill the Minute-men showed that they could bear defeat and yet go on to victory, while in the fight between the "Chesapeake" and the "Shannon," the dying David Lawrence uttered the words, "Don't give up the ship," which have ever since been the chosen motto of our navy. In this battle the English lost eighty-three men and the Americans one hundred and forty-five. To those in Parliament assembled it seemed that the tide had turned, and that British naval supremacy had again asserted itself, but at the end of 1813 the record stood as follows: The English had captured seven American ships, mounting one hundred and nineteen guns, and the Americans had captured twenty-six British ships, mounting five hundred and sixty guns. When one remembers the difference in size between the two navies, one realizes that such victories as the Americans had won could do no actual harm to the British navy, but, nevertheless, the whole world recognized the truth of Canning's words, that the spell of the invincibility of the British navy had been broken. In 1813 the Americans won another victory of far-reaching con-

sequence, this time on an inland sea, far from any base of supplies. On September 10th Commodore Oliver H. Perry, with a small squadron of boats built on the shores of Lake Erie, met the fleet which Great Britain used to patrol the Great Lakes, and defeated them near Put-in-Bay, opposite the city of Sandusky.

His message announcing his victory to Congress, "We have met the enemy and they are ours," was typical of the whole spirit of his campaign, which has settled forever, we hope, the status of those inland waters. Aside from her tiny navy, the United States made very effective use of privateers during the Three Years' War. The Government licensed two hundred and fifty of these small craft, and they made several hundred captures and succeeded in making both the Irish Sea and the English Channel unsafe for British merchant ships. In thirty-seven days the sloop "True Blooded Yankees" not only captured a town on the coast of Scotland and burned seven ships, but also captured twenty-seven vessels. The "Surprise" took twenty prizes in one month, and the "Leo" captured an East Indian merchantman with a booty of two million five hundred thousand dollars. It is undoubtedly true that the activities of the privateers had much to do with hastening the end of the war, which had never been popular in either country. During the peace discussion one event took place which was regarded with equal opprobrium in both England and America. The British army attacked the defenseless city of Washington and set fire to the Capitol, the White House, the navy yard and all public buildings,

except the Patent Office, destroying public records and archives which were of priceless value to the Government of the United States. This proceeding was denounced in the British Parliament as "an outrage, inconsistent with civilized warfare," one might call it a work of the "Huns" of those days. Flushed with their victory at Washington the British advanced against Baltimore, but were there repulsed. This attempt on Baltimore will be ever memorable because, during the attack on Fort William Henry, Francis Scott Key had rowed out to the British fleet under a flag of truce to arrange for the parole of a brother soldier and had been detained all night on a British ship. It was while in detention and eagerly watching to see whether the attack on the fort was successful that he composed "The Star Spangled Banner," which has become our national anthem. While the arbitrators for peace were in session in Ghent, in the autumn of 1814, the news of Jackson's victory at New Orleans, the first real American victory on land, reached Europe and ended the war. Before this news had been received the British Commissioners had demanded the cession to Canada of a portion of Maine and Northern New York, and that a large territory in the Northwest, between the Ohio River and the Great Lakes, should be reserved for the Indians and regarded as neutral territory. The failure of the British to capture Baltimore and their defeat at New Orleans caused Great Britain to greatly modify her demands. The United States was compelled to yield on the impressment question, but the boundaries of

1783 were agreed upon, and peace was made with the Indian tribes. The questions of future boundaries, the Newfoundland fisheries' rights and the navigation of the Mississippi River were left open for future discussion to be settled by arbitration. From the British standpoint the war was a costly blunder, as no additional territory was gained, no new principle established and no friend won, while the destruction of their capital city had deeply offended the American people and left a wound which rankled for many years. By using conciliatory measures towards the United States, during Jefferson's administration, and opening her ports to United States commerce, Great Britain could have dealt Napoleon a staggering blow and have won America's enthusiastic support against France, which had almost equally offended the sensibilities of the United States. This she consistently did not do, and as a consequence she lost, for a time at least, her exclusive monopoly of the seas, thousands of precious lives and millions of money.

Although in comparison with her resources, the war cost this country infinitely more than it had cost Great Britain, as she lost thirty thousand lives and a hundred million dollars, yet the war was of distinct value to the young Republic, for by her successes upon the seas she gained commercial independence and that complete separation from Europe which was so necessary for her material development. Until the final settlement at Ghent, in December, 1814, Europe had regarded with almost contempt the attempt to establish a Republican form of government which would

be capable of permanent development or of carrying on war. The little war of 1812 showed to Europe that both of these things were possible, and aroused in the various states which formed the American Republic the first really national feeling that the country had ever known. Why I have placed an outline of this particular war in the midst of an account of the upbuilding of the British Empire will be shown in a later chapter.

CHAPTER VI.

ENGLAND AFTER THE FALL OF NAPOLEON.

BEFORE describing the methods by which Great Britain, after the fall of Napoleon, built up her splendid world-wide empire to its present dimensions it is necessary to tell of an expedition which took place during the height of the Napoleonic struggle, in order to understand exactly with what consistency Great Britain has regarded the integrity of small nations. The peace of Tilsit, between Napoleon and the Czar Alexander, was signed on the 7th of July, 1807, and Continental Europe breathed a sigh of relief, but almost before the ink was dry upon the treaty secret arrangements were being made to again plunge Europe into war, and this time England started the conflagration. Rumors reached Canning that when the Emperor and the Czar had met at Tilsit, on June 25th, they had made a secret agreement by which Napoleon would gain control of Schleswig-Holstein and cut the British navy off from any communication with the Baltic Sea. We have seen how in Cromwell's day England prevented a similar move between Denmark and Holland. A report of this agreement was placed in Canning's hands on July 21st, and on July 26th a British fleet, under command of Admiral

Gambier, was ordered to the Baltic. On August 3rd, at a conference between the English Minister to Denmark, Mr. Taylor, and Count Bernstorff, the Danish Minister of Foreign Affairs, the former stated that he had positive information that a secret agreement against England had been entered into between France and Russia, and that Denmark was a party to that agreement. Later in August, Canning announced that his government was positively informed that France had already taken possession of Schleswig and Holstein.

When Canning was questioned by the House of Commons, he replied that "the ministers have not said that they had in their possession any one secret article, but that the substance of such secret article had been confidentially communicated to His Majesty's Government, and that such communication had been made a long time previous to the date alluded to by the honorable gentleman." In the Declaration of Westminster, given out on September 25th, it is stated "that the English Government had received the most positive information of the determination of the present ruler of France to occupy with a military force the territory of Holstein for the purpose of excluding Great Britain from all her accustomed channels of communication; of inducing or compelling the court of Denmark to close the passage of the Sound against the British commerce and navigation; and of availing himself of the aid of the Danish marine for the invasion of Great Britain and Ireland." This declaration was, as I have said, made public on September

25th, but previous to this, on July 28th, a special Minister, Mr. Jackson, was appointed to the Danish Court, and on the next day, July 29th, he received from the Secretary of State his instructions, which were in Mr. Canning's own handwriting and marked "very confidential."

A portion of these instructions reads as follows :

"You will carefully bear in mind that the possession of the Danish fleet is the one main and indispensable object to which the whole of your negotiations is to be directed and without which no other stipulation or concession can be considered as of any value or importance. In the event, therefore, of the Danish Government even consenting to enter into a treaty of alliance, as proposed in the project with which you are furnished, it will be necessary that a secret article should be added to this treaty by which the delivery of the Danish fleet must be stipended to take place forthwith and without waiting for the formality of the ratification of the treaty."

The negotiations between Mr. Jackson and Count Bernstorff were fruitless. In spite of protests, British soldiers landed, on August 16th, at Vibeck, between Copenhagen and Helsingor. On September 2nd the bombardment of Copenhagen began, and was continued for three days. During the bombardment the cathedral, a number of the university buildings and over three hundred houses were burned. In the end the city capitulated, and the British took forcible possession of the entire Danish fleet. Erik Möller, the Danish historian, in his account of this expedition against Denmark, published in 1910, quotes Councilor Manthey, who says :

"Today, when the whole veil is rent which hitherto concealed from princes and peoples England's selfishness and ambition, let us consider whether so many a crown would have been brought low and so many a flourishing land devastated if England's policy, England's gold and England's secret crimes had not been the great ferment by which, in our remarkable generation, the excited masses were brought to revolt and by which dissolutions, separations and new alliances were brought about, and everything tended toward an altered state of affairs whose eventual realization was to cost mankind much blood and many tears."

Möller, in the same book, publishes the secret agreement between Napoleon and the Czar, which did, under certain conditions, provide for pressure being put upon Denmark, but differed entirely from the assertions made by Canning. He also states that the Duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had never been occupied by French troops. The general indignation which was aroused by the British assault upon Copenhagen was not confined to Continental Europe, but was even more strongly expressed in England. In the *Political Review* for September, 1807, the whole proceeding is described as "a scene of complicated iniquity." The *Review* says: "If anything could add to that disgust, that horror which we feel whenever we contemplate the subject, it is the language of humanity and piety affected by our commander-in-chief employed in this expedition." When Parliament opened its session in January, 1808, the address from the throne commended the Danish expedition as a glorious deed. Six members of the House of Lords protested against this commendation "because no proof

of hostile intention on the part of Denmark has been adduced, nor any case of necessity made out to justify the attack upon Copenhagen, without which the measure is, in our conception, discreditable to the character and injurious to the interests of this country." Lord Erskine, in his individual protest, says:

"No speculation of the probable fall of the Danish fleet into the possession or power of France would justify its hostile seizure by Great Britain; that such a seizure would be subversive of the first elements of public law, and that, until this attack upon Copenhagen shall receive vindication by proof of its justice, Great Britain has lost her moral situation in the world."

While protests were being made in the House of Lords, the renowned orator, William Windham, who had only recently been made a member of the Cabinet, said, in the House of Commons, "the only way left of effacing the stains thus brought upon the country was the public disavowal of their atrocity," and he openly accused the ministry of having deliberately sacrificed the national reputation, declaring that "the ruins of Copenhagen are monuments to their disgrace." Some years later, in 1822, Thomas Campbell, the poet, in some verses dedicated to a Danish friend, said:

"That attack, I allow, was a scandalous matter;
It was the deed of our merciless Tories,
Whom we hate, though they rule us, and I can assure you
They had swung for it if England had sat as their jury."

¹Flower's "Political Review—Reflections on the War With Denmark."

²Parliamentary Register for 1808, Volume I.

Later historians, in treating of this "little war," are naturally far less heated than the men speaking and writing at the time.

In volume 9 of the *Cambridge Modern History*, H. W. Wilson, of Trinity College, Oxford, attempts to justify it by saying: "That the attack was necessary no one will now deny. England was fighting for her existence, and, however disagreeable was the task of striking a weak neutral, she risked her own safety if she left in Napoleon's hands a fleet of such proportions." How strangely similar these words are to the excuses put forth by another power in our own day, and almost universally condemned by the American press! J. Holland Rose, in the same volume from which I have just quoted, says:

"Great Britain suffered a loss of moral reputation which partly outweighed the gain brought by the accession of material strength to her navy and the added sense of security.

"The peoples of the Continent, unaware of the reasons which prompted the action of Great Britain, regarded it as a little better than piratical."

After Napoleon was finally defeated at Waterloo, in 1815, the sovereigns of Europe met together, united in one determined purpose, which was to utterly stamp out the democratic ideas which had permeated Europe during and after the French Revolution, and to restore the *status quo ante*. In all of these conferences the master mind was that of Prince Metternich, Democracy's most implacable foe. During the Napoleonic upheaval a new republic had sprung into existence at the eastern end of the Mediterranean called

"The United States of the Ionian Islands," which was composed of Corfu, Cephalonia, Zakythos, Paxos, Ithaca and Cythera. In the general re-arrangement of European affairs this Ionian Republic was declared a free and independent state, whose neutrality was guaranteed by a treaty signed by Great Britain, Russia, Austria and Prussia, and this state was placed under the protection of Great Britain, and its government was to be administered by a Lord High Commissioner endowed with both legislative and executive power. Speaking of this new government, Lord Morley, in his *Life of Gladstone*, says, "A Constitutional Charter of 1817 formed a government that soon became despotic enough to satisfy Metternich himself."

Until 1847 the Lord High Commissioner exercised absolute power in the islands. During this period the story of the islands is one of continual outbreaks by the people, which were ruthlessly suppressed by virtue of the "power of high police" vested in the Lord High Commissioner, who was particularly brutal in the manner in which he suppressed the press. Among the reasons for dissatisfaction was the desire of the inhabitants of the islands to become a part of the Kingdom of Greece, with which people they were closely connected by the ties of common blood and common speech. The central government in London was constantly annoyed by chronic uprisings, caused largely by the tyranny of the British Governor, and conditions of land ownership and agriculture. In 1858 Mr. Gladstone was sent out to the islands to introduce

reforms and to report to the home government as to the exact condition of affairs. His report was never published, because it was agreed by the colonial office that such publication was not expedient, owing to the excited condition of public opinion, so it was filed in the archives of the colonial office. In spite of Mr. Gladstone's efforts, conditions continued to grow steadily worse, and the British protectorate was abolished in 1864, England retaining for herself the island of Malta, which she deemed necessary for her protection in the Mediterranean.

The years immediately following the fall of Napoleon were years of recuperation, readjustment and comparative peace. Great Britain, outside of the British Isles, was mainly occupied with strengthening her power in India. All fear of France was forever removed, but the development of India turned the attention of the British Government to the administration and ambitions of the Empire of Russia. From 1817 to the end of the century, the fear of Russia loomed large in the minds of England's rulers, and governed their entire foreign policy.

The first active conflict between the two Powers took place in Afghanistan. In this unhappy country English and Russian interests were everywhere opposed, and everywhere Russia seemed to have the advantage and to stand in favor with Dost Mohammed, the ruler of the eastern territory, who resided in Kabul. Russia and Persia, in alliance with Dost Mohammed, attacked Herat, the capital of the western district, in 1836. At this time Lord Auck-

land was Governor-General of India, and he considered the time ripe for British intervention, in order to protect the Indian boundary from any possible Russian advance. Making an alliance with the Sikhs he proceeded to depose Dost Mohammed and set up in his place an unpopular pretender who had been expelled from the country and was living in exile. This action of Lord Auckland's was approved by the Home Government and caused rejoicing in London.

In 1841 the native Afghans revolted against the ruler who had been imposed upon them contrary to their wishes. In the conflict which ensued, the British troops were completely defeated and compelled to leave the country. Akbar Khan, the son of Dost Mohammed, had been the leader of the revolt. He followed the retreating British army and eventually took under his protection the large number of women and children who were with the British and who not only suffered great hardship, because of the severity of the winter, but were in constant danger, as the army was continually attacked by fanatical mountain tribes. After several thousand of the British had lost their lives, the remainder of the army found itself trapped in the Jugdulluk Pass, where they were brutally massacred; only one man out of the original sixteen thousand escaped, and he found refuge under the walls of Diellibad, where a British garrison was maintained. Akbar Khan tried in vain to gain this garrison, but was driven back by re-enforcements of British, under General Pollock, and the siege was raised. On October 1, 1842, Lord Ellenborough, who had succeeded Lord

Auckland as Governor-General of India, declared that "India would remain content with the limits that Nature appears to have assigned to its empire."

When the news of the massacre of Jugdulluk Pass and the utter defeat of the British expedition and the re-instatement of Dost Mohammed reached England, it was received with stupefaction. The action of the Government was attacked on all sides. David Urquhart, a brilliant Scotch author, wrote a polemic against the *Edinburgh Review*, which had defended the war, in which he introduced an imaginary dialogue between Lord Palmerston, then, and for long afterwards, in charge of Foreign Affairs, and a Privy Councillor. It describes the situation so trenchantly that I quote it:

Lord Palmerston: "We must march to Kabul, dethrone its ruler and set up another."

Councillor: "Are we attacked by the Afghans? Are treaties violated?"

Lord P.: "No, none of these things. But Dost Mohammed is friendly to Persia, and Persia is friendly to Russia; therefore, we must destroy him."

Councillor: "But what do you propose to do with Persia?"

Lord P.: "Oh, Persia is beaten back, the siege of Herat is raised, and we have nothing to fear from her."

Councillor: "What do you propose to do with Russia?"

Lord P.: "Oh, Russia has sent to us the most satisfactory assurances, and we have nothing to fear from her, quite the contrary; indeed, she can do nothing, for her missions and expeditions have utterly failed."

Councillor: "The danger is over, you are satisfied with the power whence it sprang, and after that you go to send armies into the territory of a friendly people!"

Summing up his account of the whole affair, Urquhart further says:

"Into Central Asia we march an army among a people so friendly as to be ready to even accept our government—we set up a pretender—we support the perpetration of every internal folly and crime—we do everything that can arouse a people, already subject to us through good will and respect, into hatred and contempt. Our army is destroyed. We make up our minds that we shall have nothing to do with the country, and yet we send an army there again to ravish and destroy without even the thought of retaining possession, so that the contrast between the Mongols and the British is this—that the first destroyed and ravished by calculation and without either hatred or vengeance, and that our troops, composed of so-called citizens and Christians, and sent forth from a country honoring itself with the name of Britain, esteeming itself enlightened, philanthropic and religious, appear there without any calculation, to devastate and destroy, moved only by hatred and vengeance. As to the pretext that we marched to regain the prisoners, however it might have served for the cry of the moment, it is too hollow and absurd to refer to now. The prisoners could have been endangered only by the step we took; and for them to be returned to us it required that we should cease to perpetrate crime and to hold as a slave the Prince whom we had so cruelly dethroned."

Justin McCarthy, from whose *History of Our Own Times* I have gathered most of the facts related in this chapter, calls the history of these years, 1839 to 1842,

"a tale of such misfortune, blunder and humiliation as the annals of England do not anywhere else present. Blunders which were, indeed, worse than crimes and a principle of action which it is a crime in any ruler to sanction, brought things to such a pass that in a few years from the accession of the Queen we had in Afghanistan soldiers who were posi-

tively afraid to fight the enemy and some English officials who were not ashamed to treat for the removal of our most formidable foes by purchased assassination. This chapter will teach us how vain is a policy founded on evil and ignoble principles. We had gone completely out of our way for the purpose of meeting mere speculative dangers."

After this unfortunate experience England kept practically out of Afghanistan for forty years, but in 1879 there was again a revolution in Kabul, and on September 3rd, of that year, the entire British legation was massacred. As a result of this massacre, after several skirmishes with the Afghans, England was again compelled to withdraw and to give up her demand for a permanent British legation at Kabul. It was not until her agreement with Russia, nearly thirty years later, that the Afghanistan question could be considered settled, but that Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907 will be described in another chapter.

About the same time that she was attempting to impose upon Afghanistan a ruler whom the people would not accept, England tried, for purposes of trade, to compel the Chinese Empire to admit into its territory a commodity which China both feared and hated. The story of the "Opium War" is not a pretty story, but is of interest to us because the United States, in spite of its policy of not mixing in European affairs, was outspoken in its condemnation of the opium trade. Morse, in his history of *The International Relations of the Chinese Empire*, says:

"Public opinion in America was pronounced against the opium trade. Of the Protestant missionaries in China during the years 1834 to 1860, it may be said generally that the

Americans outnumbered the English in the proportion of two to one; and their reports to the home societies produced a marked effect upon the deeply religious sense of the American people."

During the negotiations of the years 1832 to 1844 the representative of the United States was the only one who strongly supported the Chinese Government in its efforts to prevent the importation of opium, and even before these negotiations, a number of American merchants had declined to trade in opium on moral grounds. The opium trade into China was first introduced by the East India Company, which controlled the cultivation of poppies in India. After the powers of the company were curtailed, in 1784, the government monopolized the cultivation of the poppy. At first the trade into China was confined to smuggling, as the Chinese Government absolutely forbade all importation of opium because of the horrible moral and physical effects resulting from the use of this drug. In spite of the efforts of China to entirely suppress this trade, the smuggling went on, because the British Government took no measures to prevent it. Great Britain officially declared that she would not protect British subjects when carrying on a trade which was contrary to the laws of the country with which they were trading, but this declaration was never taken seriously, as no provisions were made for enforcing it. Towards the end of the year 1837, the Chinese Emperor, Suan Tsung, took a decisive step by ordering the Governor of Canton to demand the delivering to the government of all contraband stores of opium.

Twenty thousand cases were seized and burned by the authorities. The British agent in Canton appealed to the Governor-General of India for aid to protect the lives and property of British subjects which had been attacked. This was the beginning of the so-called Opium War which lasted from February, 1840, to August, 1841. As a result of this war, Hong Kong was ceded to Great Britain, and the Chinese Government was forced to open five harbors to European trade and to pay \$6,250,000 for the opium which had been destroyed as well as a war indemnity of \$22,500,000. When the complete accounts of this war began to reach England, the conscience of the people was greatly aroused. Mr. Gladstone, addressing the House, said:

"I am not competent to judge how long this war may last. . . . but this I can say, that a war more unjust in its origin, a war more calculated in its progress to cover this country with disgrace, I do not know and I have not read of."

The opium question was not finally settled until 1858, when a treaty was signed by which China agreed, under pressure, to sanction a trade which it had been unable to suppress and thus make of it a legitimate source of income.

Through that fear of Russia, which had grown out of the control of India and which was only ended by the partition of Persia, in 1907, the British Government has been led into various and devious conflicts, the most futile of which was the Crimean War. This war was almost entirely the work of Lord Palmer-

ston, who regarded Russia very much as Pitt had regarded France. McCarthy says:

"He (Palmerston) believed from the first that the pretensions of Russia would have to be put down by force of arms and could not be put down in any other way; he believed that the danger to England from the aggrandizement of Russia was a capital danger calling for any extent of national sacrifice to avert it. He believed that war with Russia was inevitable, and he preferred taking it sooner to taking it later. . . . He understood better than anyone else the prevailing temper of the English people."

The war was undertaken for the support of Turkey and to preserve the "balance of power" in Europe. The only participant who reaped any real profit from it was the French Emperor, Louis Napoleon, whose prestige in Europe was greatly increased. Peace was signed in Paris in 1856. What England learned, as a result of the war, was that her military organization, especially on the sanitary side, was wholly inadequate and inefficient. This was plainly shown in that remarkable novel by Richard Dehan, entitled, *Between Two Thieves*, which, next to Tolstoi's *War and Peace*, gives the best picture of the horrors of this unnecessary war. From its inception the war had been opposed by many of the clearest thinkers in England, notable among them being John Bright, whom Lord Salisbury described as the "greatest English orator of his century." During the preliminary peace negotiations, which were held at Vienna, John Bright said: "The Angel of Death has been abroad throughout the land; you may almost hear the beating of his wings." The inability of the belligerents to agree

upon the neutralization of the Black Sea brought the negotiations at Vienna to an end, and to gain this point Palmerston prolonged the war for another year. Russia was compelled to consent to this neutralization, but in 1870, when France was at war with Prussia, she availed herself of the opportunity and repudiated the agreement about the Black Sea, so that all of England's efforts in that direction had been in vain. Bright had vigorously opposed, with all the force of his splendid oratory, the principle of waging wars to preserve the balance of power, also alliances which had only that end in view. That he was right in his theory the present conflict in Europe is an eloquent proof.

CHAPTER VII.

ENGLAND IN EGYPT.

IN order to round out and complete the story of the growth of the British Empire during the Nineteenth Century, a brief account must be given of the acquisition of Egypt, which, only last year (1915), was declared by Sir Edward Grey to be formally annexed to the British Empire. From the time of the French Revolution, when Napoleon made his spectacular assault upon Egypt, until the latter part of the Nineteenth Century, the country of the Pharaohs has been a bone of contention between France and England. In 1864 Ferdinand de Lesseps found that all his efforts to finance his project of a canal through the Isthmus of Suez were being thwarted by Lord Palmerston, whose agent stirred up opposition to the project in Constantinople. So short-sighted was Lord Palmerston as to the tremendous advantages which the building of this canal would bring to the entire world, that he stated in Parliament "that in the opinion of the British Government the canal was a physical impossibility; that if it was made it would injure British maritime supremacy; and that the project was merely a device for French interference in the East." In spite of British opposition, de Lesseps, in 1866,

secured the needed concession from the Sultan and proceeded to build the canal, which was opened for traffic in November, 1869. In 1875 Disraeli, who was always an idealist and dreamer of empire, purchased from the Khedive his canal stock, amounting to 176,602 shares, for four million sterling. This purchase the Prime Minister carried through on his own personal responsibility, with the assistance of the great banking house of Rothschild, and even after it was accomplished, it was regarded by the British Government and people with very mixed feelings. That it was a bit of far-sighted wisdom on the part of Disraeli has long since been recognized, and this transaction really marks the beginning of British interests in Egypt. At the time of the purchase, the reigning Khedive, Ismail, found himself overwhelmed with debt, owing to the failure of most of his schemes for personal aggrandizement, including the Abyssinian War. His relations with France had been such that he feared to apply to the French Government for financial assistance, and, as his needs were desperate, he made overtures to the English Government through Colonel Staunton, in the autumn of 1875. In the matter of the building of the canal, Egypt had become very suspicious of the ultimate motives of the French Government, so when Ismail decided to sell his shares in the canal, it was natural that he should first offer them to the European Power which was most friendly to the Ottoman Empire. Disraeli was, for a time, blamed for involving England in a transaction which was bound to have serious political consequences, as at

that time the British Government was not disposed to enter into any complicated situation in the East. Ismail was also undoubtedly responsible for Mr. Cave's mission to Egypt, which almost immediately followed the purchase of the canal shares. He seemed to think that he had discovered a new source of supplies upon which he might draw indefinitely, and, in order to recover his credit upon the European stock exchanges, he wished to secure some public testimonial as to his solvency. Mr. Cave, who was sent out by the British Government, was evidently an honorable and public-spirited man, but he was utterly ignorant of the East, and soon became a tool in the hands of the Khedive. It was Ismail's policy to dazzle distinguished financial visitors, whose aid he desired to enlist with a show of Oriental magnificence and power, and to prevent them from seeing any of the nakedness and poverty of the land. Had Mr. Cave understood anything of the workings of the Oriental mind, he would have soon discovered that Ismail's debts were the result of purely personal extravagance and were in no sense of the word national, but he was completely deceived, and, by his report to his home government, led to the recognition of Ismail's debts as a public obligation, and so brought about political intervention. The story of the British occupation of Egypt has best been told in two books, which are fairly well known in this country, and it is from these two books that I have gotten most of the facts mentioned in this chapter. These books are *Modern Egypt*, by Lord Cromer, and *Secret History of the English Occupation of Egypt*, by Wil-

frid Scawen Blunt. Lord Cromer's career in Egypt began after the defeat of Arabi Pasha and the first active English intervention. As a careful and graphic account of the upbuilding of British power which finally resulted in actual annexation to the British Empire, his book is an invaluable document, but he was not at Cairo during any part of the Revolutionary period, and in his writings he always assumed that the "official truth" was the only truth. Mr. Blunt first visited Egypt in 1875, and ever since then has resided in that country for a large portion of each year, and was personally intimate with all of the participants in the drama which has resulted in the elimination of this ancient land as a politically independent nationality. Speaking of his first visit, he says:

"I was as yet, though not perhaps even then enthusiastically so, a believer in the common English creed that England had a providential mission in the East, and that our wars were waged there for honest and beneficent reasons. Nothing was further from my mind than that we English could ever be guilty, as a nation, of a great betrayal of justice in arms for our mere selfish interests."

Within less than three years after Disraeli's purchase of the canal shares came the war between Russia and Turkey, which ended in the spring of 1878. In this war Russia was everywhere victorious, and would have gained possession of Constantinople had it not been for the active interference of England in behalf of the Sultan. By this time English public opinion had become entirely reconciled to the canal purchase, and the English Government had decided to

take an active part in affairs of the near East as the champion of the Ottoman Empire. By the treaty of San Stefano, which terminated the Russo-Turkish War, the integrity of the Turkish Empire was preserved, and, as a consequence of this treaty, a secret convention was drawn up between England and Turkey by which the English gained possession of the Island of Cyprus. In the meantime, affairs in Egypt had gone from bad to worse. The Cave Mission, to which I have referred, had been followed by several other missions which had resulted in an arrangement for the settlement of the Khedive's debts under the "Dual Control" of England and France, by which an annual charge of nearly seven million pounds sterling had been added to the Egyptian revenues, which enormous sum had to be wrung out of the already almost starving fellahin. The general elections in England in 1880 proved to have far-reaching consequences for Egypt because they brought into supreme power Mr. Gladstone, who, in spite of his strong liberal sympathies, did more than any other prime minister to destroy the independence of Egypt. In 1877, in the August number of the *Nineteenth Century Review*, Mr. Gladstone contributed an article on Egypt and the freedom of the East, in which he expressed himself as opposed to further British aggression in Africa. Pointing out the dangers which would result in an aggressive policy, he made a prophecy of its probable results which has been so nearly fulfilled that it is worthy of quotation.

"Our first site in Egypt (he writes), be it by larceny or be

it by exemption, will be the most certain egg of a North African Empire that will grow and grow until another Victoria and another Albert, titles of the lake sources of the white Nile, will come within our borders and until we finally join hands across the Equator with Natal and Cape Town, to say nothing of the Transvaal and the Orange River on the south, or of Abyssinia, or Zanzibar to be swallowed by way of viaticum on our journey, and then, with a great empire in each of the four quarters of the world, we may be territorially content but less than ever at our ease."

Continuing, he said (I quote only in parts) :

"The susceptibilities which we might offend in Egypt are rational and just. For very many centuries she has been inhabited by a Mohammedan community. That community has always been governed by Mohammedan influences and powers. During a portion of the period it had sultans of its own. Of late, while politically attached to Constantinople, it has been practically governed from within, *a happy incident in the condition of any country and one which we should be slow to change.*¹ The grievances of the people are indeed great, but there is no proof whatever that they are incurable. . . . My belief is that the day which witnesses our occupation of Egypt will bid a long farewell to all cordiality of political relations between France and England. There might be no immediate quarrel, no exterior manifestation, but a silent rankling grudge there would be, like the now extinguished grudge of America during the Civil War, which awaited the opportunity of some embarrassment on our side, and on hers, of returning peace and leisure from weightier matters. Nations have long memories."

This was Gladstone's attitude in 1877. In 1880 he became Prime Minister of England, and Ismail was deposed in Egypt and succeeded by his son Tewfik.

¹Italics are the author's.

In the meantime, the Nationalist party in Egypt, under the guidance of one of the most romantic and chivalrous leaders in modern history, Arabi Pasha, had succeeded in wresting from the Khedive certain constitutional privileges, which lead one to think that had the Egyptians been left alone they might have succeeded in becoming a constitutionally independent nation. Only since his defeat and elimination has the true character of Arabi become known in England. During the revolution, which he led, he was held up to the British public by the jingo press, which was controlled by the financial interests desiring intervention, as an unspeakable tyrant worthy only of total annihilation; yet as long ago as 1882, shortly after the British fleet had bombarded Alexandria and set fire to the city, General Gordon, that truly British hero, wrote from Cape Town, where he was then stationed, "As for Arabi, whatever may become of him individually, he will live for centuries in the people," and Bismarck spoke of him as "a powerful factor with whom one must reckon." On July 11, 1882, the British bombarded and destroyed Alexandria, and Gladstone, whose views in 1877 I have already quoted, defended this bombardment in the House of Commons!

Public opinion in England, prior to the actual bombardment, was almost equally divided. John Bright, the ablest member of Gladstone's cabinet, was so opposed to active intervention that he resigned from the cabinet on June 19th. On June 21st Mr. Blunt, at the personal request of Frederic Harrison, editor of the *Pall Mall Gazette*, and an ardent sympathizer with

Arabi and the Egyptian Nationalists, wrote an open letter to Mr. Gladstone, which was published in the *Times* of that date. This letter gives, in a concise form, such an accurate account of the political conditions in both England and Egypt by one thoroughly familiar with the situation, that I quote it in full:

"June 21, 1882. Sir: The gravity of the present situation in Egypt and the interests of honor and advantage to the English nation which are there engaged, impel me to address you publicly on the subject of the diplomatic steps which have led to this imbroglio, and to put on record certain facts which, in the case of any new departure taken by the Powers at the approaching Conference, should not be lost sight of. You are aware, sir, that during the past winter I was engaged as mediator in a variety of unofficial but important negotiations carried on between Sir Edward Malet and Sir Auckland Colvin on the one hand and the chiefs of the National Egyptian party on the other, negotiations in which I engaged my personal honor to the loyalty of Her Majesty's agents; also that I have been in constant communication with those chiefs since my return to England, and that I am consequently in a position to speak with certainty and authority as to the character and intentions of the popular movement in Egypt. You know, moreover, that I have, from time to time, warned Her Majesty's Government of the danger they were running from a false appreciation of facts, and that I have repeatedly urged the necessity of their coming to a rapid understanding with those in whose hands the guidance of the movement lay. Finally, you know that in the interests of right and justice and in accordance with the promise made by me to the Egyptians, I have counseled them to the best of my ability in the recent crisis, and spared no pains to urge them to that settlement of their difficulties with the Khedive, Mohammed Tewfik, at which they have now happily arrived. In this I took upon myself a great responsibility, but one which I think the event has already justified.

"The main points in the past which I would state are these:

"1. In the month of December last, I assisted the National party to publish a program of their views which was just and liberal and to which they have since rigidly adhered. At this time, and down to the publication of the Dual Note of the 8th of January, the Egyptians had no quarrel whatever with England or the English, neither had they any real quarrel with the Khedive or the (Dual) Control, trusting in these to permit the development of political liberty in their country in the direction of parliamentary and constitutional self-government. Their aim was, and is, the resumption by Egypt of her position as a nation, the redemption of her debt, and the reform of justice. They trusted then, as now, to the army which was, and is, their servant, to secure them these rights, and to their Parliament to secure them these ends; and they were prepared to advance gradually and with moderation, in the path they had traced.

"2. The Dual Note, drawn up by M. Gambetta, with the view of making England a partner of his anti-Mussulman policy, and understood by the Egyptians as the first step in a policy analogous to that recently pursued in Tunis, changed this confidence into a sentiment of profound distrust. Instead of awing them it precipitated their action. It caused them to insist upon the resignation of Sherif Pasha, whom they suspected of the design to betray them, and to assist with the Khedive in summoning a Nationalist ministry to office. This insistence, though represented by the English journals as the work of the army, was, in fact, the work of the nation through their representatives, the notables. Of this I can furnish ample evidence.

"3. The unexpected fall of M. Gambetta prevented the execution of the threat of armed intervention implied by the Dual Note. Nevertheless, a plan of indirect intervention was persisted in. The English and French Controllers-General protested against the Constitution granted by the Khedive on the 6th of February, and the English and French Governments carefully withheld their consent to it, signifying only that

the Article giving to the Egyptian Parliament the right of voting that half of the Budget which was not affected to the payment of the debt was an infringement of international engagements. The argument for this, based on certain firmans of the Port and certain decrees of the Khedive, has been constantly denied by the Egyptians.

"4. Acting, it must be presumed in accordance with their instructions, the English agents at Cairo have for the past three months set themselves steadily to work to bring about a revolution counter to the will of the people and the liberties granted to them by the Viceroy. The English Controller-General, through a paid agent of the Egyptian Government, has not scrupled to take part in this; and the English Resident Minister has spared no pains to create a quarrel between the Khedive and his Ministers. The Controller-General, sitting in council with the Ministers as their official adviser, has withheld his advice, counting, it would seem, on the mistakes likely to be made by men new to office, and noting these in silence. The English press correspondents, hitherto held in check by the Resident, have been permitted full license in the dissemination of news injurious to the Ministry and known to be false. I will venture to recall to you some of the scares reported at this time and disseminated through Europe—the scare of banditti in the Delta—the scare of the Bedouins rising—the scare of the revolt in the Soudan—the scare of an Abyssinian war—the scare of huge military expenditure—the scare of a general refusal to pay taxes, of the resignation of the provincial governors, of the neglect of irrigation works, of danger of the Suez Canal, the scare of Arabi Pasha having become the bribed agent, in turn, of Ismail, of Halim and of the Sultan. For some of these a very slight foundation may have existed, in fact; for most, there was no foundation whatsoever.

"5. On the 20th of March I addressed Lord Granville by Arabi Pasha's request, on this subject, and pointed out to him the danger caused to peace in Egypt through the attitude of

the English agents, urging that a commission should be sent to Cairo to examine into Egyptian grievances.

"In the month of April advantage was taken by the English and French Consuls-General of the discovery of a plot to assassinate the National Ministry, and traced by these to an agent of Ismail Pasha's, to induce the Khedive to put himself in open opposition to his ministers. Those implicated in the plot and condemned to banishment were men of position, Turks and Circassians, and as such of the same race and society with the Khedive, and he was unwilling to ratify their sentence and suffered himself to be persuaded to refuse his signature. This led to the rupture which the previous diplomatic action of the Consul-General had prepared. A summons was sent by Mahmud Sami Pasha to the Deputies to come to Cairo and decide between the Ministers and the Khedive, and the Deputies came. Sultan Pasha, however, through jealousy, refused to preside at any formal sitting, and advantage was again taken by the Consul-General to encourage all who were in opposition to the National party to rally around the Khedive. A section of the rich Egyptians, fearing disturbances, sided with the Circassians, and the Consul-General, deceived by appearances, ventured a *coup de main*. An ultimatum, dictated by them, was sent in to the Ministers, insisting on the resignation of the ministry and Arabi Pasha's departure from the country. The step for an instant seemed to succeed, for the ministry resigned. It became, however, immediately apparent that the feeling of the country had been miscalculated by our diplomacy, and Arabi, by the manifest will of the nation, returned next day to power. I cannot understand that the action of our Consul-General in this matter was justified by any principles of Liberal policy, it certainly has not been justified by success.

"6. When the fleet was ordered to Alexandria, I endeavored to convey a warning, as my private opinion, based upon all I had witnessed last winter of the temper of the Egyptian people, that the presence of English men-of-war at that moment in the port of Alexandria, especially if their crews should be

allowed on any pretense to land, would be exceedingly likely to provoke a serious disturbance; and it was my intention to go myself to Egypt to do what I could towards mitigating what I feared would be the results.

"7. About the same time the English Government consented to the despatch of a Turkish Commissioner to Cairo. It was supposed that the authority of the Sultan was so great in Egypt that obedience would be shown to whatever orders his representative might bring, or that, at any rate, little opposition would be offered. In any case, the Porte was authorized to act in its own way. Dervish Pasha was sent; and it is a lamentable fact that he was a man notoriously unscrupulous in his method of dealing with rebels. I have reason to know that what was expected of him was that he should summon Arabi Pasha to Constantinople; that, failing this, he should have recourse to bribery; and that in the extreme resort he should arrest or shoot the Minister of War as a mutineer, with his own hand. Whether these were Dervish Pasha's instructions or intentions I will not argue. The Porte seems to have been as little prepared as Her Majesty's Government were for the strength of the National feeling in Egypt; and only the union and courage shown by the people would seem to have convinced the Sultan that methods, such as those formerly used by Dervish Pasha against the Albanians, would be here out of place. Humaner counsels have in any case prevailed, and peace has been recommended between the Khedive and his people.

"Such, sir, is shortly the history of England's diplomatic action in Egypt during the past six months. It is one of the most deplorable our foreign office has to record. The future, however, in some measure remains to us, though, when the Conference assembles, England's will be only one of many voices raised in the settlement. It is not for me to suggest the words which should there be spoken; but I will venture to express my conviction that if Her Majesty's representative then comes forward with an honest confession of the mistakes made, and a declaration of England's sympathy with Egyptian

freedom, England will regain her lost ground. In spite of the just anger of the Egyptians at the unworthy tricks which have been played upon them by our Foreign Office, they believe that a more generous feeling exists in the body of the English nation which would not suffer so vast a public wrong to be committed as the subjugation of their country for a misunderstood interest in Egyptian finance and in the Suez Canal. They have, over and over again, assured me, and I know that they speak truly, that their only aim is peace, independence and economy, and that the Suez Canal cannot be better protected for England, as for the rest of the world, than by the admission of the Egyptian people into the comity of nations. Only let the hand of friendship be held out to them freely, and at once, and we shall still earn their gratitude.

"I am, Sir, your obedient servant,

"WILFRID SCAWEN BLUNT."

Unfortunately, for the Egyptian dreams of political independence, neither the Prime Minister nor the Foreign Office paid any attention to this appeal of Mr. Blunt's. After the bombardment of Alexandria, which Mr. Gladstone so eloquently defended, British troops, under Sir Garnet, afterwards Lord Wolseley, entered Egypt by way of the canal and defeated Arabi at Pel-el-Kebir on September 13th, and Egypt virtually passed into the control of Great Britain.

Arabi, after a long and sensational trial, was sentenced to exile in Ceylon. The "Dual Control" continued, theoretically, in force until 1904, when, by the secret agreement between France and England, which will be described in the story of Morocco, France finally withdrew all her Egyptian claims, and England assumed a protectorate over Egypt. Under the British

control there is no doubt that the country has been wisely administered by Lord Cromer and the men associated with him, but the Egyptians feel that they have lost their independence. Foreign rule, no matter how wise or how lenient, is never grateful to the people under it and is always regarded as a burden. When a lack of comprehension of native customs and habits of thought is joined to severity against crimes which result from attempts to preserve these native customs, dissatisfaction always results. Professor Sayce, the well-known authority on Semitic language, says:

“Those who have lived in the East and have tried to mingle with the native population know well how utterly impossible it is for the European to look at the world with the same eyes as the Oriental. For awhile, indeed, the European may fancy that he and the Oriental understand one another, but sooner or later a time comes when he is suddenly awakened from his dream and finds himself in the presence of a mind which is as strange to him as would be the mind of an inhabitant of Saturn.”

In spite of the able manner in which the affairs of Egypt have been administered, there has been continued opposition in England to the steady encroachment of British power, and Sir Edward Grey has been severely criticized both in the House of Commons and among his own party. How the mass of the British public regard the final incorporation of Egypt into the Empire, so recently announced to the world by Sir Edward Grey, the present censorship has, thus far, prevented the outside world from knowing. It may be that after the war we shall learn more about this last instance of “benevolent assimilation.” The conquest

of the Soudan followed as a natural corollary to the control of Egypt. One thing during this conquest stirred the entire world, and that was the tragic fate of the heroic Gordon at Khartoum. Shortly before the news of Gordon's fate reached England, Herbert Spencer wrote, in 1903:

"Love of country is not fostered in me on remembering that when, after our Prime Minister had declared that we were bound in honor to the Khedive to reconquer the Soudan, we, after the re-conquest, forthwith began to administer it in the name of the Queen and the Khedive, practically annexing it. . . . Contemplation of the acts by which England has acquired over eighty possessions—settlements, colonies, protectorates, etc.—does not arouse feelings of satisfaction."

PART II.

ENGLAND AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

CHAPTER VIII.

THE ACQUISITION OF THE TRANSVAAL.

THE beginning of the new century found the British Empire engaged in the most serious struggle in her long history, the war with the two little South African Republics. Shortly before the war broke out, on September 12, 1899, Lord Wolseley, who, alone among British generals seems to have appreciated the Boer strength, wrote: "If this war comes off it will be the most serious war England has ever had." The story of this war is of such recent date and has been so well told by numerous writers that I shall not go into it in this chapter. The two most interesting books on the subject are *The Great Boer War*, by Sir A. Conan Doyle, which treats it from the British standpoint, and *The Three Years' War*, by General Christian de Wet, written with great clearness of mind from the Boer point of view. With the results of the war and the wise and humane British policy after conquest, all the world is familiar. Let us consider for a few moments the early history of this interesting little country, the Transvaal, and how it first came under British control.

In 1835 a small body of Dutch farmers from Cape Colony, inspired by much the same motives which led

our forefathers in 1620 to brave the perils of the Atlantic and settle on the barren coasts of New England, crossed the Vaal River and trekked as far as the Zoutpansberg. The first party, under the leadership of Louis Trichard and Jan von Rensburg, consisted of about a hundred persons. Their main desire was to get entirely away from British control and govern themselves and the natives as they saw fit. When they reached the Zoutpansberg the party divided up, a portion, under Trichard, setting out to explore the country as far as Delagoa Bay. The remainder of the party, under Rensburg, were, soon after the separation, murdered by the natives. Trichard's party did not reach the coast until 1838, after a number of them had perished. The survivors proceeded to Natal by boat. In 1846 another party, led by Andries Hendrik Potgieter, crossed the Vaal and established themselves on the banks of the Vet, but no permanent settlement was made until 1838, when Potgieter and his followers, in November of that year, founded the town of Potchefstroom. An elementary form of government was established, and in 1840 these colonists entered into a very loose form of confederacy with the Boers of Natal. In 1848 Andries W. J. Pretorius became commander of the Boers of Potchefstroom. Under his leadership the colony grew rapidly, and its recognition by Great Britain was sought by the colonists. This recognition was secured on January 17, 1852, when a convention, known as the Sand River Convention, was drawn up between Pretorius and other Boers on one hand and assistant commis-

sioners nominated by the British High Commissioner on the other. The first clause of this convention reads as follows:

"The assistant commissioners guarantee in the fullest manner on the part of the British Government to the emigrant farmers beyond the Vaal River, the right to manage their own affairs and to govern themselves according to their own laws without any interference on the part of the British Government, and that no encroachment shall be made by the said government on the territory beyond to the north of the Vaal River, with the further assurance that the warmest wish of the British Government is to promote peace, free trade and friendly intercourse with the emigrant farmers now inhabiting, or who may hereafter inhabit that country; it being understood that this system of non-interference is binding upon both parties."

This convention marks the first recognition of the existence of a new incipient nationality. The population of white people north of the Vaal consisted of about five thousand families, numbering in all, including women and children, about forty thousand persons. These people were only united in one thing, and that was their determination to live independent of British control in what they considered their own territory. Among themselves disputes were many and bitter, but in 1856 Marthinus W. Pretorius, who, on the death of his father, had succeeded to the leadership among the Burghers, was able to bring about a sort of unity among the scattered factions and to establish a permanent form of government. A representative assembly of delegates was chosen for the purpose of drafting a constitution. The title, "The South

African Republic," was adopted, and the new constitution made provision for a *volksraad* or parliament, to be elected by the people. All the legislative powers of the government were vested in this Volksraad, and the members were to serve for a period of two years. All the administrative powers were given to a president who was to be assisted by an executive council or cabinet. Only members of the Dutch Reformed Church of European blood were allowed to serve in any department of the government; Pretorius was elected first president of the Republic. Shortly after the constitution had been ratified and himself installed in office, Pretorius attempted to bring about a union between the South African Republic and the Orange Free State. His first peaceful overtures were not accepted, but, as he felt such a union to be vital to the permanent existence of both the little states, he, together with Paul Kruger, formed a commando, crossed the Vaal River, and attempted to bring about the desired union by force. This attempt also failed, but in 1860 Pretorius, while still president of the South African Republic, was elected to the presidency of the Orange Free State. Upon learning of his election to this position, in February, 1860, Pretorius obtained from his council a six months' leave of absence and went to Bloemfontein with the hope of peacefully arranging a political union between the two states. Shortly after he left Pretoria, the newly founded capital city of the Transvaal, named in honor of his father, a protest was made in the Volksraad by Cornelius Potgieter against the proposed union, which,

he said, would be of incalculable benefit to the Orange Free State but of small benefit to the Transvaal. Following this outbreak it was declared unconstitutional for the same man to be president of both republics. At the end of his six months' leave of absence Pretorius, after a stormy meeting of the Volksraad, resigned the presidency of the Transvaal. In October, 1860, a mass meeting of citizens was held at Potchefstroom, the old capital, which resulted in the passing of the following resolutions:

"A. That the volksraad no longer enjoyed the confidence of the people.

"B. That Pretorius should remain president of the South African Republic and should have a year's leave of absence to bring about union with the Free State.

"C. That Schoeman should act as president in the absence of Pretorius.

"D. That before the return of Pretorius to resume his duties a new volksraad should be elected."

Had the Transvaal Boers not been actuated by an extremely narrow and distrustful policy, it is undoubtedly true that a strong and compact republican state would have resulted from Pretorius' efforts, as the burghers of the Orange Free State were not at that time opposed to the union, but the complications which followed Pretorius' resignation brought about almost a state of anarchy, with two acting presidents and two rival governments in control of the Transvaal. To put an end to this distressing and demoralizing state of affairs, Commandant Paul Kruger took matters into his own hands. Calling out the burghers of his own district, he drove Schoeman and his followers

out of Pretoria and then attacked Potschefstroom, which, after a sharp skirmish, in which three men were killed and seven wounded, fell into his hands. In 1863 Pretorius resigned the presidency of the Free State and returned to Pretoria, where, acting as mediator between rival factions, he brought about a condition of at least temporary peace. A conference between factions was held in January, 1864, which was followed by a new election, in which Pretorius was again chosen president, and Kruger was made commandant-general.

As a result of this civil war the condition of the country was deplorable. The public exchequer was empty, and, in order to meet current expenses, paper money was introduced, with the usual results which have followed such an expedient in all parts of the world. The exact boundaries of the state had not been defined in the Sand River Convention, so when gold was discovered at Tati, in 1868, President Pretorius, by proclamation, extended the boundaries of the Transvaal on the north and west to include the gold fields and the whole of Bechuanaland, and on the east to Delagoa Bay. This proclamation brought forth strong protests from Sir Philip Wodehouse, the British High Commissioner and from the Portuguese Consul-General. The eastern boundary question was finally settled by treaty with Portugal in 1869. The territory to the north, which Pretorius wished to annex, was claimed not only by the South African Republic, but also by the Bechuanas, the Koranas and also by one Nicholas Waterboer, a Griqua captain. To settle this

question, in 1871, an arbitration board was appointed, consisting of A. A. O'Reilly, on behalf of the South African Republic; John Campbell, on behalf of the other claimants; and Lieutenant-Governor Keate, of Natal, who was to act as referee. The judges disagreed, and, the decision being left to the referee, he, on October 17, decided in favor of Waterboer. What rendered this decision of far-reaching consequences was the fact that on August 25, 1870, a year before the "Keate Award," Waterboer had offered his territory to Great Britain. A few days after the decision of the "Keate Award," the British High Commissioner, Sir Henry Barkly, issued a proclamation taking over, in the name of Great Britain, all of Waterboer's territory which he called Griqualand West. This territory included all of the then discovered diamond diggings. This annexation by Great Britain, although based upon the Keate decision and Waterboer's original offer, aroused great resentment among the Boers, and led to the resignation of President Pretorius. The Boers, wishing to have in the presidency a man whom they felt to be strong enough to cope with Great Britain, offered this position to Mr. (afterwards Sir) John Brand, president of the Orange Free State, but he declined. Failing to secure the services of Mr. Brand the burghers elected the Rev. Thomas François Burgers, a minister of the Reformed Church and a member of a prominent Cape Colony family, to the presidency. This was in 1872. and marked a new departure in policy, as heretofore every officer of the republic had been chosen from

among the families of the original colonists. Burgers was an able, active and patriotic man, but was more visionary than aggressive, and he became involved in many entanglements with the native chiefs. In 1875 he went to Europe for the purpose of raising money to finance the building of a railroad to Delagoa Bay, but was not successful. He returned to the Transvaal in 1876 to find that in his absence the acting president, with the consent of the Volksraad, had attempted to carry out many measures opposed to the public welfare, had unwisely and indiscriminately allotted native lands to various adventurers, and that war with the Zulus was imminent. In 1877 the paper currency had so depreciated that Transvaal one-pound notes only brought one shilling in actual cash. Just at this time the South African Colonial Secretary, the Earl of Carnarvon, was agitating a union of all the South African States under the British Government. On October 5, 1876, he had appointed a commission, under Sir Theophilus Shepstone, to visit the Transvaal and try to arrange with the Boers for the annexation of the country to the British crown. Shepstone went to Pretoria in January, 1877, escorted by twenty-five mounted police, and after careful consideration decided that annexation was the only salvation for the Transvaal, but to his disappointment the Volksraad did not agree with him. The condition of affairs could hardly have been worse, as the treasury was empty and the Boers would not pay their taxes; government contractors were unpaid; the country was in debt to the amount of \$1,075,000; and there seemed to be no

power able to compel the Boers to meet their obligations. Finding that the Volksraad would do nothing to remedy conditions, on April 12, 1877, Shepstone issued a proclamation formally annexing the country to Great Britain. The proclamation graciously stated that—"It is the wish of Her Most Gracious Majesty that the State shall enjoy the fullest legislative privileges compatible with the circumstances of the country and the intelligence of its people." This instance of benevolent assimilation, like almost all of the more recent additions to British territory, was received by the people of England with mixed feelings. Sir Bartle Frere defended Shepstone's act of annexation on the ground that Burgers, President of the South African Republic, had already approached some of the Continental Powers with reference to forming an alliance, and that Germany would surely intervene if Great Britain did not forestall her. In the Transvaal Shepstone's proclamation aroused almost instant opposition, although President Burgers seemed to be in favor of the annexation. In April Frere visited the Transvaal and tried to persuade the Boers to accept the annexation as being for their ultimate good, assuring them that under the British crown they would have complete self-government in all local affairs with the added security of the British against the Zulus, who were the common enemy. The Boers, however, felt that the Zulus were more than a match for the British army, and that this was the time for them to secure absolute independence. The conflict with the Zulus, which ensued, was carried on without any co-operation

from the Boers, and cost Great Britain many lives and \$25,000,000 before it was ended. Sir Garnet Wolseley, who had come out to Africa in June to command the British forces, declared to the Boers, in a public gathering held after the Zulus had been defeated, that "So long as the sun shines, the British flag will fly at Pretoria." This was in 1879; on the 13th of December, 1880, the Boers again declared the independence of the South African Republic and appointed a triumvirate, consisting of Kruger, Pretorius and Joubert, as a provisional government. They felt justified in assuming that the British Government would acquiesce in this declaration because in the elections held in England in 1880, Gladstone had been made Prime Minister. While conducting his campaign in Mid-Lothian before this election, Gladstone had, in his speeches, seemed to favor Boer independence. He had accused the British of having placed themselves in the position of "free subjects of a monarchy going to coerce the free subjects of a republic," and in one of his speeches had said:

"If these acquisitions were as valuable as they are valueless, I would repudiate them, because they were obtained by means dishonorable to the character of our country."

These speeches were circulated freely in the Transvaal, and from them the Boers naturally assumed that, with Mr. Gladstone in control, their efforts to secure complete independence would be crowned with success. In February, 1881, came the complete defeat of the British army, under Sir George Colley, at Majuba Hill, in which battle Colley himself was

slain. This defeat at Majuba Hill was a tremendous blow to British prestige in South Africa and was so regarded in Great Britain. A truce was declared on March 3rd, and on March 21st a treaty was drawn up between Sir Evelyn Wood on behalf of Great Britain and the Boer Triumvirate by which complete internal self-government under British suzerainty was granted to the Boers. This treaty was confirmed in a convention held in Pretoria on August 3rd, and on the 8th the government was handed over to the Triumvirate, who continued in control until May, 1883, when Kruger was elected president. After the Pretoria convention the Boers felt that their independence was assured, and that the British suzerainty was merely a nominal concession to save the face of the British Government at home. In 1884 a convention was held in London in which certain articles were substituted for those of the Pretoria convention. The timidity of Lord Derby, in the London convention, only strengthened the Boer belief in the actual independence of the republic. At first Lord Derby repudiated the Majuba treaty, on the ground that treaties could only be drawn up between equally sovereign states. At the same time he acted as if he wished to conciliate the Boers, and while he was not willing to formally relinquish the suzerainty, he consented not to mention it. Lord Cairns, in the House of Lords, openly accused Lord Derby of having relinquished the British suzerainty in substance even if he had refrained from using the word, and the impression of British defeat

made upon Kruger and his associates was as strong as that created by the surrender at Majuba Hill.

The increased discoveries of gold in 1883, followed by those in the Rand in 1886, brought an influx of diggers and prospectors into the country from the British Colonies and from Europe, and in 1886 Johannesburg was founded, and in ten years became a city of 108,000 inhabitants. The whole country was on a boom, and the wealth which was pouring into the Boer treasury exceeded anything that Kruger and his thrifty burghers had ever imagined. By 1896 fully one-third of the land areas had been purchased by Uitlanders. In spite of the fact that these outsiders were filling up the land and bringing to it untold prosperity, the Boers would not recognize them as citizens, and adopted towards them a policy of rigid political exclusion. In 1888 Cape Colony, the Orange Free State and Natal attempted to form a customs-union with the Transvaal, but to this Kruger was rigidly opposed. Because of his hostility to Great Britain, Kruger adopted a policy which was distinctly prejudicial to the gold industry, and this naturally caused friction between the Uitlanders and the Boers. To the demands of the former for some share in the government, Kruger replied by extending the period of qualification for suffrage from five to ten years. A compromise of a seven years' period was finally agreed upon, but this was never satisfactory to the Uitlanders, who, by 1890, formed a majority of the population. The friction between the native and outside elements became so strong that in 1895 the ques-

tion of a direct appeal to the British Government was considered by the Uitlanders, but was opposed by the men of Colonial birth, who, because of the defeat at Majuba and the vacillating policy of the home government, had lost faith in the ability of Great Britain to coerce the Boers. In October, 1895, Cecil Rhodes, Prime Minister of Cape Colony and the real originator of the dream of uniting all Africa under the British crown, made overtures to the Uitlanders through Dr. Jameson, which led to what is known as the "Jameson Raid." The collapse of this raid, ending in the arrest of Jameson and his associates, only intensified the feeling between Boers and Uitlanders, and greatly strengthened Kruger's power, while increasing his antipathy to Great Britain. When Sir Hercules Robinson, the British High Commissioner, heard of the raid he at once sent an order to the British Resident at Pretoria advising all British subjects in Johannesburg against any co-operation with Jameson. On January 7, 1896, Sir Hercules telegraphed to the British agent at Johannesburg "that if the Uitlanders do not comply with my request they will forfeit all claims to sympathy from Her Majesty's Government and from British subjects throughout the world, as the lives of Jameson and the other prisoners are now practically in their hands." Upon the receipt of this telegram, the rifles and ammunition which had been distributed among the Uitlanders at Johannesburg were given up. After the disarmament at Johannesburg, Kruger proceeded to arrest sixty-four members of the

reform committee while declaring to the world that his motto would be "Forget and Forgive."

In the period between the collapse of the raid and the outbreak of the war in October, 1899, Kruger's policy became more and more aggressive against the Uitlanders. Sir Alfred Milner, who had succeeded Sir Hercules Robinson in 1897, did everything that was humanly possible to persuade the Transvaal Government to consider the much needed reforms, but his efforts were fruitless. At the conference, held at Bloemfontein from May 31, to June 5, 1899, between Sir Alfred and President Kruger, it was evident from the outset that the latter was determined to wring further concessions from the British Government rather than make any on his own part. After this conference Sir Alfred urged the home government to rigidly insist upon certain reforms, among them the return to the five years' franchise, and his recommendations were loyally supported by Mr. Chamberlain. Mr. Kruger maintained that the franchise question was a local one in which Great Britain had no right to interfere. He persisted in asserting the full independence of the South African Republic as a sovereign state and formally denied the claim of British suzerainty. Thus an *impasse* was reached, and in October the war broke out.

As I said at the beginning of this chapter, I will not attempt to tell the story of the war. Much has been written in English reviews, both before and during the war, of the attitude of Germany towards both of the belligerents. In view of the present struggle, which is

exhausting Europe and which seems to be narrowing down to a contest between British navalism and German militarism, it is interesting to note the one official act of the Kaiser during the Boer War. The so-called Kruger telegram, which was published throughout the world after the Jameson raid, has been definitely proven, even to England's satisfaction, not to have been written by the Kaiser. During the war, when the tide had turned and the Boers began to realize that they would be defeated, a delegation was sent from the Transvaal to the Continent of Europe to secure European intervention in favor of the Boers. Kruger felt sure that the Continental Powers would never consent to the destruction of the South African Republic. His delegates were fêted and rapturously received in both Holland and France, but when they wished to be received by the Kaiser, he declined to meet them, although German public opinion was wholly in sympathy with them. As a result of his refusal, the embassy collapsed. The war ended in 1902, and it resulted in both the Transvaal and the Orange Free State being incorporated within the British Empire. The period of reconstruction was very short, as the British Government, during the long struggle, had learned to appreciate the splendid qualities of the Boer people. Great Britain has never produced a wiser colonial administrator than Sir Alfred, now Lord, Milner. Under his administration a complete union of all the South African colonies was brought about, and the native leaders were given responsible positions under the new government. The loyalty of the Boers to

their new allegiance has been splendidly shown in the present war. What the attitude of South Africa will be after the war no man now knows, but it looks as if this last case of assimilation into the Empire would be permanent, because of the wisdom and broad-mindedness shown in internal administration after the war.

CHAPTER IX.

THE STORY OF MOROCCO.

ONE cannot get a comprehensive knowledge of the present tendencies of British Foreign Policy without carefully considering the "Affair of Morocco." In May, 1891, Lord Salisbury sent a special mission to the Sultan of Morocco for the purpose of clearing up all questions which had arisen between the British and Moorish Governments and protecting British interests in Morocco, which were very extensive. This mission, which was headed by Sir C. Euan-Smith, was attended with a good deal of ceremony as a means of impressing a semi-Oriental potentate. In his written instructions to Sir C. Euan-Smith, Lord Salisbury said:

"You will observe that it has been the constant aim of Her Majesty's Government, and of your predecessors at Tangier, to preserve the independence and territorial integrity of the Empire of Morocco, while neglecting no favorable opportunity of impressing upon the Sultan and his Ministers the importance and advantage of improving the government and administration of the country. Unfortunately, their efforts in this direction have hitherto been unsuccessful, and herein lies the great danger of the situation, as the decease of the present Sultan will, in all probability, give rise to internal disturbances, the issue of which it is impossible to foresee."

The main purpose of this mission was to negotiate a commercial treaty between the two Powers. For years the desire of the British Government had been to preserve the political integrity of Morocco and prevent this state from falling under the control of any other European Power which might endanger Gibraltar and the direct route to India. During the twenty-five years preceding this mission, there had been frequent periods of tension between Morocco and Algeria, but throughout all this period the British Government had been absolutely sincere in its efforts to preserve the political *status quo* in Morocco. Unfortunately the mission of 1891 was a complete failure. They were delayed for weeks at Fez, while the Sultan kept postponing the time of their reception, but the main cause of its failure, to again quote Lord Salisbury, was "the misrepresentations which attended the mission from the first." Lord Salisbury, with his usual straightforwardness and honesty, had sent to the Governments of Germany, Italy, Austria, Spain and France a draft of the treaty which Sir C. Euan-Smith was to present to the Sultan, and had asked their support in a measure which was intended to protect the interests of all the Powers without in any manner attempting to secure the slightest special privilege for the British Government. The Governments of Germany, Austria and Italy at once signified their approval of this treaty, and Spain shortly joined with these Powers, but France refused to sign it until she should have had time to carefully consider all its points. After what seemed to the Powers undue

procrastination, the French Government refused to ratify the treaty, and so the matter was dropped. Lord Salisbury, in his last despatch to Sir C. Euan-Smith, said:

“The correspondence which has now been published will sufficiently establish that there was nothing in your Mission prejudicial to the independence or integrity of Morocco or threatening in any way the Sultan’s prerogative or his territorial rights. It was conceived and carried out in a spirit entirely conformable to the policy which Her Majesty’s Government has uniformly pursued of upholding the Moorish Empire and discouraging all efforts either to diminish its extent or to precipitate its fall.”

The Euan-Smith mission was Great Britain’s last serious effort to maintain the political independence and sovereignty of the Sultan, although she continued to be very greatly interested in the commercial development of Morocco until 1902. The *Times*, in an editorial on July 19, 1892, commenting upon the results of this mission, said:

“As usual, France stood out. The Power which protects the Shereef of Wazau and which, with scarcely any disguise, supports him in something like rivalry to the Sultan of Morocco, has yet obtained influence enough with the latter to put a stop to negotiations which were directed to the common advantage of Europe. Probably this will be represented tomorrow, by the Parisian Journals, as ‘a triumph of French diplomacy.’ That Spain, Austria, England and France herself are not to be allowed to import corn or horses from Morocco is ‘a triumph of French diplomacy!’ What it really means is that, even for a great common gain to Europe, France will not permit Great Britain to obtain influence at Fez, lest, perchance, at some future time the claims of the mistress of Algeria to succeed to the Sultan’s dominions should find

themselves barred. But there are some people to whom no present advantage counts in comparison to some sentiment of *amour propre*, especially of a national kind, and among these, we fear, are to be reckoned the French consular and diplomatic agents in backward countries, almost without exception, together with a large portion of the official and journalistic world of Paris."

In 1901 the Moorish Government seems to have become alarmed by the attitude of France, and appealed to Great Britain. A mission was sent to London, but accomplished nothing much beyond Lord Lansdowne's gaining some minor advantages for international trade.

Five years after this came the Council at Algeciras, where the Governments of Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Belgium, Holland, Spain, Portugal, Russia, Sweden and the United States were represented. Before considering this council and its consequences, it is necessary to understand France's position in Africa and the arrangements between France, Morocco and the various Powers which made this council an international necessity. Up to 1881 the interests of France in Morocco had been confined to Algeria, which had been declared a French Colony in 1848. In 1881 France had assumed control of Tunis, in order to prevent that country's falling into the hands of Italy, and she had cast longing eyes towards Egypt, which, since the days of Napoleon, had been tempting her ambitions. After the French challenge to British control of Egypt had been defeated at Fashoda in 1901, M. Delcassé wrote as follows to the French Minister at Tangier:

"You should make the Sultan understand that it will depend upon himself to find in us friends the surest, the most anxious for the integrity of his power, the most capable of preserving him, in case of need, from certain dangers. Our loyalty, as also our interests, are guarantees to him that we shall not inroach upon it."

This was in 1901. In 1904 a *rapprochement* began between France and Great Britain, as a result of arrangements settling the disputes which had been existing between the two governments about the fisheries of Newfoundland, the West African boundaries problem and various questions concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides. An agreement was also made between the two powers affecting Egypt and Morocco. This agreement, like the one drawn up later in the year, consisted of two parts, a public declaration and several secret conventions. Not until seven years later were the people of either England or France aware of the existence of these secret agreements, and they would probably be still ignorant of their existence had not an over-zealous and rather indiscreet reporter published them in the *Paris Matin* in November, 1911.

The arrangement with England was signed early in April, 1904, and reads, in part, as follows:

"The Government of the French Republic declares that they have no intention of altering the political status of Morocco.

"His Britannic Majesty's Government for their part recognize that it appertains to France more particularly, as a Power whose dominions are conterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco, to preserve order in that country and to provide assistance for the purpose of all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require.

"They declare that they will not obstruct the action taken by France for this purpose, provided that such action shall leave intact the rights which Great Britain, in virtue of treaties, conventions and usage enjoys in Morocco, including the rights of the coasting trade between the ports of Morocco enjoyed by British trading vessels since 1901."

The Declaration further states that both in Egypt and Morocco the British and French governments are "equally attached to the principle of commercial liberty" and that they cannot "countenance an inequality either in the imposition of customs duties or other taxes or of railway charges; that the trade of both nations should enjoy the same treatment in transit through the French and British possessions in Africa, and that concessions for roads, railways, ports, etc., should only be granted on such conditions as would maintain intact the authority of the state over these great undertakings of public interest."

Article 7 of the public Declaration states that neither state should "permit the erection of any fortifications or strategic works on that portion of the coast of Morocco comprised between, but not including, Melilla and the heights which command the right bank of the river Sebou."

Article 8 stipulates that "France should come to an understanding with Spain, bearing in mind the latter's interest derived from her geographical position and her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean."

Article 9 provides that both governments should "afford to one another their diplomatic support in

order to obtain the execution of the clauses of the present Declaration." The commercial provisions of the Declaration were to remain in force for a period of thirty years.

Article 7 was evidently insisted upon by England for the purpose of not allowing a great power like France to control the approaches to the Straits of Gibraltar and her direct route to India. Besides the articles above quoted, which were duly made known to the public of both nations who were parties thereto, as well as to the government of Spain, there were several articles which, as I have said above, were kept secret until their publication in the *Paris Matin* in November, 1911.

Article 1 of these secret documents foresees the possibility of either government finding itself constrained by force of circumstance to modify this policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco. Article 3 presages the possibility of a French Protectorate over Morocco and imposes upon such a Protectorate a permanent Spanish control of the North Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts of Morocco. It says:

"The two governments agree that a certain extent of Moorish territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta and other *présides* should, whenever the Sultan ceases to exercise authority over it, come within the sphere of influence of Spain, and that the administration of the coast from Melilla as far as, but not including the heights on the right bank of the Sebou, shall be entrusted to Spain.

"Nevertheless, Spain would previously have to give her formal assent to the provisions of Articles 4 and 7 of the

Declaration of today's date (April 8, 1911), and undertake to carry them out.

"She would also have to undertake not to alienate the whole, or a part, of the territories placed under her authority or in her sphere of influence."

The public declaration of the agreement between France and Spain is very short and declares on the part of France that she remains "firmly attached to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the authority of the Sultan," while Spain declares her adherence to the Anglo-French Declaration of April 8th. This agreement between the two countries was entered into on October 3rd; on October 6th M. Cambon wrote to Lord Lansdowne:

"Dear Lord Lansdowne:

"I am instructed to communicate to you the arrangements which have just been concluded between France and Spain on the subject of Morocco. They were signed on the 3rd inst., by our Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Spanish Ambassador at Paris; they consist of a general declaration, which will be made public, and of a convention, which is to be kept secret. M. Delcassé, in instructing me to forward to you the text of this agreement, in accordance with Article 8 of our Declaration of April 8, 1904, pointed out to me the confidential character of this communication and instructed me to request you to be good enough to keep the Convention entirely secret.

"I have, etc.,

"PAUL CAMBON."

To this Lord Lansdowne promptly replied:

"Dear M. Cambon:

"I have had the pleasure of receiving your letter of today's date, covering the two documents which you had been instructed to communicate to me in accordance with Article 8

of the 'Declaration respecting Egypt and Morocco,' of April 8th last.

"I need not say that the confidential character of the Convention entered into by the President of the French Republic and the King of Spain in regard to French and Spanish interests in Morocco is fully recognized by us and will be duly respected. The shorter paper, or 'Declaration,' made by the two governments is, I understand, public property.

"With best thanks, I am, etc.,

"LANSDOWNE."

It is readily seen from the reading of the two public Declarations that the integrity and political entity of the Empire of Morocco is guaranteed, but Article 3 of the private agreement between England and France certainly presages the termination of that integrity. Now let us examine the secret convention between France and Spain as published in the *Matin*.

Article 2 describes the sphere of influence which falls to Spain by virtue of her possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean where she shall possess the same right of action as France has acquired by the Anglo-French understanding in the remainder of the country to preserve order in and provide assistance for all administrative, economic, financial and military reforms which it may require.

Article 3 says: *In case the continuance of the political status of Morocco and the Shereefian Government should become impossible, or if, owing to the weakness of that Government and to its continued inability to uphold law and order or to any other cause, the existence of which is acknowledged by both parties, the status quo can be no longer maintained. Spain*

*may freely exercise her right of action in the territory defined in the preceding article, which henceforward constitutes her sphere of influence.*¹

In Article 4 the Spanish sphere in Atlantic Morocco is carefully defined and Spain agrees not to exercise her right of action for fifteen years without the consent of France, stating that if she shall "be obliged to take military action the other party shall be at once informed. In no case shall the assistance of a foreign power be invoked."

Article 10 declares that all schemes for the development of public works, mines, railways, etc., and "economic undertakings in general" in the respective French and Spanish spheres (which comprise the whole of Morocco) "shall be executed" by French and Spanish enterprise.

To both of these agreements England was a party and with both of them was apparently in active sympathy, although we have seen how persistently she had, under Lord Salisbury and even as late as 1901, insisted upon the independence and integrity of Morocco. We have seen how in 1901 the Sultan, alarmed by the aggressions of France, had sent a mission to London to appeal to the British Government. Let us now for the moment go back to the general situation in Morocco at the time that Lord Salisbury sent his ill-fated mission to the Sultan under Sir C. Euan-Smith.

The governments to which Lord Salisbury's pro-

¹ Italics are the author's.

posed commercial treaty with the Sultan were submitted were those of France, Italy, Spain, Austria and Germany. Among the earliest European explorers of Morocco were two Germans by the names of Lenz and Rohlf's who on their return to their own country published accounts of their discoveries which attracted much attention because of the possible trade developments which they opened up. In 1873 the German government appointed a resident in Fez. In 1880 the first International Conference on the affairs of Morocco was held at Madrid at which conference Germany took an active part and joined her influence to that of Great Britain, in insuring the extension of the "most favored nation" treatment by securing what we now call "the open door" and thus made Morocco a problem of international interest. In 1887 Spain proposed a renewal of the Madrid Conference, and to this proposal Germany gave her consent, but as the idea did not appeal to the other powers the conference was given up. In 1889 the Sultan sent an embassy to Berlin. In 1890 a commercial treaty between Germany and Morocco was signed at Fez on June 1st, which treaty was to continue in force for five years. Before signing this treaty the German government submitted it to the other powers who had been party to the Madrid Conference and stated that she would not sign it without their approval.

We have already seen that Germany gave her cordial support to the mission sent to the Sultan by Lord Salisbury in 1891 and 1892. Commenting upon the attitude of the German government at this time the

London *Times*, in its issue for July 19, 1892, said:

"The actual dealings between the British Minister and the Sultan, who, by the law and practice of Morocco, takes personal cognizance of every detail of public diplomatic business, are believed to have been amicable, as are those between the Mission and most of the other European representatives, Germany, in particular, which negotiated the last commercial treaty in 1890, has supported British diplomacy, and Spain and Italy are stated to have done the same.

"The support of nearly all the Powers was accorded very freely to the British Envoy, and it is believed that Count Tattenbach, the German Minister, has been especially prominent in supporting the British attitude to obtain rights which would benefit all European nations."

It is interesting to note that the support given by Count Tattenbach to the British efforts aroused considerable opposition in Germany from the jingoes and the Pan-German press, and it is quite equally interesting and important to remember that the Count's actions received the unqualified support of the Imperial Chancellor and the entire German government. In France this German action was looked upon in the nature of an affront. From this outline of conditions in Morocco previous to 1904, the year in which France made her first special arrangements with England and Spain respectively, it will be seen that Germany had sufficient commercial interest in Morocco to make the preservation of the integrity of the Moorish Empire of great importance to her. According to every precedent recognized by diplomatic and international custom, the text of the two special declarations of 1904 should have been submitted to the German Ambassador

in Paris. That they were not so submitted is a well known fact, and the German government only learned of the Anglo-French declaration after its wording had been made public in England and France. On April 12, 1904, four days after the signature of the declaration, Count von Bülow, the German Chancellor, stated in the Reichstag that he had no reason to believe that the Anglo-French agreement was directed against Germany but that he had received no official notification of its existence. Speaking of Morocco he said:

"We are interested in that country, as, moreover, in the rest of the Mediterranean, principally from the economic standpoint. Our interests therein are, before all, commercial interests; also we are specially interested that calm and order should prevail in Morocco. We must protect our commercial interests in Morocco, and we shall protect them. We have no reason to fear that they will be set aside or infringed upon by any power."

Apparently there was no cause for any anxiety about Morocco in any of the chancelleries of Europe. On March 30, 1905, the German Emperor, who was cruising in the Mediterranean, called at Gibraltar and dined with Sir George White. The next day he proceeded to Morocco and anchored off Tangier and spent a few hours there where he received the diplomatic corps and held a conversation with representatives of the Sultan who had been sent to meet him. The short speech which the Emperor made to the German residents in Tangier was reported throughout Europe and caused great excitement as it was regarded as a challenge—and against what? The public only knew of the published declarations between France and Eng-

land and France and Spain. The entire English press in particular was up in arms. German commercial interests in Morocco, which had been developing steadily since 1873, were belittled, and the Emperor's visit was regarded as a piece of insolent effrontery and an attempt to drive a wedge between England and France. Is it not reasonable to suppose that the German Foreign Office, through their well-developed secret service, had gotten some inkling of the secret addenda to the public declarations and that it was with this knowledge in mind that the Emperor determined to visit Morocco and on the spot declare his intention to guard the independence of the sultan, and by this means to maintain the open door in Morocco? When Europe discovered that Germany proposed another conference of the powers over the Moroccan question the English and French papers, especially the English, violently opposed the idea. The *Times* on May 2, 1902, said:

"The international conference, which it is suggested should be proposed by the Sultan of Morocco and which Count von Tattenbach says will be supported by Germany, will probably never take place. Its object could only be to revise or stultify the agreement recently concluded by France and to give Germany a voice in matters with which she has nothing to do."

Again on June 5th of the same year the *Times* said:

"Consequently it may be announced with confidence that the Moroccan proposal for a European conference will be entertained by only one of the great powers—namely Germany. On all sides it is recognized that Germany must have foreseen that an invitation coming from Morocco would meet with no response, and this confirms the general opinion as to Germany's whole Moroccan policy being a mere blind for something else."

In France the general trend of public opinion seemed to be growing in favor of the proposed conference, while the opposition in the British press became more bitter. The Foreign Office went so far as to inform the Sultan that Great Britain would not attend a conference. In spite of this, the conference met at Algeciras in April, 1906, at which conference eleven European nations *including Great Britain* were represented as well as the United States of America. At this conference an act was drawn up which was supposed to settle the Moorish question for five years.

The Sultan of Morocco ratified the act on June 18, 1906. The act begins, "In the name of God Almighty" and states that it is "based upon the threefold principle of the sovereignty and independence of His Majesty the Sultan, the integrity of his dominions and economic liberty without any inequality."

The reforms, which the signatory powers declared to be necessary for the preservation of the three principles upon which the act was based, covered the organization of the police; the illicit trade in arms which had been going on for some years; the establishment of a "Moorish State Bank"; the proper regulation of taxes so as to provide new sources of revenue; the regulation of customs and suppression of smuggling, and public offices and public works. How these reforms were to be carried out is very carefully defined in various articles of the Act, the concluding article of which (No. 123) reads as follows:

"All existing treaties, conventions and arrangements between the signatory Powers and Morocco remain in force. It

is, however, agreed that in case their provisions be found to conflict with those of the present general Act, the stipulations of the latter will prevail."

Such then became the general law of Europe regarding Morocco for a period of five years from its ratification by the Sultan, on June 18, 1906. The last article quoted above expressly states that while all previous conventions and agreements, such as those entered into by England, France and Spain in 1904, remain in force, should the provisions of such previous agreements be found to conflict with the provisions of the Act of Algeciras "the stipulations of the latter shall prevail." Now let us see, briefly, how the provisions of the Act of Algeciras were carried out. On March 27, 1907, a Frenchman was murdered at Malakest in Southern Morocco. France at once invaded Morocco to avenge this murder, and took possession of Udja. The Sultan protested against the French government's retaining possession, and the French promised to evacuate but continued in possession. About this time a Franco-Spanish syndicate obtained from the Moorish government a concession to build a railroad from Casablanca, a trading town on the Atlantic coast. The survey for this railroad ran directly through a Moorish cemetery to the east of Casablanca. While attempting to carry the line through this cemetery, which the Moors regarded as sacred ground, a fracas occurred in which several employes of the railroad were killed. The French in retaliation bombarded Casablanca and overran the territory back of the town known as the Shawiya District and occu-

pied both Casablanca and Rabat, another important coast town on the Atlantic north of Casablanca. Having successfully invaded and occupied a portion of the country, whose integrity it had so solemnly guaranteed, France levied an indemnity upon Morocco for \$12,000,000 for the expenses which she had incurred in taking possession of this portion of the country, far from her own Algerian border. She also presented a bill for the losses suffered by European and Moorish merchants because of the bombardment of Casablanca. These indemnities, piled on top of loans which the Sultan Abdulaziz had made from France, so increased the taxation of the Moors that an uprising of the people drove Abdulaziz from the throne, and on January 4, 1908, his brother Mulai-Hafid was proclaimed Sultan at Fez. Civil war at once ensued and lasted until August, 1908, when Abdulaziz was finally defeated by his brother. About the same time Spain, in pursuance of her secret arrangement with France of 1904, started a little campaign of her own in the Melilla district and demanded an indemnity of \$1,200,000. In order to meet these indemnities, the distracted and bankrupt government negotiated a new loan by merging all of her liabilities to Spain into one loan of \$2,020,000. This loan was secured by a mortgage upon various Moorish revenues, including the remaining 40 per cent of the customs, so that Morocco's indebtedness to Europe in 1910 had increased to \$31,600,000. With almost all of his revenues mortgaged to Europe, and no money at hand to meet the current expenses of the Government, the Sultan had no other resource

except to wring tribute from the tribes, and the cruelties to which he was driven resulted in the unhappy country's being reduced to a state of chaos. France was his largest creditor and to her he was forced to appeal. This was the opportunity for which the French government had been waiting. A French army under General Moinier entered Morocco in April, 1910, meeting little opposition. En route to the capital he took possession of Mequinez and other places and finally settled down in Fez. At this Spain became alarmed lest she should be deprived of that portion of the country allotted to her by the secret agreement of October, 1904, so she proceeded to take possession of Larash on the North Atlantic coast of Morocco, El Kasr in the interior, and Ifni on the South Atlantic coast, and sent 20,000 troops to the Riff district on the Mediterranean coast. Thus we see the partition of Morocco which had been secretly determined upon between France and Spain, with the concurrence of England, in the two declarations of 1904, actually carried out in spite of the stipulations of the conference at Algeciras. The French occupation of Fez was officially endorsed in the British Parliament by Sir Edward Grey, who was attempting to carry out the policies inaugurated in 1904 by his predecessor, Lord Lansdowne. A graphic description of the chaos reigning in the Moorish capital, the suffering and privations of the foreign residents and the perils to which they were exposed aroused public opinion in Great Britain to an enthusiastic support of the French action. The real situation in Fez just before the French occupation has

been so graphically described by M. Francis de Presensé, one of the ablest and best informed of French publicists that I copy his description in full :

"Nevertheless, matters were still not sufficiently to the liking of the impressarii. To justify the financial operation which was to crown the sordid tragic-comedy, something else was still needed. At this point the Comité du Maroc and its organs surpassed themselves. They organized a campaign of systematic untruth. Masters of almost the entire press, they swamped the country with false news. Fez was represented as threatened by siege or sack. A whole European French colony was suddenly discovered there, living in anguish. The ultimate fate of the women and children was described in the most moving terms. Even in the absence of independent information, one could not fail to be struck by the singular contradictions of these alarmist despatches. Now Fez was lost, because the Mehallah, commanded by a French instructor, was away. Anon the return of the said Mehallah was calculated to lose Fez. One day the alarmed public learned that the town had undergone a formidable assault. The next day the public was gravely told that the rebels had not yet assembled, but would soon surround Fez with a circle of iron and flame. The most lamentable details were given of the state of the expeditionary Mehallah, which only possessed an insignificant quantity of cartridges and shells, but this did not prevent the subsequent announcement that, thanks to the heroism of its leader, it had achieved a great victory and scattered the enemy with a hailstorm of shot and shell. Finally it was affirmed that, in the case of siege, the city was only provisioned for two or three weeks. Thus carefully cooked, public opinion soon took fire. What was the government thinking of? At all cost the Europeans, the Sultan, Fez itself, must be saved! As ever from the beginning of this enterprise, the government knew nothing, willed nothing of itself. With a salutary dread of complications it would have preferred not to move, perhaps, even, had it dared, to with-

draw from the hornet's nest. But the greater fears it experienced from another quarter prevailed; those inculcated by the so-called patriotic shoutings, the concerted clamours of the orchestra of which the Comité' du Maroc holds the baton, and whose chief performers are to be found in *Le Temps* and *Le Matin*. The order to advance was given.

"Already, while the expedition was on its way, light began to pierce. Those redoubtable rebels, who were threatening Fez, had disappeared like the dew in the morning. Barely did a few ragged horsemen fire off a shot or two before turning around and riding away at a furious gallop. A too disingenuous or too truthful correspondent gave the show away. The expeditionary force complains, he gravely reports, of the absence of the enemy; the approaching harvest season is keeping all the healthy males in the fields! Thus did the phantom so dextrously conjured by the Comité' du Maroc, for the benefit of its aims, disappear in the night.

"Avowals and disclosures then began in right earnest. One of the correspondents, who had contributed his share to the concert of lying news, wrote with an admirable sang-froid that, in truth, there had been some exaggeration; that, in point of fact, at no moment had the safety of Fez and its inhabitants been seriously menaced; that the idea of a regular siege and sudden capture had been alike chimerical; and that, moreover, so far as the provisioning of the place was concerned, he could re-assure the most timorous that there was sufficient corn in the city to feed the whole population, plus the expeditionary column, for more than a year! The farce was played. After Casablanca Fez, France, without realizing it, without wishing it, almost without knowing it, had taken a decisive step. An indefinite occupation of the capital was a natural prelude to a Protectorate. For clever men, who had invented and executed the scenario, there now only remained the task of reaping the fruits of their efforts. The era of concessions, profits, dividends was about to open. Premature joyfulness! It was the era of difficulties which was at hand."

This was the awful situation which the French government had sent an expedition to remedy and which Sir Edward Grey so heartily approved of in Parliament,—but what was Germany, equally with England, France and Spain a signatory to the Act of Algeciras, which so carefully and solemnly guaranteed the integrity and independence of Morocco, doing all this while? To understand the situation clearly it must be remembered that ever since the Madrid Conference in 1880, when Morocco became “an international question,” Germany had steadily maintained, before the Reichstag and in all diplomatic correspondence with the various chancellories, that her interests in Morocco were purely and solely commercial, and that to protect these interests and secure an equal opportunity of trade for all nations alike, in other words, “the open door,” it was necessary that the independence and integrity of the Shereefian Empire be maintained. That her commercial interests in Morocco were large and her insistence upon their protection just, was recognized in the French Chamber. This was shown when M. Deschanel, president of the French Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs, in the course of his explanation to the Chamber of Franco-German Convention of November, 1911, said:

“Could we affect to ignore the interest of Germany in Morocco for half a century, the travels of her explorers, the activity of her colonists, her agricultural and mineral enterprises, her steamship lines, her postoffices, and especially that movement of ideas which gravitated towards the Shereefian Empire, not in Pan-German circles and colonial committees alone, but in intellectual circles among the elite, which, to

the honor and power of that nation, where all co-operate for the same ends, prepares the work of the diplomatists and soldiers."

But let us return to the question as to what Germany was doing before and during the French occupation of Fez. That she was perfectly aware of the consequences of such an occupation no one can doubt, nor can one doubt her recognition of the fact, that, after such an occupation, to expect France to retreat would be an act of humiliation to which no proud nation would voluntarily submit.

On July 1, 1911, a despatch was sent by the German government to her ambassadors in the various capitals of Europe which read, in part, as follows:

"Some German firms, established in the south of Morocco, notably at Agadir and in that vicinity, have been alarmed by a certain ferment among the local tribes, due, it seems, to the recent occurrences in other parts of the country. These firms have applied to the Imperial Government for protection for their lives and property. At their request the Imperial Government has decided to send a warship to the port of Agadir to lend help and assistance in case of need to its subjects and proteges, as well as to the considerable German interests in the territory in question. As soon as the state of affairs in Morocco has resumed its former quiet aspect, the ship, charged with this protective mission, shall leave the port of Agadir.

"Please convey this information, verbally, to the government to which you are accredited, if possible on Saturday at noon, leaving the text as an *aide-memoire*.

(Signed) "Kiderlen."

On July 3rd the German gunboat "Panther," of moderate tonnage, carrying only one hundred and twenty-five men, anchored off Agadir.

The news of its arrival was received in Paris with great calmness. The French Foreign Minister, M. de Selves, regarded it as an incident of so little importance that he went to Holland with President Fallières and remained there until July 7th. In England, on the contrary, the excitement was great, although the British Empire was only indirectly interested. Sir Edward Grey sent for the German Ambassador and called a meeting of the Cabinet. This was on July 3rd, the day the "Panther" arrived. On July 4th he again sent for the German Ambassador and told him that the British government could not recognize any arrangement which might be made as a result of the new situation which had arisen. Mr. Asquith, the Prime Minister, told the House of Commons on July 6th, that "His Majesty's government considered that a new situation had arisen in Morocco in which it is possible that future developments may affect British interests more directly than has been the case." The *Times* took up the question, attacking the German government and the German Emperor with great violence, denying that Germany had any rights in question, and accusing the German government of insolently attempting to interfere in matters with which she had no concern.

In France, where the public were most directly interested, the tone of the press was distinctly mild. The government recognized that Germany had a very strong case indeed and that if France were to be allowed to occupy Morocco without any friction some compensation must be offered to Germany because of her very

large commercial interests in the Shereefian Empire. Throughout July the discussions about Morocco were carried on, with apparently perfect understanding between France and Germany, but it was evident that the British Foreign Office viewed a rapprochement between these two powers with great disquietness. If it were my purpose, in this book, to go into any detailed discussion of the causes of the present European war I would publish in full Sir Edward Grey's speech to the House on July 21st, Mr. Lloyd George's famous speech at the Bankers' Dinner held at the Mansion House on the same date, and the editorial comment upon both of these speeches, on July 22nd, as well as the correspondence between Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador. These speeches throw a strong light upon European diplomatic methods and form interesting reading, but are of no importance here. Sufficient to say that in spite of British protests the government of France did cede to Germany a portion of the French Congo, and Germany made no further protest against the French occupation of Morocco, which occupation had been both publicly and privately approved of by England in spite of her pledge to guarantee the Sultan's independence, and thus we see how another small power had been defended by benevolent assimilation. In this case, however, the assimilation was not made by England, but only with her connivance, and the blame for the partition of Morocco can fairly be laid upon all the signatories of the Act of Algeciras.

CHAPTER X.

THE AGREEMENT WITH RUSSIA OVER PERSIA

THUS far in outlining the growth of British policy we have seen how the Foreign Office from the time of Queen Elizabeth until today has been dominated by fear of some other nation, and how this fear by some psychological power, has governed all diplomatic action. The fear of France, which held England in its grip for so many years, was no sooner wiped out by the fall of Napoleon than the attention of the Foreign Office was turned upon Russia because of imaginary dangers to British control of India. Because of fear of Russia, England joined France in the Crimean War, and in 1878 prevented Russia from gaining control of Constantinople.

After the Franco-Prussian War of 1870 a new and united empire appeared upon the European scene, but at first England was in open sympathy with German aspirations. This was because Germany had no navy and no colonies worth mentioning. When Germany began to build a navy and to enter into the race for foreign markets Lord Lansdowne began to anticipate future complications and approached France in the

manner described in the preceding chapter, which resulted in the partition of Morocco and the final agreement with France as to Egypt. All this time France had been in close alliance with Russia, and Russia had been steadily encroaching upon the territory of Persia, and thus getting nearer to India. In order to reach a perfect understanding with France it became necessary to arrive at some sort of understanding with Russia, and this led to the formation of the Triple Entente which was planned by King Edward VII and Delcassé, the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, to check the Triple Alliance between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy, and thus preserve that sacred idol of secret diplomacy, the "Balance of Power in Europe."

When Sir Edward Grey succeeded Lord Lansdowne, under the ministry of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman in 1906, he, although member of a Liberal cabinet, proceeded to carry out the distinctly Tory policy of his predecessor.

This naturally led to the convention between England and Russia as to Persia, which was signed on August 31, 1907. The preamble to this convention and those parts of it which most vitally affect the independence of Persia read as follows:

"His Majesty, the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty, the Emperor of All the Russias, animated by the sincere desire to decide by mutual agreement different questions concerning the interests of their states on the Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude agreements destined to prevent all cause of misun-

derstanding between Great Britain and Russia in regard to the questions referred to, and have nominated for this purpose their respective plenipotentiaries, to wit:

"His Majesty, the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the British Dominions beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, the Right Honorable Sir Arthur Nicholson, His Majesty's Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to His Majesty, the Emperor of All the Russias;

"His Majesty, the Emperor of All the Russias, the master of his Court, Alexander Iswolsky, Minister for Foreign Affairs;

"Who, having communicated to each other their full powers, found in good and due form, have agreed on the following:

"The Governments of Great Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to respect the integrity and independence of Persia, and sincerely desiring the preservation of good order throughout that country and its peaceful development, as well as the permanent establishment of equal advantages for the trade and industry of all other nations;

"Considering that each of them has, for geographical and economic reasons, a special interest in the maintenance of peace and order in certain provinces of Persia adjoining to or in the neighborhood of the Russian frontier on the one hand and the frontiers of Afghanistan and Baluchistan on the other hand, and being desirous of avoiding cause of conflict between their respective interests in the above mentioned Provinces of Persia;

"Have agreed on the following terms:

I

"Great Britain engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favor of British subjects, or in favor of the subjects of third Powers, any concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transports, insurances, etc., beyond a line starting from Kasr-l-Shirin, passing Isfahan, Yezd, Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian frontier at the inter-

section of the Russian and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose directly, or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the Russian Government. It is understood that the above mentioned places are included in the region in which Great Britain engages not to seek the concessions referred to.

II

"Russia, on her part, engages not to seek for herself, and not to support in favor of Russian subjects, or in favor of subjects of third Powers, any concessions of a political or commercial nature—such as concessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transports, insurances, etc.—beyond a line going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, Birjasid, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, demands for similar concessions in this region which are supported by the British Government. It is understood that the above mentioned places are included in the region in which Russia engages not to seek the concessions referred to.

III

"Russia, on her part, engages not to oppose, without previous arrangement with Great Britain, the grant of any concessions whatever to British subjects in the regions of Persia situated between the lines mentioned in Articles I and II. Great Britain undertakes a similar engagement as regards the grant of concessions to Russian subjects in the same regions of Persia.

"All concessions existing at present in the regions indicated in Articles I and II are maintained.

IV

"It is understood that the revenues of all the Persian customs, with the exception of those of the Persian Gulf and of Farsistan, revenues guaranteeing the amortization and the interest of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the 'Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse' up

to the date of his signature of the present arrangement, shall be devoted to the same purpose as in the past.

"It is equally understood that the revenues of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, as well as those of the fisheries on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea, and those of the posts and telegraphs, shall be devoted, as in the past, to the services of the loans concluded by the Government of the Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the present arrangement.

V

"In the event of irregularities in the amortization of the payment of the interest of the Persian loans concluded with the 'Banque d'Escompte et des Prets de Perse' and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the date of the signature of the present arrangement, and in the event of the necessity arising for Russia to establish control over the sources of revenue guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the first named bank, and situated in the region mentioned in Article II of the present Arrangement, or for Great Britain to establish control over the sources of revenues guaranteeing the regular service of the loans concluded with the second named bank and situated in the region mentioned in Article I of the present Arrangements, the British and Russian Governments undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly exchange of ideas with a view to determine, in agreement with each other, the measures of control in question and to avoid all interference which would not be in conformity with the principles governing the present Arrangement."

The remaining articles of the convention refer to Thibet and Afghanistan and do not affect Persia, except remotely. This agreement was made solely between Great Britain and Russia, without any consideration of Persia, nor was Persia requested to sign it. It was concluded on August 31st, but the Medjlis, or Persian Parliament, did not know of its existence

until it was published in a Teheran newspaper on September 4th.

As may be easily imagined, the publication of this convention was received with surprise and indignation by the Persian Parliament and people who strongly resented having their country partitioned off into zones by foreign governments who styled themselves as "friendly," and proclaimed so loudly their "mutual engagement to respect the integrity and independence of Persia," and their "sincere desire for the preservation of order throughout that country and its peaceful development." At that time Sir Cecil Spring-Rice, now British Ambassador at Washington, was the British Minister at Teheran, and because of the excited condition of public opinion he, on September 5th, gave to the Persian Government an official explanation of the convention, from which I make two quotations, which will be sufficient to show the tone of the whole communications. They are as follows:

"As to the reported partition of Persia between Russia and England, concerning which it is asserted that the two Powers above mentioned wish to define spheres of influence for themselves, Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Iswolsky have explicitly declared that these reports have no foundation.

"From the above statements you will see how baseless and unfounded are these rumors which have lately prevailed in Persia, concerning the political ambitions of England and Russia in this country. The object of the two Powers in making this agreement is not in any way to attack but rather to assure forever the independence of Persia.

"Not only do they not wish to have at hand any excuse for intervention, but their object in these friendly negotiations

was not to allow one another to intervene on the pretext of safeguarding their interest. The two Powers hope that in future Persia will be forever delivered from the fear of foreign intervention and will then be perfectly free to manage her own affairs in her own way, whereby advantage will accrue to herself and to the whole world."

It is interesting to note that until December, 1911, no mention of this above "explanation" appeared in the British Blue Book.

Rumors of this communication from Sir Cecil Spring-Rice to the Persian Government having gained ground in England, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs was questioned in the House of Commons upon this subject, and acknowledged that this communication or explanation of the convention had been made to the Persian Government by the British Minister on the date above mentioned.

Now, let us briefly consider how the two "friendly" powers lived up to their agreement to guarantee and protect "the integrity and independence of Persia." During the five years previous to the signing of the Russo-British convention there had grown up in Persia a nationalists party led by young, able and patriotic men who had traveled and studied in Europe and had become inoculated with the modern spirit of democracy. This party had attempted to establish a constitutional government in Persia, but every effort towards real reform which they made was opposed by the reigning Shah, Mohammed Ali, who was little more than a tool of Russia. In spite of this opposition a constitution had been established which the Shah solemnly swore to accept.

In December, 1907, the year of the convention, the Shah determined to destroy the Medjlis, and for this purpose gathered together an army composed of from twelve to eighteen hundred Persians, commanded by Russian officers, who had been loaned by the Russian Government for this purpose but were paid out of the Persian Treasury, and a large body of his own servitors, increased by all of the discontents in the capital. On December 15th the Prime Minister and his cabinet, who had just resigned, were summoned by the Shah to his palace and there forcibly detained. During their detention the Shah's forces stirred up a riot in Teheran, which was successfully put down by the Medjlis, and by December 20th order was restored and a new cabinet, proposed by the Shah, was accepted by the Medjlis.

By the end of May, 1908, both the Royalist and Nationalist parties had formulated their policies and had come to a mutual agreement. The Shah, on June 1st, dismissed certain of his courtiers in accordance with the demands of the Nationalists, and one of these, Ami Bahadur Jang, the one most hated by the Persian people, found an asylum in the Russian Ministry, and Mr. Marling, the British Chargé d'Affaires, called upon the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs and threatened that unless the Persian Government agreed to the demands of the Shah, Russia would forcibly intervene. This was in less than five months after Sir Cecil Spring-Rice had issued his formal communication stating that neither Great Britain nor Russia would ever interfere in the local affairs of the

Persian Government. This threat of the two legations led to an attack on the Parliament Building on June 23rd, when one thousand Cossacks, under the leadership of Colonel Liakhoff, a Russian officer, opened fire upon the Medjlis and killed a number of Nationalists. The defenders of the Medjlis kept up a resistance for seven or eight hours, in spite of the odds against them, and did not give up until the buildings were badly damaged by shell and shrapnel and most of the inmates either killed or captured. For several days after the destruction of the Medjlis, Colonel Liakhoff and his Cossacks bombarded and looted the houses of all who were especially disliked by the Shah. Valuable records belonging to the Medjlis were destroyed in this bombardment, and Colonel Liakhoff became an actual dictator in Teheran. The Russian zone in Persia, as defined by the convention of 1907, contained Teheran, the capital, Tabriz, the second largest city, and most of the important centers of population. During the bombardment in Teheran a minor revolution against the Shah broke out at Tabriz, which was put down by a second intervention of Russian troops on the ground that their presence was necessary to protect the lives and property of foreigners, although both in Teheran and at Tabriz, all of the depredation against foreigners had been committed by Royalist soldiers and followers, as the Nationalists were scrupulous to protect foreign lives and properties. Ample proof of this fact has been given by Europeans who were residing in both cities at the time. The hopes of the Persian people

to establish a constitutional government of their own seemed doomed to defeat, owing to the active interference of Russia.

In October of this same year, 1908, the tide in favor of the Nationalists began to turn, and by October 12th they succeeded in getting undisputed control of Tabriz, but the inhabitants of the city were in almost desperate straits. Many were dying from starvation, and the city was surrounded by the forces of the Shah.

Throughout the winter conditions went from bad to worse, and on April 21st, 1909, an attempt was made to break through the enemy's lines to secure food. This sortie was led by an Englishman named W. A. Moore, who had gone to Persia to represent several English newspapers and who had joined the Nationalist forces, and an American, Mr. H. C. Baskerville, who was a teacher in the school of the American Presbyterian Mission at Tabriz. In this sally Mr. Baskerville was killed, and on April 29th a Russian force, composed of three battalions of infantry, two of artillery and a company of sappers, entered the city. At this time the Russian Government gave solemn assurances that just as soon as order was restored these four thousand troops would be withdrawn, but down to June, 1912, the order for their withdrawal had not been issued. On April 22nd the British and Russian Legations sent a note to the Shah demanding that he restore order and accept the constitution, and as a result of this note he, the Shah, on May 10th again solemnly swore that he would

abide by the constitution, but by this time the Nationalist leaders, as well as the Persian people, had lost all faith in his promises.

A guerilla warfare between the forces of the two parties was kept up, with varying results, until the month of July, when Russia warned the Nationalists that any further attempts on their part to enter Teheran would be followed by active intervention. On July 10th a battle was fought between Cossack troops and Nationalist forces at Badamak, fifteen miles from Teheran, but without any decisive results, although skirmishing continued for two days. On July 13th the Nationalist forces succeeded in slipping through the Cossack and Royalist lines and entered Teheran.

They were received by the inhabitants of the city with greatest joy, and by the 15th received full possession of the capital. On the next day the Shah, with a large party of his soldiers and attendants, left the city at 8:30 o'clock in the morning and took refuge in the Russian Legation, seven miles outside of the city. By this act he virtually abdicated his throne. As soon as he reached the legation both the Russian and British flags were hoisted, showing the unanimity between the two powers in upholding the Shah against the Persian people.

On that same evening a mass meeting was held in the grounds of the Medjlis palace, in which the Shah was formally deposed and his son, Ahmad Mirza, a boy twelve years old, was proclaimed his successor,

and a regent was appointed in the person of Azudu'l Mulk, a venerable statesman.

In January the cause of the Nationalists had seemed entirely lost, but by July 16th, through the courage, patriotism and skill of their leaders and soldiers, the hopes of a constitutional and representative government had been restored.

On July 20th the young Shah triumphantly entered his capital, and shortly after this the new constitutional government was formally recognized by both England and Russia. With the Shah deposed and the constitutional government in full force, the Nationalist party hoped for a long period of peace in which to work out the grave problems facing the government. The cabinet and Medjlis got vigorously to work to raise the revenues needed to meet their current expenses and foreign obligations; to police the country; to restore order and protect lives and property. The problems facing them were far from easy of solution. They plainly realized that their government must not only command the confidence and respect and loyal support of their own people, but must also be so stable that it could resist any further interference from the so-called "friendly" powers. Added to their own internal difficulties, which were tremendous, they had to reckon with the open hostility of Russia and the timidity of England in opposing any of Russia's schemes. Several times the Medjlis had appealed to England against Russia's encroachments, and at one time had won the sympathy of the British Minister, but Sir Edward Grey set aside the advice of Spring-

Rice and issued positive orders not to oppose Russia. The Persian Government, in December, 1909, attempted to obtain from the governments of Great Britain and Russia a loan of \$2,500,000, but the conditions upon which they could secure this amount of money were so dangerous to the independence of Persia that the Medjlis did not dare to accept them. In the following year the Persian Government entered into negotiations with a private banking house in London, and the terms of the loan had been mutually agreed upon, to the satisfaction of both parties, when the British Government, acting upon protestation from Russia, prevented the Medjlis from pledging the Persian crown jewels as security, so these negotiations were brought to an end. While the above mentioned negotiations were going on, Russia was demanding valuable concessions from Persia as the price of withdrawing her troops from Tabriz and vicinity, although the country was absolutely at peace, and there was no possible excuse for the presence of the Cossacks. In all of these demands Russia had the open sympathy of the British Government. Having failed in all the attempts to float a loan in England or Russia, the Medjlis decided to try the experiment of securing an administrator from the United States, as they felt that an official who was free from any European influence might be able to re-organize the financial condition of their distracted country. On December 25, 1910, the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs sent instructions to the Persian representative in Wash-

ington to take the necessary steps to secure such an administrator as might be needed.

Mr. Knox was then the American Secretary of State, and, upon his recommendation, Mr. W. Morgan Shuster was offered a contract to act for three years as Treasurer-General of the Persian Empire in order to organize and collect the revenues of Persia and superintend their disbursements. Four American assistants to the Treasurer-General were also engaged. Shortly after his return to this country Mr. Shuster published a graphic account of his experiences in this responsible position, which he very aptly describes in his title as *The Strangling of Persia*. He arrived in Teheran on May 12, 1911, and at once entered upon his difficult duties. From the very first he was made to feel the subtle opposition of Russia and the apathy of England to his efforts at reform, but equally, at the outset of his work, he won the support and active sympathy and co-operation of the Medjlis and Persian people. Shortly before Mr. Shuster's arrival, the Persian Government had secured from the Imperial Bank of Persia, a British corporation, the loan of \$6,250,000. On May 30th, a little over a fortnight after his arrival, Mr. Shuster submitted to the cabinet the project of a law placing in the hands of the Treasurer-General the control of the refunding operations and expenditures resulting from this loan, which project was at once approved by the Cabinet, passed by the Medjlis and enacted into law. The passing of this law was in direct opposition to the Russian influence and was regarded by the Medjlis as a victory for their govern-

ment. On June 13th the Medjlis passed another law establishing a central organization, which was to be known as the office of the Treasurer-General of Persia. This office was to be held responsible for the collection and disbursement of all revenues and government receipts, from whatever source they might be derived, and was to make and authorize all payments, for whatever purpose, in behalf of the Government of Persia. Previous to the enactment of this law collections had been made by officials of so many government departments that it was practically impossible for the government to know the amount of the public revenues, from what sources they came and where they went. During the eight months, in which Mr. Shuster was allowed to remain in Persia, under the operation of this law, taxes were collected, all regular and extraordinary expenses were met, all foreign obligations and the salaries of the different ministries and of the foreign representatives of the government, were paid for the first time in years, and an accurate account of every receipt and expenditure was kept. It was to have been supposed that the enactment of such a law, protecting and guaranteeing the rights and interests of foreign creditors, would have won the enthusiastic support of the foreign powers, but such, alas! was not the case. On the very day on which the law was passed, the Russian Minister announced that the Belgian Customs employees, who had been installed before the advent of Mr. Shuster, should not be under the control or supervision of the American Treasurer-

General, and he threatened to seize the customhouses in the north and put Russian officials in charge.

Whichever way he happened to turn, the American Treasurer-General found himself opposed by the powers, but in spite of this opposition he persisted in his attempts to carry out the terms of his contract with the Persian Government. Mr. Shuster's own account of the proceedings of the eight months in which he was allowed to remain at his post, form one of the most interesting treatises upon the method of European diplomacy which have been published in recent years. While the Russian Government took the initiative in all the opposition against him, he does not hesitate to state that Great Britain flatly refused to interfere in any way with Russia's actions.

When he wished to secure the services of Major C. B. Stokes, a British subject who had been long a resident in Persia, who spoke the native language and was thoroughly familiar with the internal condition of the country, solely because he, Mr. Shuster, felt that Major Stokes was the most capable and efficient man to carry on the important work to be done, the British Government refused to allow Major Stokes to serve because Russia objected, although Major Stokes himself was willing and anxious to so serve.

The loss of Major Stokes' services was not only a disappointment to the American Treasurer-General, but also a great handicap to his carrying on of his plans, as there was, in the country, no other man of equal efficiency for the work required. An incident which occurred in October brought matters to a head.

A number of the wealthy nobles of Teheran refused to pay their taxes, and among them, the most flagrant delinquent, was Prince Alau'd Dawla, a member of the royal family. When these men could not be persuaded to pay their taxes the Treasurer-General, following what had always been the procedure in Persia, sent a body of the Treasury gendarmes to collect the taxes by force. These gendarmes notified the prince that his property was seized by the government and would be held until the taxes were paid. Alau'd Dawla fled from his house to the house of the Premier, who lived nearby, and with tears in his eyes besought his aid. The Premier's brother, who was bitterly opposed to the American administration of the Treasury, accompanied by a colonel of the regular army and some troops, rushed upon the unsuspecting Treasury gendarmes, beat them with sticks and took their guns from them. The following morning Mr. Shuster received from the Premier a note telling what action he had taken. The Treasurer-General at once demanded a full written apology for the affair, the punishment of the guilty parties and prompt payment of the taxes. The Premier made an open and manly apology, restored their guns to the Treasury gendarmes and saw that the taxes were paid in full. This little incident greatly increased the prestige of the Treasury and caused numerous other delinquents to promptly pay their taxes, but it also greatly aroused the opposition of the Russian Legation, with whom Prince Alau'd Dawla was on intimate terms. Shortly before this incident the Russian Minister had issued to the

Persian Government a verbal ultimatum demanding among other things, an apology for the "insult" which he alleged had been offered to Russian Consular Officials. An immediate answer of "Yes" or "No" was demanded to this ultimatum. The Persian Cabinet sent for Mr. Shuster, who advised that the demands of Russia were without either law or justice and should be refused. This was on November 3rd, the same day as the incident about Prince Alau'd Dawla above reported. On November 6th the Persian Government made a dignified but firm reply to the Russian ultimatum and offered to submit the matters therein to arbitration. It is needless to say that the Russian Government was greatly surprised by the firmness of Persia's reply. In the meantime some friction had arisen because Mr. Shuster had employed a British subject named Lecoffre, who had for several years been a resident of Teheran, to go to Tabriz to investigate the misappropriation of taxes in that city. Russia had objected to this employment of Mr. Lecoffre, and Sir Edward Grey had wired to Sir George Barclay that the sending of Mr. Lecoffre to Tabriz would cause a protest from Russia which might result in her seizing the northern provinces.

The Persian Government, on November 11th, having become alarmed at the Russian preparations for seizing Northern Persia, appealed to the British Government as to what course they should pursue. Sir Edward Grey immediately wired his advice for Persia to accept the Russian ultimatum and apologize.

Acting upon Sir Edward Grey's advice and realizing

the hopelessness of the situation, the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs, on November 24th, drove to the Russian Legation and made the desired apology. This was the last thing that Russia really wanted, as she had been counting upon a pretext for invading Northern Persia.

Persia only yielded because Sir Edward Grey had assured the Persian Government, through the British Legation, that Russia would at once withdraw her troops if an apology was made.

One can imagine the Persian Minister's surprise and indignation when the Russian Minister informed him that Persia's apology was accepted but that in the meantime another ultimatum was being prepared. The text of the second ultimatum I copy in full from Mr. Shuster's book, because it marks the end of Persia's pathetic struggle for national independence. It reads as follows:

"In the course of our interview of Friday (November 24th) I had the honor of explaining to Your Excellency the reasons which impelled the Imperial Government of Russia to put several further proposals before the Persian Government, and I have been waiting for my Government's instructions on the subject. Those instructions have now reached me and I have the honor to make, on the behalf of the Russian Government, the following proposals.

"1. The dismissal of Mr. Shuster and Mr. Lecoffre; the status of the other persons who have been invited into service by Mr. Shuster will be determined in accordance with the second proposal.

"2. An undertaking by the Persian Government not to engage in the service of Persia foreign subjects without

first obtaining the consent of the Russian and British Legations.

"3. The payment by the Persian Government of an indemnity to defray the expenses of the present despatch of troops to Persia. The amount and manner of payment and compensation will be fixed after the receipt of the Persian Government's reply.

"I consider it my duty to explain that the reasons for these measures are:

"1. The absolute necessity of obtaining compensation, owing to the fact that the Imperial Government has been forced to send troops to Persia and owing to the recent insulting acts of Mr. Shuster towards Russia.

"2. The earnest desire of the Imperial Government is now to remove the principal source of conflict which has arisen, and in the future to lay the foundations upon which the two Governments can firmly build up friendly and stable relations and to give a prompt and satisfactory solution to all the Russian matters and questions still pending.

"3. In addition to the above facts I have to point out that the Imperial Government will not wait longer than forty-eight hours for the execution of the aforesaid proposals, and during this interval the Russian troops will remain at Resht. If no reply, or an unsatisfactory reply, is received at the expiration of the said period the troops will advance and it is evident that this will increase the indemnity to be paid by Persia to Russia."

The rest of the story is very short and can be told in a few words. This second ultimatum was presented on November 29th. Shortly after its presentation, the British Parliament demanded of Sir Edward Grey why the name of the British Government had been used. *His reply was that he had agreed to Russia's demands.* He further stated that Mr. Shuster had attempted to "set the clock back" in Persia, and, in

consequence, must go. The effect of the ultimatum upon the Persian Government was stupefying. In spite of the continued aggressions of Russia since 1907, the Persians had believed in the sacredness of treaty obligations and could not imagine that their whole national independence, and even existence, could be overthrown on such a pretext as Russia had offered, and the government found it even more difficult to believe in England's acquiescence to such demands. The Medjlis however determined to stand by their guns. An hour before the expiration of the time limit, a venerable Mohammedan priest arose in the Medjlis and said, "It may be the will of Allah that our liberty and our sovereignty shall be taken away by force, but let us not sign them away with our own hands." So saying he sat down in silence, but these inspired words were enough. The die was cast, and the ultimatum was rejected. Of course, the Medjlis realized what their action meant, but such realization makes the action only the more noble. After the rejection events followed fast. By December 24th the Medjlis was abolished, the Russian troops had advanced to Teheran, and military control was established in the capital.

Mr. Shuster left Teheran on the 11th of January, 1910, and four days later sailed from Enzeli, and the story of Persia's dying struggle for liberty was at an end. Speaking of the part which England played in this tragic struggle, Mr. Arthur Bullard, in an article on "The British Foreign Policy and Sir Edward Grey," which appeared in the *Century Magazine* for Decem-

ber, 1915, says: "From a humanitarian point of view the British record in Persia is the blackest in recent history. It is on a par with their Chinese opium war and their ultimatum to Portugal in 1890."

CHAPTER XI.

ENGLAND AND GERMANY.

THE relationship between England and the states which now comprise the German Empire was one of sympathy, and at times close alliance, from the time of Elizabeth until the close of the Nineteenth Century. From the accession of George I, in 1714, until the death of Queen Victoria, the alliance with the German States might almost be called a family affair, as the sympathies of the House of Hanover were distinctly German. During his numerous wars we find England aiding and abetting Frederick the Great against the rest of Europe. For a short space of time, during Victoria's reign, England, in alliance with Napoleon III, carried on the Crimean War, but this alliance was wholly due to the fear of Russia, which I have already dwelt upon. The Crimean War was never popular, and, when war broke out between France and Prussia in 1870, the English people sided with Prussia. The question of the neutrality of Belgium was brought to the front during this war, and in view of the present situation in Europe, it is interesting to consider the attitude of the British Government upon that subject in 1870. On August 19th of that year Great Britain and Prussia signed a treaty

concerning the neutrality and independence of Belgium.

Article I of this treaty bound Prussia to respect the neutrality of Belgium during the Franco-Prussian War. Article II made provision for joint action of the two powers against France in case she violated Belgium territory. Article III stated that this treaty should only be binding during the Franco-Prussian War, and for twelve months thereafter. On the 10th of August, 1870, Mr. Gladstone, speaking of the treaty just signed, said: "There is, I admit, the obligation of the treaty. It is not necessary, nor would time permit me, to enter into the complicated question of the nature of the obligations of that treaty, but I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee is binding on every party to it, irrespectively, altogether, of the position in which it may find itself when occasion for acting on the guarantee arises."

The treaty of 1839, as well as the previous one concerning Belgium of 1831, can only be understood by remembering the conditions under which they were framed. Belgium had broken away from Holland, and the main object of the treaty of 1839 was to put an end to the disputes between these two countries. It stated in Article VII that "Belgium shall form an independent and perpetually neutral state." Mr. Gladstone evidently did not consider this treaty as sufficient to protect Belgium against France in 1870, and, consequently, brought about the treaty with Prussia,

which I have just quoted, and which was to be binding for only one year after the close of the war. By his speech in the House of Commons, he showed that he did not wish to bind his country in any future controversies which might arise. At that time the feeling in England was strong against France. Lord Salisbury, who succeeded Mr. Gladstone, was even more averse to having his country mixed up in Continental affairs. When, in 1887, there seemed to be a possibility of another war between Germany and France, a letter appeared in the *Standard*, which was the recognized organ of the Salisbury government (February 4th), in which the writer stated that "it would be madness for us to oppose the passage of German troops through Belgium." This was the openly expressed view of the Foreign Office at that time. The facts relating to the treaties of 1839 and 1870 must be borne in mind when one considers the origins of the present war, which will be considered in another chapter.

Throughout the Eighteenth Century we find England closely allied with the German States, particularly with Prussia, not merely because her king was German, but because it was to her interest to preserve such alliances. It was under the leadership of a German, Prince George of Hesse-Darmstadt, that German troops, aided by the British navy, captured Gibraltar and secured for Great Britain actual control of the entrance to the Mediterranean Sea. In all of her Continental struggles England employed Hanoverian or other German troops, and in her war with her American Colonies sent bands of Hessians to this

country. When Maria Theresa allied herself to France in 1756, and thus broke away from the traditional Hapsburg policy, England first appreciated the necessity of a definite understanding with the German principalities, and this led to her making a treaty with Prussia (in 1756) by which subsidies amounting to \$3,350,000 a year were paid to Frederick the Great for the purpose of carrying on his wars and raising Prussia to an equality with Austria. It is true that under George III and Lord Bute this treaty was for a time set aside and Frederick left to his own resources, but when France allied herself to the American Colonies in 1778, and thus enabled them to achieve their complete independence, Frederick refused to offer England any assistance, and so paid off his old scores, and friendly relations were restored. During the Napoleonic wars the sympathy between England and Prussia was closer than ever before, and, had it not been for England's steady refusal to make any terms with Napoleon and the troops which she sent to the Continent under Wellington and the subsidies which she granted to the allies, Germany today might be only a French province. In 1813, after the battle of Jena, Prussia was completely crushed and humiliated, and the victorious Napoleon proceeded to divide up her dominions to suit himself.

Nēver has the spirit of the German people and their leaders been finer than in this, their darkest hour; with a lofty ideal of national independence before them, under the guidance of such patriotic statesmen as Stein, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and Hardenburg,

they set resolutely to work to build up the nation which is now the most advanced progressive power on the Continent of Europe. From the battle of Waterloo, in 1815, until 1848 was a period of peace. During these years Great Britain devoted herself to internal development, the enlarging and strengthening of her fleet and the extending of her already vast possessions. For Prussia these years were those of struggle and disappointment.

Frederick William III, the son of Frederick the Great, was expected by his people to achieve the rehabilitation of his country and the unification of the German States, but he, unwisely, accepted the conditions of the German Confederation, arranged by Metternich at the Congress of Vienna, by which Prussia became a second-rate power, subservient to Austria. Had England's policy at the Congress of Vienna been guided by a man of real world-vision, the history of Europe for the past hundred years would have been very different. She was in a position to dominate the Congress and could have demanded a strong and united Germany, which would have satisfied the hopes and desires of the German people. Such a demand would have won the hearty support of the Czar, Alexander, who was the most enlightened and progressive sovereign in Europe. Unfortunately England was represented at the Congress by Lord Castlereagh, who personally disliked the Czar, and suspected that he had designs on Constantinople and the destruction of the Ottoman Empire. Austria was suspicious of Russia's ambitions in the Balkan peninsula, and was the tra-

ditional ally of Great Britain, except in the Seven Years' War, so Castlereagh joined Metternich and Tallyrand to oppose the schemes of Russia, and forced the German Confederation upon Prussia. What could poor Frederick William do against such a coalition—Metternich, Tallyrand and Castlereagh, true disciples of the policies of Machiavelli! After the retirement of Castlereagh, in 1822, English foreign policy became distinctly more broad-minded. The Resolutions of Carlsbad, in 1819, had given to the German Governments complete control over the political activities and intellectual life of their people, and German thought was guided by Goethe and by the professors in the various universities, all of whom were enthusiastic admirers of English institutions. About this time Lord Palmerston was placed in control of Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, and he held this position for almost an entire generation, and may be said to have established the British Foreign Policy of today. He arranged the neutrality and independence of Belgium; established British influence in China; by his benevolent neutrality made the Kingdom of Italy possible, and effectually put a check to French and Russian designs in the Near East, but his whole attitude to the German States was the narrow one of prejudice, if not actual dislike. To him is ascribed the description of Germany as "a land of damned professors," and he is said to have quoted the statement of Voltaire, that the Germans should be content to rule the clouds, while France ruled the land and Great Britain the seas. The witty Frenchman, of course, did not foresee the

days of Zeppelins. In 1848, when the Frankfort Assembly bought a fleet to protect Schleswig-Holstein from being taken over by Denmark, Palmerston said that the German flag was unknown to international law, and that the ships of that confederation could be treated as pirates by British cruisers. His policy was regarded on the Continent as treacherous and high-handed, and in Germany it was felt that he intended to keep the country divided in the interests of British monopoly. In the light of the knowledge of today it seems incomprehensible that a statesman, who so quickly realized the value of a united Italy, and who did all in his power to aid the Italian cause, should have failed to realize the value to Europe of a united Germany. Had this unification taken place in those days it is hardly possible that Europe today would be facing destruction. Under Palmerston's domination the English people accepted his ideas and prejudices about Germany the more easily, because they knew nothing about the German people. Thackeray says that at no time in English history has the English insularity and patronizing insolence to all foreign people been stronger than in the days of Palmerston, and never were the English people less understood or more cordially disliked by the people on the Continent. This doubtless accounts, in a measure, for a great deal of the present hatred of England in Germany. The Germans are a proud and supersensitive people, "slow to wrath and slow to speak," and in the minds of such a people slights and insults are not easily forgotten and, feeding upon themselves, grow into mighty forces for good or

evil. The influence of the English Court, on the other hand, was strongly German, and was made so by the marriage of the Queen, as Prince Albert, by his personal charm, his quiet dignity and his steadfast effacement of himself in all political questions, won the admiration and affection of the English people. Sir Harry Johnston says:

"The marriage of Queen Victoria gave a fresh impetus to the Germanization of Britain. Notable Germans were more or less directly brought to this country by those far-seeing helpers of England, Leopold and Albert of Saxe-Coburg. They explored unknown lands for the British Empire, founded colleges of music and chemistry, schools and museums of art, studios in philology, ancient and modern, improved both theatre and drama, extended horticulture and assisted to make Kew Gardens and the Herbarium what they are and have been to an Empire in which economic botany is a matter of necessity, not a pretty luxury as some of our home-bred statesmen have imagined. Glance through the eminent names which have become famous in the British colonial and imperial history, in British exploration, biology, metallurgy, printing, music, journalism, banking, law making and expounding, soldiering and seamanship, and note how many of them are of recent or immediate extraction."

When Bismarck began to carry out his plans for the unification of the German States, Queen Victoria lent all of her sympathy and her tremendous influence to aid and assist him. This was the time of the Schleswig-Holstein controversy. The question of the rightful ownership of these provinces was so complicated that Lord Palmerston said only three people really understood it, and they were the Danish Prime Minister, who had lost his mind; Prince Albert, who had

recently died, and himself—and he had completely forgotten it. The status of these duchies rested upon an international agreement made in 1852, and Lord Palmerston fully believed, when Denmark attempted to annex them in 1863 and Prussia and the entire German Confederation opposed Denmark, that the whole matter could easily be settled by the European Concert. In this belief he was mistaken, and Bismarck acquired for Prussia both Schleswig and Holstein. This action of Bismarck's was generally disapproved in Germany until after the war with Austria in 1866. A prominent English writer upon naval affairs said, "The war of 1864 was one of the great crossroads of British History, and England took the wrong turning." After Austria was defeated in 1866 and the North German Confederation established, the English Government began to understand the progress of affairs in Central Europe, but this caused no anxiety in England. The government rather looked upon the new confederation as a valuable bulwark against France and an aid in the preservation of the balance of power. Napoleon III had excited the animosity of the English people because he had exacted Savoy and Nice from Italy as a price for his aid in the Italian War of Liberation, and in 1867 he had involved England in a very difficult pledge to preserve the neutrality of Luxemburg. Bismarck's action in transposing the wording of the famous Ems telegram was then entirely unknown, so when war broke out between France and Prussia the sympathies of the English Court and the English people were all with

Germany, but after the war, when the demands of Bismarck upon the French people (for the French Government had collapsed) became known in England, public opinion experienced a reaction in favor of France. The French war, in Bismarck's eyes, was wholly justified, because it brought about the realization of his dreams.

The German Empire was proclaimed at Versailles, and a new and unknown power appeared in the councils of Europe. Sidney Whitman, in an article entitled, "England and Germany," which appeared in *Harper's Magazine*, April, 1898, says, "A great English statesman would either have prevented the unification of Germany or have loyally welcomed it as a guarantee of the peace of Europe." Unfortunately, at the time, England did neither, but adopted a policy of strict neutrality. The Germans could not then, and have never since, understood why English statesmen did not grasp the necessity of a united Germany, when it had so readily accepted a like necessity in the case of Italy. Invaluable assistance was granted to Cavour and Garibaldi, why not to von Moltke and Bismarck?

Europe in 1871 was very different from the Europe of twenty years previous. France had been pushed back from the front rank of Continental powers and shorn of two of her most fertile provinces on the ground that Louis XIV had stolen these same provinces from the affiliations which they had borne for six hundred years and more; the petty principalities of Italy and Central Europe had been formed into

unified states as the Kingdom of Italy and the German Empire; and Austria had become the Dual Empire, Austria-Hungary. Only Great Britain and Russia remained unchanged. This was an era of great colonial expansion in different parts of the globe, and among European nations the German Empire alone made no attempt to acquire colonies. Bismarck, who controlled German policy, was occupied in preventing France from securing allies who would help her to recover the lost provinces. For this purpose he formed, first the entente with Russia and Austria, which was so short lived, and later the Triple Alliance with Austria and Italy. At the same time he tacitly aided France in securing possessions in Northern Africa, because he felt that if she should become absorbed in colonial expansion she would have less time to think about Alsace-Lorraine.

The Triple Alliance, which was formed in 1882, endured for thirty-two years, and made a compact block in the center of Europe, and in the minds of its authors was intended to ensure European peace. For this purpose the combination was purely defensive, which was the reason why Italy refused to go into the war with Austria and Germany, and this gave her the excuse for breaking with her former allies in 1915 and joining the Allied Powers against Germany and Austria. At first the British Government realized the advantages to Great Britain from this alliance, and she was not slow to make use of it to restrain both France and Russia. Lord Salisbury, who succeeded Lord Beaconsfield as head of the Conservative party,

realized how German assistance had enabled his predecessor to attain that "peace with honor" at the Congress of Berlin, and welcomed the news of the first alliance between Germany and Austria-Hungary as "tidings of great joy." Had the Conservatives not been driven from power in 1880, it is probably true that an Anglo-German Alliance would have been formed, as Bismarck had made such a suggestion to Lord Beaconsfield immediately after the Congress of Berlin, and his suggestion had been cordially received. There are many reasons why such an alliance would have been distinctly favorable to Great Britain. She and Austria were equally anxious to prevent any Russian aggression in the Balkans, and both she and Italy opposed French pretensions in Africa and the Mediterranean, and when France occupied Tunis in 1888, a British squadron immediately appeared in Italian waters, while Bismarck announced, "In Egypt I am English."

It is a recognized fact that Anglo-German friendship prevented Russia from acquiring control of Bulgaria, and General Boulanger from bringing about a war of revenge. While, through the efforts of Bismarck and Beaconsfield, England and Germany seemed on the eve of a close mutual alliance, Russia had come to an understanding with France, from whom she had borrowed vast sums of money. This understanding did not, in its beginning, cause any great anxiety in Berlin, because the relations between the German Empire, and both France and Russia, were at that time reasonably cordial. In England, the

Franco-Russian agreement was a cause of alarm, because of that fear of Russia which had been so fostered under Lord Palmerston.

The Boer War broke out in 1899, and almost immediately after its close Edward VII succeeded to the British throne. In spite of the recognized fact that the German Emperor had prevented a European coalition against Great Britain to compel her to recognize the complete independence of the South African Republics, the new King of England almost immediately entered upon his policy for the isolation of Germany. To offset the power of the Triple Alliance he visited Paris in 1903 and concluded the arrangements of the "entente cordiale" between France and England, which was announced to the world in 1904, when the famous triple arrangement about Morocco was made.

At that time M. Delcassé was the actual head of the French Government, and in him King Edward found a kindred spirit. The purposes of the entente were to surround Germany by a system of ententes and alliances, and thus leave her without military or financial support. Shortly after the agreement about Morocco came the understanding with Russia over Persia, which was engineered by Sir Edward Grey, and the consequences of which we have already shown. Later an attempt was made to draw Italy away from the Triple Alliance by offering her Albania, but this attempt was not then successful, and the Alliance remained in force.

Now the question naturally comes to the mind of the reader: Why did King Edward, who was own cousin to the German Emperor, desire to cripple Germany? The

answer is easily found. To refer once again to Sir John Seeley, "All the great wars since the days of Cromwell have been wars of trade." At the time of the formation of the German Empire England controlled the trade of the world. The only power who was at all likely to be her competitor was the United States, and as this country had no merchant marine and only a comparatively small navy, and is, moreover, closely allied to Great Britain by ties of language and blood, our development and prosperity were looked upon with leniency, almost with a kind of family pride that the youngster should be doing so well. Until the establishment of the Empire, Germany had been an almost exclusively agricultural country, her people had been either in the army trying to protect their land from foreign invasion or else striving to cultivate a naturally poor soil. Every year thousands of Germans had migrated to America, where they found conditions of life much easier, and where they have become a most valuable part of our citizenry.

After the war with France conditions rapidly changed. The people seem to have acquired a spirit of intense love and loyalty to their unified country. On the banks of the Rhine, in Westphalia, Saxony and Silesia great industries sprang into existence, furnaces, forges, steel mills, cotton mills, woolen mills, chemical industries, shipyards, etc.

A merchant marine was established, and soon ships belonging to the North German Lloyd and Hamburg-American companies, were to be found bearing the produce of this intense German industry to all parts

of the world. At first England laughed at all this activity, but soon the laughter ceased and the English industrial magnates began to realize that here was a real competitor to be accounted for. They passed a law requiring that everything of German manufacture should be labeled "Made in Germany," thinking that by this label they would soon put an end to the use of the articles which they were convinced must be of inferior quality to their own. To their complete surprise they found that a large percentage of the articles which they had thought to be English products came directly from Germany. The label by which they had thought to cripple, if not destroy German trade, proved to be the best advertisement the Germans had ever had. This was naturally disconcerting to British trade, but was in no sense, as yet, a *casus belli*. To stem the German tide something, however, must be done, so Joseph Chamberlain tried to persuade the Government to give up the policy of Free Trade, the policy, which more than any other, had made England both prosperous and great; but the common sense of the English people fortunately prevented that measure from being carried through.

Thus far there had been no actual friction between the two governments, and in Germany William II had actually been accused by many of his people as being entirely too pro-English in his sympathies and tastes. The English naturally had not relished the growth of German trade and especially the growth of their merchant marine, but they were preparing to meet it legitimately and to develop and improve their home

products, to meet the new world conditions. Up to this time the German navy was a negligible quantity.

When William II came to the throne, in 1888, the entire navy consisted of "floating forts placed at the entrances of the rivers on which stood the rising commercial centers." It was administered by officers of the army who considered it of little importance. Bismarck was opposed to it and that apparently settled the question. The Emperor, however, did not agree with Bismarck on this point. He soon realized that he could not protect a merchant marine, which by 1890 had become the third largest in the world and was steadily growing in order to meet the demands of the manufacturers, by coast defence gunboats or torpedo craft, and so determined to create a navy adequate to protect the marine service. In the beginning it was necessary to educate the public mind to the need of a navy. Little progress was made in this direction until 1898, when the Navy League was founded. Shortly before the foundation of the League, in 1897, Admiral Tirpitz was appointed Secretary of State for the Navy. This marked the real beginning of the German Navy and as a matter of course brought about some friction with the "Ruler of the Seas."

In 1898 the German Navy consisted of 9 battleships, exclusive of coast defense vessels, 3 large cruisers, 28 small cruisers and 113 torpedo boats, while 3 battleships and 7 cruisers were being built. The personnel of the navy amounted to about 25,000 men. The British Navy at this time had 54 battleships, 14 coast defense ships, 104 cruisers and several hundred

torpedo craft, but even then there were murmurings in England against the probable menace of a German Navy. Admiral Tirpitz determined upon a policy of naval upbuilding which has been persistently pursued ever since.

The construction program of 1900 planned that by 1920 the navy should consist of thirty-eight line ships, fourteen large cruisers and thirty-eight small cruisers, with as many torpedo-craft as should be needed and the age of replacement of battleships was placed at twenty-five years. In 1906 and again in 1908 additions were made to the construction program; the age of displacement was reduced to twenty years and, because of the enthusiasm which had been aroused in England by the creation of the dreadnought, this type of battleship was introduced into the German program. Mr. W. H. Dawson, from whose well known book *The Evolution of Modern Germany*, I have taken the above figures, says:

"It is of immense importance that the strength of this (the Naval) movement should be understood. Making allowances for a few hotheaded chauvinists, there is no brag, no truculence, no menace about the movement, its greatest significance lies in the fact that behind it are the deliberate will and calm resolution of a united nation."

Few Englishmen, unfortunately, looked upon the naval movement in Germany with the calmness and judgment of Mr. Dawson. In 1907, when William II visited England, and in his speech at the Guild Hall, emphatically declared his friendship toward the country of his mother and his grandmother, the press openly

doubted his sincerity and truthfulness. Again in 1908, in the now famous *Daily Telegraph* interview, the Kaiser reiterated his friendship for England and cited instances where he had proved it, notably when he had refused to receive the Boer delegates and had thus, for a time, greatly impaired his own popularity at home. In spite of this a certain party in England seemed determined to view every act of the German admiralty as a covert threat to England's sea power and, by means of a Jingo press, to stir up animosity among the people. The Jingo press was by no means confined to England, but was equally strong in Germany; but in both countries the masses of the people continued to be friendly to each other. The German Government repeatedly stated that Germany had no reason or desire to interfere with British naval supremacy. The fact of England's being absolutely dependent upon oversea supplies made this supremacy necessary to the very life of her people. All that Germany desired, to quote Count von Bülow, was a navy adequate to defend her coasts, her colonies and her expanding merchant marine. To say that Germany alone is responsible for the vast naval expenditure of the past few years is manifestly unjust. Had she wished to provoke a European war she had had numerous opportunities during the forty-three years in which she alone, among the great powers of Europe, has kept peace. After the affair of Morocco, in which she was certainly shabbily treated by both England and France, she behaved so well that even Sir Edward Grey determined that the time had come for him to

change his policy and he publicly announced that relations between the two nations, England and Germany, were at the point where a perfect understanding was in sight. Mr. H. G. Wells, who from his most recent writings, can not be accused of any sympathy for or with Germany says in his *Social Forces in England and America*:

"We, in Great Britain, are intensely jealous of Germany. We are intensely jealous of Germany not only because the Germans outnumber us and have a much larger and more diversified country than ours and lie in the very heart and body of Europe; but because in the last hundred years, while we have fed upon platitudes and vanity, they have had the energy and humility to develop a splendid system of national education, to toil at science and art and literature, to develop social organization, to master and better our methods of business and industry and to clamber above us in the scale of civilization. This has humiliated and irritated rather than chastened us, and our humiliation has been greatly exaggerated by the swaggering bad manners, the talk of 'Blood and Iron' and Mailed Fists, the Weltpolitik rubbish that inaugurated the new German phase."

The English people have in the past been so considerate of the finer feelings of other people when carrying out their own world policies that the last words quoted from Mr. Wells have an amusing sound.

Mr. James Davenport Whelpley in his book, *The Trade of the World*, says:

"In the great total of Germany's trade, and in the rapidity with which it has risen to its present volume and value, lies the reason for the anti-German agitation in England. On the surface this antagonism is political and relates to arma-

ments, but its roots lie in the trade of the world and it is fed upon commercial rivalry."

These wise words sum up the whole story of the relations between England and Germany from 1880 to the summer of 1914. We have considered the foreign policy of Great Britain from the time of Elizabeth to our own day. The British foreign policy, like that of all the European powers, has never been the people's policy, but has always been in the hands of a few, and conducted behind closed doors. It is this policy of secret diplomacy which has brought the world to the present awful crisis. In the concluding portion of this book I hope to show how the continuation of such a policy will affect not only the future of America, but also the future of the whole world. Only by clearly understanding these questions can we in America hope to become truly prepared to meet the responsibilities of the future.

PART III.
CONCLUSIONS.

CHAPTER XII.

THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR.

SINCE August, 1914, when the world seemed suddenly to lose all its bearings, we, in America, have been flooded with pamphlets, magazine articles, various colored "papers" and other propaganda from both of the belligerent factions, setting forth the whys and the wherefores of this most unnecessary of all wars.

Very early in the conflict the American press more or less violently espoused the side of the Allies and, as no other people in the world accept so blindly the dictum of the newspapers as the American people, public opinion in this country today is about ninety per cent pro-Ally. When one remembers that almost the first act of war on the part of Great Britain was to cut the German cables, and at the same time establish a strict censorship at home, the attitude of the newspapers is more easily understood. The business interests of Wall Street have always been close to those of London, so naturally British business ideas, ideals and policies have exerted a strong influence over those of New York, as London has long been the financial center of the world, with New York a close second. In face of such an established point of view it is a difficult task to attempt, while the war is still on, to

change the present trend of public opinion. During the Russo-Japanese War public opinion in this country was strongly for Japan. When the war was over and Japan's treatment of Corea, her aspirations in China, and what her attitude might become toward the United States because of our occupancy of the Philippines, and some of the state laws of California, became more widely known in this country, our people began to realize that there was something to be said in favor of the Russian side of the question. In order to point out what I believe should be the attitude and policy of the United States after the war is over, it is necessary to say a few words about the origins of the war. All of the facts which I shall give are taken from the Blue, White, Orange and other colored "Papers" issued by the different belligerents, and from authentic data taken from various British publications, which, on their own face value can stand as an accurate statement of facts.

The United States is the most fortunately situated nation in the world for internal development, occupying the very heart of a vast and fertile continent; having within her boundaries everything needed for the upbuilding and maintaining of a population of at least 300,000,000; washed on the east and west by great oceans; bounded on the north by a democracy kindred to her own in race, language, traditions and interests; her only vulnerable frontier the Mexican boundary, it is impossible for the people of this country to understand any national fear. And it is this impossibility which makes it so difficult to comprehend the point of

view of Germany. We have read and seen evidences of the marvelous development of the German nation since 1871 in all lines which make for national advance and prosperity, and we therefore ask with wonder, if not with indignation, "Why, when everything was coming his way, did the Kaiser bring on this awful war?" The answer of both press and public, based upon what we learn through the British censor, is because of "Prussian militarism," "lust for power," "*Weltpolitik*." Such an answer is the easy and logical one if we pay no attention to what is one of the fundamental beliefs and emotions of the whole German people—that is, fear of Russia. We have outlined the British fear of Russia and its results, but the German fear is something far deeper and more personal, and has existed since the days of Peter the Great, who moved his capital from Moscow to Petrograd that he might have his "window open toward Europe."

Every German, for generations, has been brought up to recognize the danger to his country, and all for which his country stands, from the vast unconquerable power on the east. He knows how Napoleon was swallowed up by the immensity of Russia a century ago, he also knows that his country is the only barrier which protects western Europe. English statesmen, in the past, have recognized the reasonableness of this German fear of Russia and have sympathized with it. In 1878 the nations of Europe met in conference in Berlin to decide how best to meet and overcome a peril which all recognized. At the Congress of Berlin Lord Beaconsfield, the most farsighted of British statesmen

since Pitt, directed the councils and was ably supported by Bismarck. The results of this conference are too well known to need repetition, but Russia's Pan-Slavic policy, then already well developed, was given a severe check. The Russian policy was clearly defined in a paper which has been known to the world since 1812 as "The Will of Peter the Great." I quote from Mr. A. R. Colquhoun's translation of the version published by M. Lésur in 1812 in his book *Des Progres de la Puissance Russe*. Mr. Colquhoun (in his book *Russia against India*) says that this document has been in circulation in Europe for 150 years. It is divided into sections, which read as follows:

1. "Neglect nothing which can introduce European manners and customs into Russia, and with this object gain the co-operation of the various Courts and especially of the learned men of Europe, by means of interesting speculations, by philanthropical and philosophical principles, or by any other suitable means.

2. "Maintain the State in a condition of perpetual war, in order that the troops may always be inured to warfare, and so that the whole nation may always be kept in training and ready to march at the first signal.

3. "Extend our dominion by every means on the north along the Baltic, as well as towards the south along the shores of the Black Sea; and for this purpose, excite the jealousy of England, Denmark and Brandenburg against the Swedes, by means of which these powers will disregard any encroachments we may make on that State and which we will end by subjugating.

4. "Interest the House of Austria in the expulsion of the Turk from Europe, and under this pretext maintain a permanent army and establish dockyards on the shores of the

Black Sea, and thus, by ever moving forward, we will eventually reach Constantinople.

5. "Keep up a state of anarchy in Poland; influence the national assemblies and, above all, regulate the election of its king; split it up on every occasion that presents itself and finally subjugate it.

6. "Enter into a close alliance with England and maintain direct relations with her by means of a good commercial treaty; allow her even to exercise a certain monopoly in the interior of the State so that a good understanding may be by degrees established between the English merchants and sailors and ours, who, on their part are to favor everything which tends to perfect and strengthen the Russian Navy, by aid of which it is necessary to at once strive for mastery over the Baltic and in the Black Sea, the keystone on which the speedy success of the scheme depends.

7. "Bear in mind that the commerce of India is the commerce of the world and that he who can exclusively command it is dictator of Europe. No occasion should therefore be lost to provoke war with Persia, to hasten its decay, to advance on the Persian Gulf and then to endeavor to re-establish the ancient trade of the Levant through Syria.

8. "Always interfere, either by force of arms or by intrigue, in the quarrels of the European Powers, and especially in those of Germany, and with this object in view seek after and maintain an alliance with Austria; encourage her in her favourite idea of national predominance; profit by the slightest ascendancy gained over her to entangle her in disastrous wars, so that she may be gradually weakened; even help her sometimes, but instantly stir up against her the enmity of the whole of Europe, particularly of Germany, by rousing the jealousy and distrust of German princes.

9. "Always select wives for Russian princes from among the German princesses so that by multiplying our alliances, based on close relationship and mutual interest, we will increase our influence over that Empire.

10. "Make use of the power of the Church over the dis-

united and schismatical Greeks who are scattered over Hungary, Turkey and the southern parts of Poland; gain them over by every possible means; pose as their protector and establish a claim to religious supremacy over them. Under this pretext Turkey will be conquered and Poland, unable any longer to stand alone, either by its own strength or by means of political connections will voluntarily place itself in subjection to us.

11. "From that time every moment will be precious to us. All our batteries must be secretly prepared to strike the great blow and to strike with such ardor, precision and rapidity, as to give Europe no time for preparation. The first step will be to propose, very secretly and with the greatest circumspection, first to the court of Versailles and then to that of Vienna, to divide with one of them the Empire of the world; and by mentioning that Russia is virtually ruler of the Eastern world and has nothing to gain but the title, this proposal will probably not arouse their suspicion. It is undoubted that this project can not fail to please them and war will be kindled between them, which will soon become general, both on account of the connections and widespread relationships between these two rival courts and natural enemies, and because of the interests which will compel the other Powers of Europe to take part in the struggle.

14. "In the midst of this general discord, Russia will be asked for help, first by one and then by another of the belligerent Powers; and, having hesitated long enough to give them time to exhaust themselves and to enable her to assemble her own armies, she will at last appear to decide in favor of the House of Austria, and while she pushes her irregular troops forward to the Rhine, she will at once follow them up with the hordes of Asia, and as they advance into Germany two large fleets filled with a portion of the same hordes must set sail, one from the Sea of Azov and the other from the port of Archangel. They will suddenly appear in the Mediterranean and Northern oceans, and inundate Italy, Spain and France with these fierce and rapacious

nomads who will plunder a portion of the inhabitants, carry off others into slavery to re-people the deserts of Siberia and render the remainder incapable of escaping from our yoke. All these distractions will afford such great opportunities to the regular troops that they will be able to act with a degree of energy and precision which will ensure the subjugation of Europe."

I have quoted the whole of this remarkable document, because it is universally well known in Europe but not in this country and because, in a degree, it accounts for that fear of Russia which is such a factor in German life.

Every student of European history, for the past hundred years, knows how closely the Russian government has tried to carry out the instructions of Peter the Great. Since the war Russia has stated that, on the close of the war, she would grant autonomy to Poland, but since the war broke out she has not only greatly intensified her persecution of the Jews, practically prohibiting Jewish children from receiving even the most elementary education, but she has also taken away the last vestige of political autonomy from Finland. An official program for the future government of Finland has just now been announced which will complete the scheme of the entire Russifying of the country, and this program has been signed by the Czar. The Finnish people no longer have a share in any portion of their government nor is their language to be allowed to be taught in the schools, and public lectures and meetings have been prohibited. Finland, in its humane and democratic civilization, has been for years a model to the world, but this model is no longer

to be allowed to exist. Mr. Shuster, from whose book on Persia I have already quoted says, in an article on the "Breakdown of Civilization," which he published in the *Century Magazine* shortly after the war broke out:

"The slowest moving nation in the world, except China, is Russia. At times she has seemed to take centuries to think, but she has always thought in centuries and not in decades or years. There is something impressive about great bulk and slow movements. Russia has both, but she has many other qualities. She is barbaric, but she is splendidly so. On top of her great pot of boiling tea she has a thin scum of the most brilliant statesmen in the world. By brilliant is meant sheer intellectuality and not moral force. It would take a volume to trace the workings of the Russian national policy even for the last one hundred years but its cardinal principle has never been changed. Russia is to dominate the world. Russian is to be the language of the East and of the West; the Greek Church is to be supreme; the Czar of Russia is to be the ruler of the Earth."

This quotation is in line with the testament of Peter the Great and also with the oft-repeated prophecy of Napoleon that eventually the great contest for dominion would be between the Anglo-Saxon and the Slav. One can not understand just how the present struggle began without knowing the policy of Russia during the past fifteen years. In 1878 she entered into her war with Turkey for the purpose of winning Constantinople. Checked in this direction by the Congress of Berlin, she started towards the Persian Gulf, as a warm water outlet is her first necessity. At the same time she turned towards the Far East to find herself opposed by Japan. In this war she was again de-

feated, but to Russia every defeat is merely temporary. Her recovery from the Japanese war is one of the wonders of modern history. To do this she needed ready money and found the most generous lender to be France. Out of the French loans the French Alliance grew up, but what are the exact terms of this alliance have never been known to the world at large. With the aid of French capital, and later of British after Sir Edward Grey made the agreement about Persia, she reorganized her army on a modern basis, creating a force which she announced would be on a peace footing of 4,000,000 men. In addition to this stupendous army, she also began building a number of strategic lines of railway to the German and Austrian frontiers and developed an extensive program of naval construction. When King Edward arranged the "entente cordiale" between England and France, Russia determined to end the hostility between herself and Great Britain. She realized that the development which had taken place in Germany under William II had raised a barrier between herself and western Europe which it would be difficult to overcome. Her diplomatic overtures ended in the Anglo-Russian convention of 1907. England, the most democratic, and Russia, the most autocratic of European governments, had become friends—and why? While England was dallying with France and fearing Germany, she forgot her policy with regard to Turkey which had been so dear to Palmerston, Gladstone and Disraeli, the policy of protecting the Ottoman Empire in its possession of Constantinople, and Germany stepped into her long-

held position as "protector of the Porte." This made some agreement with Russia a necessity, and opened to Russia the opportunity for which she had been waiting. She knew that, even with the aid of France, she could not safely attack the two Central Powers and yet she could never control the Balkan States unless Austria were wiped out, and to wipe out Austria she must also conquer Germany who was sure to stand by her ally. She felt that a clash between England and Germany was bound to come because of British fear of the German Navy and her jealousy of Germany's over-seas trade. "The Affair of Morocco," ending in the visit of a German warship to Agadir, so frightened the British Foreign Office that Sir Edward Grey seems to have played right into Russia's hands. She immediately announced the four million peace footing of her army, which was to be accomplished in four years. This announcement was for the purpose of deceiving Austria and Germany, for she at once began to put her army upon a war footing, so that in 1914, two years after her announcement of the four year program, she was able to mobilize within a few days the tremendous force at which all the world wondered two years ago. After the Balkan wars which, as has been well proven, were instigated by Russian intrigue, William II alone kept the peace in Europe, when he told Austria-Hungary that if she should enter upon war with Russia, as a result of her having attacked Servia, Germany would not support her; while to Russia he said that if she should attack Austria, even though she attempted no active inter-

vention in the Balkans, he would support Austria.

So great was the relief in Europe that war had been averted that Mr. H. G. Wells said:

"If we can avert war with Germany for twenty years we shall never have to fight Germany. In twenty years' time we shall be talking no more of sending troops to fight side by side on the frontier of France; we shall be talking of sending troops to fight side by side with French and Germans on the frontiers of Poland."

With the settlement of the Balkan wars there was reasonable hope, in all the great Chancellories of Europe, of a period of peace, but in the Balkans there is no peace—and suddenly, on June 28, 1914, the entire world was shocked by the news that the heir to the Austrian throne and his consort had been murdered on the streets of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The first investigations into this crime proved that the plot had been elaborately prepared in Servia, that Servian officers were implicated and that the bomb which killed the Archduke had been made in the Servian arsenal. Several weeks went by and nothing was done by the Servian government towards punishing the criminals, so, on July 23rd, almost a month after the murder, Austria issued her ultimatum to Servia. That this ultimatum seemed to the world unjustifiably severe, both in its terms and in the time allowed for a reply there is no question. Within the time limit Servia, however, did make a reply in which she conceded to most of the points in Austria's demand but would not give in on what the Austrian government considered the most important point, which was that Austrian

officials should take part in the trial of the suspected Servians. When one stops to consider the facts of the case, that for months the Servian government, backed up by Russia, had been fomenting all sorts of plots and insurrections in Bosnia, it is easy to understand why the Austrian government should have felt that any trial which was carried on without her supervision would be a travesty upon justice. Several distinguished Englishmen, who have written upon the immediate causes of the war, have pointed out that, had the Prince of Wales been murdered in any neighboring state which had been openly carrying on an anti-British propaganda, the British government would have been equally insistent upon its right to supervise the trial of the murderers, and that their demands would have been enthusiastically supported by a united public opinion. After Austria sent her ultimatum to Servia events moved with terrific rapidity. In order to make them plain I shall show as briefly as possible the events as they occurred in that most eventful week.

On July 24th Servia replied to the Austrian note. Russia refused to allow Austria to settle with Servia alone, and Austria declined to allow Russia to interfere in what she regarded as a purely personal affair between herself and Servia. The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs held a consultation with the representatives of Great Britain and France in Petrograd and urged that Great Britain fulfill her obligations to the Triple Entente, and proclaim her "solidarity with France and Russia." He also stated on this day that "the Russian mobilization would at any rate have to

be carried out." On this same day, in Paris, the German Ambassador said "The German Government desires urgently the localization of the dispute because every interference of another would, owing to the natural play of alliances, be followed by incalculable consequences." (See French Book 28.)

July 25th the German Government again stated that she felt that the European powers should not enter into the quarrel, but that if Russia was determined to interfere then she, Germany, would co-operate with England, France and Italy to bring about a settlement. This was exactly what Sir Edward Grey proposed on the following day, but unfortunately he did not make his position clear. The ambiguity of his proposal encouraged Germany but did not discourage Russia, as she was sure of the support of France and felt reasonably confident of the sympathy of the British Foreign Office. The most important occurrence on this day was the Russian order for mobilization, which has been amply proven to have taken place by the Czar's telegram to the Kaiser of July 30th, in which he said, "the military measures, now coming into operation were decided upon five days ago." This telegram is published in full in the Russian Orange Book No. 6.

July 26th—Austria notified the world, through Germany, that in her punitive measures against Servia, she would annex no territory, and she appealed to both France and England to restrain Russia from interference. Her Ambassador at Petrograd made the same announcement to the Russian Foreign Office. On this

day Sir Edward Grey made his proposal—that the Ambassadors of France, Germany and Italy should meet with him in London to arrange a settlement.

July 27th—Austria refused to make any settlement until she should have punished Serbia for the murder of the Archduke. Germany, in her reply to Sir Edward Grey's proposal of the previous day, said that if such a conference as he suggested were to be effective, Russia and Austria should be represented in the conference. She reiterated her statement that the quarrel between Austria and Serbia should be localized but recognized that the difficulties arising between Austria and Russia were far more serious and used her influence at Vienna to persuade Austria to approach Russia directly. That Germany was bending every effort to preserve peace was recognized by such papers as the *London Times*, the *Daily Chronicle* and the *Manchester Guardian* of that date. The Russian Foreign Minister conditionally agreed to Sir Edward Grey's proposal, and the Czar telegraphed to the Crown Prince of Serbia urging that Serbia be "reasonable," stating at the same time that Russia will "under no circumstances remain indifferent to the fate of Serbia." (Orange Book 40.)

France accepted Sir Edward Grey's proposal, but the Russian Ambassador in Paris told the French Government, that Germany's only object in urging France to remain neutral was to break up the Triple Entente.

On this date the English Admiralty ordered the concentration of the fleet and Sir Edward Grey, who had

become impatient at Germany's delay in answering his proposal, encouraged the Russian Ambassador by telling him of the orders to the fleet. He also told the Austrian Ambassador that Austria could not hope to punish Serbia without Russian intervention.

July 28th—Austria declared war on Serbia; but in spite of this fact Germany continued her efforts to bring about some agreement between Austria and Russia. The Kaiser telegraphed to the Czar that he was bringing all possible pressure to bear upon Austria to accept the Russian proposals, and Sir Edward Grey openly approved the direct communication between Vienna and Petrograd, but insisted that his proposal for a conference be accepted.

July 29th—Open fighting began between Austria and Serbia. The German Chancellor made proposals to the British Ambassador respecting Great Britain's neutrality which were refused; at the same time Germany continued her efforts with Austria and went so far as to, herself, guarantee the integrity of Serbia. In spite of Germany's efforts to reach a settlement Russia refused to withhold her mobilization. On this same day Reuter's Petrograd correspondent sent the following telegram to the press: "Confident of England's support, about which doubts have mostly disappeared, the Russian public is prepared to accept war."

July 30th—Owing to the heavy pressure which had been brought upon her by Germany, Austria signified her willingness to resume conversation with Russia but Russia was opposed to this proposition. The Kaiser appealed to the Czar to stop mobilization and asked

King George of England to intervene, Russia agreed to stop all mobilization preparations if Austria would promise not to violate Servian territory, but, without waiting for a reply to this proposition, she issued orders which amounted to an absolute and general mobilization to take effect upon the evening of that same day. France agreed to move with Russia and, through her Ambassador, reminded Sir Edward Grey of the military negotiations between himself and the French Cabinet and the letter which had been given him in 1912, and stated that on no account could France remain neutral if Russia should go to war.

July 31st—On this day it looked, for a moment, as if some settlement between Austria and Russia might be arranged, as conversations were resumed between the two governments. Austria repeated her assurance that she would respect the integrity and independence of Servia and would accept Russia's conditions of peace. Germany continued her pressure on Austria but the German Government was becoming greatly alarmed at Russia's mobilization, which was being pushed ahead. In view of the French statement that France would not remain neutral if Russia went to war, the German Chancellor made his statement that Germany could not respect the neutrality of Belgium in case of war, while France officially agreed to respect Belgium neutrality. Sir Edward Grey declined to use his influence to persuade Russia to stop mobilization. He declared that if Germany would make it perfectly clear that she and Austria were sincerely trying to prevent a general war, he would advise France and Russia

to accept such a proposition. France appealed to Sir Edward Grey to definitely state what he would do, as his dilly-dallying was making war more imminent. The condition of Belgium was discussed between England and France, and Sir Edward made the statement that the invasion of Belgium by Germany "would not be a decisive but an *important* factor in determining England's attitude." That this was the general feeling in England regarding Belgium, has been clearly shown in a paper by Hilaire Belloc which was published in the Philadelphia *Ledger* and the New York *Times* on January 17, 1915.

On August 1st Germany made her last effort to keep England out of the war. My account of this effort is taken largely from the British White Paper, No. 123.

On this day the German Ambassador to Great Britain, Prince Lichnowsky, begged Sir Edward Grey to state upon what conditions Great Britain would remain neutral.

A misunderstood telephone communication regarding French neutrality had given the Berlin Foreign Office another hope that the war might still be localized. When later, on August 27th, Mr. Keir Hardie demanded of Sir Edward Grey some explanation of his refusal to answer Prince Lichnowsky's question as to England's remaining neutral, Sir Edward replied that he had not regarded the German Ambassador's proposal as official. In this proposal Germany had agreed not only to respect all French territory on the continent of Europe but also all French colonies. Upon the evidence Sir Edward Grey is alone responsible for

the supposition that Prince Lichnowsky's proposal was personal and not official, as it was telegraphed to Berlin along with other matters, distinctly official and of grave importance. Before submitting his proposal to Sir Edward Grey, Prince Lichnowsky had telegraphed to the German Chancellor that he was to have an important conversation with Sir Edward upon neutrality. White Paper 123 proves without a doubt that Sir Edward Grey made no attempt to save Belgium in event of war. He had so bound himself, and through himself the British Government, to the Triple Entente that he could not have remained in charge of the Foreign Office if Great Britain remained neutral.

On August 2nd it was rumored in Berlin that Russian troops had crossed the border and the Kaiser was compelled to give in to his ministers and on August 3rd Germany declared war on France as well as Russia; on August 4th Great Britain declared war on Germany and the die was cast.

It is quite plain that, throughout the negotiations, all of the Powers felt themselves compelled to act with their allies. Either Germany's proposal or the one of Sir Edward Grey could have prevented war, if Russia had not interfered in Austria's quarrel with Servia. The larger quarrel, which sprang out of the smaller one, was purely the result of that secret diplomacy which is alone responsible for the present awful struggle in Europe.

The Honorable Bertrand Russell, a grandson of the celebrated Lord John Russell of early Victorian days, has written much and fearlessly, since the war broke

out, upon his country's position, and responsibilities. His book, *Justice in War Time*,* is one which every American should read. In a pamphlet entitled "War the Offspring of Fear," he describes most graphically the point of view of each of the nationalities now engaged in the great war. He says of the German view:

"It was felt that a great conflict of Teuton and Slav was inevitable sooner or later; that if Servian agitation was not stopped, Austria-Hungary would break up and the Teuton would be weakened before the great conflict had begun. It must not be supposed that this conflict is, on the part of the Teuton, aggressive in substance whatever it may be in form. In substance it is defensive, the attempt to preserve Central Europe for a type of civilization indubitably higher and of more value to mankind than that of any Slav State. The existence of the Russian menace on the Eastern border is, quite legitimately, a nightmare to Germany and a cause of much militarist talk by which Germans attempt to conjure away their fears. If we were exposed to the same menace, is it to be supposed that peace propaganda would have much success among us?

"The Germans and Austrians accordingly thought the chastisement of Servia essential to their safety and to the preservation of their civilization—so essential as to make it worth while to *risk* war with Russia on this account. But the White Paper shows conclusively that they did not *expect* war with Russia. 'Ministry for Foreign Affairs here (in Vienna) has realized, though somewhat late in the day, that Russia will not remain indifferent in the present crisis.' Sir M. de Bunsen telegraphs on July 29th (White Paper 94) 'German Ambassador had a second interview with Minister for Foreign Affairs at 2 A. M. when former completely broke down on telling that war was inevitable.' Sir G. Buchanan telegraphs from St. Petersburg on July 30th. (White Paper 97).

* The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, 1916.

Sir E. Goschen, on July 31st, reporting a conversation with the German Chancellor, telegraphs to Sir Edward Grey, 'His Excellency was so taken up with the news of the Russian measures along the frontier that he received your communication without comment. He asked me to let him have the message I had just read to him as a memorandum, as he would like to reflect upon it before giving an answer, as his mind was so full of grave matters that he could not be certain of remembering all its points' (White Paper 109). None of these extracts suggests the mood of deep plotters whose machinations are being crowned with success; they suggest the despair of those who have played a desperately risky game and lost. The one Power which, on the showing of the White Paper, marched on calmly and imperturbably throughout, was Russia.

Speaking of the Western view, in the same pamphlet, Mr. Russell says:

"In all the nations involved, with the exception of Russia, the one motive which makes the populations acquiesce is fear. Germany and Austria fear Russia; France and England fear Germany. The fears of Germany, Austria and France are well grounded; those of England are much less so, and have had to be carefully nursed by the naval scare of 1908 and the general election campaigns of January, 1910."

"It is the universal reign of fear which has caused the system of alliances, believed to be a guarantee of peace, but now proved to be the cause of the world-wide disaster. Fear of Russia led to the Anglo-Japanese alliance and to the alliance of Germany and Austria. The need of support in a long tariff war with France led Italy to ally herself with Austria, from fear that otherwise Austria would seize the moment for an attack on Italy. Fear of Germany led France and England into their unnatural alliance with Russia. And this universal fear has at last produced a cataclysm far greater than any of those which it had hoped to avert."

None of us, whatever the outcome, can hope to return during our life-time, to the level of happiness, well-being and civilization which we enjoyed before the war broke out."

I have quoted the calm and simple words of Mr. Russell because they seem to me to put the whole situation in a nutshell.

Because of our ingrained belief that the Anglo-Saxon is the most superior of God's creations we have accepted the newspaper idea that this great struggle is a fight between England and Germany for the trade of the world. We sympathize with France, because her country has been ruthlessly invaded, and also because France has always been our friend, and thus we seem to entirely overlook the fact that if France had not been bound to support Russia in war, solely because she had supplied the funds by which Russia prepared for war, she need never have been drawn into the conflict. Ever since William II came to the throne his policy and his desire have been to come to friendly terms with France. This would have come about quite naturally in 1911 had it not been for the interference of M. Delcassé and Sir Edward Grey. Mr. Belloc, in the article which I have already mentioned, pointed out how much trade conditions had to do with influencing Britain's decision, but history will show that not trade so much as secret agreements and personal pledges dictated British policy.

Napoleon, just before his death, wrote a last letter to his little son, the burden of which was "read history," and again "read history" for it is the only foundation of a true understanding and true philosophy.

History will show that this great war springs from the deep rooted fear that the unconquerable Slav will over-run and dominate western Europe. That this fear is largely psychological and without foundation is my deep belief, and one of the duties facing the United States is, by her influence, her power, and by clinging to her early ideals, to remove this bugbear of fear from the world and so point out the paths of an abiding peace.

CHAPTER XIII.

PRESENT CONDITIONS IN EUROPE AND AMERICA.

IN July, 1914, the world was outwardly in a state of peace although conditions in Europe had been greatly upset by the murder of the Austrian Archduke on June 28th. Outside of the various foreign offices of the different Powers, no one dreamed of universal war, and when on August 4th, England entered into the conflict and war had begun in deadly earnest, the whole world was aghast. At that time the relationship between the United States, the only great Power not involved in the struggle, and each of the belligerent nations was one of cordial friendship. In the latter part of August, President Wilson issued his "neutrality proclamation," in which he defined what should be our attitude to all of the warring Powers. This proclamation was received by our own people and by all the world with approbation and joy.

After two years of titanic warfare, what are the general conditions of the world now?

Among the fighting nations Germany alone entered the conflict fully prepared. That she was so prepared

has been frequently used as an argument against her by those who believe that she wantonly started the war. A thoughtful survey of the map of Europe should give a sufficient reason for her being prepared to meet any emergency. Another factor in Germany's preparedness, which at the outbreak of the war was not fully appreciated, is the highly socialized condition of the state. In this she is far ahead of any other nation and the value of such socialized preparation is now being fully recognized.

From a military standpoint France was the next best prepared. Her army has always been distinguished for its bravery and efficiency. In point of numbers she has long had the largest standing army in the world in proportion to her population, and by lengthening her two year system of service into a three year system, she greatly increased her military efficiency, as by this change all of her troops were brought up to war strength even in time of peace, and every corps was able to furnish a nucleus for each unit of reserve. Social conditions in France were not as sound as in Germany, although the Socialist party had been for years steadily gaining in power and in popularity and, in Juarez, it had a leader of the highest type. His murder, under very suspicious circumstances, shortly before the war broke out, coupled with the disgraceful proceedings connected with the Cailloux trial, made many thinkers in different parts of the world believe that France was, in vulgar parlance, in a pretty bad way, and this fact undoubtedly was responsible for the idea, current in German military circles, that France

was not to be seriously considered as an obstacle to German ambitions should war break out.

England has only once in her long history been what would be considered a great military power. This was in the days of Cromwell, as already narrated in these pages. Her strength has always lain in her mighty fleet and to keep this fleet up to the highest degree of efficiency has been her unbroken policy for the past three hundred years.

In every democracy great social changes are brought about slowly, and usually as a result of much public discussion and unceasing compromise. The present liberal government in England has steadily striven to better the social conditions of the country and until the outbreak of the war their efforts were being crowned with considerable success. The Boer war showed the world the superb qualities of the British officer, and during the present war, the German Emperor, in one of his speeches reported in American papers, has said that in point of real culture and personal bravery the upper class Englishman is the highest product of civilization. Unfortunately for the condition of the nation as a whole, the upper classes only form a small minority of the population. In no other civilized country is the condition of the masses so wretched. Mr. Lloyd George is reported to have said, only a few years ago, that sixty per cent of the population of England lived on or below the starvation line. The same condition is largely true in Ireland and it is this condition, of overwhelming poverty on the one hand and a luxury and extravagance rivaling that of

Imperial Rome on the other, which has made so many social thinkers, English as well as foreign, prophesy that Great Britain had entered her period of decline. Such was the state of affairs in England, France and Germany when the war broke out.

Russia is so vast in both territory and population and has kept herself so unto herself that her exact status up to August, 1914, is practically unknown. Her recovery after the Japanese war has been the marvel of modern history and in that time a form of Parliamentary government has been established, but at present, democracy in Russia is in the travails that precede birth.

In the United States, in 1914, the social unrest was almost as great as in Europe, but with the exception of Mexico we were free from any foreign worries and our problems were, as they have always been, almost wholly domestic and commercial. The Payne-Aldrich Tariff law, enacted under the Taft administration, had met with almost universal disapproval and the country was passing through one of its periodical times of financial depression, when the Wilson administration entered upon its duties. The platform of the Democratic party had pledged the administration to the carrying out of certain definite policies, notably a wholesale reduction of tariff, as well as a reform of the currency laws. Both of these measures were carried through by Congress with thoroughness and expediency, and one of them, the reform of the currency and the establishment of the Federal Reserve Banks, has proven of inestimable benefit to the country. Such

in outline were the conditions in the western world in August, 1914. Now, after two years of struggle how does the world find itself today?

The awakening of France, through war, has aroused the enthusiasm of the world. Once again has she proven herself to be the most chivalrous and enlightened of peoples. France, alone among the great belligerent powers, has made no effort to defend her position by flooding neutral countries, especially the United States, with all types of propaganda. In this struggle for her very life, the soul of the people has instinctively turned again to the God of her fathers in unswerving faith and trust; her sons have gone bravely forth and have borne the brunt of the fighting on the western front, while her daughters have joyously cast aside the foibles of modern life, and have taken upon themselves the burden of carrying on the work of the nation which their husbands, fathers, sons and brothers are fighting to preserve. From France the world hears no complaints, no vilifying of the enemy; the spirit of the entire people is bent upon doing the duty which is facing it and thus saving, for the joy of the world, the country, which more than any other since ancient Greece, has led the world in the finest arts of civilization.

In England the changes brought about by two years of actual warfare are far more revolutionary and startling. Up to the fatal month of August, 1914, the British Empire regarded herself, and was generally so regarded by the world, as the bulwark of real democracy. One of the blessings which the war, in spite of

its horrors, has brought to the world is the shattering of this illusion. Mr. F. S. Oliver, in his very noble book, *Ordeal by Battle*, had done much towards this shattering. He has pointed out, in his final chapters, many of the weakest spots in that idol of the Anglo-Saxon race, representative parliamentary government. He goes so far as to say that no new nation aspiring towards democracy, and seeking for a model upon which to build up a truly democratic government, will ever adopt the form so dear and so familiar to the people of Great Britain and the United States, and he feels that the greatest problem facing these two nations is how to so remodel their governments, without entirely destroying past traditions, as to make them really democratic. Up to the summer of 1914 the English people were undergoing a steady but unconscious social revolution, which, if left undisturbed, might have been trusted to bring about social conditions as beneficial to the masses of the people as those of Germany, and this, too, under a strictly democratic form of government.

The outbreak of the war put a sudden stop to all this social legislation. Gradually almost every branch of industry and distribution has been put under state control and Mr. Lloyd George, when Minister of Munitions, wielded powers politically, socially, economically and in a military way, far greater than any Englishman would have dreamed possible two years ago. Mr. H. M. Hyndman, chairman of the English Socialist party says, in an article in the *North American Review* for May, 1914:

"Few people have any idea of the despotic authority which our Government has taken to itself under the Munitions Act and the various Orders in Council. Our courts of Law have been superseded, the House of Commons has been reduced to a Bed of Justice and our ordinary liberties have been filched away. We have, in fact, undergone a reactionary revolution without knowing it. Our public servants of yesterday are our uncontrolled masters today. The entire administration of the country has been transformed, in order to attain a success which has not been attained, and to establish an organization which has repressed individual initiative without securing collective efficiency."

The liberties of Englishmen have not only been curtailed, but England has reasserted her ancient claim to the right to make international maritime law for the entire world, and by her repeated Orders in Council has disregarded the fundamental rights and privileges of all neutral nations. Of her internal disturbances we only know what the censorship allows us to know, but that is enough to show that the nation is far from united on the question of the war, and almost all of the men, both in and out of Parliament, who have devoted their lives to the improvement of living conditions for the masses of the people have been strong and fearless in their criticisms of the Government. We have read of strikes and dissension, and finally of the recent tragic uprising in Ireland which, of course, was futile but it was for an ideal of liberty and self government, the selfsame ideal which filled our forefathers in 1776. With that same inconsistency, which has been such a feature of English governments, we see today, occupying a prominent position in the cabinet, the very man

who, just before the war broke out, started a similar rebellion against the government because his particular portion of Ireland objected to Home Rule, for which the greater portion of the country had struggled for a century.

In Germany, after nearly two years of warfare, we find a nation more intensely united than ever before. In 1914 the German Empire presented to the world an *apparently* united front, but within its borders were really three Germanys, the feudal, the industrial and the democratic. Feudal Germany is what remains of the inheritance of the Hohenzollerns, a nation largely agrarian in its pursuits, dominated by a ruling caste which is held in high repute, because during the centuries when the land was the battle ground of Europe, a patient and simple, but intensely virile people, had learned by the bitter experiences of war and spoliation to depend upon the strength and leadership of this same ruling class.

Industrial Germany is wholly the creation of the new empire, and is the most wonderful picture of the transformation of a people that the world has ever seen. We are accustomed to boast of our own industrial achievements, and we can do so with both pride and justice, but we had only to develop a virgin continent. Our people sprang from the ablest and strongest of European stocks and we were free to shape our own form of government, according to our own ideals, without any outside interference, while the Germans were handicapped by ancient traditions, a poor soil, poverty, industrial inexperience and constant interfer-

ence from not too friendly neighbors on both sides. In spite of such obstacles to block their progress, the German people have built up an industrial system which, in general efficiency and perfection of detail, is the model of the world. Where sixty years ago, in the entire empire, there were only two cities having a hundred thousand inhabitants we now find forty-eight of more than that size, and these cities are governed with more efficiency and greater economy and a greater consideration for the health, happiness and well-being of the individual citizen, than the cities of any other country.

Alongside of this industrial Germany, and keeping pace with it, has grown up what I have called democratic Germany. This is the Germany of Goethe and Schiller and Kant and Fichte, the Germany of idealism and of dreams, affected and transformed by the spirit of modernism, the spirit of the twentieth century. It was this Germany which was born anew in 1848, when the first attempt at constitutionalism was made. The outside world has watched with increasing interest the growth of Social Democracy in Germany, from the very smallest of beginnings until it became the largest party in the Reichstag, and, when the war broke out, the socialists in England and Russia and France predicted a revolution which would disrupt the German Empire; but the socialists, to a man, joined with the junkers and the industrial princes in the support of the Kaiser and the nation. Every extra taxation which the war has made necessary, has been supported by them, and, when the stress of the British blockade

compelled the Government to take over the regulation and distribution of the food supply, a socialist was for the first time made a member of the Government.

The war has brought to Germany the dawn of a new democracy. It is very difficult for the American, brought up according to the individualistic British tradition, to understand the German ideal of a democratic state, in which the well-being and security of the state is the first consideration. Germany, more than any other nation in the world today, has grasped the spirit of the new century, the spirit of co-operation as against both individualism and competition. The war thus far has taught the German people the strength and power that lies in the universal co-operation of an entire people and having learned this lesson through suffering and privation, in the better days which are to come we may look for its higher development. The most astounding result of the war thus far, is the tendency towards autocracy in democratic England and towards a deeper, more widespread democracy in autocratic Germany.

In the United States the results of war have been almost as marked as in the belligerent countries. At first the country was disposed to carry out the policy of strict neutrality, as outlined in President Wilson's proclamation already referred to. The German invasion of Belgium, the destruction of Louvain and the reports of German atrocities, mostly unproven, soon brought about a distinctly anti-German feeling, which was greatly augmented by the very pro-English tone of the press. The business conditions in the

country were distinctly bad, resulting in an unusually large number of unemployed men and women. The Underwood Tariff Bill, upon which the administration had based many hopes, did nothing to better conditions and was soon almost universally condemned by public opinion. It is hard, at this time, to tell what might have been the effect of this law under normal conditions. The war naturally put a stop to any large importations from Europe except from the allied countries, and these countries were so occupied with the production of needed equipment for their armies that the usual manufactures for export trade had temporarily ceased. The British blockade of Germany and Austria prevented our shipping of foodstuffs and other products to the Central Powers. At the same time representatives of the Allies came to this country to secure munitions and other supplies of war. American manufacturers were quick to seize upon this opportunity. At first some qualms were felt against embarking upon such a trade but the legal aspects of the question were carefully looked into by legal experts. It was shown that in previous wars neutral nations had not hesitated to supply the sinews of war to belligerents. Even Germany recognized the legality of the trade. The fact that the British Navy controlled the sea and that Great Britain monopolized the carrying trade of the world, prevented the Central Powers from purchasing from us, because we have no ships in which to transport our products. Since the Civil War our merchant marine had disappeared from

the oceans, except for coast trade between our Atlantic and Pacific borders.

On August 6th, 1914, we made our first attempt to protect neutral trade during the war by sending a telegram to each of the belligerents asking them to accept the declaration of London which had been drawn up at the instigation of Great Britain, as the code of naval warfare. This declaration had been intended to supersede the declaration of Paris of 1856 and was a clear statement of neutral rights of trade and travel. Our proposal was accepted by the Central Powers but was practically rejected by the Allies as they only agreed to accept it under certain modifications. These modifications, as set forth in the British Orders in Council of September 11th, practically destroy any protection of neutral trade, so on October 24th we withdrew our former suggestion of August 6th. Great Britain, however, continued to conduct her campaign in accordance with the Declaration of London, as modified by herself, and instituted what she called a blockade of Germany and warned all vessels against indiscriminate travel in the North Sea. She thus prevented our shipping any foodstuffs to Germany, although she was actually maintaining no blockade, and without an actual blockade, according to all law and precedents which she herself had established, such stoppage of our foodstuffs was distinctly illegal. In our first letter of protest, of December 24, 1914, our State Department clearly explained our position. On January 7th and February 10th, 1915, Great Britain replied to our letter of December 24th, and declared it to be her in-

tion to proceed as she had begun, in spite of our protest that such procedure would be contrary to all international law.

For some years past, Germany has been dependent upon the United States for many foodstuffs, especially cottonseed meal and fodder. Fearing famine, because of the starvation campaign of Great Britain she, on January 28th, commandeered flour and grain throughout the empire for governmental distribution and began to issue "breadcards" to regulate consumption and, as a retaliatory measure to Great Britain's starvation campaign and her having made the North Sea a private lake, on February 4th, she issued her "War Zone Proclamation," declaring she would sink all British vessels of every type wherever and whenever found. Because Great Britain had adopted the policy of flying neutral flags upon her ships, Germany warned neutral nations to keep out of the war zone, and advised neutral citizens to travel only upon neutral ships. Our Government regarded this proclamation and warning as an attempt to destroy all neutral rights on the sea, and on February 10th, we requested the British Government to cease using our flag upon any of her vessels. Great Britain replied to our note on February 19th, stating that she could not give up the use of our flag to protect her vessels against submarines and that she intended to stop all traffic to or from Germany, in the retaliation for the submarine warfare. On February 20th we made another attempt to make both belligerents return to a compliance with international law. We asked England to allow us to

send food to the civilian population of Germany and we asked Germany to give up her submarine warfare. On March 1st Germany replied to our note stating that she would end the submarine campaign if England would comply with our request as to foodstuffs. On March 15th England refused to accept our proposition.

She had declared, on March 1st, that she would seize all goods moving to or from Germany, and would prevent our gaining access to Germany through the Baltic Sea.

There was no real blockade of German ports on the Baltic, and both Norway and Sweden were carrying on trade with Germany. This was made possible because the German navy controlled the Baltic Sea. We again wrote to England, on March 30th, maintaining our rights to ship goods to Germany and stating that for us to agree to Great Britain's assumptions would, on our part, be a refusal to trade with Germany and a direct violation of the position of neutrality which we chose to observe. During this period of diplomatic correspondence the Germans had been actively carrying out their submarine campaign and thus stirring up a strong antagonism in all neutral nations. On May 7th came the Lusitania disaster, which was so horrible that the whole world was shocked, and the feeling against Germany in this country became very intense, many who had heretofore been in sympathy with her turning decidedly to the other side. It is not my purpose to here discuss the way in which this war has been carried on by either side. "Each of them is bad enough and both of them are worse." Aside from the

actual horrors of it, the sinking of the *Lusitania* was an act of such colossal stupidity that it is difficult to believe that it was according to direct orders from the home government. We know, from a statement printed in the *New York Times*, that when the full reports of this disaster reached Germany, the German people, officials and civilians alike, were as greatly shocked as the rest of the world. All of the facts relative to our diplomatic correspondence with the various belligerents to which I have referred, as well as the actual documents themselves, are published in a "White Paper" issued by our State Department on May 27, 1915. This paper can be secured, free of charge, by simply writing to the State Department in Washington.

The *Lusitania* disaster so inflamed American public opinion that we paid no attention to further British violations of international law and even overlooked the insolence of Sir Edward Grey's reply to our note about cotton, in which he said we were making so much money by our exportation of munitions to the Allies that we could overlook Great Britain's "necessary" interference with normal neutral trade.

It is perfectly true that during the submarine campaign business conditions in this country, in certain lines, had tremendously improved. So many great manufacturing concerns have abandoned their regular lines of output and have converted their plants into munition factories that instead of our having an army of unemployed there was an actual dearth of labor. That this has not benefited the country as a whole has been recognized by many of our ablest men, notably

by the late James J. Hill, who, before his death, issued several wise words of warning upon this subject. That the present situation in America is not without a certain pathos was most beautifully expressed by Mr. Henry Osborn Taylor, a profound student of history, in a brief article which he published in the *Atlantic Monthly* for November, 1915. He says:

"The American people are unconscious of their pathetic situation. Yet to perceive it requires but a moderate knowledge of the laws of life. We are the only prosperous people in the world at present. We alone are not weighted down either by war, by mobilization or by extreme anxiety. Nor is it clearly our fault that we are fattening while the rest of the world grows lean. It is, nevertheless, portentous. How can we help it? Are we to blame? We did not bring on the war; nor do we clearly owe to any other country a duty to take part in it. France and England can not reasonably reproach the United States on this ground. We have no army and but a questionable navy; there really was no way in which we could attack a foe across the ocean. And the citizens of the United States are a mixture of many peoples, with different traditions. They are, however, what they are, living in a certain organized way, through a complicated social organization, of which they are somehow part, but for which they do not seem altogether responsible. They are equipped to do the things they do but they are not equipped for lofty sacrifice unless, perhaps, in case they should be obviously driven to it."

These last few lines seem to me to sum up the whole present condition of the United States. Modern business and our great material prosperity seem to have banished from our minds, only temporarily I hope, the ideals and aspirations of the founders of this country.

In moments of great shock or excitement, such as

the sinking of the *Lusitania*, our emotions are aroused, and for the moment we are apt to forget the fundamental principles upon which our national safety depends. This is why we have brushed aside, as of secondary importance, England's interference with our neutral rights while we have so vigorously protested against Germany's acts of lawlessness. We have said, and justly, that human life is far more precious than property, how could we think otherwise?

But by yielding only to our emotions, however noble they may be, have we not lost, in a measure our sense of perspective? At the outbreak of the war all of the belligerents were our friends. Today England treats our protests with half-concealed contempt. She is engaged in a gigantic struggle upon the results of which she thinks that her very existence as a nation depends, and she feels, quite justifiably from her point of view, that for us to quibble about mere rights of property, especially when we are making money steadily out of the war, shows a contemptibly small and mercenary spirit. Is she not fighting the "battles of democracy" for which we stand? Germany on the other hand, long our close friend and valuable customer, the country who, from the Revolutionary days, has sent her sons to aid us in our conflicts and to form one of our most valuable types of citizen, cannot understand why, when she, too, is fighting for her very life in a war which she regards as purely defensive, we should turn all the vials of our wrath upon her alone and secretly aid and abet her enemies. Neither of these great powers regards us as a neutral. Where do we stand? That is what I

shall try to define in my concluding chapter. It is plain, from the efforts which have been made by both the belligerents to win our approbation, that they realize that the United States because of its geographical position and its real and potential power, is bound, after the war is over, to occupy a great position in the councils and affairs of the world. What will that position be? This is the one paramount question which faces us as a nation.

CHAPTER XIV.

WHERE DO WE STAND?

SELF preservation is the first law of nature." These words or others of similar meaning were doubtless first said by our father Adam after he and Eve had finished their delightful repast of "Forbidden Fruit," and were considering how best to meet the consequences. When a private citizen faces any crisis in his business life, the first thing he instinctively does is to sit down and take an inventory of his assets and liabilities in order to see just where he stands.

The nation is only the private citizen expanded to the seventh power. The one point upon which practically every citizen of the United States will today agree is that, as a nation, we have come to a parting of the ways. In which direction shall we turn in order to reach our highest development—our "manifest destiny," in other words? The popular slogan in this country today is the word "preparedness." Before we can arrive at any sane conclusion as to what we must do in order to become "prepared" let us briefly consider just how "prepared" we are. In other words let us take an inventory, first of our domestic conditions and then how these same conditions affect our present and future foreign relations.

This country was founded upon a sincere belief in

the brotherhood of man and it offered from its very inception an asylum to all who in their own lands were prevented from living in accordance with their own ideals.

Up to the close of our Civil War we were a simple people, living under simple, wholesome conditions, and under those same conditions we were conquering a continent and establishing what we call a Christian civilization.

The Civil War settled forever the question whether we were one nation or merely a group of small affiliated nationalities. After the war was over this consciousness of national unity proved the greatest incentive to material advancement that the world has ever seen. For fifty years we have been at peace, for our little war with Spain was hardly of sufficient importance to be regarded as a break in our peaceful development. The one thing the Spanish War did was to show us that it was no longer possible for us to live entirely unto ourselves, but that we must face the responsibilities when we accepted the privileges of becoming one among the World Powers. "Peace hath her victories, no less renowned than war." With the tremendous victories of peace we all are, happily, familiar, but it is also true that if "peace hath her victories," she hath also her tragedies. We boast of our civilization and when we think of this great country stretching across an entire continent, when we think of her great and beautiful cities, her prosperous towns, her schools and colleges and libraries, her thousands of churches where millions gather to give thanks to God

for the blessings He has poured upon this most favored land, we may well be proud. But the picture has its reverse side, and no true perspective can be gained unless we consider, very humbly and with clearness of mind and vision, the other side to our civilization.

With unbounded natural resources at our command how have we conserved and developed these resources? Have we abolished poverty in a land of plenty? Has every man sufficient labor to enable him to support himself and his family? Has he the leisure needed to develop his own mind and body? Are we a contented and helpful people, or is every man out for himself and what he can make, regardless of his fellow? These are some of the questions which must be answered before we can even begin to be prepared for the future. With regard to our national resources, experts have published volumes showing how we have ruthlessly exploited farm lands, mining lands, forests, in the most wasteful and extravagant manner. Within the past year the leading financial publication* of the country has given carefully prepared statistics showing the distribution of wealth in this country. When we are told, upon the best authority, that seventy-five per cent of the entire wealth of the nation is either owned or controlled by four per cent of the population and twenty-five per cent is divided up, more or less unequally, among the remaining ninety-six per cent, the question as to the elimination of poverty is soon answered. The question of unemployment is like the

* *Wall Street Journal.*

poor, "always with us," to a greater or less degree. Just at present, owing largely to the munitions manufactures, the number of unemployed is comparatively small, but should war suddenly end and a lasting peace be established, there is no telling how great this question might not suddenly become. Our country is, with the exception of the British Empire, the richest country in the world, and yet under what conditions do a very large proportion of the people live? Look at the poorer districts of our great cities, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, Boston! Where on the entire continent of Europe are found such slums as we know in all of these cities, and even in the small towns and villages scattered throughout the land? In the choicest suburban district near the great city of Philadelphia, almost within a stone's throw of beautiful suburban estates and two famous institutions of learning, can be found today a slum district so squalid, so degraded, so dirty, that it not only must make the denizens therein nothing but sodden, degraded, "driven cattle," but it is a distinct menace to the health and physical well-being of the entire surrounding community. Similar conditions can be found near every city from Maine to California, and this does not apply only to the larger cities, but is almost equally evident in the smaller manufacturing towns and villages in frugal New England and throughout the great Middle West. Are the masses of the people contented? Look into the faces you pass daily in the streets and answer for yourself. Because of this discontent we hear much of socialism today. The editor of the *Springfield Republican*, one of the

three most conservative papers in America, recently published an editorial in which he said, "Socialism, whether regarded as a theory or an organized movement or a state of mind, never looked more attractive than now." Why should socialism grow up in a country which offers "equal opportunity to all?" Simply because opportunity is not offered.

We read and talk, in our peaceful homes, of the brutality and horror of war with its trail of murder and rapine, but are there no horrors, no murders, of a peace which is not of the mind, but only of things material? A prominent New York clergyman recently said:

"The war in Europe, the most decimating war in history most probably, is more merciful, less cruel, than peace, as times are. To many thousands it is far better, happier, to die on the battlefield than to live in our present civilization. The death-roll of civilization is vastly greater than the death-roll of all the battlefields the world has ever witnessed."

Let us for a moment consider what Mr. Sampson meant by the "death-roll of civilization." Each morning in our papers we read of the number of lives lost by accident, because safety appliances have not been provided by law in manufacturing plants. Multiply this daily toll by three hundred to find out how many lives are thus snuffed out each year. We are told by the ablest medical authorities that 150,000 Americans die yearly from tuberculosis, and we know that this dread disease is easily preventable and that hundreds of noble men and women are giving their lives to the effort to stamp it out. Is not this a case where national

law should interfere? The scourge of typhoid, which a plentiful supply of pure water and proper sanitation will prevent, is almost equally exacting in its annual toll of victims. Throughout our land millions of human beings are compelled to live in buildings palpably unfit for human habitation, and in these unfit houses millions yearly die. Industrial conditions are so severe, that annually millions of children are taken from the schools before they have acquired even rudiments of the education needed to fit them for useful citizenship. Statistics show that the high schools of our country graduate yearly less than five per cent of those who, under the law, entered the elementary schools. The remaining ninety-five per cent are forced to enter upon the struggle for existence before they can know what existence really means.

These are only a few examples of the murderous toll of peace, but they are sufficient to show the general social conditions of the masses of the American people and until they are remedied there can be no true preparedness. Social conditions in Great Britain are, if anything, worse than in this country. Next to our own material development, since the unity of the nation was established by the Civil War, comes the material development of the unified German Empire. Let us, before we consider the question of the future, see how Germany has solved similar problems.

The German social system is regulated by two factors, first the conservation and care of her human resources and second the national co-operation of industry, agriculture and everything that affects the general

welfare of her people. Thus we see how human rights transcend property rights in a country which we have been taught to consider wholly autocratic.

The first factor in all human problems is the care of the child and the principal thing to look after in the child, if he is to become a valuable citizen, is his education. The German child gets about fifty per cent more school training than the American one, and this training is not only broad in the field of study but also in each case, especially adapted to fitting him for what is to be his life work. In addition to this scholarly training, the German school looks after the child's health, sees that he is properly fed, and if he is not physically fit, provides holiday camps where he lives out of doors and gets plenty of fresh air and exercise. As a result of this system there is less illiteracy in Germany than in any other country in the world.

After the child is educated, it is necessary that he find employment, and the German Government considers that every man has a right to work and, for the purpose of securing work for her citizens, co-operative labor exchanges are established throughout the Empire. In times of depression, when private enterprise is at a low ebb, it is customary for the government to undertake large public enterprises giving employment to many. In the period from 1903 to 1911 the number of unemployed in Germany ranged from 1.1 per cent to 2.9 per cent of the whole working population. During the same period the number of unemployed in the states of New York and Massachusetts ranged from 6.8 per cent to 28.1 per cent and in New York during

the winter of 1914-15, according to the Federal census 16.2 per cent, out of 100,000 workers, were without employment. Within the last few years some forms of workingmen's insurance have been adopted by a few of our States, but such movements have been regarded in the country at large as a form of socialism which is a menace. In Germany, for over thirty years, insurance against illness, accidents and old age has been compulsory, and if a man dies his widow and children are provided for. This compulsory insurance system covers office employees, clerks, farm workers, teachers, tutors and in fact every form of employment, and has cost the government far more money than has the German Navy. The farmer is quite as carefully protected as the worker in the large cities, for the government recognizes his importance in the preservation of the state. A system of canals and inland waterways provides transportation for his products and in times of stress he is granted special railroad rates; a bureau of chemistry tells him how to increase the fertility of his soil, for the German country is not naturally fertile; and if he can not afford to buy the most modern machinery co-operative associations enable him to borrow this machinery at a very low rental, while a system of land-bank associations makes it possible for him to borrow money at an exceptionally low rate of interest. As a result of all of this care, the comparatively barren and worn-out soil of Germany yields per acre just twice the product of our rich and fertile soil.

During the nineteenth century "individualism" and

“free competition” were the catch words of opportunity, but by the dawning of the twentieth century, thinkers throughout the world realized that only by combination and co-operation could the greatest progress be made. No class of men grasped this truth more quickly or put it into practice more efficiently than our American “captains of industry,” but almost immediately all the so-called “trusts” became objects of suspicion and of vigorous attack from the proletariat, and the government began to interfere with their development. In many cases such interference was necessary to protect the small producer, but the idea of our government has not been to foster and encourage co-operation but rather to restore the old system of wasteful competition. The German Government early recognized the fact that large business units are necessary for the development of home industries, as well as to secure foreign markets, and consequently has fostered as well as regulated big business combinations, as a result of which the German producer realizes that he has not only his own business, but the national government behind him, while the American producer feels that he has not only his competitors to fight, but his government as well. In Germany there are no slums as we know the word, a fact which I discovered some few years ago, when I went to Europe to investigate housing conditions. The Zone System not only determines what types of building can be erected in different localities, but also specifies what percentage of land area may be covered by buildings, thus insuring air and sunshine.

This slight comparison of certain fundamental social conditions in the United States and Germany shows which country is attempting to solve the problem of producing good citizens in the more rational manner and which is more truly democratic, if by democratic we mean what is most beneficial to the masses of the people. When the war is over there will be a period of rigid and radical readjustment to new conditions in all the belligerent nations. As we are the only great power that has not overwhelmingly suffered from the war, it is natural to suppose that all of them will turn to us for at least material assistance. Mr. Roland Usher, in his book, *Pan-Americanism*, takes a very different view from mine of the position of the United States at the close of the war. He says:

"The United States is facing a crisis without parallel in its history, since the signature of the Declaration of Independence. As a nation we are less concerned with the European war itself, its cause, its course, than with its ending. Whatever the result of this war may be, whoever wins it, whenever it ends, the victor will be able to threaten the United States, and if he chooses, to challenge our supremacy in the Western Hemisphere. The motive for challenging it is already in existence; the power with which to do so effectively will beyond doubt be in the victor's hands."

This is assuming that one side or the other will achieve an overpowering victory, but as the war goes on this result seems less and less likely. The more reasonable assumption is that when the war ends all of the powers will be so nearly exhausted that each nation will resolutely have to face internal problems of such gravity as to demand its entire attention for many

years to come. From each belligerent country, and especially from England, we hear emphatic statements that the people will no longer submit to having their foreign relations controlled by a foreign office behind closed doors. Before the censorship suppressed their publications many British writers expressed themselves freely in their criticism of the policy of secret diplomacy. Mr. Arthur Ponsonby, a member of Parliament, has given the most complete account of the workings of the Foreign Office under Sir Edward Grey in his book, *Democracy and Diplomacy*. He, Mr. Morel and others date the actual beginnings of the present war to the time when France and England entered into the secret agreement about Morocco in 1904.

In January, 1905, the first conversations took place between French and English military experts and in that same year Sir Edward Grey privately informed France that if a "certain situation arose with a certain power" England would rally to her support. Shortly after this came the "gentleman's agreement," by which France kept her fleet in the Mediterranean, leaving it for the British fleet to protect her North Sea coasts. When the House of Commons got wind of these agreements and questioned Sir Edward Grey, he repeatedly denied that they were "binding." Even as late as August 1, 1914, he asserted that Great Britain was under no "obligations" to send troops to the continent.

When the crisis finally came, England was in a very equivocal position. Through her Foreign Office she was secretly bound to help France, and yet neither Parliament nor the people knew a thing about these

secret agreements. If Sir Edward Grey sincerely desired to maintain peace, as he so steadfastly asserted, would he not have been better able to accomplish his purpose had he either made no agreements with France or if these agreements, before being made, had been frankly discussed in the House of Commons and thus been known to the whole world?

Since the publication of his *Pan-Americanism*, Mr. Usher has written another book called *A Challenge to the Future*, in which he openly advocates an immediate alliance with Great Britain. In this point of view he is supported by many people, and by a large number of the more prominent newspapers. Such an alliance might have many advantages to both countries were it entered upon calmly and after careful consideration, *in times of peace*. For us to form such an alliance now would be an unwise policy unless we are ready to play Great Britain's game and accept her antagonisms as well as her alliances. Among the latter we would gladly consider an alliance with France, if we were willing to at once abandon our traditional policies, but would we regard an alliance with Japan in the same light?

It has been said that because of our tremendous sales of munitions to the Allies we have convinced Germany that we are not neutral, and consequently we should openly seek an alliance with Great Britain. This seems to me to be a policy of cowardice not worthy of consideration. It is true that we have supplied the Allies with munitions and have been most severe in our treatment of German infringements of international law and

that the German people have naturally resented this treatment, but every student of history knows that in time of war peoples allow themselves to be worked up to a state of hatred which soon disappears after peace is once again established. It is well known that all governments, when wars threatened, have adopted the policy of inflaming their peoples, in order to produce the enthusiasm needed to carry on a successful war.

The time has passed when we can hope to maintain ourselves in that isolation from Europe which Washington recommended, and be of any real value to the world, but the war has taught us that we are not as yet prepared to enter upon any alliances, even those "dis-entangling alliances" which Mr. Wilson advises. The question of our unpreparedness, to which the entire country is so fortunately at last awakened, is in grave danger of becoming merely a political catch-word, unless our government and our people go into it both deeply and broadly, and cease looking upon it from only the military standpoint. That we need an army of sufficient strength and efficiency to defend our northern and southern borders, and a navy large and strong enough to protect our coasts on both oceans as well as to guard the Gulf of Mexico and the Panama Canal, is a fact which no sane and truly patriotic American can dispute. Personally I believe that the entire country would be tremendously benefited in every way from a form of universal conscription similar to the Australian system, which teaches obedience, efficiency and respect for law combined with perfect liberty. We have for 140 years boasted of our liberties, but

there is no real liberty without its attendant duties and responsibilities, and the current idea of liberty in America today is not freedom but license. True preparedness is made up of many things of equal importance, and involves problems not only of military strength and efficiency, but also problems of human welfare, physical, social and spiritual, problems of agriculture, of industry, of finance, of transportation, and these problems are so closely inter-related that one can not be properly solved without solving all the others. The Germans have a word which has been much bandied about in our press without ever being really understood. Mr. George Santayana, one of the ablest philosophical writers of our day, defines "Kultur" as something that is purely personal and is "transmitted by systemic education." He says:

"It is not, like culture, a matter of miscellaneous private attainments and refined tastes, but, rather, participation in a national purpose and in the means of executing it. The adept in this Kultur can live freely the life of his country, possessing its secret inspiration, valuing what it pursues and finding his happiness in those successes which he can help it to attain. Kultur is a lay religion, which includes ecclesiastical religion and assigns it to its due place.

"German Kultur resembles the policy of ancient cities and of the Christian Church in that it constitutes a definite, authoritative, earnest discipline, a training which is practical and is thought to be urgent and momentous. It is a system to be propagated and to be imposed. It is all inclusive and demands entire devotion from everybody. At the same time it has this advantage over the classic systems, that it admits variations. At Sparta, in Plato's Republic, and in the Catholic Church the aims and constitution of Society were ex-

pected to remain always the same. The German ideal on the contrary, not only admits evolution but insists upon it.

"Like music, it is essentially a form of movement."

Is not this what we, as a people, need? An American Kultur which shall define our ideals and aspirations, compel us to realize them, and, under the power of its influence, amalgamate all the races of our polyglot population into one united Americanism? Then, after it has accomplished this much, to steadily push us forward in those paths of real progression is what is most needed so that we may become what Gladstone once called us, "the hope of democracy." In order to do this the nation needs leaders, men like Washington and Hamilton and Lincoln, men who are not politicians but statesmen, who think in terms of the nation as a whole and not in terms of little localities, little political advantages and little business.

Among our political leaders today, Mr. Roosevelt is the only one who has publicly defined preparedness in truly national terms. When we reach a state of even national semi-preparedness we will be ready to then consider the subject of our national alliances, but not before, and when we are ready to ally ourselves with any European power the question with which power to make alliance is one which will affect our domestic peace and happiness and our relations with the rest of the world for many years, and is one which should not be entered upon lightly or inadvisedly.

The one object of this book is, to call the attention of its readers to what has been Great Britain's policy towards foreign nationalities for the past three hundred

years, to urge caution before deciding to irrevocably tie ourselves up to her or to any one power. Mr. Hyndman, in the quotation which I have made, shows the present autocratic character of the British Government. We have seen what was her attitude towards Holland, then the one democratic government in Europe, when she possessed a great army as well as navy. Today, according to Mr. Asquith, her army consists of 5,000,000 trained men, a tremendous power in the hands of an autocratic government. In Germany, on the other hand, we see an autocratic government becoming more and more democratic under socialization and, since the war, a socialist in the Imperial Government. These are conditions of tremendous import which we, a nation fundamentally democratic, must carefully ponder over before we bind ourselves irretrievably. Mr. Usher urges an alliance with the Mistress of the Seas, but can we not hope that the day is dawning when the seas, which form the highway of all nations will no longer be controlled by any one mistress?

The question of the control of the seas during wars is the most important commercial question facing the nations of the world today and upon its proper solution depends the commercial prosperity of the world. Great Britain maintains that control over commerce during war, even if necessary to the extent of prohibition, is desirable in the ultimate interest of maritime freedom itself, while Germany insists on the "right of all nations to trade during war almost to the same extent that they do during peace." Was not this the position which we took in our war with England in

1812? Times change, but principles never. Suppose we decide to follow the suggestion of Mr. Usher *et al* and form an alliance with the present sea power. This would involve us in more or less close relations with the allies of Great Britain and would draw us into the present war. The Allies have bound themselves to pursue the conflict to the bitter end and to make no separate peace. Would we be willing to accept such a pledge? Assuming that Great Britain's position in the present war is the right one, and that she is fighting Democracy's battles—what about Russia? And has history taught us to believe that Great Britain will always be right? Alliances are not perpetual. As long as our alliance lasted we would be fighting Great Britain's battles, because our geographical position does not involve us in international quarrels. If circumstances should arise which would compel us, for the preservation of our national integrity and honor, to sever our alliance, we would not be in a very enviable position, but would then be easily open to attack from any power who might have resented our former alliance and was jealous of our material prosperity.

Just at present, we have not stated to the world just where we do stand and it is quite evident that we do not know ourselves. While we are in doubt as to our own position and are not prepared, in any true sense of the word, to aggressively enter the European Congress we should cease talking and thinking as a belligerent and should at once begin to put our house in order. While we are doing that, there are countless ways by which we can convince the world of our

friendship and our sympathy. The war has made us preponderantly rich. We can remove the stigma against these riches by doing more to relieve the suffering caused by the war. Australia is a poor country and is engaged in the present struggle, but she has given more to Belgium than we have in spite of the splendid generosity of so many of our citizens, but we must not confine our national giving to Belgium alone, but must think of Serbia, of Poland, of the Balkans, of the suffering in Greece caused by the Allied blockade, of the hungry babies in Germany and the countless refugee women and children in Holland and France, and we must insist in spite of the Orders in Council, upon our right to minister to one and all alike.

Then, when we have convinced the world that we are really neutral and really great, we can carry our ministry of service farther and bend all of our efforts to putting an end to the doctrine of hate which now dominates Europe. Those who believe that Germany started the war, as well as those who do not, can unite in recognizing the fact that no nation is wholly evil and that no crime can be atoned for by countenancing more crime. By taking this position we shall be rendering to Europe such inestimable service that, when the councils of peace assemble, all will turn to us for cooperation and advice.

Then the "War after the War," about which we are reading in our papers, the much more insidious war of trade, may be prevented and then the United States, the true "Cradle of Liberty," when she has truly prepared herself within herself, will find herself equally

prepared to face the great problems of the future at one with the civilized nations of the world, and to form such an alliance with one or more of these nations as will guarantee that permanent peace for which the whole world yearns.

APPENDICES.

SINCE the opening of the war the British Government has felt it necessary to stop the circulation among its own people of a number of articles written by prominent men who are at odds with the present government on the question of the war. While such an attitude may be wise on behalf of the government for its own people while the nation is at war, that does not apply in this country. In order that the people of America may know how some of the leaders of modern thought in England do feel, I have secured permission to reprint the following articles as appendices to this book. While all appeared during the first months of the war their re-publication at this date is none the less valuable.

APPENDIX A.
THE ORIGINS OF THE GREAT WAR.*

BY H. N. BRAILSFORD.

For Englishmen this war is primarily a struggle between Germany and France. For the Germans it is emphatically a Russo-German War. It was our secret naval commitment to France, and our fatal entanglement through ten years in the struggle for a European balance of power, which sent our fleets to sea. It is our sympathy with France which makes the one human link that binds us to the Triple Entente. We have dramatized the struggle (and this clearly was for Sir Edward Grey the dominant consideration) as an attempt to crush France. German thinking followed other lines. Alike for the deputies in the Reichstag and for the mob in the streets of Berlin, the enemy is Russia. It is true, indeed, that if the war should end in the defeat of the Triple Entente, some part of the consequences of defeat would be borne by France. It is clear that German statesmen hoped to acquire some part at least of her extensive and valuable colonial possessions, and on her no doubt would have fallen the financial brunt of the war. She would have paid in money and in colonies for her imprudence in allying

* Reprinted from the *Contemporary Review* for September, 1914.

herself to Russia. But in spite of this, her place in Germany's imagination was secondary. Her army must indeed be broken before Russia could be dealt with. That was a fatality, a detail in the mechanics of the problem which affected its central political purpose hardly more than the resistance of the Belgians. The politics which made the war, and the sentiment which supported it, had reference exclusively to Russia. Read the speech by which the Chancellor induced the Reichstag to vote the war-credit without a dissentient voice: the only mention of France in it is a reply to the French accusation that German troops had violated the French frontier. The illuminating White Paper (*Denkschrift*) in which the history of the outbreak of the war is set out from the German official standpoint, contains hardly so much as an incidental reference to France. More significant still is the speech in which Dr. Haase, on behalf of the Social Democrats in the Reichstag, while repudiating the diplomacy which made the war, accepted on behalf of his comrades the duty of patriotic defence. He, too, made no reference to France. "For our people," he declared, "and for the future of its liberties, much, if not everything, depends on a victory over Russian despotism, stained, as it is, with the blood of its noblest subjects." It is for us in this country of the first importance to follow the direction of German thought. If we are to understand why the war was made at all, if we are to grasp the reasons which will make it on the German side an obstinate and determined struggle, if we are to think out with any hope of success the problem of shortening

it, we must realize that it was the fear of Russia which drove German diplomacy into a preventive war, and in the end mobilized even the Social Democrats behind German diplomacy. To the diplomatists and the statesmen the issue was from the first not merely whether Austria or Russia should exert a hegemony in the Balkans, but also whether Russia, using Serbia as her vanguard, should succeed in breaking up the Austrian Empire. It is not merely a tie of sentiment or kinship which unites Germany to Austria. Austria is the flying buttress of her own Imperial fabric. Cut the buttress and the fabric itself will fall. To the masses of the German people the fate of Serbia and even of Bosnia was a matter of profound indifference. A month before the war broke out, three Germans in four would probably have said that not all the Serbs in Christendom were worth the bones of one Pomeranian grenadier. But the Russian mobilization and the outbreak of war made even for the German masses a supreme and only too intelligible issue. There is rooted deep in the memory of the German people a recollection of the exploits of the Cossacks during the Seven Years' War. The simplest peasant of the Eastern marches has his traditions of devastated fields, and ruined villages. He knows, moreover, that the intervening generations which have transformed the West have left the Russian steppes still barbarous. Even for the Social Democrat the repugnant thought that he was marching out to shoot down his French and Belgian comrades was overborne by the imperious necessity of arming to de-

fend his soil against the millions which the Russian Tsar had mobilized.

The broad fact about the general war of 1914 is that it is the postponed sequel of the Balkan War of 1912. We all congratulated each other that Sir Edward Grey's diplomacy and the Conference of London had enabled the Eastern people to settle the Eastern question without involving the Great Powers in war. The armaments of the Great Powers betrayed their belief that a war averted is only a war postponed. For two years this chaotic struggle, which came in the end with such vertiginous speed, had cast its shadow before it. The first move in the last round of the war of armaments was the direct consequence of the creation of the Balkan League. In justifying the last increase of the peace-effectives of its army the German Government pointed to the new fact of the entry on the European scene of these young and victorious Balkan armies, and spoke bluntly of a possible struggle between the Slav and Teuton worlds. The Balkan League of 1912, formed under Russian guidance, was, in fact, an alliance directed as much against Austria as against Turkey. There followed the reply of France and Russia, the return in the one to Three Years' Service and in the other the imprudently-advertised schemes of military reorganization, with its vast naval expenditure, its new strategic railways near the German frontier, its rearmament of the artillery, and its gigantic increase in the standing "peace" army. Russia (so an official memorandum declared) would henceforth be able to assume in case of need not merely a defensive,

but an offensive strategy. The early months of this year witnessed the outbreak of a military panic in the German press. The fear inspired by the growth of the Tsar's armies was beginning to tell on German nerves, and a pamphlet to which the German Crown Prince contributed an approving note, predicted that the Slav world would have completed its armaments by the year 1916, and would then attempt to deal the death-blow to the German peoples. If Germany has by her own act made the general war of 1914, it is chiefly because her military caste was convinced that it would sooner or later have to meet a Russian challenge.

The German White Paper explains the political issue which was the obverse of this military rivalry. For a generation we in this country have thought of the Eastern question as an issue between Turkey and the Christian races of the Balkans. With the destruction of the Ottoman Empire in Europe the Eastern question became primarily an Austrian question. Russia and Austria, up to the eve of the Young Turkish revolution, had been content to divide the hegemony of the Near East. They worked in close association; they presided jointly over the Macedonian reforms; they even recognized a certain division of spheres of influence. Austria was allowed by Russia to exert a predominant pressure upon Servia, while Russia was the leading partner in all that concerned Bulgaria. It was never, at the best, an easy arrangement to maintain. Austria was always detested in Belgrade, and the dominant political party in Servia, the Radicals, were vehemently Russophile. With the murder of King Alexander, and

the coming of King Peter, the moral influence of Russia in Serbia became supreme, but the little kingdom remained none the less within the Austrian sphere until the Bosnian crisis shattered the whole conception of an Austro-Russian co-dominion in the Balkans. From the autumn of 1909 onwards, Serbia became as absolutely and almost as openly the protégé of Russia, and the tool of Russian policy, as Montenegro had been for generations. It would hardly be an exaggeration to say that the dominant personality in Belgrade was not King Peter, nor yet M. Pachitch, but the brilliant, energetic, unscrupulous Russian Minister, the late M. de Hartwig. He formed the Balkan League, and he also encouraged the Servians to tear up the Treaty of Partition, which the Tsar had guaranteed.

There were several reasons why Russian policy regarded the Servians as its favored foster-children, and willingly aggrandized them at the expense of the Bulgarians. The Servians, in the first place, have always been the more pliable, the less independent of the Balkan Slav peoples. But while the Bulgarians were useful as a piece in anti-Turkish policy, the Servians were doubly valuable, for they were indispensable to any move against Austria. The annexation of Bosnia, so far from being accepted by the Servians as a final and irrevocable fact, had actually been the starting point of an agitation more conscious, more open, and more reckless than any which had preceded it. The triumph of Servian arms in Macedonia, first over the Turks and then over the Bulgarians, was accepted by most Servians as the presage of a greater victory to come.

There was evident a tremendous heightening of the national consciousness. Some of its effects worked uncompensated mischief. It showed itself as brutal intolerance towards the Albanians and the Bulgars of Macedonia. The Servians are an attractive race, imaginative, quick-witted, excitable, and richly endowed with the artistic temperament. But their morals and their politics belong to the Middle Ages. They were judged more harshly than they deserved for the murder of that neurotic despot, King Alexander. But the officers who at the same time murdered his queen, mutilated her corpse, and flung it naked into the streets of Belgrade, gave the measure of their own social development.

Their record in Macedonia reveals their political immaturity. By exile and imprisonment they forced the conquered Bulgarians to sign documents in which they declared themselves not merely loyal Servian subjects, but Servians by race and choice. They totally suppressed the Bulgarian Church, and exiled its bishops. They forbade the public use of the Bulgarian language. They denied the conquered population all political and some civil rights. They have ruled by the harshest form of martial law. This revival of patriotism created a militarism wholly alien to the democratic traditions of the Balkan races. But it also set the nation to the work of organizing itself for the future with a new seriousness and a new devotion. Under her two last Obrenovitch Kings, Servia had been nothing but a meaningless and isolated enclave in the Balkans, wedged between Austria and Bulgaria, without a fu-

ture and without a mission. Her national life was stagnant and corrupt. The coming of the new dynasty, and still more the breach between Austria and Russia, opened a brilliant path before her. She believed at last that the re-union of all the Servian peoples was possible, and she resolved that it should come about under her leadership. She saw herself destined to do for the Serbs what Piedmont had done for the Italians. The adventure might seem to sober minds impossible. Servia in isolation could hardly dream of challenging Austria with success, even if she had the moral and material resources which enabled Piedmont to expand into the Kingdom of Italy. But the Servians remembered that Piedmont did not overcome Austria by her own resources. She had Louis Napoleon behind her. If the Servians armed and plotted for the liberation of Bosnia and the other Serb lands under the Austrian yoke, it was with the firm conviction that when the hour of destiny struck, Russia would stand behind them.

When historians come to deal with the real causes of this general war, it is possible that exact documentary evidence may show how far Russian diplomacy stood behind the Greater Servian propaganda. The general presumption is strong. No one doubts that Russian influence was supreme in Belgrade. The Serbs owed much to their own arms, but on the whole they owed more to Russian diplomacy. But for Russia, the Austrians would have crushed them in 1909; but for Russia, Austria would certainly not have remained neutral during the two Balkan wars. To Russian pres-

sure Serbia owed such of her conquests in Albania as she was allowed to retain, and but for Russia, Austria would have torn up the iniquitous Treaty of Bucharest. There were more material bonds between the Great Power and her satellite. The Servian soldiers made the winter campaign of 1912-1913 in Russian great-coats, and the second Balkan war was financed by the French banks which do nothing in the Balkans that would run counter to Russian policy. When the full tide of Servian aspirations set towards Bosnia, and the National Union (Narodya Odbrana) began to turn against Austria all the criminal "comitadji" methods of agitation consecrated by long usage in Macedonia, Russia, had she chosen, might have set her veto on a development of Servian policy which threatened European peace.

It is this absolute dependence of Serbia upon Russian countenance and support, which makes it probable that when Serbia openly launched and assisted the Great Servian propaganda, she did this with Russia's approval. This propaganda involved much more than a mental disturbance in the minds of the Servian population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, who were organized in patriotic leagues and clubs with a view to an insurrection in the future. It had begun to smuggle arms, and it had been guilty of a series of assassinations of Austrian officials, to which the murder of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his Consort came as the climax. The Archduke was singled out for vengeance, not at all because he was the enemy, or oppressor of the Slavs. He was feared by Servians be-

cause his aim was to reconcile the Slavs to Austria. The historical memorandum in the German White Paper declared bluntly that this reckless and provocative attitude was possible for Serbia "only because she believed that she had Russian support in her activities." After referring to the original creation of the Balkan League under Russian auspices, it continues:

"Russian statesmen planned the rise of a new Balkan League under Russian protection, a league which was aimed not at Turkey—now vanished from the Balkans—but against the Austro-Hungarian monarchy. The idea was that Serbia should be compensated for the cession of its Macedonian acquisitions to Bulgaria by receiving Bosnia and Herzegovina at Austro-Hungary's expense."

There is nothing improbable in this statement. The original Serbo-Bulgarian alliance of 1912, afterwards expanded into the Balkan League, was directed against Austria as well as Turkey.

The treaty, as more than one Balkan diplomatist has told me, required Bulgaria to put all her forces at Serbia's disposal in the event of a war against Austria. These preparations for a united Slav assault upon Austria explains the determination of the German Powers to challenge Russia. Nor should it be forgotten that Pan-Slavism was busy in Galicia as well as in the Serbian lands. An active propaganda, disclosed in some famous state trials, was endeavoring, in Russian interests, to win the Ruthenians for the Orthodox Church. At its head stood the Russian reactionary politician, Count Bobrinsky, who, as Governor of Galicia, is now officially promoting the conversion of the Catholic Ruthenians to Orthodoxy.

It is not easy in the midst of the horrors and resentments of war to view such a situation as this in cold retrospect. The peril in front of Austria was grave, but it was not immediate. Russia had not at the first essay succeeded in restoring the Balkan League. Bulgaria could not forget her resentment, and had become a loosely attached associate of the Triple Alliance. If the Slavs were to choose their own hour, they would wait presumably until the Balkan armies had somewhat recovered from the exhaustion of two campaigns, and until the Russian military reorganization was completed. But there was good reason to infer that, sooner or later, the blow would be struck. A rising in Bosnia, organized by Servian comitadjis, would bring Servia herself into the field, and behind Servia would be the Balkan League and the Russian Empire. Such conspiracies as this are so remote from Western habits of life and thought, so inconceivable in our own experience, that we are apt to dismiss them as fantastic. They are the stuff of daily life in the Balkans, and we may do Austrian statesmen the justice of supposing that their fears were sincere. "The country," wrote Sir Maurice de Bunsen in his final dispatch, "certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Servia, or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands."

An enlightened power in Austria's place would not have acted as she did. The "Great Servian" idea is dangerous to Austria, because she lacks the courage to be liberal without reserves. Servia may compare herself to Piedmont, but the parallel is imperfect. Her

culture is so backward, her politics so corrupt, her economic life so primitive, that she has little to commend her to the Austrian Serbs save the community of blood. Our fathers sympathized with Italian aspirations, because the Italians were a race with a great past and a living culture, subject to an empire which was not their superior in civilization, and which denied them any species of autonomy. Austria does not deny Home Rule to her Serbs, though she gives it grudgingly, and she represents an older and maturer civilization. The Italians, moreover, were a homogeneous people. Of the Austrian Serbs one-third are Catholics, who have no reason to hope for equal treatment from an Orthodox State, whose record in Macedonia is a defiance of toleration, and another third are Moslems, who will emigrate *en masse* if the Servians should conquer Bosnia. Even the remaining third, who are Orthodox Serbs, would not have been ready-made material for a Servian propaganda, if Austria had known how to treat them with generosity. Faced by this Great Servian danger, and forced to realize at last that it was serious, a big man in Count Berchtold's place would have resolved to make Austria a home so attractive even to Servian idealists, that the half-civilized kingdom over the border, with its backward culture and oriental morals, would have lured and beckoned them in vain. He would have made them feel, as the Poles have long felt, that they are Austrians with a share in the fortunes of the empire. He would have made their autonomy a handsome reality. He would have banished the spies and the policemen, enemies of the

Austrian idea more dangerous than all the Servian bomb-throwers and comitadjis. He would have released the Croatians from the Magyar yoke, and bidden Dalmatians, Croatians, and Bosnians realize their Great Serbia to their heart's content within the Austrian Empire itself. That was the policy which the dead Archduke was supposed to favor. Against such a policy, conceived with some boldness of imagination and executed with good faith and tact, the incitements and conspiracies of Belgrade would have been powerless. Count Berchtold is neither a liberal nor a man of genius. He acted after the Serajevo murder as the average Imperialist bureaucrat commonly does act in such cases. He tightened his police system. He made Austrian rule a little more than usually hateful to men of Servian race. He determined to crush and humiliate Serbia, and realizing that behind Serbia stood Russia, he turned to his ally for aid.

The policy on which Austria and Germany determined is a matter of history, and the German White Paper describes it with an approach to frankness. This interesting document has not been fairly reproduced by our daily newspapers, and the main passage may be worth translating at length:

"In these circumstances Austria was driven to the conclusion that the dignity and self-preservation of the Monarchy alike forbade her to watch this movement from across the frontier any longer in passivity. She communicated her view to us and asked our advice. We were able with all our hearts to inform our ally that we shared her opinion of the situation, and we assured her of our approval for any action which she might take to put an end to the move-

ment in Serbia, directed against the integrity of the Monarchy. We were well aware that any military action by Austria against Serbia might bring Russia on the scene, and involve us in war by reason of the obligations of our alliance. Realizing as we did, that the vital interests of Austria-Hungary were at stake we could neither counsel our ally to a pliability inconsistent with her dignity, nor refuse her our aid in this difficult moment. Nor could we forget that our interests were nearly threatened by this continual Servian agitation. Had the Servians been allowed, with the help of Russia and France, to endanger the integrity of the neighboring Monarchy much longer, the consequence must have been the gradual disruption of Austria, and the subjection of the whole Slav world to the Russian sceptre, with the result that the position of the German race in central Europe would have become untenable."

There lies, in its naked simplicity, the German case for this war. The provocations followed in an alternating series. Russia encouraged the Great Servian movement, which aimed at the break-up of Austria, whereupon Austria struck at Serbia, and thereby challenged Russia. The issue now was, in plain words, whether Serbia should become an Austrian vassal or remain a Russian tool. While a diplomatic accommodation was still possible, Russia took the menacing step of proclaiming a general mobilization, and Germany replied with an ultimatum, followed in a few hours by war. This war is a co-operative crime. To its making have gone Russian ambitions and German fears. It would be as just to say that the real aggressor was the power which stood behind Serbia, as it would be to say that it was the power which first lit the conflagration by hurling its shells at Belgrade. On

their own showing, the Germans had planned a bold challenging stroke, which might lead them into a preventive war. The last thing which they wanted was a universal war. They tried to buy our neutrality. They even appealed to us to keep France neutral. There is evidence enough in our own White Paper that they did not believe Russia would fight. They thought that they had defied her in a good time before her armaments were ready. They had bullied her with success in the similar crisis of 1909, and with the characteristic clumsiness of Bismarckian psychology, they did not realize that a public act of bullying can never be repeated. It was precisely because Russia had yielded in 1909, that she could not yield again. It is nonsense to say, as M. Sazonoff said, that the prestige of Russia as a great power would be gone if Serbia became an Austrian vassal. Serbia had been an Austrian vassal throughout the lifetime of King Milan, and for many a year after his abdication. But it may be true to say that Russia would have lost in prestige, if Serbia had been torn from her orbit by Austrian arms and German threats. It is more to the point that such a humiliation would have ended the dream of a Great Serbia forever. That was the real issue. What Russia dreaded was not so much the humiliation of her little Slav brothers, the Serbs; she had watched the humiliation of her other little brothers in Bulgaria with equanimity, and even with satisfaction. The Servians, however, were more than brothers; they were tools. They were an indispensable piece in the game of chess for the Empire of the East.

The historian of the future will be in one sense more biased in his judgment of this moving chapter of history than we are ourselves. He will give his verdict, as historians commonly do, to the side that wins. To us the issue is unknown, and we must divide our wonder and our censures. The Pan-Slavists have brought the whole of European civilization to a test which may come near submerging it, in order to accomplish their dream of racial unity. The Germans, by rashly precipitating an issue which might never, in fact, have been forced upon them, may well have brought upon themselves the very catastrophe which they dreaded. A preventive war, if it is not a crime as inexcusable as a war of naked aggression, is always a folly. Nothing obliged Austria to fight now. From Serbia she might have had ample reparation, with pledges for her future good behavior. The crime of Serajevo was far from raising Serbia's prestige among the Austrian Slavs; it had, on the contrary, lowered and besmirched it. A policy of conciliation might have rendered any insurrection impossible. Nor was Russia's star in the ascendant in the counsels of Europe. Persian affairs had led to marked cooling in Sir Edward Grey's hitherto uncritical regard for Russia. The Anglo-German friendship was deepening, and something like the "Utopian" proposal of our White Paper (Sir Edward Grey's conception of a collective guarantee by the Triple Entente that it would allow no aggression against the Triple Alliance) might have isolated Russia in the future, if, in fact, she meditated a war of Slav against Teuton. What is clear today is, that Germany,

reasoning in cold blood amid profound peace that Austria's future status was threatened by this Pan-Servian danger, has made a war in which the chief issue may soon be whether Austria can continue to exist. The event will probably show that Germany, when she forced the quarrel to a trial of armed strength, acted with folly. Her violation of Belgian neutrality was certainly as imprudent as it was iniquitous. It cannot be honestly argued that the Russian mobilization justified her declaration of war. The answer to mobilization is not war, but a counter mobilization. But when this overwhelming case against German policy is stated, the fact remains that Germany could fairly plead that Russian policy was provocative. Russia was backing Servia in manoeuvres which threatened to break up Germany's ally, Austria. Russia was, moreover, the first of the Great Powers to order a general mobilization. This capital fact is ignored in nearly all the statements of the British case against Germany. It is slurred over in Sir Maurice de Bunsen's final despatch. It is omitted altogether in the historical preface to the cheap edition of the White Paper. That is not the way to write candid history. The dates are given in the White Paper. Russia, after a partial mobilization in her Southern provinces against Austria, made her mobilization general (i. e., called out the reserves in the Northern provinces for use against Germany) on July 31st (No. 113). Austria and Germany ordered their general mobilizations on August 1st (Nos. 127 and 142). Up to the first day of August Austria had only partially mobilized; Germany had not

mobilized at all; Austria in this last phase of the negotiations was showing moderation, and had conceded, as Sir Maurice de Bunsen has recognized, the main point of issue. The Kaiser was offering his personal services as mediator, and there can be no doubt that at the last moment, when she realized that the Austro-Serbian War could not be localized, Germany did use her influence with success to induce Austria to be moderate. She now saw in the Russian mobilization a threat to herself, and she replied to the threat with a defiance. The Tsar's order to mobilize compromised the hope of peace; the Kaiser's ultimatum ruined it. The moral responsibility for the universal war must be shared between Germany and Russia.

If the Triple Entente should be victorious, and if Russian policy is allowed to dominate the settlement, it is hard to draw a fortunate horoscope for Austria. A Russian proclamation has already snatched from Germany the Polish province of Posen, and from Austria the loyal and contented Poles of Galicia. We may be sure, if Servian arms should meet with any measure of success, that Russia will aim at creating a Greater Serbia by amalgamating Croatia, Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina with Servia and Montenegro. The *tertius gaudens*, as the Balkan struggle shows, is apt to exact a heavy price for his neutrality, the miserable Albanians will require some strong hand to restore their wretched country to order and peace. Roumania is a formidable military power, and at the moment when the struggle becomes desperate, her weight might be decisive in one or other of the Eastern scales of power.

She has no love for either Empire, though her king is a Hohenzollern. Russia took Bessarabia from her, and Hungary is the mistress of a large Roumanian population in Transylvania. She may elect to move her armies into one or the other of these provinces, but more probably she will hold to her neutrality for an assurance that the victor will reward her.

Bulgaria is in the same case. An armed neutrality will pay her best. If Russia wins, then Serbia, rich in her new acquisitions, can well afford to give up a part at least of Macedonia. The whole of the Near East is in the melting pot, but the central question of all is in what shape Austria will emerge from the tremendous test. A decisive victory would mean for her that Russian hegemony would be ended in Europe. She would have become herself the rival Slavonic Power. She anticipated Russia by promising the restoration of Polish unity. She would either annex Serbia outright, or reduce her to vassalage, while Roumania, Bulgaria, and Turkey, each aggrandized somewhat by the pursuit of a profitable neutrality, would be attached to her as grateful satellities. She would dominate the Balkans, and in the act she would have solved triumphantly the problem of her own internal cohesion. A beaten Russia would no longer attract the Southern Slavs. The other alternative is, if possible, still more cataclysmic. If Russia wins and has her way, little will be left of Austria save her German provinces, and these might be incorporated at length in a German Empire which had lost Posen and Alsace-Lorraine. Roumania and Serbia would emerge as big states, attached

by interest to the Russian system. Bulgaria would be reconciled by the gift of Macedonia. The doubtful points would be the future of the Czechs and Magyars. But whatever their fate might be, the German Powers would have been cut off forever from the East, and Russia with some millions of Poles and Ruthenians added to her territories, and the Southern Slavs enlisted as her allies and vanguard, would dominate the Eastern Mediterranean and overshadow Turkey, as to-day she overshadows Persia.

We are taking a parochial view of Armageddon if we allow ourselves to imagine that it is primarily a struggle for the independence of Belgium and the future of France. The Germans are nearer the truth when they regard it as a Russo-German War. It began in a struggle for the hegemony of the Near East, with its pivotal point at Belgrade. It will end logically, if either side achieves a decisive success, in a melting of all the frontiers of the East, and the settlement by force of arms of the question whether its destinies shall be governed by Germany or by Russia. It is, to my mind, an issue so barbarous, so remote from any real interest or concern of our daily life in these islands, that I can only marvel at the illusions, and curse the fatality which have made us belligerents in this struggle. We are neither Slavs nor Germans. How many of us, high or low, dare form a decided opinion as to whether Bosnia would in the end be happier under the native but intolerant and semi-civilized rule of the Serbs, or the alien but relatively civilized rule of Austria? How many of us would dare to answer one by one the ques-

tions whether Poles and Ruthenians and Slovacks would be the happier for passing from Austrian to Russian rule? We have not even debated these questions, yet our arms are helping to settle them. Our fleet in the North Sea, our army in France may be winning for the Tsar millions of fresh subjects, and for the familiar process of forcible Russification unnumbered victims. They will pass from a higher to a lower civilization, from a system usually tolerant and fitfully Liberal, to one which has not even begun to grasp the idea of toleration, and whose answer to Liberalism is the censorship, the prison, and the "truly Russian" pogrom. The Russian exiles who ask us to believe in the Liberal Russia of tomorrow can only repeat their pathetic, instinctive hopes. They admit, with a candor which enlists our respect, that nothing is changed as yet. One may dream of a future federal organization of its many nationalities. But are we so secure in our anticipation of that brighter future that we will back it by our arms? On the lower level of self-interest and Imperial expediency have we reason to desire a world in which the Balance of Power will lurch violently to the side of this unscrupulous and incalculable empire? Within a year from the breaking of Germany's power (if that is the result of this war), as Russia forces her way through the Dardanelles, dominates Turkey, overruns Persia, and bestrides the road to India, our Imperialists will be calling out for a strong Germany to balance a threatening Russia.

A mechanical fatality has forced France into this struggle, and a comradeship, translated by secret com-

mitments into a defensive alliance, has brought us into the war in her wake. It is no real concern of hers or of ours. It is a war for the Empire of the East. If our statesmanship is clear-sighted, it will stop the war before it has passed from a struggle for the defense of France and Belgium, into a colossal wrangle for the dominion of the Balkans and the mastery of the Slavs. When the campaign in the West has ended, as we all hope that it soon will end, in the liberation of French and Belgian soil from a deplorable invasion, the moment will have come to pause. To back our Western friends in a war of defense is one thing, to fling ourselves into the further struggle for the Empire of the East quite another. No call of the blood, no imperious calculation of self-interest, no hope for the future of mankind requires us to side with Slav against Teuton. We cannot wish that either Austria or Russia should dominate the Balkans, but if we had to make the choice in cold blood, most of us would prefer the more tolerant and more civilized German influence. Our orators talk of the cause of nationality. Two months ago what man in his senses would have suggested that the best way to serve the cause of nationality was to bring fresh subject races under the Russian yoke? The Poles and Ruthenians are Slavs indeed, but they are not Russians. One might as well propose to further the cause of nationality by annexing Holland to the German Empire. If in the heat of battle, we allow ourselves to rush onward without reflection from a war of defense to a war of conquest, we shall find that all the old problems confront us anew. Enthu-

siasts for this hateful war may applaud it as an effort to "destroy German militarism." That is a meaningless phrase. The Allies may indeed destroy the German armies, but no one can destroy German militarism, save the German people itself. Militarism seizes a nation only when the prophets of the gospel of force can preach to ears prepared by fear. We are about to make new fears for the German people. Crush that people, load it with indemnities, lop it of its provinces, encircle it with triumphant allies, and so far from turning to depose its Prussian leaders, it will rally behind them in a national struggle to recover its standing, its integrity, its power of free movement. Not France, but Germany will arm to recover lost provinces, and weave new alliances to adjust the ever-shifting balance of power. If once the world begins to play at map-making, it will create unsatisfied appetites; there will be states enough to join with Germany in an effort to upset the settlement. The future will stretch before us, a new phase of the ruinous armed peace, destined to end, after further years of anger and waste, in another war of revenge. It lies with public opinion to limit the duration of this quarrel, and to impose on our diplomacy, when victory in the West is won, a return to its natural role of moderator in a quarrel no longer its own.

APPENDIX B.
BRITAIN AND THE WAR: A STUDY
IN DIPLOMACY.

BY C. H. NORMAN.

Austria, Servia, Russia, and Germany.

The first step in the tragedy, which was so rapidly unfolded before the astounded peoples of Europe in July last (1914), was taken by Austria, in October, 1908, when it was announced that the Austrian Protectorate over Bosnia and Herzegovina had become a formal occupation. The cause of this action was the Young Turk Revolution in Turkey, as a result of which the powers, who had divided among themselves certain portions of the Turkish Empire, feared that Turkey might be induced to challenge the proceedings under which partial dismemberment of her Empire had taken place.

The Servian Government, at that time just emerging from the discredit into which the horrible circumstances connected with the murder of King Milan and Queen Draga had enveloped it, protested against this conduct of the Austro-Hungarian Government, on the ground that the interests of Servia in Bosnia were greater than those of Austria, and that Austria had been permitted in Bosnia by Europe only as a trustee;

so that the annexation was a breach of trust. Public opinion in Europe, generally speaking, pronounced itself decidedly against the excuse of Austria, as it was clear that the abrupt destruction of the *status quo* in the Balkans, at a time when Turkey was in an internal ferment, might gravely imperil the future peace of Europe.

On March 31, 1909, Servia made the following declaration to the Austrian Government: "Servia declared that she is not affected in her rights by the situation established in Bosnia, and that she will therefore adapt herself to the decisions which the powers are going to arrive at . . . By following the counsels of the powers, Servia binds herself to cease the attitude of protest and resistance which she has assumed since last October, relative to the annexation, and she binds herself further to change the direction of her present policy towards Austria-Hungary, and in the future to live with the latter in friendly and neighborly relations." The charge brought against the Servian Government by Austria has been that that solemn undertaking was not adhered to in any way. The German Chancellor, in a confidential note to the German Governments dated July 28th, put the Austro-German point of view in this way: "The agitation conducted by the Pan-Slavs"—that is the Servian Party—"in Austria-Hungary has for its goal, with the destruction of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the scattering or weakening of the Triple Alliance with a complete isolation of the German Empire in consequence. Our own interest, therefore, calls us to the side of Austria." On that

date, Germany knew that the policy initiated by King Edward of isolating Germany was being completed; and that there was a combination of Russia, France, and Britain, possibly Japan, all actuated by a suspicious spirit towards the policy of Germany.

In 1911 came the European crisis over the Morocco Question, when Germany, faced by a combination of Russia, France, Britain and Spain, sustained a disastrous diplomatic check.

That fact undoubtedly much exasperated opinion in Germany, as it was a further confirmation of the fixed idea that there was a tacit understanding to undermine her influence at every point. That this was so was apparently felt by Sir Edward Grey, whose anti-German policy has been such a potent cause of the terrible catastrophe now being analyzed, for he telegraphed to the British Ambassador in Berlin on July 30, 1914, in these remarkable terms: "If the peace of Europe can be preserved, and the present crisis safely passed, my own endeavor will be to promote some arrangement to which Germany could be a party, by which she could be assured that no aggressive or hostile policy would be pursued against her or her allies by France, Russia, and ourselves, jointly or separately." That repentance was too late; but those words cast a bright light upon the errors of the past.

In 1912 the first Balkan War broke out, in which Turkey was severely handled by a combination of Bulgaria, Greece, Servia, and Montenegro. On May 26, 1913, peace was concluded between Turkey and the allied combination. On June 30th, Bulgaria was at-

tacked by Greece, Serbia, and Roumania, and had to surrender much of what she had won. This internecine conflict led to much bitterness between the Balkan States. The Austrian Government exhibited some anxiety at the territorial accessions secured by Serbia in these two wars, especially as the Pan-Serb agitation in Bosnia had become very active. A threatening tone was adopted by the Austrian Government and Press towards the Servian Government, an attitude which much irritated the Russian Government.

What ensued is well summarized in the Annual Register for 1913: "In foreign politics the greatest achievement of Germany this year was the prevention of a European War, which would in all probability have broken out if the Emperor William had not plainly declared on the one hand to Austria-Hungary that he would not support her should she be involved in a war with Russia as the consequence of an attack by her upon Serbia, and on the other to Russia that if she attacked Austria-Hungary notwithstanding her abstinence from active intervention in the Balkans, he would fight by the side of his Austrian ally." That stand was effective, and the crisis of 1913 was safely passed.

On June 28, 1914, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir to the Austrian Emperor, and his Consort, were murdered at the City of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia. The incidents connected with the crime were most startling. Three different attempts were made on the part of the assassins, at separate places, within a short period of time. The murder was seemingly anticipated in several cities—notably London, Belgrade, St. Peters-

burg, and Rome. In view of the extraordinary line now being taken by certain members of His Majesty's Government with regard to Austria, it is worth while to recall the references of the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister of Britain to that assassination. Sir Edward Grey said, on June 29th, in the House of Commons: "I was one of those who less than a year ago saw the pleasure that was given here by the visit to the King of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his Consort. I knew the goodwill which the Archduke personally expressed towards our country during his visit and the pleasure which he so obviously felt in that visit."

Mr. Asquith, in moving an address of condolence to the Emperor of Austria, used this language, which was either unreal, or mocking, in view of the proceedings of the Government since: "We are once more confronted with one of those incredible crimes which almost make us despair of the progress of mankind.

. . . The Emperor and his people have always been our friends, and in the name of the Commons, of the nation, of this United Kingdom, we respectfully tender to him, and to the great family of nations of which he is the venerable and venerated head, our heartfelt and our most affectionate sympathy." Yet, within six weeks of the utterance of these sentiments, Britain had drifted into war with Austria-Hungary, against which country no one has pretended that Britain had any legitimate ground of complaint!

Faced with this terrible loss, the Austrian Emperor

directed that a secret inquiry should be begun into the plot which had led to the murder. The conclusions arrived at in that inquiry have thus been set forth by the Austrian Government: "(1) The plan to murder the Archduke during his stay in Sarajevo was conceived in Belgrade by Gabrilo Princip, Nedeljko Gabrinowic, and a certain Milan Ciganowic and Trifko Grabez, with the aid of Major Voja Tankosic. (2) The six bombs are hand grenades, manufactured at the arsenal of the Servian Army in Kragujevac. (4) To insure the success of the assassination, Milan Ciganowic instructed Princip Gabrinowic in the use of grenades and gave instructions in shooting with Browningpistolsto Princip Grabez in a forest near the target practice field of Topshider (outside Belgrade). (5) In order to enable the crossing of the frontier of Bosnia by Princip Gabrinowic and Grabez, and the smuggling of their arms, a secret system of transportation was organized by Ciganowic. The entry of the criminals with their arms into Bosnia and Herzegovina was effected by the frontier captains of Shabatz and Loznica, with the aid of several other persons."

It has been complained against the Austrian Government that the evidence on which these findings were founded was not published. That complaint is open to four observations: (1) The Austrian Government might not have desired to reveal the full ramifications of the conspiracy, until it was known who had inspired it, because the above findings were only directed against the agents of the conspiracy as distinguished from its authors. (2) It is not the practice in Austria-

Hungary, and in that respect Austria is like many other Continental countries, to conduct preliminary inquiries into political crimes in public. (3) Austria was much aggrieved by the crime. The pride of the Hapsburgs is notorious; and this was an occasion when any comment on their actions would be regarded as an affront. (4) Servia maintained all the while a position of masterly inactivity.

The murder took place on the 28th of June, but it was not until July 23rd that Austria presented a stiff ultimatum demanding certain reparation from Servia. The Austrian Ambassador in London offered some explanation of the strong terms of that ultimatum in these remarks, as recorded by Sir Edward Grey: "Count Mensdorff said that if Servia, in the interval that had elapsed since the murder of the Archduke, had voluntarily instituted an inquiry on her own territory, all this might have been avoided." As a matter of fact, Servia had done nothing, conduct which led the Kaiser to telegraph with some justifiable asperity to the Czar: "The spirit which made the Servians murder their own King and his Consort still dominates that country." It is fair to remember too, that the real criminals in connection with the Archduke's assassination have not been brought to justice yet.

The Austrian ultimatum created some indignation in Russia; and it is at this point that the sinister designs of Russia begin to appear. Servia appealed to the Czar for his protection, in the meantime presenting a conciliatory reply to the Austrian Government. It is probable that the reply would have been accepted by

Austria, had not the Servian Government so often broken its pledges, given in 1909, to live "in neighborly and friendly relations" with Austria.

The vital point of the Austrian ultimatum, namely that Austrian officers should watch the inquiry to be held by Servia so as to see that it was a genuine one, was rejected by Servia as an interference with her integrity as a sovereign state. A deadlock was thus reached, as Austria was unwilling to forego this demand and submit her case to an international tribunal, where Servia, whom she was accusing of carrying on a murderous propaganda, would have presented herself as an equal of Austria. The attitude of Austria was, undoubtedly, a harsh and unbending one in the beginning, but, before condemning Austria too severely, Britons should ask themselves this question: Supposing the Prince of Wales had been murdered in Germany, and the inquiry showed a connection of German officials with the murderers, that knowing this the German Government did nothing, would the statesmen of Britain have submitted such a matter to the Hague Tribunal? It may be that they ought to have done so in a democratic community; but does any reasonable man think that the government would have taken such a course? The British Ambassador at Vienna thus diagnosed public feeling in Austria in his despatch on the rupture of diplomatic relations: "The demeanor of the people of Vienna showed plainly the popularity of the idea of war with Servia, and there can be no doubt that the small body of Austrian and Hungarian statesmen by whom this momentous step was adopted

rightly gauged the sense of the people. . . . The country certainly believed that it had before it only the alternative of subduing Serbia or of submitting sooner or later to mutilation at her hands." On July 23rd, the British Ambassador at Rome reported: "Secretary-General took the view that the gravity of the situation lay in the conviction of the Austro-Hungarian Government that it was absolutely necessary for their prestige, after many disillusionments in the Balkans, to score a definite success." The Austrian Government, under pressure from the Russian and German Governments, declared its intention of not seeking any territorial compensation at the expense of Serbia. Then, on July 26th, the German Ambassador at St. Petersburg wired to the German Chancellor:

"The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador had an extended interview with Sazonoff this afternoon. Both parties had a satisfactory impression, as they told me afterwards. The assurance of the Ambassador that Austria-Hungary had no idea of conquest, but wished to obtain peace at last at her frontiers, greatly pacified the Secretary."

On July 28th, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and the inevitable consequence ensued. Russia replied to a partial Austrian mobilization and declaration of war against Serbia by a partial Russian mobilization against Austria. Here must be inserted two telegrams which tell most heavily against the good faith of Russia.

On July 26th, the Russian Minister for Foreign Af-

fairs sent this extraordinary telegram to the Russian Ambassador at Rome: "Italy could play an all-important role in the preservation of peace if she could use her influence in Austria and bind herself to a neutral attitude in the conflict since it can not remain localized. It would be desirable for you to say that it is impossible for Russia not to give help to Servia." What could that mean but that Russia had decided to kindle a general conflagration? Austria had pledged her honor not to take Servian territory. If she broke her word, then would have been the moment for Russia to call Austria to account. That Russia and Servia were playing a dubious game is confirmed by this frank admission of the Czar, on the 30th of July. "The military measures now taking form were decided upon five days ago, and for the reason of defense against the preparations of Austria." That is to say, Russia had decided on mobilization on the 25th of July—three days before Austria had declared war on Servia! What reason of defense was there in this act? As the Kaiser telegraphed on the 31st of July to the Czar: "Nobody threatens the honor and power of Russia, which could well have waited for the result of my mediation." The Russian mobilization was grossly provocative, and was a primal cause of the catastrophe which has befallen Europe; because that mobilization terrified the German Government, which could not understand the motive of Russia in shielding Servia from the wrath of Austria, in the peculiar circumstances surrounding the murder at Sarajevo. The counsel Germany could tender to Austria was weak-

ened by the fact that the intervention of Germany against Austria in 1913, which averted war, had not improved the relations between Austria and Servia, but had produced the assassination; as Servia imagined, with some justice as events turned out, that the politics of assassination were not viewed unfavorably in Russia. It was not until August 1st, as the British Ambassador at Vienna states, that Austria replied to the Russian move. "General mobilization of army and fleet," is the laconic message. On the same date it is noted by Sir E. Grey: "The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador declared the readiness of his Government to discuss the substance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia." But the Russian mobilization did not cease. Germany asked that it should be stopped; and no answer was returned. The German representatives were telegraphing that France and Russia were pressing on with their mobilization; and Sir E. Grey had already informed the Austrian Ambassador that the British fleet would be kept together, as the situation was difficult. It is known now that transports were being collected together in the mouth of the Thames on the 31st of July. Faced with this crisis, Germany lost her nerve, and mobilized her forces late on the 31st of July. On the same date, the German Ambassador in Paris was instructed: "Please ask French Government whether it intends to remain neutral in a Russo-German war." He answered on the 1st of August: "Upon my repeated definite inquiry whether France would remain neutral in the event of a Russo-German

war, the Prime Minister declared that France would do that which her interests dictated."

The second part of this drama may be said to open at the peaceful town of Andover, in Hampshire, where a certain Captain Faber, M. P., delivered a speech in the month of November, 1911. He informed his audience that "he was not going to gloss over or pass over anything, and he was going to dwell on the late crisis in the European situation. That crisis was brought about over the state of Morocco, and the crisis between France and Germany was exceedingly grave, and at that time there was a division in the cabinet as to whether we should stick to France or not. He knew the names of the men who wanted to stick to France in the cabinet and the names of those who did not. The names of the men who decided to honorably stick to France were Mr. Lloyd George and Mr. Winston Churchill. Those two men were in favor of sticking to and abiding by the treaty with France. The idea at the time of the late stress was to send six divisions of regular troops to help our ally, France."—(*Andover Times*, November 16, 1911.)

That speech naturally caused a stir in political circles by reason of its positive and grave assertions. On November 16, 1911, Mr. Primrose asked Sir E. Grey whether "he will state what are our engagements with foreign powers involving armed intervention or support." The reply by Sir E. Grey was: "All treaties concluded by H. M. Government since 1898 and engagements with foreign powers that might involve armed intervention have been laid before Parliament."

On the 27th of November, 1911, Sir C. Kinloch-Cooke inquired whether the declaration between France and Great Britain as to Morocco, signed on April 8, 1904, was interpreted by either the French or British Governments "to mean and to include military and naval support under any and what circumstances?" Mr. Acland answered: "An agreement to afford diplomatic support does not impose on any power an obligation, either to give or to withhold military or naval support."

On the same date, Sir E. Grey delivered a speech in which he remarked: "Let us try to put an end to some of the suspicions with regard to secrecy. We have laid before the House of Commons the secret articles of the agreement with France in 1904. There are no other engagements . . . No British Government could embark upon a war without public opinion behind it, and such engagements as there are which really commit Parliament to any thing of that kind are contained in treaties or agreements which have been laid before the house. For ourselves, we have not made a single secret article of any kind since we came into office." Such was the position in 1911. In his fatal speech of the 3rd of August, 1914, Sir E. Grey read the following document, technically known as an *aide-memoire*, which he had written to the French Ambassador in London on November 22, 1912: "My dear Ambassador—From time to time in recent years the French and British naval and military experts have consulted together. It has always been understood that such consultation does not restrict the freedom of

either Government to decide at any future time whether or not to assist the other by armed force. We have agreed that consultation between experts is not and ought not to be regarded as an engagement that commits either Government to action in a contingency that has not yet arisen and may never arise. The disposition, for instance, of the French and British fleets respectively at the present moment is not based upon an engagement to co-operate in war. You have, however, pointed out that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, it might become essential to know whether it could, in that event, depend upon the armed assistance of the other." Then comes the operative part, in which was an undertaking of the highest importance. "I agree that, if either Government had grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third power, or something that threatened the general peace" (just observe how far-reaching those words might become in certain eventualities) "it should immediately discuss with the other whether both Governments should act together to prevent aggression and to preserve peace, and, if so, what measures they would be prepared to take in common." Between two private individuals an instrument so worded would be regarded as a contract in terms as well as in honor. Yet Sir Edward Grey admitted, in the same speech, that he did not know what the outcome of such a bargain might be, because he continued: "We are not parties to the Franco-Russian Alliance. We do not even know the terms of that alliance." That is a confession of in-

competence, because no such letter should have been given to the French Ambassador until disclosure had been permitted of the obligations of France towards Russia.

Reports emanating from Paris soon began to circulate alleging the existence of this document. In February, 1913, Lord Hugh Cecil, in the debate on the address, pointed out: "There is a very general belief that this country is under an obligation, not a treaty obligation, but an obligation arising out of an assurance given by the ministry in the course of diplomatic negotiations, to send a very large armed force out of this country to operate in Europe." Mr. Asquith intervened at once, saying: "I ought to say that it is not true." How can that denial be reconciled with the contents of the letter addressed to the Ambassador? On March 24, 1913, the Prime Minister was again questioned: "Whether the foreign policy of this country is at the present time unhampered by any treaties, agreements, or obligations under which British military forces would, in certain eventualities, be called upon to be landed on the continent?" Mr. Asquith replied: "As has been repeatedly stated, this country is not under any obligation, not public and known to Parliament, which compels it to take part in any war." That answer was an untruth. On the 28th of April, 1914, more rumors on the subject being current, Sir Edward Grey was further interrogated: "Whether the policy of this country still remained one of freedom from all obligations to engage in military operations on the continent?" He answered: "The position now remains

the same as was stated by the Prime Minister in answer to a question on March 24, 1913." That was a most disingenuous and tricky reply. In May, 1914, there was a discussion in the Russian Duma on the relations between Britain and Russia. That topic was debated in secret, and Sir Edward Grey has declined to publish the British Ambassador's report as to what transpired in that debate; but on the 11th of June, 1914, Sir Edward Grey was asked: "Whether any naval agreement had been recently entered into between Russia and Great Britain, and whether any negotiations with a view to a naval agreement have recently taken place or are now pending between Russia and Great Britain." The Foreign Secretary dealt with the question in a most elaborate and formal manner: "The Prime Minister replied last year to the question of the Hon. Member that if a war arose between European powers there were no unpublished agreements which would hamper or restrict the freedom of the Government or of Parliament to decide whether or not Great Britain should participate in a war. That answer covers both questions on the paper. It remains as true today as it was a year ago. No negotiations have since been concluded with any power that would make the statement less true. No such negotiations are in progress, and none are likely to be entered upon as far as I can judge."

All this time Sir Edward Grey had in his possession a copy of the letter he had written himself to M. Cambon that committed Britain to every kind of continental adventure into which Russia might drag France.

The concluding sentence of this statement of Sir Edward Grey, in the circumstances, is a masterpiece of misrepresentation: "But if any agreement were to be concluded that made it necessary to withdraw or modify the Prime Minister's statement of last year which I have quoted, it ought, in my opinion, to be, and I suppose that it would be, laid before Parliament." That is the mental state of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary, whose appeals to heaven and to national honor read a little strangely in view of the falsity of their representations to Parliament, the custodian of national honor. It is a curious commentary upon these repudiations that the American press, on June 20, 1914, before the assassination of Serajevo, published a report that a naval convention had been signed between Russia and Britain under which, in the case of a Russo-German war, Britain would render assistance to Russia by naval operations. It is right to add that Sir Edward Grey has strenuously contradicted that report; but the reader must judge what value he will attach to contradictions emanating from Sir Edward Grey.

The position of Belgium must next engage our attention. It has been reiterated that Britain is fighting in this war because there was some treaty under which the neutrality of Belgium was guaranteed in a European war.

Neither the Prime Minister nor Sir Edward Grey has enlightened the world as to the text of that guarantee. The present writer has been through Hertslet's "Map of Europe by Treaty," and has failed to discover

any such instrument. The treaties of 1831 and 1839 contain merely this: "Article VII: Belgium shall form an independent neutrality towards all other states." That is a common form stipulation which is always inserted on the creation of small buffer states like Belgium. There is also the fact that on August 9, 1870, Great Britain and Prussia entered upon a treaty "relative to the independence and neutrality of Belgium." Article I of that treaty pledged Prussia to respect the neutrality of Belgium during the Franco-Prussian war. Article II provided for joint measures against France should France violate the territories of Belgium. Article III provided that the treaty should only be binding on the high contracting parties during the Franco-Prussian war. "On the expiration of that time the independence and neutrality of Belgium will, so far as the high contracting parties are respectively concerned, continue to rest as heretofore on Article I, of the Quintuple treaty of April 19, 1839." Sir E. Hertslet has a note that that treaty is No. 183 in his book. Article I of that document simply says: "H. M. the King of the Netherlands engages to cause to be immediately converted into a treaty with H. M. the King of the Belgians, the articles annexed to the present act, and agreed upon by common consent, under the auspices of the courts of Great Britain, Austria, France, Prussia and Russia." That the neutrality of Belgium doctrine is more complicated than the problem of the Danish Duchies, reputed as the most abstruse question known in the history of diplomacy, is the only determination that one can arrive at from

the documents; and it is criminal that Britain should have been plunged into a European war on a pretext of this character. Britain owed one duty to Belgium; and that is a duty which does not seem to have been performed, namely to give Belgium sound advice. Britain had never guaranteed to protect the neutrality of Belgium during a continental war for the excellent reason that the guarantee was impossible of performance. The neutrality of Belgium could only be upheld by force of arms. Belgium should have been warned by Britain that it was unlikely that the British troops could be brought to Belgium in time to render the Belgian forces any assistance; and that it was improbable that the French army, owing to its general state of disorganization, could promptly aid the Belgian troops. If that counsel were given by Britain, and still Belgium was willing to risk a conflict against Germany's overwhelming strength, then Belgium has her own Government to thank for the devastation which has been wrought in her territories. If Britain and France led the Belgians to believe that the French and English troops would effect a junction with the Belgian army outside Brussels, then Belgium has been the catspaw of Britain and France; because no military officer of repute has ever contended that it was possible to defend Belgium from German invasion ever since Germany constructed the net-work of strategical railways which runs to the Belgian frontier. It may be that King Albert of Belgium was actuated by ambition, and that Belgium is to be rewarded at the ex-

pense of Luxemburg, in which case the transaction is even more scandalous.

Had Belgium surrendered to *force majeure*, insisting on substantial compensation for the trespass committed by the German troops, no one could have doubted her wisdom, nor suspected her honor.

As already demonstrated, Germany attempted to get some statement from France concerning the latter's attitude in a Russo-German war, but without result. The next move by Germany was to ascertain the intentions of Britain. The Emperor had some ground for hoping that Britain would remain neutral, as he had prevented a European coalition against Britain in 1900-1901 to compel Britain to give terms to the Boers. The Kaiser, in 1908, had allowed an interview to be published in the *Daily Telegraph*, which was summarized in the *Annual Register*. "He (the Emperor William) had proved his friendship for England by refusing to receive the Boer delegates at Berlin, while the European peoples had received and fêted them; by refusing the invitation of France and Russia to join with them in calling upon England to put an end to the Boer war; and by sending to Windsor a plan of campaign against the Boers in December, 1899, drawn up by himself and submitted to his general staff for criticism, which ran very much on the same lines as that which was adopted by Lord Roberts." Neither the French nor Russian Governments ventured to contradict this account, which was amplified in the debates in the Reichstag. Finding war with France was in-

evitable, the German Chancellor made overtures to Britain, which, by some misuse of language, have been described as infamous. What the German Chancellor offered, according to Sir E. Goschen, was to guarantee the territorial integrity of France if Germany were successful in defeating Russia and France, which was a remote contingency. There may be some hidden wickedness in this suggestion, but the present writer can only see that it was a business proposal. Sir Edward Grey rejected this proposition. Then Prince Lichnowsky put forward a second basis, as Sir Edward Grey wired on August 1. "He asked me whether, if Germany gave a promise not to violate Belgian neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. I replied that I could not say that; our hands were still free, and we were considering what our attitude should be. All I could say was that our attitude would be determined largely by public opinion here, and that the neutrality of Belgium would appeal very strongly to public opinion here. I did not think that we could give a promise of neutrality on that condition alone. The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could formulate conditions on which we would remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed. I said that I felt obliged to refuse definitely any promise to remain neutral on similar terms, and I could only say that we must keep our hands free." Sir Edward Grey has since contended that Prince Lichnowsky was not authorized to negotiate on this basis and was being deceived by his superiors in Berlin. That argument is founded upon

the unshakable conviction in Sir Edward Grey's mind that Germany was intending to fight the world all at once. That is rather ridiculous, considering that the hopeless nature of such a conflict would restrain any power from embarking upon it. On the 2nd of August, Sir Edward Grey handed M. Cambon this memorandum: "I am authorized to give an assurance that, if the German fleet comes into the channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against French coast or shipping the British fleet will give all the protection in its power. This assurance must not be taken as binding H. M. Government to take any action until the above contingency of action by the German fleet takes place." That was an extraordinary communication which, as Germany and France were at war, amounted to a declaration of hostility against Germany; it was an act of war by Britain against Germany long before Belgian territory had been entered by the German troops. Had the German navy steamed into the North Sea on August 2nd, it would have been liable to destruction by the British fleet (though Britain and Germany were still negotiating), in accordance with the assurance presented to the French Ambassador. It was an ingenious scheme, but hardly of a nature to warrant the high moral tone since taken against Germany by the British Ministers! On August 1st, Prince Lichnowsky telegraphed to Berlin: "Sir E. Grey has just called me to the telephone and asked whether I thought I could say that in the event of France remaining neutral in a Russo-German war we should not attack the French. I told him I thought

I could accept the responsibility for this." The Imperial Chancellor replies: "Germany is ready to take up the English proposal if England guarantees with her forces the absolute neutrality of France in a Russo-German conflict. . . . We promise that the French frontier shall not be passed by our troops before 7 p. m. on Monday, August 3rd, if England's consent is given in the meantime." France, however, was determined to support Russia, so that the proposal fell through. If France had remained neutral, Belgium would have been saved much misery, and France and Britain much blood and treasure.

Sir Edward Grey should have warned France more sternly of the consequences of involving her fortunes in a struggle between Slav and Teuton. Also he should never have committed Britain in 1912 to a blind support of France, without acquainting the cabinet with his ignorance of the terms of the Franco-Russian alliance. The document of 1912 should have been disclosed to the British Parliament at the time of dispatch; because, then, the German statesmen would have known how desperate the situation might become. Sir Edward Grey laid a snare for the House of Commons, out of which, in the excited condition of public opinion and the electrical atmosphere in Europe the house could not be extricated with honor and dignity. Without reading or disclosing the last quoted telegrams to Parliament, Sir Edward Grey had the effrontery to tell the House of Commons on the 3rd of August: "We have disclosed our mind to the House of Commons." He had these documents in his possession, but

concealed them; nor have they been published in the White Paper. The Kaiser himself wired to King George: "If France offers me her neutrality, which must be guaranteed by the English army and navy, I will, of course, cease to consider an attack on France, and use my troops in another direction. I hope that France will not be nervous. The troops on my frontier are being held back by telegram and telephone from passing the French frontier." King George replied that there had been a misunderstanding, and the negotiations could not proceed on those lines; and war ensued. Germany had lost some valuable hours and had endeavored to keep France and Britain out of war, knowing that her best chance of success was in France, as Russia was almost invulnerable to invasion. Yet the Jingo party in Britain would impute the whole blame for this cruel war to the artful manoeuvres of the Kaiser.

That is a supposition which rests upon the absurd assumption that Germany would risk a war with Russia, France, Britain and Belgium at the same moment! There is some element of truth in the comments of Herr von Jagow, as recorded by the British Ambassador at Berlin: "Herr von Jagow expressed his poignant regret at the crumbling of his entire policy, and that of the Chancellor, which had been to make friends with Great Britain, and then, through Great Britain, to get closer to France." The Chancellor expressed himself more strongly: "What we had done was unthinkable; it was like striking a man from behind while he was fighting for life against two assail-

ants. He held Great Britain responsible for all the terrible events that might happen." After all, Britons should reflect that it would have been very unpleasant had Germany joined a European coalition on behalf of the Boers. Germany, no doubt, refused to do so in her own interests, as the Kaiser did not believe that it was to the advantage of Germany that Britain should be crippled by a European coalition. It is, unfortunately, the present writer's view that the same observation is applicable to the situation of today; and that Britain never entered upon a more insane campaign than this campaign in which she is helping to destroy Germany in the interests of Russia and France.

On the 3rd of August the British Minister at Brussels wired the following information: "French Government have offered through their military attaché the support of five French army corps to the Belgian Government. Following reply has been received today: 'We are sincerely grateful to the French Government for offering eventual support. In the actual circumstances, however, we do not propose to appeal to the guarantee of the powers. Belgian Government will decide later on the action which they may think it necessary to take.'" Up till that late hour, the Belgian Government was seemingly willing to adopt an attitude of enforced neutrality, as Belgium could not hope permanently to contest the march of the German army. On August 4th, the King of the Belgians addressed an appeal to King George which is thus worded: "I make a supreme appeal to the diplomatic intervention of your Majesty's Government to safeguard the integrity of

Belgium." The mystery of Belgium is almost insoluble on these documents as that is a telegram inviting only diplomatic intervention, and not armed intervention, to preserve the neutrality of Belgium. The German Government, according to Sir Edward Grey, had delivered a note to Belgium, "proposing friendly neutrality, entailing free passage through Belgian territory, and promising to maintain the independence and integrity of the kingdom and its possessions at the conclusion of peace, threatening, in case of refusal, to treat Belgium as an enemy." On August 4th, Sir Edward Grey wired to the British Minister at Brussels: "You should inform Belgian Government that if pressure is applied to them by Germany to induce them to depart from neutrality, His Majesty's Government expect that they will resist by any means in their power." It was a terribly selfish act to press that advice upon Belgium, when no substantial assistance, in the military sense, could be rendered to save Belgian territories from devastation.

It may be asked: "Well, but granted all this criticism is sound, what can be done now?" That is a question often put by those persons who explain that Britain "must go through with it."

Surely one is entitled to know, "To what end is this policy directed?" The Prime Minister, Mr. Churchill, and Mr. Lloyd George, in their recruiting orations, have introduced a lot of irrelevant and prejudicial matters; but on that principal point on which more information is needed their silence has been unanimous and complete. The Prime Minister has ex-

plained that Britain is fighting for Belgian neutrality. One cannot fight for a myth. Belgian neutrality vanished the moment the first German patrol crossed the frontier. His next argument was that German militarism must be crushed. Well, can it be done? The militarism of Germany has this excuse, that it has proved itself a fairly efficient weapon against a powerful combination. In these days, it is questionable whether a well-organized composite European state can be thoroughly beaten. Britain had enough trouble to subjugate the small Boer Republics in South Africa. The partition of Germany and Austria-Hungary may be the motive of the Czar; but what benefit can accrue to Britain or France from such madness? Before Germany and Austria surrender to Russia, millions of men will have died, as many of the races in Austria and Germany must literally strive to their last man against Russian control. That is the common sense of the situation. Moreover, there is a certain amount of humbug in this outcry against German militarism. In the centuries before German unity was accomplished, Berlin was more often in the hands of a foreign invader than any other capital in Europe. Bismarck calculated that the French had occupied Berlin over twenty times, while the German troops had been in Paris twice. Prussia and Brandenburg were two of the most invaded countries in Europe before the ring of bayonets was welded together. That is historical fact. On the other hand, Russia has a militarist propaganda of the most evil kind; and the Dreyfus case demonstrated what form French militarism could as-

sume. Nor is British navalism innocuous in its spirit! Through that navalism, Britain has assailed nation after nation in Europe that has threatened her trade supremacy; and Germany, the latest comer, is being similarly handled. "On the knee, you dog!" was a phrase that rang unpleasantly through England not long ago. The militarism of Lord Kitchener in Egypt and in India was as bad as anything one could want in that line. Mr. Asquith, in his orations about Britain struggling for the liberties of Europe, might re-assure us about the restoration of the statutory British liberties which have been whittled away in the past two months by a series of royal proclamations.

In 1899, Britain was righteously engaged in the destruction of "Krugerism;" today it is "Kaiserism" which is the target of Britain's virtuous indignation. By an ironic stroke of fate, this year (1914) was the scene of the greatest procession ever organized by British trade unionism, when hundreds of thousands of men protested against the deportation of Englishmen without trial or without charge by the successors of "Krugerism," "Krugerism" never deported British subjects without trial and without charge; but "Krug-erism" did resist the importation of Chinese "blackleg" labor. The disappearance of "Krugerism" was rather a barren victory; it certainly was an expensive one. Many wonderful things were forecasted as likely to occur under the British regime in South Africa; but the world still awaits something newer than the old tyranny of capitalism.

Another argument for the war is that the principle

of the freedom of nationalities is involved. On which side? Germany and Austria have been promised partition by the genial Czar and the witty Frenchman! In the past twelve years, there have been five states whose independence has been taken from them without any protest from Britain. They were all examples where the nationalities were distinct. The Transvaal and the Orange Free State had their independence destroyed by Britain. Persian integrity was broken into by the thieves' covenant of 1907 between Russia and Britain; and Mr. Morgan Shuster, the American who was re-organizing Persian financial administration, was expelled through Russo-British intrigue. Morocco was partitioned between France and Spain with British connivance. The case of Corea was almost parallel to that of Belgium. The independence and neutrality of Corea were guaranteed by Japan, Russia, Britain and France, under a number of treaties. The Corean Queen was foully murdered by Japanese agents. The Japanese, some time afterwards, invaded Corea and compelled the Coreans to fight against Russia in the Russo-Japanese War. Russia and Corea protested to Britain and France; but, on that occasion, which was a far more shameless breach in international law, Britain and France thought it convenient to forget their "obligations of honor," "their written bond," "their sacred covenant," or whatever high sounding phrase may occur to the recruiting orators of the Cabinet. Corea was annexed by the Japanese, and has regretted her unhappy fate ever since. The Germans were not parties to any of these touching inci-

dents in the War of Liberation on behalf of small nationalities; probably, because they were elbowed out by the Triple Entente. Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey, by the way, were the two prominent Liberal leaders who deserted Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman when the latter was endeavoring to obtain some undertaking that the independence of the Orange Free State would be preserved. The sudden affection for principle exhibited by Mr. Asquith nowadays is somewhat unconvincing when compared with past events in his life.

Ah! but it will be proclaimed, "What about the German atrocities and the road-hog of Europe?" That is the only topic that the government has really left; and it is a strange defense for a war which ought never to have been undertaken. Undoubtedly some terrible crimes have been perpetrated by the German soldiery; but as the worst crime under most penal codes is "Thou shalt not kill," can one be astonished that the authorization to large bodies of men to commit the capital offense should bring in its train all the lesser crimes of rape, arson, mutilation, etc.? Once the passions are unloosened—and war does unloose the worst and most deeply ingrained passion of all, to-wit, the desire to slay—it is silly to complain about the excesses that will follow. The burning of Louvain, Malines, Rheims, are artistic calamities; but they are specks compared with the spectacle of ten millions of men slaughtering each other seven days a week; because these Christian generals pursue their vocation with special ardor on Sunday. The Christian denomi-

nations lament the bombardment of cathedrals; but the dominion of Satan has no need for those buildings. The Prince of Darkness is ruling this world, and the fact that he is being supported by all the self-styled "Vicars of Christ" simply proves that the latter have been masquerading under false colors.

Those editors who have been denouncing the German atrocities have not protested against the action of the censor in refusing permission to publish the counter charges. This is most unfair procedure. Both sides' allegations should be allowed a hearing or should be suppressed—not one to the exclusion of the other. Russia and Japan have been the subject of some strictures by the Ex-Press Censor, Mr. F. E. Smith, in his work on *International Law*, which were to this effect: "On November 21, 1894, the Japanese Army stormed Port Arthur, and for five days indulged in the promiscuous slaughter of non-combatants: men, women and children, with every circumstance of barbarity." The *Times* correspondent reported: "Thursday, Friday, Saturday, and Sunday were spent by the soldiery in murder and pillage from dawn to dark, in mutilation, in every conceivable kind of nameless atrocity, until the town became a ghastly inferno, to be remembered with a fearsome shudder until one's dying day." Mr. F. E. Smith adds: "The details of this awful scene completely warrant this eloquent and emphatic condemnation." So much for the gentle Japanese. Next Mr. F. E. Smith details the record of the pastoral and simple Russian, as he is being now pictured by H. G. Wells and other litterateurs: "The

recurrent tradition of Suvaroff's savagery at Ismail and Warsaw found a re-echo in the events of the Crimean War and of Akkel Teke, and culminated in 1900 in the cold-blooded slaughter by the Russians of the whole Chinese population of Blagovestchenk and district. . . . The massacre of Blagovestchenk was described by a Russian officer in the following words: "The Cossacks took all the Chinese and forced them into the river on boats that could not carry them, and when the women threw their children on shore and begged that they at least might be saved, the Cossacks caught the babies on their bayonets and cut them in pieces." . . . Nothing worse than this massacre of Blagovestchenk has ever been related of the unspeakable Turk." That was Mr. Smith's judgment, writing in 1907, the very year in which Britain and Russia entered into a treaty to undermine Persian independence! The "red rubber" denunciations of Belgium cannot have been forgotten; and the report of Sir Roger Casement on Belgian rule in the Congo Free State is still available to those who want to be sickened with the horror of man's "inhumanity to man." The International Commission on the atrocities in the Balkan War condemned the Servians as the worst offenders. Even now Belgium has not been laid waste as the Boer Republics were by Lord Kitchener and Lord Roberts. The sack of Peking by the troops of the Allied Powers in 1900, in which Germany was equally involved, should lead the European statesmen to refrain from this sort of denunciation, until the Christian communities of Europe have offered some sort of

reparation to the "Heathen Chinees" for the abominations which disgraced that punitive expedition.

This war is being supported by sham arguments and hypocritical appeals to sentiment. Its pretended cause, "The neutrality of Belgium," is non-existent. Its real cause, the wish to beat the German Navy, remains to be examined. On the face of it, it would seem a convenient opportunity to annihilate the German Navy; but surface considerations are not always the soundest. Just let us examine the amazing procedure adopted by the statesmen of Britain to preserve Britain's predominance in sea power. The French fleet, with some British ships, is at present guarding the Mediterranean trade routes in the interests of the trade of France. The Russian Fleet is stationed in the Baltic, the Black Sea, and the Far East; its inactivity is distinctly masterly. Britain has marshalled the whole active strength of the navy in or about the North Sea so as to strike at the German High Seas Fleet should it venture upon a general battle. As the German Fleet is hopelessly inferior in ships and guns to the British Fleet, its big ships are not likely to risk a general engagement; but its submarine and torpedo boats will make desperate sorties. Notwithstanding Mr. Churchill's reference to "rats in a hole," the Germans are sensible to adopt on sea the tactics followed by the Boers on land. Assuming, however, that public opinion in Germany puts pressure on the German Admiral to endeavor to fight his way out of the Kiel Canal, there may be a titanic sea fight in which the German Fleet would be destroyed and the British Fleet somewhat damaged. Then, at

the end of the war, what would be the position in the realm of sea power? Germany's Fleet would have been annihilated; Britain's Fleet would have been damaged; the French Fleet would be peacefully patrolling the Mediterranean; and the Russian, Italian, Japanese, and the American Fleets would be intact. The Austrian Fleet will, in all probability, remain in Pola Harbor, which is practically impregnable, as Austria, having no quarrel with either France or Britain, can have no particular wish to jeopardize her small fleet in combat with the Mediterranean squadrons of Britain and France. The whole burden of contending with the German Fleet has been cast upon Britain. What is the economy or the sanity of this policy, which may leave Britain's Fleet inferior in strength to the combined naval forces of any two of the powers named?

No statesman in Europe has explained definitely what the objective of any country participating in the war really is. The British ruling class is united upon some undisclosed policy because the arguments that are being expounded in the recruiting speeches simply disappear on the first touch of criticism. The road is a road to ruin; that is clear. By reason of the stupid tactics of European policy, the Germans and Austrians, actuated by their terror of Russian barbarism sweeping across their country, will be reinforced by the nerving spirit of desperation. The cruel measures enforced in Belgium are good evidence of the serious terror prevailing in the German mind. Cruelty is always a symptom of fear; and it needs a brave man to be merciful to his enemies; and that is true of nations. Germany

and Austria are in graver peril than any other country except Belgium; because their trade has gone, and their armies have had no tremendous success except in East Prussia over the Russians. The conclusions which look probable are: (1) stale-mate; (2) victory and aggrandizement of France and Russia over Germany and Austria-Hungary. Such a policy is not worth a single British life. It is a mad world; but there is not even method in the madness which is afflicting Britain and her statesmen at this time of crisis in the history of civilization. On these grounds, the government should be compelled to answer on the re-assembling of Parliament the plain question: What are we doing and where are we going in this bitter contest? The militarism prevalent in Prussia is a form of militarism which is formidable, inexcusable, and immoral in its denial of the rights of the individual; but it is impossible to measure the ebb and flow of enmity between nations. The bitterness of militaristic Germany against the loose combination of the Triple Entente inevitably produced an unrest of fear which, once it was inflamed by the Russian attitude towards Austria, caused universal terror to develop into universal murder.

The events of the past few weeks, which have staggered Europe with the rapidity of their occurrence, have produced, one must recognize, a complete paralysis of democratic government in Britain, since Parliament was prorogued leaving many matters of vast public importance wholly undebated. (1) The intervention of Japan in a conflict between European States.

It is true that the intervention was engineered during a temporary adjournment and was an accomplished fact when Parliament reassembled, yet it was a question of the utmost moment. No protest was raised in Parliament against its withdrawal by Sir Edward Grey from the cognizance of Parliament; nor was any censure moved upon him. (2) The use of ferocious Asiatic troops, such as the Gurkhas, against a European State in Europe. (3) The sending of the Expeditionary Force on to the Continent was never discussed. Sir Edward Grey told the House of Commons on August 3rd, "that no decision had been yet come to with regard to sending an expeditionary force." Then came the declaration of war against Germany, and the government was allowed to send thousands of men to perish on the Continent without a word of debate on the wisdom of such a proceeding. (4) The treaty between Russia, France, and Britain, whereby those powers have agreed not to make terms of peace separately, was withheld from discussion in the House of Commons. No hint was given by Sir Edward Grey of his intention to bind Britain's future by such an instrument; Sir Edward Grey is the autocrat of Britain. Even when the document was published, the principle of pledging Britain to an agreement of that nature with Russia, whose ambitions have been a potent influence in bringing on the catastrophe, was not even debated or discussed. It is doubtful whether any British statesman has ever concluded a more momentous bargain which may have most unforeseen consequences on the future of Britain. Parliament has neglected to

extract any information as to the lengths the governmental policy, whatever it may be, will be pushed, nor is it comprehensible why the Belgian Government, now a belligerent, was not a signatory to this covenant of loyalty and good faith. If these points are all considered as improper for public debate, one must wonder what utility democratic control through Parliament is as a check upon a war-infected executive, which is working the governmental machinery at full speed. All that can happen at the present rate of progress is that Britain will be turned into a mourning house, Europe into a cemetery, and the world into a bankruptcy court. Let us reflect upon some passages in Mr. John Bright's speeches. On March 31, 1854, in denouncing the Crimean War, he said: "It is not my duty to make this country the knight errant of the human race, and to take upon herself the protection of the thousand millions of human beings who have been permitted by the Creator of all kings to people this planet." Ah! those of us who ask for a little knight errantry on behalf of the downtrodden millions of British workers know the answer that is given by those who are willing to expend billions on preserving "the neutrality of Belgium." The wealthy capitalists, whose wives are generously crowding to succor the Belgian refugees, will be unremitting in their grinding of the faces of the British working class, and that class will go on applauding their patriotic zeal and self-sacrifice! Ah! is not it tragically ironical? For instance, the soldier's widow is to receive 5s. a week and 1s. 6d for each child. Indeed! this is a noble country, with a generous heart in the way of promises! The first

duty of Britons is to remedy the wrongs of Britons and to end the scandalous poverty which is the outstanding feature in these islands. When the call goes that "England expects every man to do his duty," in what respect will there be a hearty response from the ruling class of Britain? Mr. Bright resumed: "I am told, indeed, that the war is popular, and that it is foolish and eccentric to oppose it. I may ask, What was more popular than the American War? Where is now the popularity of that disastrous and disgraceful war, and who is the man to defend it? The past events of our history have taught me that the intervention of this country in European wars is not only unnecessary but calamitous." How true that is of the present war! The ruin of Austria and Germany for the advantage of Russia and France can be nothing but immediately disastrous to Britain. Mr. Bright concluded: "I believe if this country seventy years ago had adopted the principle of non-intervention in every case where her interests were not directly and obviously assailed, that she would have been saved from much of the pauperism and brutal crimes by which our government and people have alike been disgraced. This country might have been a garden, every dwelling might have been of marble, and every person who treads its soil might have been sufficiently educated. We should indeed have had less of military glory. We might have had neither Trafalgar nor Waterloo, but we should have set the high example of a Christian nation, free in its institutions, courteous and just in its conduct towards all foreign states, and resting its pol-

icy on the unchangeable foundation of Christian morality."

That also is the creed of the author of this pamphlet. One last word of warning. Remember that no time is too soon to confer upon society the blessings of peace. The government has pursued a course which has brought Britain into war with Austria against whom nobody has discovered a *casus belli*. The intervention of the United States, of Turkey, and China may light another conflagration, which will burn out the remnants of social organization at present left untouched by the appalling struggle in Europe. It is possible that the practical blockade of Holland will drive that country into war with Britain. It is probable that the victorious march of Russia will compel Sweden, which is organizing an army of 800,000 men, to enter the field against the Allies. Then, Britain will be arrayed against the most civilized and enlightened people in Europe. Once the path of crime is begun no one can foresee where the tragedy will end. There is a gallows which overhangs national crimes as well as individual crimes, and that these proceedings of H. M. Government, if persisted in, will bring a most frightful retribution, is a lesson written on the blood-stained pages of nearly every war that the British democracy has been deluded into, most of which have been embarked upon in the hope of riveting the chains of privilege still more tightly round the wrists of the hard working, underpaid mass of British citizens.

God Save the People!

APPENDIX C.

WHY WE ARE AT WAR. A REPLY TO SIR EDWARD GREY.

BY J. RAMSAY MACDONALD, M. P.

On that fatal Sunday, the second of August, I met in Whitehall a member of the Cabinet and he told me of the messages and conversations between foreign secretaries and ambassadors which were to be published for the purpose of showing how we strove for peace and how Germany immovably went to war. "It will have a great effect on public opinion," he said, and he was right. It is called "Correspondence respecting the European Crisis," but is generally referred to as "The White Paper." I wish to comment upon it for the purpose of explaining its significance.

It begins with a conversation between Sir Edward Grey and the German Ambassador on July 20th regarding the Austrian threat to punish Servia, and finished with the delivery of our ultimatum to Germany on August 4th. From it certain conclusions appear to be justified, the following in particular:

1. Sir Edward Grey strove to the last to prevent a European War.
2. Germany did next to nothing for peace, but it is not clear whether she actually encouraged Austria to pursue her Servian policy. The mobilization of Russia drove Germany to war.

3. Russia and France strove, both by open pressure and by wiles, to get us to commit ourselves to support them in the event of war.

4. Though Sir Edward Grey would not give them a pledge he made the German Ambassador understand that we might not keep out of the conflict.

5. During the negotiations Germany tried to meet our wishes on certain points so as to secure our neutrality. Sometimes her proposals were brusque, but no attempt was made by us to negotiate diplomatically to improve them. They were all summarily rejected by Sir Edward Grey. Finally, so anxious was Germany to confine the limits of the war, the German Ambassador asked Sir Edward Grey to propose his own conditions of neutrality, and Sir Edward Grey declined to discuss the matter. This fact was suppressed by Sir Edward Grey and Mr. Asquith in their speeches in Parliament.

6. When Sir Edward Grey failed to secure peace between Germany and Russia, he worked deliberately to involve us in the war, using Belgium as his chief excuse.

That is the gist of the White Paper.

That Sir Edward Grey should have striven for European peace and then, when he failed, that he should have striven with equal determination to embroil Great Britain, seems contradictory. But it is not, and the explanation of why it is not is the justification of those of us who for the last eight years have regarded Sir Edward Grey as a menace to the

peace of Europe and his policy as a misfortune to our country.

What is the explanation?

Great Britain in Europe can pursue one of two policies. It can keep on terms of general friendship with the European nations, treating with each separately when necessary and co-operating with all on matters of common interest. To do this effectively it has to keep its hands clean. It has to make its position clear, and its sympathy has to be boldly given to every movement for liberty. This is a policy which requires great faith, great patience, and great courage. Its foundations are being built by our own international and if our Liberal Government had only followed it since 1905 it would by this time have smashed the military autocracies which have brought us into war.

But there is a more alluring policy—apparently easier, apparently safer, apparently more direct, but in reality more difficult, more dangerous, and less calculable. That is the policy of the balance of power through alliance. Weak and short-sighted ministers have always resorted to this because it is the policy of the instincts, rather than of the reason. It forms groups of powers in continents. It divided Europe into two great hostile camps—Germany, Austria and Italy on the one hand, Russia, France and ourselves on the other. The progeny of this policy is suspicion and armaments, its end is war and the smashing up of the very balance which it is designed to maintain. When war comes it is then bound to be universal. Every

nation is on one rope, or another, and when one slips it drags its alliance with it.

As a matter of practical experience the very worst form of alliance is the entente. An alliance is definite. Everyone knows his responsibilities under it. The entente deceives the people. When Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey kept assuring the House of Commons that we had contracted no obligation by our entente with France they said what was literally true but substantially untrue. That is why stupid or dishonest statesmen prefer the entente to the alliance; it permits them to see hard facts through a veil of sentimental vagueness. Had we had a definite alliance with France and Russia the only difference would have been that we and everybody else should have known what we had let ourselves in for, and that might have averted the war.

It is interesting to gather from Sir Edward Grey's speech of August 3rd and the White Paper how completely the entente entangled him. There were first of all the "conversations" between French and British naval and army experts from 1906 onwards. These produced plans of naval and military operations which France and we were able to take jointly together. It was in accordance with these schemes that the northern coasts of France were left unprotected by the French Navy.

Those schemes, moreover, assumed that the neutrality of Belgium would be violated if a general war broke out. The "conversations" were carried on for about six years without the knowledge or the consent of the

Cabinet. The military plans were sent to St. Petersburg and a Grandduke (so well-informed authorities say) connected with the German party in Russia sent them to Berlin. Germany has known for years that there were military arrangements between France and ourselves, and that Russia would fit her operations into these plans. We had so mixed ourselves up in the Franco-Russian Alliance that Sir Edward Grey had to tell us on August 3rd that though our hands were free our honor was pledged!

The country had been so helplessly committed to fight for France and Russia that Sir Edward Grey had to refuse point blank every overture made by Germany to keep us out of the conflict. That is why, when reporting the negotiations to the House of Commons, he found it impossible to tell the whole truth and to put impartially, what he chose to tell us. He scoffed at the German guarantee to Belgium on the ground that it only secured the "integrity" of the country but not its independence; when the actual documents appeared it was found that its independence was secured as well. And that is not the worst. The White Paper contains several offers which were made to us by Germany aimed at securing our neutrality. None were quite satisfactory, in their form and Sir Edward Grey left the impression that these unsatisfactory proposals were all that Germany made. Later on the Prime Minister did the same. Both withheld the full truth from us. The German Ambassador saw Sir Edward Grey, according to the White Paper, on August 1st—and this is our Foreign Minister's note of the conversation:

“The Ambassador pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions upon which we could remain neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be guaranteed.”

Sir Edward Grey declined to consider neutrality on any conditions and refrained from reporting this conversation to the House. Why? It was the most important proposal that Germany made. Had this been told to us by Sir Edward Grey his speech could not have worked up a war sentiment. The hard, immovable fact was that Sir Edward Grey had so pledged the country's honor without the country's knowledge to fight for France or Russia, that he was not in a position even to discuss neutrality.

Now, the apparent contradiction that the man who had worked for European peace was at the same time the leader of the war party in the Cabinet can be explained. Sir Edward Grey strove to undo the result of his policy, and keep Europe at peace, but, when he failed he found himself committed to dragging his country into war.

Without this wide survey of policy, it is impossible to estimate either Sir Edward Grey's culpability or Germany's share of blame.

Germany's share is a heavy one. Taking a narrow view, she with Russia, is mainly responsible for the war; taking a longer view, we are equally responsible. The conflict between the entente and the alliance had to come and only two things determined the time of its coming. The first was the relative capacity of the countries to bear the burdens of an armed peace.

That was reaching its limit in most countries. The second was the question of how the changes which time was bringing were affecting adversely the military power of the respective opponents. The alliance was to receive a great blow on the death of the Austrian Emperor; Russia was building a system of strategic railways up to the German frontier, and this was to be finished in 1916, by which time her army was greatly to be increased. The entente therefore was forcing Germany to fight within two years. We can understand the military mind of Germany faced with these threatening changes if we remember how scared we were when we were told of German threats against ourselves. The stubbornness of Germany, shown on every page of the White Paper, was not merely military offensiveness, but the stand of a country being put into difficulties by time tipping the balance of power against it. The breaking point had been reached. Foreign ministers and ambassadors had to give place to the war lords.

So I come back to the statement which I think I have clearly proven; that the European War is the result of the existence of the entente and the alliance, and that we are in it in consequence of Sir Edward Grey's foreign policy.

The justifications offered are nothing but the excuses which Ministers can always produce for mistakes. Let me take the case of Belgium. It has been known for years, that, in the event of a war between Russia and France on the one hand and Germany on the other, the only possible military tactics for Ger-

many to pursue were to attack France hot foot through Belgium, and then return to meet the Russians.

The plans were in our war office. They were discussed quite openly during the Agadir trouble, and were the subject of some magazine articles, particularly one by Mr. Belloc. Mr. Gladstone made it clear in 1870 that in a general conflict formal neutrality might be violated. He said in the House of Commons August 1870:

"I am not able to subscribe to the doctrine of those who have held in this House what plainly amounts to an assertion that the simple fact of the existence of a guarantee, is binding on every party to it, irrespective altogether of the particular position in which it may find itself at the time when the occasion for acting on the guarantee arises."

Germany's guarantee to Belgium would have been accepted by Mr. Gladstone. If France had decided to attack Germany through Belgium Sir Edward Grey would not have objected, but would have justified himself by Mr. Gladstone's opinions.

We knew Germany's military plans. We obtained them through the usual channels of spies and secret service. We knew that the road through Belgium was an essential part of them. That was our opportunity to find a "disinterested" motive apart from the obligations of the entente. It is well known that a nation will not fight except for a cause in which idealism is mingled. The *Daily Mail* supplied the idealism for the South African War by telling lies about the flogging of British women and children. Our government supplied the idealism for this war by telling us that

the independence of Belgium had to be vindicated by us. Before it addressed its inquiries to France and Germany upon this point, knowing the military exigencies of both countries, it knew that France could reply suitably, whilst Germany could not do so.

It was a pretty little game of hypocrisy which the magnificent valor of the Belgians will enable the government to hide for the time being.

Such are the facts of the case. It is a diplomatists' war, made by about a half a dozen men. Up to the moment that ambassadors were withdrawn the peoples were at peace. They had no quarrel with each other; they bore each other no ill will. A dozen men brought Europe to the brink of a precipice and Europe fell over it. Today our happy industrial prospects of a fortnight ago are darkened. Suffering has come to be with us. Ruin stares many of us in the face. Little comfortable businesses are wrecked, tiny incomes have vanished. Want is in our midst, and Death walks with Want. And when we sit down and ask ourselves with fullness of knowledge: "Why has this evil happened?" the only answer we can give is, because Sir Edward Grey has guided our foreign policy during the past eight years. His short-sightedness and his blunders have brought all this upon us.

I have been reminded of one of those sombre judgments which the prophet who lived in evil times uttered against Israel. "A wonderful and horrible thing is committed in the land: the prophets prophesy falsely,

and the priests bear rule by their means, and my people love to have it so; and what will ye do in the end thereof?"

Aye, what will ye do in the end thereof?

APPENDIX D.

SECRET DIPLOMACY THE CAUSE OF WAR
AN APPEAL TO THE BRITISH PEOPLE.

BY E. D. MOREL.

We are involved in a terrible war, and until peace which offers solid prospects of being a stable one can be secured, we must continue to plow the bloody furrow.

But a really stable and lasting peace neither ourselves nor the other belligerent peoples will secure, unless public opinion in all lands, and in this land of ours especially—makes up its mind to grapple with the fundamental causes, apart from the visible appearances, which have produced this catastrophe and which will repeat it, if they are not removed. The time to think about them is not at the end of the war, when all the belligerents will be too utterly exhausted to think at all, but now, when the horror of the whole thing is part of our daily lives.

I do not know whether you have ever navigated in tropical seas. If so, you will have had some such experience as this. All around you a calm expanse; a cloudless sky, but for a little, dark smear, hardly perceptible upon the horizon. Then, with a rapidity almost inconceivable, the smear grows to an ugly, menacing smudge, fouling the heavens; a blast of icy breath; a rushing upheaval of the waters; a fierce blow

like the crack of a whip, to be immediately followed by a pandemonium of shrieking gusts, lashing rain, thunderous discharges, blinding flashes and tumultuous terror, as the tornado bursts upon you in all its furious force.

The analogy to what we are now witnessing is not perfect. But it will serve. The European horizon was not free from threatening clouds. But four months ago it could have been said with truth that civilized mankind on the whole was steadily progressing towards higher and saner ideals, towards a deeper, broader, more charitable conception of human needs. The last forty years had witnessed an astounding upward gravitation of the peoples of Europe. They had registered great victories for human liberty over the forces of reaction. Everywhere, under the impulse of popular determination, advances were being made in social reforms, in education, in the preservation and reclamation of human life. Intellectually the great mass of mankind was moving further and further away from the conception of war as a solvent in international disputes; nearer and nearer to the principle of arbitration. And now with the swift and rending violence of the tropical tornado, has come the staggering horror, this universal cataclysm.

War has been described as the failure of human wisdom. It might more fittingly be termed the failure of the mechanism of Government. Whence comes this failure? Does it spring from the peoples themselves? Indirectly, yes. Directly, no.

It is not the peoples who make war. It is not even

the Governments as such. It is the elements in Governments which escape popular control that makes the wars of our day, that have made this war. They constitute the positive factor producing war. The negative factor resides primarily in the non-realization by the people of the power inherent in them to curb those elements. Today, the governing statesmen of every belligerent country are engaged, inevitably so, in efforts to conceal the failure of their system from the victims of it. They appeal now to the noble traits of courage, endurance, and self-sacrifice; now to the ignoble sentiments of hatred and revenge. They cover us with the flowers of rhetorical compliment, the while they flog us into fury. A press from whose pages all sense of perspective and proportion has been driven abets them in their task. Divines in every belligerent land in their anxiety to claim a monopoly of the Deity, forget the Christ. The people are plunged in a great darkness of mind. With that darkness, however, they must grapple, from it they must escape. Otherwise, a few more years into the pit of destruction.

"If you would enjoy peace prepare for war." How often have those to whom we looked for guidance dinned this philosophy into our ears in the course of the last ten years? "Pile up your armaments," they told us; "accumulate your explosives, perfect your killing machines. Prepare to kill not on land and on the sea only, but under the sea, and even from the skies. Then and only then, will you be safe. Thus and only thus can you secure peace." As the result we have war.

And what a war! Had these millions of men who face one another in the trenches any quarrel? None. They are merely paying in their persons for the great failure. Again wherein lies the explanation of that failure?

We shall not help to build up a public opinion which shall save humanity from similar situations in the future if we allow ourselves to be hypnotized with the idea that the explanation is alone to be sought in the real or alleged characteristics of one man, or a group of men in one particular country. Prussian militarism is a vile and hateful thing. But you cannot permanently smash Prussian militarism unless you can understand and remove the causes which have produced it. And do not delude yourselves with the idea that Prussian militarism is the only militarism in Europe. Take care that those who today are the loudest in their denunciation of it do not impose its prototype upon us here at the end of this war. If you turn up the literature of the period you will find that all the vices attributed today to Germany and the Germans were attributed in the fifties to Russia and the Russians; in the sixties, the eighties and the nineties to France and the French. They were in turn arrogant and treacherous, machiavellian and wholly abominable. They possessed either unpleasant writers, or degrading literature, or boastful generals. In fact, they were endowed, each in turn, with a double dose of original sin like the legendary Irishman. And, of course, each in turn, were told to believe the same sort of things about us. All this fustian is the common stock-in-

trade of statesmen and still more of a number of officials behind closed doors, who have failed to adjust their differences, and whose collective incompetence, intractability of temper and absurd notions of dignity and prestige have dragged, or are on the point of dragging the peoples into war. It is part of the effort to hide the breakdown of the impossible system under which they work, and under which the peoples have been content to be governed.

Yesterday, we were asked to see in the French, a restless, vain-glorious people, eaten up with ambition and honeycombed with immorality and corruption; and the French were told to see in us a brutal, piratical crowd of hypocritical knaves. What did that really mean? It only meant that the foreign offices of the two countries were squabbling over Newfoundland cod, West African jungles, or Nilotic swamp. In the fifties of last century the British artisan and the French vine-grower were told that it was their duty to maim and kill as many Russian peasants as they could, because the Russians were a thoroughly bad lot. What did that really mean? It only meant that the Russian, British and French diplomatists and rulers had quarrelled amongst themselves about the future of Turkey. Today, Englishmen are slaughtering Germans and Germans Englishmen. Why? Ostensibly, on the surface, because of a cruel wrong perpetrated upon Belgium. Fundamentally, because Austrian and Russian diplomatists could not agree upon the future of the Balkan states, which not one Englishmen in five hundred thousand has ever visited and which many

thousands of Englishmen could not point out on the map.

A conviction that their cause is just and that they are fighting for self-preservation against wicked aggression is common to all the peoples in this dreadful war. And if you and I could today, by some mysterious gift of inward vision, absorb the multifold elements of history, heredity, and environments which go to make up the modern German, and if a body of Germans could by a similar process become acquainted with the outlook of the modern Englishmen, we should understand, and with that understanding of our common human needs, the scales would fall from our eyes and our anger would be turned upon those who had led us to this pass. A British officer just returned wounded from the front, said to a friend of mine the other day, "We talk with our German prisoners around the camp fires at night and we say to each other. What in heaven's name are we fighting for?"

The profound deep-seated causes of this war are to be sought in the fact that the mutual relationships of the peoples are still conducted in such a way that although their interests have become more bound up with one another than ever before, although they can get nearer to one another than they have ever been able to do before, although their respective activities in the economic, the intellectual, and the scientific field are more indispensable to one another than at any previous period in their history, although they were beginning to realize as they had never realized till now that the real needs of civilized humanity, the things

that really matter in the life of peoples, are common to them all, despite all this, the moment a difference of opinion arises between their respective governments there is interposed a barrier between them and their neighbors which prevents any effectual discussion and examination of the point at issue. No machinery exists by which the various Parliaments can confer together through the medium of authorized representatives and compel the Government to listen to their views. The public never hear anything but a caricature of the other side of the case.

They are committed to courses of action without their knowledge. They are utterly helpless in the hands of a particular department which is supposed to exist for the purpose of regulating the national relations with other states; but which conducts its work in silence and in secrecy. This situation prevails in every country, and when the officials in these particular departments cannot agree, the peoples pay for that disagreement with their lives. That is the brutal truth.

The last half century has been a steady decrease in the capacity of dynastic friction to promote war. But an autocratic power greater today than the power of kings and parliaments rules the destinies of mankind in the mass. The power is secret diplomacy, and until the peoples of Europe take it in their hands and break it, they themselves will be constantly broken and periodically destroyed by it.

Secret diplomacy is the barrier which separates the peoples; which prevents reasoned and reasonable dis-

cussion of international disputes and precipitates the peoples into war. It is the octopus whose all embracing tentacles drag down the peoples into the abyss of desolation. Secret diplomacy is the dominating factor in the statecraft of Europe, the basic cause of militarism, armaments, incendiary press campaigns, and the rest of the paraphernalia of international fears and hatreds leading to war. Substitute for it public instruction and discussion, a tribunal where the real or the supposed conflicting interests of the nations can be thrashed out in advance by impartial assessors, and militarism, with its gigantic and insensate waste of the commonly-earned wealth of the peoples, its piteous misdirection of talent and devotion, and its criminal and imbecile consummation, the slaughter of tens of thousands and the misery of millions would cease to exist because it would cease to possess relevancy to human issues. War as the solution for international disputes would disappear as it disappeared in religious disputes. Had the needs and requirements, the reasonable fears, the general problems and difficulties of the now belligerent peoples been known and realized by public opinion; had their adjustment not been at the mercy of the intrigues, narrow prejudices and ignorance of a handful of bureaucrats tunnelling in the dark and escaping all effective public control, the rulers of so-called Christian Europe would not today be assisting at the mutual destruction of their peoples.

Dark as is the hour, it is my belief that a sentiment vague, as yet, unformed and uninstructed, is beginning to permeate the soul of the peoples; a sentiment that

is half question, half passionate revolt; a sentiment of mingled helplessness, bewilderment and anger at being caught in the meshes of a net or being swept blindfolded into the vast maelstrom of furious, intangible elements inspired by unknown forces whirling towards unknown issues for uncomprehended ends.

In the growth of that sentiment, in its discipline, in its wise direction towards conscious aims and concrete achievements lies the only hope of the civilized peoples. The statesmen have failed them. They themselves, the mass of the people, the awakened intelligence and determination of democracy can alone provide salvation for the generations to come.

Arbitration versus the sword. The court against the battlefield. That is the goal which the peoples of Europe must attain, and we, the people of England, by the peculiarity of our geographical position, by our immense power and inexhaustible resources derived from every part of the globe, by the liberties which we have wrested and kept and conferred in turn upon others, by the real greatness which I believe to be in us, we, the people of England, can, if we wish, lead the way in its attainment.

APPENDIX E.

LETTER BY BARON DE L'ESCAILLE, BEL-
GIAN MINISTER AT ST. PETERSBURG,
TO M. DAVIGNON, BELGIAN MIN-
ISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

Belgium Legation, St. Petersburg, July 30, 1914.

To His Excellency M. Davignon, Secretary of Foreign
Affairs.

Mr. Secretary:

Yesterday and the day before yesterday have passed in the expectation of events that must inevitably follow Austria-Hungary's declaration of war against Serbia. The most contradictory reports have been circulating, without its being possible to distinguish between the true and the false, concerning the intentions of the Imperial Russian Government. *Only one thing is uncontradicted, which is that Germany has made earnest efforts here and in Vienna to find some way of avoiding a general conflict.** On the one side, however, it has met with the firm decision of the Vienna cabinet not to yield a step, and on the other side with the mistrust of the St. Petersburg cabinet against the assurance of Austria-Hungary, that it only intends to punish Serbia, and not to take a part of her territory.

* Italics are the author's.

M. Sasonoff has said that it is impossible for Russia to avoid holding herself in readiness and not to mobilize, that these preparations, however, are not directed against Germany. This morning an official communication in the newspapers announced that the reserves in a certain number of governments have been called to the colors. *Anyone who knows the custom of the official Russian communications to keep something in reserve, can safely maintain that a general mobilization is taking place.**

The German Ambassador has this morning declared that he has reached the end of the efforts which since Saturday he has been making without interruption for a satisfactory arrangement, and that he has almost given up hope.

I have been told that the English Ambassador also has expressed himself in the same way. England has recently proposed arbitration. Sasonoff answered: "We have ourselves proposed it to Austria-Hungary, but it has rejected the proposal." To the proposal of a conference, Germany answered with the counter proposal of an understanding between the cabinets. One might truly ask oneself whether the whole world does not wish war and only seeks to postpone for awhile the declaration, in order to gain time.

England at first let it be understood that it would not allow itself to be drawn into a conflict. Sir George Buchanan said that quite openly. Today in St. Petersburg one is firmly persuaded that *England will stand by the side of France, and even that the assurance*

* Italics are the author's.

*of this has been given. This assistance is of quite extraordinary weight, and has not a little contributed to give the war party the upper hand.** The Russian Government has in these last days given free rein to all demonstrations friendly to Servia and hostile to Austria, and has in no wise attempted to suppress them. In the council of ministers, which took place yesterday morning, differences of opinion still showed themselves; the declaring of a mobilization was postponed, but since then a change has appeared, *the war party has attained the upper hand, and this morning at four o'clock the mobilization was ordered.**

The army which feels itself strong, is full of enthusiasm, and bases great hopes on the extraordinary progress which it has made since the Japanese war. The navy is still so far from the completion of its plans of reorganization that it is scarcely to be taken into account. For this reason, *the assurance of English assistance is considered of such great importance.*

As I had the honor of telegraphing you today (T. 10) all hopes of a peaceable solution seem to have vanished; that is the view of the diplomatic corps.

I have made use of the route via Stockholm with the Nordisk cable for sending my telegram, as it is safer than the other.

I am entrusting this report to a private courier, who will post it in Germany.

Please receive, Mr. Secretary, the assurance of my greatest respect.

(Signed)

B. de L'ESCAILLE.

* Italics are the author's.

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